Date: 20010710
Docket: 98-2256-IT-G
BETWEEN:
ARTHUR C. DWYER,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Reasons for Judgment
McArthur J.
[1] The Appellant appeals the reassessments of the Minister of National Revenue to include in income unreported interest earned in excess of $750,000 and interest and penalties for gross negligence for the taxation years 1987, 1988, 1989 and 1990. In addition, the Minister reassessed the Appellant for the 1991 taxation year increasing the amount of income from $62,537 to $126,677.
[2] The Appellant was born in 1941. He has a grade eight education, has lived most of his life in the Peterborough area and has been married for 41 years to Ruth Dwyer. Over the years, he worked in the logging business, at Johnson's Outboard Marine, and in a brake shoe manufacturing plant. About 1984, he injured his back lifting slabs of asbestos and received Worker's Compensation benefits for several years. He and his wife live very modestly. She has worked at Sears for over 32 years and they use her salary to pay household expenses.
[3] The Appellant has been investing in residential mortgages for over 20 years. He did not declare the interest, bonus and penalties received by him and his investment fund grew exponentially. He never used an accountant until Revenue Canada's audit in 1992. He used the services of a mortgage broker and lawyers and demonstrated an expertise that belied his counsel's position that "the Appellant is a very simple and naive man who had an honest belief that interest earned in respect of residential mortgages was not included in income for tax purposes".[1] The Appellant stated that he had read in an article in the newspaper years ago that interest from residential mortgages was not taxable. Revenue Canada keeps a record of such newspaper reports but could not find any such article. The Appellant could not remember when and where he read it.
[4] Commencing in 1976 through to 1991, the Appellant loaned money through a mortgage broker for approximately 78 residential mortgages. His position is that while income from commercial mortgages is subject to income tax, the interest and profit from residential mortgages is not taxable. The Appellant's investments in commercial mortgages were limited to only two or three. He did not declare interest in 1990 on one of these mortgages stating that he was awaiting the builder (mortgagor) to complete an entire project. This appears to be a reason without logic and flies in the face of his reasoning to spread income with his wife. The Appellant's primary position is that the Minister violated sections 7 and 8 of the CanadianCharter of Rights and Freedoms, which sections read as follows:
7 Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.
8 Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure.
[5] The Appellant did his banking through a Peterborough Community Credit Union. He arranged two mortgage accounts, one for principal and one for interest. He also set up two corresponding accounts for principal and interest for his wife to whom he gave a 50% interest in the mortgages. He divided the mortgages with his wife to split the income for tax purposes although he did not declare residential mortgage interest. The manager of the credit union, Mr. Butterworth, testified that the Appellant was meticulous in his bookkeeping and was scrupulously honest with the credit union. He said that on occasion, the Appellant corrected the credit union where it had credited one of his accounts with too much interest.
[6] In addition, the Appellant had bank accounts with the National Trust, two for principal and two for interest, one of each in his name and also that of his wife. He managed all four. By referring to the amortization schedules for each mortgage he deposited one-half of the principal and interest in each respective account. He maintained the bank accounts at the Peterborough Community Credit Union because it paid a better rate of interest.
[7] The Appellant's position is that he honestly believed that income from residential mortgages was not taxable. The Appellant declared income from one commercial mortgage but other commercial mortgages were not declared. These were part of a group of building mortgages with a single mortgagor. He stated that he intended declaring the interest when all the mortgages with this builder were cleaned up. He was open and straightforward with the Revenue Canada investigators.
[8] The Appellant was tried in the Ontario Court, Provincial Division on four counts of failing to declare income contrary to paragraph 239(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act. In finding him not guilty, Collins J., in his Reasons for Judgment dated February 15, 1996, stated :
The difficulty in proving mens rea in a tax fraud case is often high. The standard can be shown in the case of R. v. DiPasquale, a decision of Mr. Justice Sheppard, rendered June 8, 1993. This court is bound by that decision.
To quote Mr. Justice Sheppard:
With respect to mens rea a charge of wilful evasion is a specific intent offence. A court must find on the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt an intent to evade the payment of income tax.
Carelessness or recklessness without knowledge of the facts constituting the offence is not sufficient.
...
The defence urges the court to find that the testimony of the defendant might reasonably be true, even though the large sum of money involved might lead one to conclude that such ignorance would be very unlikely.
