Community College 19 (Columbia Basin) (Washington Public Employees Association), Decision 9210-A (PSRA, 2006)

STATE OF WASHINGTON BEFORE THE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION
COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT 19 (COLUMBIA BASIN),
Employer.
KATHLEEN PAXTON,	CASE 18916-U-04-4812
Complainant,	DECISION 9210-A - PSRA
vs.
WASHNIGTON PUBLIC EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, UFCW LOCAL 365,
Respondent.
COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT 19 (COLUMBIA BASIN),
Employer.
GENE WAGNER,	CASE 18917-U-04-4813
Complainant,	DECISION 9211-A - PSRA
vs.
WASHNIGTON PUBLIC EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, UFCW LOCAL 365,	DECISION OF COMMISSION
Respondent.

Kathleen Paxton and Gene Wagner appeared pro se.

Schwerin Campbell Barnard, by Lawrence Schwerin, Attorney at Law, appeared for the union.

These cases come before the Commission on a timely appeal filed by Kathleen Paxton and Gene Wagner (complainants) seeking to overturn the Order issued by Examiner Dianne E. Ramerman, and on a timely cross-appeal filed by the Washington Public Employees Association, UFCW Local 365 (WPEA), seeking to overturn the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order issued by the Examiner.

Certain legal issues in this case are similar to issues being decided concurrently in appeals from Western Washington University, Decision 8849-A (PSRA, 2005) and Community College District 7 - Shoreline (Washington Federation of State Employees), Decision 9094 (PSRA, 2005). All of these cases stem from negotiations for first contracts under the Personnel System Reform Act, Chapter 41.80 RCW (PSRA), and specifically from agreements between employers and unions to have all bargaining unit employees vote on ratification of tentative agreements reached in negotiations. In each case, bargaining unit employees who were not union members filed complaints with the Commission, alleging the unions failed to properly notify bargaining unit employees of the ratification vote, and failed to properly notify bargaining unit employees of union security provisions contained in the new contracts. The unions filed answers denying the allegations, and questioning the jurisdiction of this Commission to adjudicate claims regarding what they characterize as internal union matters. In order to provide uniform case precedent, we examine the legal arguments of the parties in all three cases as a whole, and apply a similar legal standard to the factual differences of each decision on appeal.

The Examiner issued her decision in this case on January 23, 2006, finding that the Commission has jurisdiction to adjudicate the complaint that the union failed to give proper notice to the employees. In addition to ordering the WPEA to cease and desist from failing to fairly and adequately inform all bargaining unit employees who were not union members of the opportunity to vote on the acceptance or rejection of any tentative agreement that permits all bargaining unit employees the opportunity to vote, the Examiner also ordered the WPEA to cease and desist from enforcing the union security provision contained within the 2005-2007 collective bargaining agreement against the complainants.

ISSUES PRESENTED

Two issues are presented in all three of the appeals currently before the Commission:

1.         Does the Commission have jurisdiction over these complaints concerning notice and opportunity to vote on the ratification of these particular collective bargaining agreements?

2.         If the Commission has jurisdiction, did the WPEA commit an unfair labor practice by failing to provide adequate notice and opportunity to vote in the ratification election?

The complainants’ cross–appeal presents a third issue:

3.         If the Commission has jurisdiction, and the Commission affirms the Examiner’s findings and conclusions that the WPEA violated its duty of fair representation, did the Examiner err by not granting a remedy that allowed the bargaining unit a second opportunity to ratify the collective bargaining agreement?

 We rule in all three appeals that the Commission has jurisdiction to adjudicate claims asserting breach of the duty of fair represen tation owed by unions to all bargaining unit employees, with respect to situations where a union agrees to allow all bargaining unit employees to vote on ratification of a collective bargaining agreement. Asserting jurisdiction, we find in this case that the WPEA breached its duty of fair representation by: (1) its conduct during the ratification of the 2005-2007 collective bargaining agreement at Columbia Basin Community College, and (2) failing to allow the complainants a meaningful opportunity to review the negotiated contract. We modify the Examiner’s remedy.

ISSUE 1: THE COMMISSION’S JURISDICTION

Applicable Legal Standards

A general policy of non-involvement in internal union affairs can be readily discerned from the precedents of both this Commission and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). Unions are private organizations. When asked to regulate the internal workings of unions, this Commission has taken a “hands-off” approach except where complainants have asserted that union conduct affected the wages, hours, or working conditions of individual employees.

