Date: 20011203
Docket: 1999-2987-IT-G
BETWEEN:
THE ESTATE OF CARL EDWARD MILLER,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Reasonsfor Judgment
Bowman, A.C.J.
[1] This appeal is from an assessment for the 1989 taxation year of The Estate of Carl Edward Miller. By that assessment the Minister of National Revenue denied to the appellant a capital loss which the appellant alleges it incurred in the redemption in 1990 of shares in Carl E. Miller Construction Limited, Ellwood Apartments Limited, 187-193 Queen (Sarnia) Limited and which it carried back to 1989, the year of death of Carl E. Miller. The intention was that the loss incurred on the redemption of the shares in 1990 would be treated as having occurred in 1989 and would offset the capital gain arising from the deemed disposition on death.
[2] In a nutshell the problem is this: on the death of Mr. Miller the estate became the owner of all of the shares of the three companies. Absent a spousal rollover the death would trigger a deemed disposition and a capital gain. It redeemed some shares in 1990 and ordinarily this would have given rise to a capital loss which under subsection 164(6) of the Income Tax Act ("I.T.A.") could be electively treated as occurring in the deceased's last taxation year to offset the capital gain. The Minister denied the capital loss by reason of subsection 85(4) of the I.T.A. on the basis that the estate disposed of property to a corporation or corporations that, immediately after the disposition, were controlled directly or indirectly in any manner whatever by the estate, and therefore the loss was deemed to be nil. The appellant contends that an order of the District Court of Ontario restricting the distribution or administration of the estate had the effect of depriving the estate of control.
[3] The facts are not in dispute. They are contained in an agreed statement of facts and in an agreed book of documents.
[4] The agreed statement of facts is set out below.
1. Mary Eleanor Miller is the surviving spouse of the late Carl Edward Miller (the "Deceased"). The Deceased died on the 9th day of May, 1989.
2. Pursuant to the Deceased's Last Will and Testament dated February 10, 1988 (the "Will"), his daughter, Martha Lawrance and an employee of corporations owned by the Deceased at his death, Esther Moore, were named, therein, as co-executors.
3. Letters Probate of the Will of the Deceased were granted by the Surrogate Court of the County of Middlesex on January 24, 1990.
Tab 1 - Joint Production Book
4. The provisions of the Will of the Deceased are summarized as follows:
a) Mary Eleanor Miller ("Mrs. Miller") was to receive all household goods, furnishings, chattels and effects of a personal nature.
b) Three legacies were to be paid.
c) The residue of the Estate was to be invested and the net income therefrom was to be paid to Mrs. Miller during her lifetime with power to the executors and trustees to pay or use for her benefit, such part of the capital as they, in their absolute discretion, considered advisable.
d) Upon the death of Mrs. Miller, the Estate was to be divided into two shares; one share to be transferred to the Testator's son, William Edward Miller, and one share to be transferred to the Testator's daughter, Martha Lawrance. The Will further provided that if either of the said William Edward Miller of Martha Lawrance predeceased Mrs. Miller, that such person's share would go to his or her children, as the case may be.
e) Article 7 of the Will granted to the Executors and Trustees a very broad discretion, specifically authorizing and empowering them to carry on any business which the Deceased may have owned or in which he may have been interested at the time of his death. Pursuant to paragraph 7(v) of the Will, the Executors and Trustees were expressly empowered "generally to deal with any shares or other interests held by my estate in any company or corporation to the same extent as I could do if alive."
Tab 2 - Joint Production Book
5. At the time of his death, the Deceased was the registered and beneficial owner of all of the shares, issued and outstanding, of Carl E. Miler Construction Limited ("Construction") which shares were, following the death of the Deceased, transferred to the Estate. A copy of the Shareholder's Register page pertaining to the Estate of Carl Edward Miller is contained in the Joint Production Book at the tab referred to below.
Tab 3 - Joint Production Book
6. At the time of his death, the Deceased was the registered and beneficial owner of all of the shares, issued and outstanding, of Ellwood Apartments Limited ("Apartments") which shares were, following the death of the Deceased, transferred to the Estate. A copy of the Shareholder's Register page pertaining to the Estate of Carl Edward Miller is contained in the Joint Production Book at the tab referred to below.