...
His business dealings were perceived by everyone, with three exceptions, as being scrupulously honest. In contrast, the three who disagreed with him, all had axes to grind and were not dependable witnesses.
At the end of the day, following the analysis of DiPasquale, as I must, it becomes apparent that, on the issue of mens rea, there must be reasonable doubt - no more, no less - and he must be acquitted. It was a very close matter because I was bound by DiPasquale.
Most, if not all of the mortgages required high interest rates of 15% to 20% per annum and many provided for initial bonus and severe payout privileges. The legality of these mortgages is not in question.
[9] The Appellant's mortgages demonstrated an expertise and aggressiveness of a shrewd businessman. He charged very high interest rates often together with an up-front bonus and a four-month interest prepayment penalty. He was well aware of the importance of equity, covenants and guarantors. At the hearing of the appeals, he demonstrated an extraordinary memory for detail with respect to his mortgages. He was very assertive in enforcing the mortgage conditions and this diligence led to a disgruntled mortgagor who anonymously informed Revenue Canada that the Appellant may not be declaring the income from his mortgage lending business. Acting on this information, Revenue Canada obtained search warrants for the Appellant's home, the law offices of Roger Clark, his lawyer at the time, and for the law offices of James Dunn, his previous lawyer. It is with the procedure in the execution of these warrants that the Appellant takes issue.
[10] In his home, the investigators found documentation for current mortgages in random locations including in the top drawer of his bedroom dresser. He stated that he discarded all documentation with respect to discharged mortgages. At the law offices of Roger Clark, Mr. Clark initially claimed solicitor-client privilege. He immediately called the Appellant who, without hesitation, instructed him to waive the privilege and release all documentation requested. He gave similar instructions upon a call from his former solicitor, Mr. Dunn. Throughout the search and seizure during the morning of March 31, 1992, the Appellant and his wife were completely co-operative and all relevant records were quickly turned over to Revenue Canada, without incident.
[11] The Appellant is portrayed by his counsel as a naïve man. His method with respect to managing his mortgages was very simple and basic. He divided the mortgages between himself and his wife for tax saving purposes. He had an amortization schedule for each mortgage that required blended payments of principal and interest. He set up separate accounts for the principal and the interest.
[12] Mr. Eric Fransky, of Revenue Canada Special Investigations Unit, was assigned the Appellant's file. His dogged determination, attention to detail and perseverance caused the Appellant and his family extreme distress and anger. While Mr. Fransky may have been aggressive, overall I find that he should be commended for his handling of this matter over the years. His meticulous analysis revealed that the Appellant's total assets in bank accounts and mortgages increased from $460,483 on December 31, 1986 to $1,717,147 on December 31, 1990. This growth was not unnoticed by the Appellant. Pursuant to paragraphs 231.2(1)(a) and (b) of the Income Tax Act, the manager of the credit union provided Mr. Fransky with documentation maintained by the credit union with respect to the Appellant's bank accounts. Though the same process, he obtained documentation maintained by National Trust in connection with the bank accounts of the Appellant and his wife.
[13] On March 31, 1992, officials of Revenue Canada executed search warrants at the residence of Mr. and Mrs. Dwyer and the law offices of Roger Clark and Dunn & Dunn pursuant to section 487 of the Criminal Code of Canada. Mr. Raymond Finkle was the Revenue Canada officer who led the search of the Dwyer premises. He read Mr. Dwyer his rights in the presence of Mrs. Dwyer in the kitchen of their home. The Appellant's counsel forcefully presents that Mrs. Dwyer was not read her rights separately making the search and seizure illegal. I cannot accept this. She was present with her husband and followed his lead. She had little knowledge of his mortgage business, he having complete control. Mr. and Mrs. Dwyer were cordial to Mr. Finkle and his team and co-operated fully even directing the six or seven searchers to where they could locate mortgage cheques, bonds and other relevant documents. The investigators found current mortgages in random locations in the house, primarily in the top drawer of the Appellant's bedroom dresser. The Appellant threw out the documentation with respect to mortgages that had been discharged.
[14] Prior to the search and seizure of documents from each lawyer's premises, the officers leading the search read a caution to the lawyers and during a telephone conversation with his lawyers, Mr. Dwyer consented to a complete disclosure of all his documents. He stated he had nothing to hide and was magnanimous in his invitation to Revenue Canada to take everything they needed for their investigation.