•           In an early decision, the Commission dismissed an employer-filed unfair labor practice complaint alleging that a union unlawfully prevented non-member employees from voting on the formulation of the union’s proposals for collective bargain ing. Lewis County, Decision 464 (PECB, 1978), aff’d Lewis County 464-A (PECB, 1978). Our Executive Director noted there that participation in union affairs is a political right incident to union membership, but one that involves no civil or property right. Lewis County, Decision 464 (citing State ex rel. Givens v. Superior Court of Marion County, 233 Ind. 235 (1954)). Because the subject matter of that complaint concerned internal union policies, and did not directly affect the employment relationship covered by Chapter 41.56 RCW, that complaint failed to state a cause of action.

•           In Lake Washington School District, Decision 6891 (PECB, 1999), the Executive Director dismissed a complaint concerning a union’s actions during a contract ratification process. The complained-of action was found to be entirely within the internal workings of the union, and that complaint also failed to state a cause of action over which the Commission could exercise jurisdiction. The Executive Director also noted that the courts, rather than the Commission, have jurisdiction over violations of union constitutions and by-laws.[1]

•           The Commission reiterated its general reluctance to involve itself in internal union affairs when several individuals filed petitions under the Administrative Procedure Act, Chapter 34.05 RCW, asking the Commission to adopt a rule permitting non-member employees required to make payments under a contractual union security clause to have equal participation with union members in voting on terms and conditions of their employment. In denying those rulemaking petitions, the Commission explored the history of its own limited involvement, and the similar limited involvement of the NLRB, in the internal workings of the unions. No author ity was found that supported adoption of the proposed rule. In re: WAC 391-95-010, Decision 9079 (2004).

Similarly, unions are generally free to limit ratification according to their own internal policies free from NLRB scrutiny. See NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349-50 (1958).[2] The NLRB recognizes that procedures relating to the ratification of a collective bargaining agreement is generally a matter exclusively within the internal domain of a union. Houchens Market of Elizabeth town, Inc. v. NLRB, 375 F.2d 208, 212 (6^th Cir. 1967).

No statute compels employee ratification votes on tentative agreements reached by unions and employers in collective bargain ing. Naches School District, Decision 2516-A (EDUC, 1987); NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342. That is certainly true of the PSRA and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). In re: WAC 391-95-010, Decision 9079; Teamsters, Local 310 v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Thus, ratification of a collective bargaining agreement is, at most, a permissive subject of bargaining.[3] The employers in these cases were not entitled to bargain to impasse on their proposals concerning contract ratifica tion. Seneca Environmental Products, 243 NLRB 624 (1979).[4]

These cases are not about the union violating a contractual provision. See, e.g., City of Walla Walla, Decision 104 (PECB, 1976). The claimants before us are asserting that the unions violated their statutory duties by preventing non-member employees from having a meaningful opportunity to vote on the contracts. Put another way, our focus is on how the union conducted itself in relation to the bargaining unit employees, rather than on whether the union violated its contractual agreement with the employer.

Unique facts can warrant assertion of jurisdiction in some situations:

•           In North Mason Country Motors, 146 NLRB 671 (1964), the NLRB noted that it could assert jurisdiction if “probative evi dence” suggested the union “agreed that the [employer] could condition execution of the contract upon ratification of any sort, [such as] by a majority of or even a representative employees group.” North Mason County Motors, 146 NLRB 671.[5]

•           In Port of Seattle, Decision 2549-C (PECB, 1987), the Execu tive Director noted that a complaint alleging that a union has aligned itself in interest against one or more bargaining unit employees during a contract ratification process could state a cause of action for violation of the union’s duty to fairly represent all bargaining unit employees.[6]

When a union agrees to allow all bargaining unit employees the opportunity to vote on a question, it lowers the shield of protection that the Financial Institutions and Lewis County precedents provide. An agreement to allow all bargaining unit members the opportunity to vote creates rights that the non-member employees would ordinarily not have enjoyed, and gives them an expectation that their votes will count in the collective bargain ing process. A union entering into such an agreement thus exposes itself to scrutiny regarding any allegation that it restrained employees from the right to vote granted to them by the agreement. Cf. Beatrice/Hunt-Wesson, Inc., 302 NLRB 224 (1991) (Stephens, concurring)(if the parties have made ratification a part of the bargain, it is appropriate for the NLRB to give a measure of protection to the expectancy interests of the parties).[7] If a union accepts an employer proposal on the permissive subject of contract ratification, our precedents on non-interference with contract ratification do not apply.