Tab 4 - Joint Production Book
7. At the time of his death, the Deceased was the registered and beneficial owner of all of the shares, issued and outstanding, of 187 - 193 Queen (Sarnia) Limited ("Queen") which shares were, following the death of the Deceased, transferred to the Estate. A copy of the Shareholder's Register page pertaining to the Estate of Carl Edward Miller is contained in the Joint Production Book at the tab referred to below.
Tab 5 - Joint Production Book
8. The aforementioned shares will be referred to herein as the "Subject Shares".
9. At all material times following the death of the Deceased, the Directors of Construction, Apartments and Queen were Martha Lawrance, Esther Moore and Mrs. Miller.
Tab 6 - Joint Production Book
10. On May 12, 1989, the Directors of Construction elected Martha Lawrance, Mrs. Miller and Esther Moore as the officers of Construction.
Tab 7 - Joint Production Book
11. The legacies provided for under the Will were paid, with the consent of Mrs. Miller, which consent was given to the Estate solicitor in or about January, 1990.
Tabs 8, 9 and 10 - Joint Production Book
FAMILY LAW ACT MATTERS
12. Immediately following the death of the Deceased, Mrs. Miller was not aware of the precise nature or value of the assets in the Estate. In consequence of incomplete legal advice received, Mrs. Miller caused an Election to be filed by her under the provisions subsection 6(1) of the Family Law Act (the "FLA") to receive the entitlement described under subsection 5(2) of the FLA.
Tab 11 - Joint Production Book
13. Due to the quantity of assets, the complexity of the Estate and the incomplete legal advice received, Mrs. Miller did not make an informed decision when she filed the Election.
14. In order to better understand her rights and her position in these matters, Mrs. Miller retained her own independent lawyer, Mr. Robert Morrison, and an independent accountant.
Tab 12 - Joint Production Book
15. Mrs. Miller's solicitor advised her that he could not provide advice to her on her position in these matters because the Estate inventory was not available and would not be available for some time.
16. On the basis of advice received from Mr. Morrison and in consequence of Mrs. Miller's inability to make an informed decision in these matters, she instructed Mr. Morrison to apply for an Order extending the period for filing an Election under the FLA and suspending the administration and distribution of the Estate until further Order of the Court.
17. Accordingly, and pursuant to an Application made by Mrs. Miller in the District Court of Ontario, the said District Court of Ontario issued an Order, dated November 7, 1989, as follows:
"1. THIS COURT ORDERS that the date by which the Applicant Mary Eleanor Miller, must file an Election under section 6(9) of The Family Law Act to take under the Will of her late husband, Carl Edward Miller, or to receive the entitlement under Section 5(2) of the Act, or to remove the Election already filed, is hereby extended to February 8, 1990, and the deemed Election contained in section 6(10) is also hereby extended to February 8, 1990.
2. THIS COURT ORDERS that the date by which Mary Eleanor Miller or Martha Lawrance and Esther Moore, Executors of the Estate of Carl Edward Miller may commence an application under subsection 7(1)(c) of the Family Law Act, 1986 to determine the entitlement of the application pursuant to subsection 5(2) of the Act is hereby extended to February 8, 1990.
3. THIS COURT ORDERS that there is to be no administration or distribution of the Estate of Carl Edward Miller prior to February 8, 1990 except by further Order of this court or on the written consent of this applicant.
4. THIS COURT ORDERS that there be no award of costs with respect to this motion except that if the application referred to in paragraph 2 of this Order is commenced, then the costs of this motion are hereby reserved for disposition by the Judge hearing the application."
Tab 13 - Joint Production Book
18. The Order described in the immediately preceding paragraph was extended on four subsequent occasions, namely February 6, 1990, May 5, 1990, July 26, 1990 and November 8, 1990 with the result that the provisions of the original November 7, 1989 Order were extended through to and including February 8, 1991.
THE ESTATE TAX PLAN
19. In a letter dated February 6, 1990, Mr. William R. Wilkinson, of Wilkinson, Rogers, Meyers and McNiven, accountants for Construction, Apartments and Queen, outlined a corporate reorganization involving each of the aforementioned corporations (the "Tax Plan"). The implementation of the Tax Plan has given rise to the reassessment herein.
Tab 14 - Joint Production Book
20. Pursuant to a memo dated March 19, 1990, Mr. Morrison, the solicitor for Mrs. Miller, "accommodated" the implementation of the corporate reorganization.