[15] During the ongoing criminal investigation, Mr. Finkle befriended the Appellant and asked him for a personal mortgage loan which the Appellant refused. Later, Mr. Finkle did not tell the truth about this loan request to the Crown prosecutor but, he recanted his lie within 20 minutes. There was no evidence of extortion by Mr. Finkle. His behaviour was disgraceful but in no way was it an abuse of process for which the assessments ought to be quashed. During the investigation, prior to criminal charges being laid against the Appellant, he paid Revenue Canada the amount of $300,000 on account of taxes. There was no evidence, as suggested by counsel for the Appellant, that this money was extracted from the Appellant while holding the threat of criminal charges over him. The Appellant raises the following issues, law and argument:
55. It is submitted that the clear and stunning facts of this case make it a "first blush" case in flagrant violation of s. 8 and 7 of the Charter by the Respondent's officials which, on their own admission, constitute the breaches for which all evidence ought to be declared inadmissible and/or a stay entered on and/or the assessment quashed by this Court pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Charter.
Statutory and Constitutional Bar to Assessment
56. In light of the fact that all evidence gathered for the assessment stems from the evidence seized from the lawyer's offices, and given that the empowering legislation for such search and seizure, being s.488.1 of the Criminal Code of Canada, was declared unconstitutional by the Appellate Courts in Ontario, Alberta, and Newfoundland which unconstitutionality of legislation is to be taken from the date of the enactment of the Charter, the Respondent is barred from basing his assessment on the evidence obtain from such seizure.
- R. v. Fink, supra
- Lavelle, supra, White supra
- O'Neill Motors Ltd. v. Canada (1995), 96 DTC 1486; affirmed C.A. 98 DTC 6424
57. In O'Neill Motors both the Tax Court and Federal Court of Appeal made it clear that evidence obtain on a search warrant, which legislation was subsequently (subsequent to execution of warrant) declared to be unconstitutional, could not be used in the Tax Court on the civil assessment.
Execution of Search Warrant
58. Regardless of this statutory bar, it is nonetheless submitted that the record clearly indicates clear breaches of:
(a) the terms of the warrant itself;
(b) the terms of s. 488.1 of the Code;
(c) s. 7 of the Charter;
(d) s. 8 of the Charter;
to render the search an illegal and warrantless one for an illegal and improper execution of the warrant and evidence gathered thereunder.
[16] The Appellant seeks the following relief:
(a) that the entire assessments be wholly quashed and/or stayed pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Charter;
(b) in the alternative to (a) above, that the assessment be set aside or quashed only to the extent of the remaining claimed by the Respondent Minister as to tax owing, penalties, and interest thereon, and that the $300,000 already paid by the Appellant remain paid on account to the Minister as full and final payment, pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Charter,
(c) in the alternative to (a) and (b) above, and in any event, that the penalties and interest thereon be vacated, quashed or set aside;
(d) in the alternative to all of (a), (b) and (c) above, at a minimum, given,
(i) the declared unconstitutionality of s. 488.1 of the Criminal Code;
(ii) the abusive, extortive and questionably dirty hands of the Respondent's officials;
(iii) the clear and unequivocal ss. 7 and 8 Charter breaches;
(iv) the consistent criminal acquittals of Mr. Dwyer;
(v) the complete disregard for the statutory and Charter rights of Mrs. Dwyer; and
(vi) the illegal and improper execution of the search warrant;
(vii) the unsatisfactory and anaemic cogency and rationale of the assessment and penalties imposed;
that this Honourable Court order a reassessment, by another office, (preferably Toronto), other than the Belleville office or its surroundings, of the taxation years in question;
(e) costs of this appeal, to be assessed, and paid directly to the solicitor for the Appellant; and
(f) such further and other relief as the Court deems just.
[17] The Minister is given the power in subsection 231.2(1) to demand information or documents from any person as part of his administration and enforcement of the Income Tax Act. This does not infringe on sections 7 and 8 of the Charter even when the information obtained is used for other than civil purposes as stated by Létourneau J. in Bisaillon v. Canada.[2]
[18] Counsel for the Appellant referred to the stunning facts and flagrant violation of sections 7 and 8 of the Charter. If any facts are stunning, it is the outrageous behaviour of the Appellant in not reporting huge sums of income while maintaining ignorance. Special investigator, Eric Fransky, was given an investigation to complete. The requirements he had served on the bankers, the Appellant and his lawyers were made as part of his investigation to determine if the Appellant had unreported income. I have no doubt the evidence obtained is admissible and sections 7 and 8 have not been violated.