Application of Standards

The WPEA and Columbia Basin Community College (employer) reached agreement for a collective bargaining agreement covering the 2005-2007 biennium on September 17, 2004. That “memorandum of agree ment” contained the following language:

In addition to all other articles tentatively agreed to, the parties accept the following as tentative agreements:

. . .

Additionally, the [WPEA] agrees that ratification votes will by taken by institution, and that all bargaining unit employees will be allowed the opportunity to vote.

 By entering into that agreement, the WPEA created voting rights that non-member employees ordinarily would not have had, and it obligated itself to provide fair representation to them in the ratification process. We assert jurisdiction in this case to determine allegations that the WPEA restrained non-member employees in the exercise of rights protected by RCW 41.80.050 and RCW 41.80.080(3), in violation of RCW 41.80.110(2)(a).

ISSUE 2: UNION’S DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION

Applicable Legal Standards

In Allen v. Seattle Police Officers’ Guild, 100 Wn.2d 361 (1983), the Supreme Court of Washington specifically recognized that the doctrine of a union’s duty of fair representation to all bargaining unit members exists within Chapter 41.56 RCW. The Allen court first described the history of the doctrine under the NLRA, noted that Chapter 41.56 RCW substantially parallels the NLRA, and concluded the doctrine of the duty of fair representation applied to unions certified under Chapter 41.56 RCW.

RCW 41.80.050 secures rights for employees covered by the PSRA, including the right to:

[S]elf-organization, to form, join, or assist employee organizations, and to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining free from interference, restraint, or coercion.

Additionally, RCW 41.80.080(3) secures representation rights for all employees in a bargaining unit covered by the PSRA:

The certified exclusive bargaining representative shall be responsible for representing the interests of all the employees in the bargaining unit. This section shall not be construed to limit an exclusive representative’s right to exercise its discretion to refuse to process griev ances of employees that are unmeritorious.

That duty of fair representation applies equally to bargaining unit employees who are union members and to bargaining unit employees who are not union members. The duty of fair representation owed under RCW 41.80.080 closely mirrors the duty of fair representation owed under the similar provision in the Public Employees’ Collec tive Bargaining Act (PECB), RCW 41.56.080, which states in part:

The bargaining representative which has been determined to represent a majority of the employees in a bargaining unit shall be certified by the commission as the exclu sive bargaining representative of, and shall be required to represent, all the public employees within the [bargaining] unit without regard to membership in said bargaining representative.

The employee rights conferred by the PSRA and PECB are enforced through the unfair labor practice provisions in each chapter, RCW 41.80.110 and 41.56.150 respectively. This Commission is author-ized to hear and determine claims, and to issue appropriate remedial orders against employers and/or unions that violate the PSRA. RCW 41.80.120; RCW 41.56.160.

In State - Natural Resources, Decision 8458-B (PSRA, 2005), this Commission held that in order to achieve its statutory mission of uniform administration of collective bargaining law, unless a specific legislative intent directs otherwise, cases decided under the PECB, Chapter 41.56 RCW, are applicable to cases decided under the PSRA, Chapter 41.80 RCW. Because the union’s duty under RCW 41.80.080 is substantially similar to the duty under RCW 41.56.080, cases interpreting a union’s duty of fair representation under the latter statute apply to allegations that the duty was breached arising under Chapter 41.80 RCW.

While ample federal case precedent interpreting the duty of fair representation exists, the Allen Court outlined and explained the standards to be applied to Washington cases involving alleged breaches of the duty of fair representation:

•           A union must treat all factions and segments of its membership without hostility or discrimination. A finding of discrimina tion requires a showing that an individual was deprived of a right based on their assertion of a protected activity, and that there is a causal connection between the exercised right and the discriminatory action. Educational Service District 114, Decision 4361‑A (PECB, 1994)(citing Wilmot v. Kaiser Aluminum, 118 Wn.2d 46 (1991); Allison v. Seattle Housing Authority, 118 Wn.2d 79 (1991));

•           A union’s broad discretion in asserting the rights of indi-vidual members must be exercised in good faith and honesty;

•           The union must avoid arbitrary conduct. A union’s actions are arbitrary only if, in light of the factual and legal landscape at the time of the union’s actions, the union’s behavior is so far outside a ‘wide range of reasonableness’ as to be irratio nal.” Airline Pilots Association, International v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 67 (1991)(quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953)).