Tab 15 - Joint Production Book
21. Pursuant to a letter dated April 27, 1990, Mr. Morrison confirmed to Mrs. Miller's accountants, Peat, Marwick, that he was aware of the "election as is required under the Income Tax Act restructuring which apparently is to evidence the redemption of xx number of shares and a capital dividend issued in order to trigger the loss".
Tab 16 - Joint Production Book
Subject Share Redemption
22. By Resolution dated April 2, 1990, the Directors of Construction resolved to redeem 970 common shares held by the Estate.
Tab 17 - Joint Production Book
23. By Resolution dated April 20, 1990, the Directors of Construction resolved to redeem 880 common shares held by the Estate and elected that, for purposes of the Income Tax Act, the deemed dividend resulting from the redemption of these shares should be a capital dividend.
Tab 18 - Joint Production Book
24. By an undated document entitled "Consent to Purchase for Cancellation of Common Shares", the Estate consented to the redemption of 880 of the shares in Construction held by it.
Tab 19 - Joint Production Book
25. By Resolution dated April 2, 1990, the Directors of Apartments resolved to redeem 810 common shares held by the Estate.
Tab 20 - Joint Production Book
26. By an undated document entitled "Consent to Purchase for Cancellation of Common Shares", the Estate consented to the redemption of 810 of the shares in Apartments held by it.
Tab 19 - Joint Production Book
27. By Resolution dated April 2, 1990, the Directors of Queen resolved to redeem 3500 common shares held by the Estate.
Tab 21 - Joint Production Book
28. By an undated document entitled "Consent to Purchase for Cancellation of Common Shares", the Estate consented to the redemption of 3,500 of the shares in Queen held by it.
Tab 19 - Joint Production Book
29. On or shortly after April 2, 1990, the following shares held by the Estate were redeemed:
1,850 Common Shares of Construction for proceeds of $2,484,550
810 common Shares of Apartments for proceeds of $613,170
3,500 Common Shares of Queen for proceeds of $168,805.
Tax Consequences of Share Redemptions
30. For tax purposes, the Estate treated the share redemptions described herein as transactions giving rise to capital losses, as follows:
Construction: $2,247,624;
Apartments: $566,190;and
Queen: $158,843.
31. There is no dispute between the parties as to the quantum of capital losses flowing from the redemption of the subject shares by the Corporations.
32. Copies of, inter alia, the corporate documentation with respect to the redemptions were provided to Mrs. Miller's solicitor on July 11, 1990.
Tab 22 - Joint Production Book
33. On April 30, 1990, Estate elected to carry such capital loss back to the year of death of the Deceased, pursuant to subsection 164(6) of the Income Tax Act (Canada) (the "Act"). The Estate Election in this regard is contained in the Joint Production Book at Tab 22 and amended Terminal Return of Carl Miller, signed by Esther Moore on April 27, 1990 and received by Revenue Canada on April 30, 1990, a copy of which is contained in the Joint Production Book at Tab 23.
Tabs 23 and 24 - Joint Production Book
34. On May 1, 1990, Mrs. Miller's solicitor (Mr. Morrison) attended on Mrs. Miller and was informed that she "had not been approached to complete any "election" forms or any matter on behalf of the estate". On June 15, 1990, Mr. Morrison wrote to the solicitors for the Estate asking for a report as to what tax returns, elections and copies of resolutions had been filed with Revenue Canada.
Tabs 16, 25 and 26 - Joint Production Book
35. Immediately after the share redemptions referred to above (i.e. taking place on or shortly after April 2, 1990), the Estate continued to own all of the remaining issued and outstanding shares of each of Construction, Apartments and Queen and was the sole shareholder of such corporations.
36. Construction, Apartments and Queen were subsequently amalgamated under the name Carl E. Miller Construction Limited on May 25, 1990. Copies of the Articles of Amalgamation and of the "Certificate of Amalgamation" are contained in the Joint Production Book at Tabs 26 and 27. Also contained in the Joint Production Book are copies of supporting resolutions of the Directors of Construction, Apartments and Queen (Tabs 28, 29 and 30), the shareholders of Construction, Apartments and Queen (Tabs 31, 32 and 33) and a resolution of the shareholders of the amalgamated corporation (Tab 34).
Tabs 27 to 35 - Joint Production Book
37. Ultimately, after receiving complete information and advice and following extensive negotiations, Mrs. Miller elected, pursuant to section 6 of the FLA to receive the entitlement under section 5 of the FLA. The completion of that aspect of the matter is summarized in the Order of The Honorable Mister Justice Flynn issued in the Ontario Court (General Division) dated February 6, 1991.