[19] Some of the evidence was gathered from documents seized from the lawyers' offices. The authority to seize the documents arises from section 487 of the Criminal Code of Canada. The procedure to be followed in carrying out the seizure was contained in section 488.1 of the Code. The Ontario Court of Appeal declared section 488.1 to be unconstitutional in R. v. Fink,[3] wherein Goudge J.A. stated:
... In serving the state interest in the investigation of crime, s. 488.1 nonetheless mandates a procedure which more than minimally impairs the solicitor-client privilege. The resulting search and seizure is therefore unreasonable for the purposes of s. 8 of the Charter and hence s. 488.1 infringes that Charter right.
... In the result, in my view s. 488.1, must be held to be unconstitutional.
The Appellant stated that the Minister is barred from having his assessment on evidence from such seizure. He found support for this in O'Neill Motors Limited v. The Queen.[4] In that case, the Minister had admitted that the search and seizure under section 231.3 of the Act was in violation of the taxpayer's rights under section 8 of the Charter and the evidence obtained was excluded. Sexton J.A. in The Queen v. Jurchison[5] considered the impact of evidence in violation of the taxpayer's Charter rights. He stated that evidence might be inadmissible in a civil trial.[6] He added:
... Such determination would require an examination of the impugned evidence and the method by which it was obtained, an inquiry into the seriousness of any Charter breach and a consideration of whether the evidence was already in possession of the Crown or would have been discovered in any event. See R. v. Stillman, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607 at 664. ...
... The questions regarding the admissibility of evidence and upon whom the onus rests with respect to the validity of the assessments are to be left to the judge hearing the appeals of the assessments.
[20] Briefly, the wrongs alleged by the Appellant with respect to the search and seizure include: no rights or caution was given to Mrs. Dwyer by Mr. Finkle, who was the team leader, and solicitor-client privilege was not respected. To review the facts, Mrs. Dwyer was present when the caution was read to the Appellant. Mrs. Dwyer knew little or nothing with respect to the mortgages since the Appellant had complete control. Both the Appellant and Mrs. Dwyer understood why Revenue Canada officers were in their home and Mr. Dwyer directed them to relevant documents. He readily waived any solicitor-client privilege and instructed his lawyers to co-operate and give the investigators all they requested. If the search and seizure under section 231.3 of the Act was a violation of the Appellant's rights under sections 7 and 8 of the Charter and the information was fundamental to the making of the assessment, subsections 24(1) and (2) of the Charter must be considered and they read as follows:
24(1) Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances.
24(2) Where, in proceedings under subsection (1), a court concludes that evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed or denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed by this Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is established that, having regard to all the circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
I do not find the searches unreasonable given the circumstances and have no difficulty concluding that admitting the evidence would not bring the justice system into disrepute. To the contrary, disallowing the evidence would no doubt bring the justice system into disrepute.
[21] In Donovan v. The Queen,[7] the taxpayer argued that certain evidence supporting the Minister's assessments had been obtained through illegal seizures under section 231.3 of the Act and his Charter rights were violated. The search in Donovan was unconstitutional following the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Baron.[8] Linden J.A. in Donovan, questioned whether the admission of evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. He stated at page 6343:
... The remaining question with respect to this search is whether the admission of evidence obtained as a result of the search would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. I agree with the Tax Court Judge[9] in her analysis of the factors and that this was non-conscriptive evidence. The search was not done in bad faith, the officials not being aware that the warrants they obtained and executed were secured under a statutory provision that was unconstitutional. It is hard to imagine, if this were all that happened in this case, that the admission of this evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, at least in a civil case such as this.