Each requirement “represents a distinct and separate obligation, the breach of which may constitute the basis for civil action.” Allen v. Seattle Police Officers’ Guild, 100 Wn. 2d 361, 375 (quoting Griffin v. United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers, 469 F.2d 181). The duty of fair representation doctrine seeks to assure “the individual employee [or minority] that his union will represent his interest unless it conflicts with the group’s interest”. Allen v. Seattle Police Officers’ Guild, 100 Wn. 2d 361, 375 (quoting Clark, The Duty of Fair Representa tion: A Theoretical Structure, 51 Tex.L.Rev. 1119, 1155 (1973)).

To prove that a union has breached its duty of fair representation, a complainant employee bears the burden of showing that the union behaved irrationally, invidiously, fraudulently, deceitfully, dishonestly, or indifferently as to the rights of bargaining unit employees, or that the union’s conduct was so grossly deficient as to be properly equated with arbitrary action. The complainant must also demonstrate a causal nexus between the breach of the union’s duty of fair representation and the harm suffered by the employee. By adopting the standard set forth in Griffin v. United Automobile, the Allen court specifically rejected the notion that bad faith is a required element to prove a breach of the duty. Allen v. Police Officers’ Guild, 100, Wn.2d 361, 374.

This is still a somewhat higher standard of proof than the “reasonable employee’s perception” test applied to most “employer interference” claims under RCW 41.80.110(1)(a) and “union re straint” claims under RCW 41.80.110(2)(a),[8] but the higher burden of proof is accompanied by a broader range of remedies than the “cease and desist” and “post notices” remedies usually available for “interference” and “restraint” violations. See, e.g., Grant County Public Hospital District 1, Decision 8378 (PECB, 2004), aff’d, Decision 8378-A (PECB, 2004)(also requiring an employer to make good faith submission of a proposed collective bargaining agreement to board of commissioners for ratification).

These standards provide unions with substantial discretion in their decision making, even if the ultimate decision proves to be wrong. Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild, 525 U.S. 33; Allen v. Seattle Police Officers’ Guild, 100 Wn.2d 361, 375 (recognizing that unions require flexibility to settle disputes). These standards also recognize that bargaining unit employees’ individual goals may not always be achieved through collective bargaining. C-Tran, Decision 7087-B. While unions are not required to bargain collective bargaining agreement provisions of equal benefit to all bargaining unit employees, and while equality of treatment is not the standard on which to judge the union’s duty of fair representation, unions are nevertheless prohibited from aligning themselves in interest against one or more employees in the bargaining units they represent. C-Tran, Decision 7087-B (citing Allen v. Seattle Police Officers’ Guild, 100 Wn.2d 361 (1983)).

Application of Standards

If the terms of a negotiated contract or a union’s constitution/ by-laws require ratification of negotiated contracts by affected employees, a failure to submit a contract to a meaningful vote of those employees breaches the union’s duty of fair representation. Deboles v. Trans World Airlines, 552 F.2d 1005 (3^rd Cir. 1977) cert. denied, 434 U.S. 837 (1977).[9] The rationale for this proposition is simple:

By denying a group of workers the chance to ratify, the union risks subjecting them to the disadvantages of a contract whose acceptance they could have prevented, and risks depriving them of the benefits of a contract whose acceptance they could have ensured.

International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 310 v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 1176, 1882 (footnote omitted). This record demonstrates the WPEA actions and inactions concerning the ratification of the 2005-2007 contract at Columbia Basin Community College precluded the complainants from having a meaningful opportunity to vote on ratification of the contract:

•           On September 17, 2004, the employer and union reached a tentative agreement for the 2005-2007 collective bargaining agreement. The above-referenced “Memorandum of Agreement” memorialized the agreed upon terms.

•           On September 20, 2004, Geanene Lubinski, the WPEA local chapter president, was notified that all bargaining unit employees were eligible to vote on ratification of the 2005-2007 collective bargaining agreement.

•           The record demonstrates that also on September 20, Lubinski sent an e-mail to all bargaining unit employees instructing them to “check Your WPEA Website”. The record demonstrates that in prior instances the WPEA had communicated with the bargaining unit in this manner about routine matters that did not affect the terms and conditions of work performed by bargaining unit employees.

•           Also on September 20, Lubinski sent two e-mails only to bargaining unit employees who were WPEA members:

➢  The first e-mail, sent at 2:49 p.m., gave explicit instructions about the ratification vote, and stated that “[The WPEA] needs EVERY CHAPTER MEMBER to VOTE in this ratification process” and “Please DO NOT FORGET to plan a time during that four hour period to VOTE! It is vitally important to all of us that WE ALL VOTE!”. (emphasis in original). This e-mail also informed WPEA members of a WPEA district meeting to provide WPEA members the opportunity to “ask questions and learn the details of the final contract”.