Tab 36 - Joint Production Book
38. Pursuant to subsection 6(8) of the FLA, the effect of Mrs. Miller's Election to receive the entitlement under section 5 of the FLA was that the gifts to her in the Deceased's Will were revoked and the Will is therefore interpreted as if Mrs. Miller had died before the Deceased.
39. On February 4, 1991, Mrs. Miller consented to the Estate being administered and distributed, an agreement having been reached on February 1, 1991, between Mrs. Miller and the Executors of the Estate. Copies of the consent and Agreement are contained in the Joint Production Book at the tabs referred to below.
Tabs 9 and 37 - Joint Production Book
40. The documents referred to in the Joint Production Book are true copies of documents the authenticity of which are admitted by both parties.
[5] The plan developed by the chartered accountants was relatively straightforward. If Mrs. Miller chose to accept what was left to her under the will, a life interest, there would be a spousal trust and therefore a rollover under subsection 70(6) of the I.T.A. and the deemed disposition under subsection 70(5) of the I.T.A. would not occur. If Mrs. Miller elected under subsection 6(1) of the Family Law Act ("F.L.A.") the equalization payment under subsection 5(2) of that act rather than under the will, subsection 70(6) of the I.T.A. would not apply to prevent the deemed disposition. Since both counsel agree that this is the effect of an election under subsection 6(1) of the F.L.A. to take under subsection 5(2) of the F.L.A. it is not necessary for me to analyze section 6 to demonstrate how that result is arrived at. I am satisfied that this is a correct interpretation of the interaction of the F.L.A. and section 70 of the I.T.A.
[6] Subsection 85(4) of the I.T.A. as it read in the years in question is as follows.
Where a taxpayer or a partnership (hereinafter referred to as the taxpayer) has, after May 6, 1974, disposed of any capital property or eligible capital property of the taxpayer to a corporation that, immediately after the disposition, was controlled, directly or indirectly in any manner whatever, by the taxpayer, by the spouse of the taxpayer or by a person or group of persons by whom the taxpayer was controlled, directly or indirectly in any manner whatever, and, but for this subsection, subsection 24(2) and paragraphs 40(2)(e) and (g), the taxpayer would have had a capital loss therefrom or a deduction pursuant to paragraph 24(1)(a) in computing his income for the taxation year in which he ceased to carry on a business, as the case may be, the following rules apply:
(a) notwithstanding section 24 and paragraphs 40(2)(e) and (g), his capital loss therefrom, or his deduction pursuant to paragraph 24(1)(a) in computing his income for the taxation year in which he ceased to carry on the business, as the case may be, otherwise determined shall be deemed to be nil; and
(b) in computing the adjusted cost base to the taxpayer of all shares of any particular class of the capital stock of the corporation owned by him immediately after the disposition, there shall be added, in the case of capital property, the amount that is equal to, and in the case of eligible capital property, 4/3 of the amount that is equal to, that proportion of the amount, if any, by which
(i) the cost amount to him, immediately before the disposition, of the property so disposed of,
exceeds
(ii) his proceeds of disposition of the property or where the property was an eligible capital property, his eligible capital amount, within the meaning assigned by section 14, as a result of the disposition of that property
that
(iii) the fair market value, immediately after the disposition, of all shares of that class so owned by him,
is of
(iv) the fair market value, immediately after the disposition, of all shares of the capital stock of the corporation so owned by him.
[7] Subsection 85(4) of the I.T.A. was repealed in 1998 and a somewhat similar provision was enacted as subsection 40(3.6).
[8] Subsection 256(5.1) of the I.T.A. reads:
For the purposes of this Act, where the expression "controlled, directly or indirectly in any manner whatever," is used, a corporation shall be considered to be so controlled by another corporation, person or group of persons (in this subsection referred to as the "controller") at any time where, at that time, the controller has any direct or indirect influence that, if exercised, would result in control in fact of the corporation, except that, where the corporation and the controller are dealing with each other at arm's length and the influence is derived from a franchise, licence, lease, distribution, supply or management agreement or other similar agreement or arrangement, the main purpose of which is to govern the relationship between the corporation and the controller regarding the manner in which a business carried on by the corporation is to be conducted, the corporation shall not be considered to be controlled, directly or indirectly in any manner whatever, by the controller by reason only of that agreement or arrangement.