He concluded that the evidence was admissible. He commented on the remedy granted in O'Neill Motors, supra, and stated at page 6344:
It was made clear in O'Neill Motors that vacating a reassessment, though a possible remedy in certain circumstances, was not an automatic one. The conduct must be "a flagrant and egregious violation of the appellant's rights" (see Collins, supra). Moreover, at least in the civil context, O'Neill Motors suggests that a further remedy will be appropriate only when limiting the remedy to the mere exclusion of evidence would "render nugatory the very rights the Charter guarantees." (O'Neill Motors, supra, at 1493 T.C.C.). In other words, before a reassessment can be vacated, it must be shown that the lesser remedy of the exclusion of evidence was inadequate to vindicate the Charter violation. In addition, for it to be "appropriate and just" to vacate a reassessment, it should be clear that the evidence illegally obtained was so "fundamental" to the reassessments that they could not be sustained without it (O'Neill Motors, supra, at 1493 T.C.C.). In short, this type of "extreme remedy", as I wrote in O'Neill Motors, is reserved only for "serious violations where other remedies are insufficient".
Therefore, while the four wrongs committed by the officials in this case, viewed cumulatively, were serious, I am of the view that they were not so "flagrant and egregious" as to support the extreme remedy of vacating these reassessments in light of the minimal importance of the additional evidence obtained by those violations. In this case, the legally obtained evidence may well be sufficient to support the reassessments. Hence, in this case it would not be unfair to the appellant to force him to go to trial because the Crown has a reasonable chance of proving the case entirely on the basis of the legally obtained evidence.
[22] I find the evidence obtained from the search of the law offices and the Appellant's home would not bring justice into disrepute. The searches were conducted in good faith and the officers were not aware that the then section 231.1 was unconstitutional. The Minister had strong reason to believe that the searches were necessary in its audit process. The evidence was non-conscriptive in that the Appellant was not compelled or forced to give evidence such as a blood sample to be analyzed in a criminal investigation.
[23] I believe Revenue Canada was already in possession of much of the evidence found in the searches and it was probably available through other means such as searching the public records in the Land Registry Offices after obtaining names and addresses of mortgagors. The execution of the search warrants was not unreasonable and conducted in good faith. The admission of the evidence obtained would not bring the administration of justice in disrepute. In fact, disallowing the evidence would bring the administration of justice in disrepute.
[24] There certainly is insufficient evidence to conclude that Mr. Finkle's attempt to borrow money from the Appellant was an attempt at extortion. It was bad judgment on his part but, the evidence was that he did have substantial equity in his cottage property to secure the loan he requested and was prepared to go through the Appellant's mortgage broker and be subject to the Appellant's usual credit checks and interest rates. When he was refused by the Appellant, he obtained his required financing through a regular lending institution. I believe he required financing to pay for his children's college education.
[25] There also was insufficient evidence that the Minister was attempting to obtain a settlement and extract $300,000 from the Appellant. Considering all of the evidence, I am satisfied that the Appellant was made aware that he would owe in excess of $300,000 in tax and he paid that amount to prevent an accumulation of interest. The Appellant was in a very difficult situation of his own making. I am sure it had a detrimental affect on his and his family's health but there was no abuse of process. Revenue Canada was doing what it had to do to audit the Appellant's mortgage business and assess tax, interest and penalty.
[26] The Appellant's counsel did not seriously contest the quantum of the assessment except to state that it is based on a minute batch of bank records unrelated to the totality and the assessment should be returned for reassessment at a Revenue Canada office other than Belleville. The Appellant produced no evidence challenging the quantum of the assessments. His general statements are insufficient. Mr. Fransky's detailed explanation of how the amounts were arrived at was impressive and I accept it.
[27] The last question is with respect to the penalties imposed. The Appellant's first submission is that mens rea is required[10] and that because the Appellant was twice acquitted of tax evasion and fraud,[11] arising out of the same allegations that he "knew or ought to have known" that he had to report the income in question, the issue of penalties is res judicata, as between the parties and the Respondent thus is estopped, in law, from attempting to impose them.[12] It is submitted, in the alternative, that the Respondent has not discharged his onus of proving the penalties.[13] The onus of proving the penalties is on the Minister and the Appellant had the onus of proving the assessments were too high and he failed to do so. I agree with the reasoning in Hirex Holdings Ltd. v. The Queen, (1996)[14] wherein the Court stated:
... Although res judicata or issue estoppel may apply in subsequent civil proceedings in the case of a conviction from an offence, it will not apply in the case of an acquittal and especially an acquittal grounded on lack of mens rea.