➢  The second e-mail, sent at 3:12 p.m., corrected a mistake in the first e-mail about the date of the vote.

The record clearly demonstrates that neither complainant received either of these e-mails.

•           In ratification elections prior to this one, the WPEA con ducted those votes by mail ballot. However, because of the October 1, 2004, deadline imposed by RCW 41.80.010, the WPEA elected to conduct an on-site ratification election between 10:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m., on September 26, 2004.

As the WPEA local chapter president, Lubinski was an agent of the WPEA. See Community College District 13, Decision 8117-B PSRA, 2005)(employees assisting a union are special agents of that union), and her action or inactions can be imputed upon the WPEA. The fact that Lubinski sent an e-mail informing WPEA members about the vote while making non-members seek such information on the WPEA website is, by itself, enough to find that the union breached its duty of fair representation.[10] A union is not required to provide the same notification about a ratification vote to all bargaining unit employees. A union is required, however, to provide reason able notification of a ratification vote.

Here, Lubinski testified that the intention behind her September 20 e-mail to WPEA members was to reinforce to them the importance that they vote. She claims that it was not necessary to provide the entire bargaining unit supplementary notice (as she did with the WPEA members) because that notice was intended for the night employees who did not have the benefit of being able to attend the WPEA information session. In a further attempt to justify her actions, the WPEA claims that Lubinski’s first e-mail informing bargaining unit employees was adequate and that if the employee chose to ignore the e-mail, they did so at their own risk. The WPEA made no efforts other than the first e-mail to contact the complainants about the ratification election.[11] We disagree with the WPEA that it provided adequate notice to bargaining unit employees:

•           First, as the Examiner found, the inequities between the two processes used by Lubinski cannot be excused. The evidence clearly demonstrates that Lubinski’s second and third e-mails went to WPEA members, and not just the night staff.

•           Second, and more importantly, the second e-mail announces a meeting where employees can ask questions about the contract. However, the WPEA did not provide non-members the opportunity to attend any type of session where they could ask questions about the contract. This clearly demonstrates an inequity of treatment by the WPEA in favor of members over non-members in violation of the union’s duty of fair representation.

•           Third, Lubinsky testified that her intention was to ensure that “my people” voted. The Examiner found, and we agree, that this statement demonstrates that Lubinski was only concerned about WPEA members voting, and she failed to make an effort to ensure that all bargaining unit employees voted.

The totality of the evidence here supports the Examiner’s findings that the WPEA breached its duty of fair representation by not providing equal notice to all bargaining unit employees.

We disagree with the WPEA’s assertion that its shortcomings should be mitigated or excused in light of the October 1 deadline imposed by RCW 41.80.010 for submission of collective bargaining agreements to the Office of Financial Management:

•           The October 1 deadline existed when the PSRA was enacted in 2002, and was no surprise to the WPEA in 2004.

•           By choosing to hold its ratification vote on September 26, the WPEA limited its own opportunity to properly notify bargaining unit employees of their voting rights, and left five full days unused prior to the October 1 deadline it cites here.

•           Even if the WPEA and this employer had failed to reach an agreement by October 1, 2004, the PSRA would still have protected the employees under RCW 41.80.001, by keeping any contract negotiated by the WPEA and the employer under the State Civil Service Law, Chapter 41.06 RCW, in effect until a successor agreement was reached.[12]

This Commission will not allow PSRA parties to use the October 1 deadline as a method to circumvent their other responsibilities under Chapter 41.80 RCW.

ISSUE 3: THE EXAMINER’S REMEDY

The authority of this Commission to prevent and remedy unfair labor practices is set forth in the PSRA, as follows:

RCW 41.80.120 UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE PROCEDURES-- POWERS AND DUTIES OF COMMISSION. (1) The commission is empowered and directed to prevent any unfair labor practice and to issue appropriate remedial orders:

. . .

 (2) If the commission determines that any person has engaged in or is engaging in an unfair labor practice, the commission shall issue and cause to be served upon the person an order requiring the person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action as will effectuate the purposes and policy of this chapter, such as the payment of damages and the reinstatement of employees.