[9] Subsection 164(6) of the I.T.A. permits the estate to treat capital losses incurred by it in its first taxation year as losses incurred by the deceased in his last year.
[10] The purchase for cancellation gave rise to a deemed dividend under subsection 84(3) of the I.T.A. It also had the effect of triggering an entitlement to refundable tax, although this is not really germane to this case. Apart from subsection 85(4) of the I.T.A. it gave rise as well to a capital loss which under subsection 164(6) of the I.T.A. could be applied against the capital gain arising under subsection 70(5) of the I.T.A. in the year of death.
[11] If the estate controlled the three corporations immediately after the redemption the capital losses (which it agreed are otherwise slightly less than $3,000,000) are deemed to be nil.
[12] The estate owned all of the shares of the corporations and accordingly would "control" the corporations in the sense in which that word was used in Buckerfield's Ltd. et al. v. M.N.R., 64 DTC 5301, where Jackett P. said at page 5303:
The word "control" might conceivably refer to de facto control by one or more shareholders whether or not they hold a majority of shares. I am of the view, however, that, in section 39 of the Income Tax Act, the word "controlled" contemplates the right of control that rests in ownership of such a number of shares as carries with it the right to a majority of the votes in the election of the Board of Director. See British American Tobacco Co. v. I.R.C., [1943] 1 A.E.R. 13, where Viscount Simon L.C., at page 15, says:
The owners of the majority of the voting power in a company are the persons who are in effective control of its affairs and fortunes.
[13] "Control" without any modification such as "directly or indirectly in any manner whatever" and without the expansion of that expression contained in subsection 256(5.1) of the I.T.A. means simply de jure control. The words "directly or indirectly in any manner whatever" by themselves may well have been intended to extend the meaning of control to de facto control but evidently Parliament felt that this position needed to be strengthened and so subsection 256(5.1) of the I.T.A. was enacted to put the matter beyond all doubt.
[14] The meaning of "control" of a corporation, without more, was considered at length by Iacobucci J., speaking for a unanimous Supreme Court of Canada in Duha Printers (Western) Ltd. v. R., [1998] 3 C.T.C. 303, 98 DTC 6334. What emerges is the following:
1. The Buckerfield's test as cited above is the normal test in Canada in determining de jure control.
2. External documents not forming part of the constating documents do not in general warrant a departure from that rule.
3. The unanimous shareholders' agreement in that case was not sufficient to deprive the majority shareholder of de jure control.
[15] The only passage from the judgment of Iacobucci J. that I consider it necessary to reproduce is at paragraph 85.
It may be useful at this stage to summarize the principles of corporate and taxation law considered in this appeal, in light of their importance. They are as follows:
(1) Section 111(5) of the Income Tax Act contemplates de jure, not de facto, control.
(2) The general test for de jure control is that enunciated in Buckerfield's, supra: whether the majority shareholder enjoys "effective control" over the "affairs and fortunes" of the corporation, as manifested in "ownership of such a number of shares as carries with it the right to a majority of the votes in the election of the board of directors".
(3) to determine whether such "effective control" exists, one must consider:
(a) the corporation's governing statue;
(b) the share register of the corporation; and
(c) any specific or unique limitation on either the majority shareholder's power to control the election of the board or the board's power to manage the business and affairs of the company, as manifested in either:
(i) the constating documents of the corporation; or
(ii) any unanimous shareholder agreement.
(4) Documents other than the share register, the constating documents, and any unanimous shareholder agreement are not generally to be considered for this purpose.
(5) If there exists any such limitation as contemplated by item 3(c), the majority shareholder may nonetheless possess de jure control, unless there remains no other way for that shareholder to exercise "effective control" over the affairs and fortunes of the corporation in a manner analogous or equivalent to the Buckerfield's test.
[16] The appellant argues that paragraph 3 of the order of November 7, 1989 (which was extended from time to time and covered the date on which the share redemptions occurred) takes de jure control away from the estate. Paragraph 3 reads:
3. THIS COURT ORDERS that there is to be no administration or distribution of the Estate of Carl Edward Miller prior to February 8, 1990 except by further Order of this court or on the written consent of this applicant.
[17] It is important that we put the order of the Ontario Court in perspective. It was a temporary measure designed to put a hold on the distribution of the estate or its administration for a few months while Mrs. Miller decided whether she wanted to proceed with the election under subsection 5(2) of the F.L.A. or take under the will. The order neither deprived the estate of control nor gave it to Mrs. Miller. She had a rather limited power to veto some of the acts of administration or distribution but she could not elect directors nor could she influence the way in which the directors went about running the day-to-day affairs of the three companies.