[28] The trial judge in the Appellant's criminal trial under paragraph 239(1)(d) of the Act appeared to be somewhat reluctant to acquit the Appellant stating: "It was a very close matter ...". At page 4 of his decision, Collins J. stated:
The defendant has already been assessed the missing income tax and will be subject to large penalties under the Income Tax Act. The charges before the court then are in addition to that and would be dealt with in the same manner as criminal fraud cases.
Subsection 163(2) of the Income Tax Act reads in part as follows:
163(2) Every person who, knowingly, or under circumstances amounting to gross negligence in the carrying out of any duty or obligation imposed by or under this Act, has made ... a false statement or omission in a return ... filed or made in respect of a taxation year as required by or under this Act ... is liable to a penalty of the greater of ...
[29] The Appellant submitted that his case is indistinguishable from Colangelo Estate v. M.N.R.[15]In that case, two married taxpayers sold real property and failed to disclose capital gains in tax returns. The taxpayers were unsophisticated and relatively uneducated with limited understanding of business and financial matters. Their tax returns were prepared by an unsophisticated tax preparer and the taxpayers did not know they had to report gains. The Minister assessed penalty, interest and taxes owing on the gains. Bowie J. of this Court found that the taxpayers were not grossly negligent. At page 2828, he stated:
The statement which is generally accepted as defining gross negligence, in the context of the Act, is that of Strayer J., as he then was, who said in Venne v. R.:
"Gross negligence" must be taken to involve greater neglect than simply a failure to use reasonable care. It must involve a high degree of negligence tantamount to intentional acting, an indifference as to whether the law is complied with or not.
In Colangelo, Bowie J. was dealing with capital gains and he believed the taxpayers' explanation. The present case is with respect to the failure to include in income amounts which clearly had an income character about them. This was not a single transaction. The Appellant was no neophyte and he had been a professional mortgage lender for years. He was wilfully blind and grossly negligent. The penalties imposed are justified.
[30] The appeals are dismissed, with costs to the Respondent.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 10th day of July, 2001.
"C.H. McArthur"
J.T.C.C.
COURT FILE NO.: 98-2256(IT)G
STYLE OF CAUSE: Arthur Dwyer and Her Majesty the Queen
PLACE OF HEARING: Toronto, Ontario
DATE OF HEARING: February 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23, 2001
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY: The Honourable Judge C.H. McArthur
DATE OF JUDGMENT: July 10, 2001
APPEARANCES:
Counsel for the Appellant: Rocco Galati
Counsel for the Respondent: M. Judith Sheppard
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For the Appellant:
Name: Rocco Galati
Firm: Galati, Rodrigues, Azevedo & Associates
For the Respondent: Morris Rosenberg
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
Ottawa, Canada
98-2256(IT)G
BETWEEN:
ARTHUR C. DWYER,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Appeals heard on February 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23, 2001, at Toronto, Ontario, by
the Honourable Judge C.H. McArthur
Appearances
Counsel for the Appellant: Rocco Galati
Counsel for the Respondent: M. Judith Sheppard
JUDGMENT
The appeals from assessments of tax made under the Income Tax Act for the 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990 and 1991 taxation years are dismissed, with costs.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 10th day of July, 2001.
|
"C.H. McArthur" |
J.T.C.C.
[1] Notice of Appeal.
[2] [1999] F.C.J. 1477 - paragraphs 4, 5 and 6.
[3] [2000] O.J. #4549.
[4] 96 DTC 1486.
[5] 2001 F.C.A. 126.
[6] R. v. Fink, supra, was a criminal prosecution.
[7] 2000 DTC 6339 (F.C.A.).
[8] [1993] S.C.R. 416.
[9] Donovan v. The Queen, 98 DTC 2140 (Lamarre-Proulx J.).
[10] R. v. City of Sault Ste. Marie, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 1299 (S.C.C.).
[11] In addition to the charges under paragraph 239(1)(d) of the Income Tax Act he was also charged and acquitted of charges under the Worker's Compensation Act dealing with the same allegations.
[12] Angle v. M.N.R. [1975] 2 S.C.R. 248 (S.C.C.).
[13] Venne v. The Queen, 84 DTC 6247.
[14] [1997] 1 C.T.C. 103.
[15] [1998] 2 C.T.C. 2923.