Thus, the fashioning of remedies is a discretionary action of the Commission. When interpreting the Commission’s remedial authority, the Supreme Court of the State of Washington approved a liberal construction of the statute to accomplish its purpose. City of Seattle, Decision 8313-B (PSRA, 2004)(citing METRO v. PERC, 118 Wn.2d 621 (1992). With that purpose in mind, the Supreme Court interpreted the statutory phrase "appropriate remedial orders" be those necessary to effectuate the purposes of the collective bargaining statute to make the Commission's lawful orders effec tive. METRO, 118 Wn.2d at 633. The Commission's expertise in resolving labor-management disputes was also recognized and accorded deference. Public Employment Relations Commission v. City of Kennewick, 99 Wn.2d 832 (1983)).

The Examiner ordered the WPEA to cease and desist from enforcing any union security obligation against the complainants. The complainants argue on appeal that the Examiner failed to follow the holding in Community College District 7 (Washington Federation of State Employees), Decision 9094 (2005, PSRA), where another examiner ordered a new ratification election. We disagree that a new election is warranted, and we disagree that the complainants should be relieved of their union security obligation.

A breach of the duty of fair representation is specific to the individual, and does not generally apply to the bargaining unit as a whole. In this case, permitting the entire bargaining unit a second opportunity to vote would allow numerous other individuals who did not file complaints to benefit from the efforts of these two complainants. More importantly, even though we find that the notice given to them was lacking, the complainants failed to demonstrate that their votes could have affected the outcome of the election if they had received adequate notice and voted.

Any remedy crafted under the statutes this Commission administers should keep in mind the Commission’s purpose of promoting labor stability between public employers, employees, and the unions who represent those employees. Even though the complainants have been obligated to pay union security under the collective bargaining agreement, they have also received the benefit of the agreement, including a cost-of-living adjustment, a Department of Personnel salary survey increase, and the union has been obligated to fairly represent the complainants and protect the rights afforded to them by the contract. Given the fact that the complainants could not have affected the outcome of the ratification election and continue to receive benefit from the negotiated contract, we not only decline to order a second vote, but we also decline to relieve the complainants of their union security obligation.

We direct the WPEA to cease and desist from failing to properly notify bargaining unit employees of their contract ratification rights. We also direct the WPEA to read into the record at its next state-wide convention the attached notice and permanently appending that notice to the official minutes of that meeting. Additionally, the WPEA shall publish a copy of the notice in its next issue of the WPEA’s “WPEA Today” newspaper.

NOW, THEREFORE, it is

ORDERED

1.         The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law issued by Examiner Dianne E. Ramerman in the above captioned case are AFFIRMED and adopted as the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of the Commission.

2.         The Order issued by Examiner Dianne E. Ramerman in the above-captioned case is amended to read:

The Washington Public Employees Association, it officers and agents, shall immediately take the following actions to remedy its unfair labor practices:

1.         CEASE AND DESIST from:

a.         Failing to adequately inform all bargaining unit employ ees of their voting rights conferred by agreement of the union with the employer in collective bargaining.

b.         Failing to adequately inform all bargaining unit employ ees of the contents of the tentative agreement that the union agreed to submit for ratification by vote of all bargaining employees, with specific reference to the union security provision.

c.         In any other manner, restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights under Chapter 41.80 RCW.

2.         TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS to effectuate the purposes and policies of Chapter 41.80 RCW.

a.         Post, in conspicuous places on the employer's premises where union notices to all employees are usually posted, copies of the notice marked "Appendix A" attached to this order. Such notices shall be duly signed by an author-ized representative of the Washington Public Employees Association. Such notices shall remain posted for 60 days. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the respondent union to ensure that such notices are not removed, altered, defaced, or covered by other material.

b.         Read the notice marked "Appendix A" attached to this order at a meeting of all employees in the bargaining units represented by the union at Columbia Basin Commu nity College and at the next state-wide convention held by the Washington Public Employees Association.

c.         Publish in the next monthly issue of “The WPEA Sentinel” a true-sized copy of the notice marked “Appendix A”.

d.         Notify each of the above‑named complainants, in writing, within 20 days following the date of this order, as to what steps have been taken to comply with this order, and at the same time provide each named complainant with a signed copy of "Appendix A" attached to this order.

e.         Notify the Compliance Officer of the Public Employment Relations Commission, in writing, within 20 days follow ing the date of this order, as to what steps have been taken to comply with this order, and at the same time provide each named complainant with a signed copy of the "Appendix A” attached to this order.

Issued at Olympia, Washington, the 20th day of June, 2006.

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION

[SIGNED]

MARILYN GLENN SAYAN, Chairperson

[SIGNED]

PAMELA G. BRADBURN, Commissioner

[SIGNED]

DOUGLAS G. MOONEY, Commissioner