[18] If a unanimous shareholder agreement of the type considered in Duha does not deprive the majority shareholder of control it is difficult to see how a court order of temporary duration designed to maintain the status quo while Mrs. Miller decided what election to make under the F.L.A. could deprive the estate of legal control.
[19] I do not accept that the words in paragraph 3 of the order of November 7, 1989
3. THIS COURT ORDERS that there is to be no administration or distribution of the Estate of Carl Edward Miller prior to February 8, 1990 except by further Order of this court or on the written consent of this applicant.
interfere with or impinge in any way with the estate's control of the composition of the board of directors.
[20] Counsel for the appellant suggests that in paragraph 4 of the summary by Iacobucci J. in Duha the word "generally" leaves the door open to permit the court to consider a court order of the type involved here.
[21] I do not agree that that is the effect of Duha but even if I were to look at the court order it merely restricts the distribution or administration of the estate, not the legal control that the estate has over three companies that form part of the assets.
[22] It is clear that "administration" is a word that can be used in different senses. In Flynn v. Capital Trust Corporation, [1921] O.L.R. 424, Middleton J. said at page 425:
This involves the consideration of the provisions of the Absentee Act and the order made.
Section 7 of the Act provides that the Court may make an order for the administration of the property of an absentee and may appoint a committee for that purpose.
It was argued before me that "administration" means administration in the sense in which that word is used when what is intended is the winding-up and distribution of the estate of a deceased person, and that for that reason the Rules relative to administration proceedings apply. Clearly this is not so. "Administration" is used here in a sense substantially equivalent to "management."
[23] "Administration" in the order of November 7, 1989 is obviously used in the former sense described by Middleton J.
[24] Nothing in that order restricts the power of the estate to elect the boards of directors of the three companies.
[25] This is sufficient to dispose of the appeal. The estate at all times had de jure control of the corporations. However since both counsel devoted attention to the words "directly or indirectly in any manner whatever" and to the provisions of subsection 256(5.1) of the I.T.A. I shall deal briefly with those provisions. Obviously those words are intended to broaden the concept of control to include de facto control. A consideration of de facto control might be necessary where someone other than the owner of a majority of the shares had and exercised de facto control of the corporation. In such a case it would be necessary to decide whether the existence of de facto control in a person or group of persons who did not own a majority of the shares ousted the de jure control of the majority owner or whether it could be said that the de facto controller and the de jure controller both controlled the corporation. The latter hypothesis is somewhat analogous to that with which Jackett P. was concerned in Viking Food Products Ltd. v. M.N.R., 67 DTC 5067.
[26] Here it is not necessary that I attempt to resolve the problem of a de facto controller who is different from a de jure controller. There is no de facto controller that is different from the estate.
[27] The appeal is dismissed with costs.
Signed at Toronto, Canada, this 3rd day of December 2001.
"D.G.H. Bowman"
A.C.J.
COURT FILE NO.: 1999-2987(IT)G
STYLE OF CAUSE: Between The Estate of Carl Edward Miller
and Her Majesty The Queen
PLACE OF HEARING: London, Ontario
DATE OF HEARING: November 22, 2001
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY: The Honourable D.G.H. Bowman
Associate Chief Judge
DATE OF JUDGMENT: December 3, 2001
APPEARANCES:
Counsel for the Appellant: Keith Trussler, Esq.
Counsel for the Respondent: Ernest Wheeler, Esq.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For the Appellant:
Name: Keith Trussler, Esq.
Firm: Giffen & Partners
London, Ontario
For the Respondent: Morris Rosenberg
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
Ottawa, Canada
1999-2987(IT)G
BETWEEN:
THE ESTATE OF CARL EDWARD MILLER,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Appeal heard on November 22, 2001, at London, Ontario, by
The Honourable D.G.H. Bowman
Associate Chief Judge
Appearances
Counsel for the Appellant: Keith Trussler, Esq.
Counsel for the Respondent: Ernest Wheeler, Esq.
JUDGMENT
It is ordered that the appeal from the assessment made under the Income Tax Act for the 1989 taxation year be dismissed with costs.
Signed at Toronto, Canada, this 3rd day of December 2001.
|
"D.G.H. Bowman" |
A.C.J.