Date: 19980923
Dockets: 96-2133-UI; 96-2135-UI; 96-2136-UI
BETWEEN:
THÉRÈSE BOUCHARD, DANIEL LANGLOIS, JEAN-CLAUDE LANGLOIS,
Appellants,
and
THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE,
Respondent.
Reasons for Judgment
Prévost, D.J.T.C.C.
[1] These appeals were heard on common evidence at La Malbaie, Quebec, on August 5, 1998.
[2] The first appeal is from a determination by the Minister of National Revenue ("the Minister") dated August 27, 1996 that the employment of Thérèse Bouchard with 2955-0571 Québec inc. ("the payer") from June 1 to November 6, 1993, from December 25, 1993 to November 12, 1994 and from December 24, 1994 to October 29, 1995 was not insurable for the following reason: [TRANSLATION] "The Minister . . . is satisfied that it is reasonable to conclude that 2955-0571 Québec inc. would not have entered into a substantially similar contract of employment with you if you had been dealing with 2955-0571 Québec inc. at arm's length".
[3] The second appeal is from a determination by the Minister on the same date that the employment of Daniel Langlois with the payer from June 21 to October 24, 1992, from December 27, 1992 to November 6, 1993, from December 26, 1993 to November 12, 1994 and from December 26, 1994 to November 4, 1995 was not insurable for the same reason.
[4] The third appeal is from a determination by the Minister on the same date that the employment of Jean-Claude Langlois with the payer from June 20 to November 6, 1993, from December 23, 1993 to November 12, 1994 and from December 24, 1994 to October 29, 1995 was not insurable for the same reason.
[5] In the first appeal (Thérèse Bouchard), paragraph 5 of the Reply to the Notice of Appeal reads as follows:
[TRANSLATION]
5. In arriving at his decision the respondent Minister of National Revenue relied inter alia on the following facts:
(a) the payer, 2955-0571 Québec inc., is a business operating two inns in Baie-Saint-Paul; (A)
(b) the shareholders of 2955-0571 Québec inc. are Jean-Claude Langlois and Daniel Langlois, as well as the appellant; (A)
(c) the capital stock of 2955-0571 Québec inc. is held in equal shares by the shareholders; (A)
(d) Jean-Claude Langlois is the appellant's spouse; (A)
(e) Daniel Langlois is the son of Jean-Claude Langlois and the appellant; (A)
(f) the payer operated two inns and offered the following services: (A)
(i) accommodation
(ii) meals (lunch and dinner)
(iii) banquet hall;
(g) the payer operated the business year-round, but the annual peak period was between June and October inclusive; (D)
(h) the payer was duly incorporated on June 17, 1992; (A)
(i) the payer's turnover at the end of the fiscal years ending December 31, 1993, 1994 and 1995 was as follows: (A)
1993 - $293,000
1994 - $348,000
1995 - $414,000
(j) for the fiscal years ending December 31, 1993, 1994 and 1995 the payer had the following net income: (A)
1993 - $16,000
1994 - $47,000
1995 - $55,000
(k) the appellant's duties during the periods at issue were the following: (A)
(i) desk clerk
- answering the telephone
- taking reservations
- receiving people as they arrived
- renting out rooms
- registering guests
- handling the cash register
- being responsible for ensuring payment for rented rooms
- being responsible for ensuring payment for meals taken in the restaurant
- providing tourist information
(ii) management - client service
- being responsible for chambermaid service
- being responsible for advertising
(l) the appellant worked an eight-hour shift daily; (D)
(m) the appellant worked six days a week; (A)
(n) the appellant was paid at a weekly rate of $450 plus 4 percent vacation pay; (A)
(o) the hours worked by the appellant were not recorded, while those of other workers (dealing with the employer at arm's length) were recorded; (D)
(p) when the appellant worked after allegedly being laid off each year she was allegedly paid at an hourly rate; (A)
(q) after her alleged annual lay-offs the appellant worked over 15 hours most weeks until her alleged return to full-time work each year; (D)
(r) after her alleged annual lay-offs the appellant provided services to the payer without pay; (D)
(s) the appellant received benefits in the following periods: (A)
- November 7, 1993 to May 21, 1994 (27 weeks)
- November 13, 1994 to May 20, 1995 (24 weeks)
(t) while the appellant was in Florida - from November 6 to November 12, 1994 - she nonetheless continued to be listed on the payer's payroll; (D)
(u) the appellant is the member of a related group which controls the payer; (D)
(v) the appellant was not dealing with the payer at arm's length; (D)
(w) only non-arm's-length dealing can explain the working conditions the appellant enjoyed. (D)
[6] In the second appeal (Daniel Langlois), paragraph 5 is to the same effect except for any appropriate adjustments and except also for the fact that, in subparagraph (k), sub-subparagraph (ii) reads as follows:
[TRANSLATION]
bookkeeping and preparation of payroll.
In addition the text of subparagraph (s) is not reproduced, with the result that the last subparagraph is (v).
[7] In the third appeal (Jean-Claude Langlois), paragraph 5 is likewise to the same effect except for any appropriate adjustments and except also for the fact that, in subparagraph (k), sub-subparagraph (ii) reads as follows:
[TRANSLATION]
maintenance person
- building maintenance.
There is as well the addition of a sub-subparagraph (iii) reading as follows:
[TRANSLATION]
(iii) management - administration
- hiring and lay-off of employees
- setting employees' schedules
- purchasing food and beverages.
Again, there is also the fact that the text of subparagraph (s) is not reproduced, with the same result as in the Reply in the second appeal.
[8] In the above-mentioned Replies to the Notices of Appeal the Court has indicated in parentheses after each subparagraph the comments made by counsel for the appellants at the start of the hearing, as follows:
(A) = admitted
(D) = denied
Appellants' evidence
According to Daniel Langlois:
[9] He did in fact read the report of the appeals officer (Exhibit A-1) in his case.
[10] It is true his parents initially purchased a residence known as "Le Cormoran" which they converted into an inn.
[11] It is also true that Daniel Langlois then decided, along with his parents, to purchase the Domaine de la Belle Plage, a bankrupt inn located two hundred feet from Le Cormoran. That is how he came into the picture and the payer was then incorporated.
[12] Le Cormoran was then leased to the payer.
[13] Both businesses are of course of the Bed & Breakfast (B & B) type catering to tourists and there was duplication.
[14] It was therefore decided to have a single operation and customers could have breakfast at either place without any difficulty.
[15] The payer operated during the tourist season, on holidays and during school vacations.
[16] There were indeed three people on the Board of Directors and they met officially from time to time to decide on opening and closing dates, on work to be done and on employees' salaries. In addition, the three of them discussed matters on a daily basis if necessary".
[17] Work shifts were generally from 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. and from 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m.
[18] If there were problems it was the desk clerk who looked after them.
[19] It was the Board of Directors which assigned duties, and these never changed very much, except for small adjustments from year to year.
[20] Daniel Langlois finished his shift at 3:00 p.m. and then dealt with paperwork, undisturbed, for two hours.
[21] He earned $7 an hour at the reception desk and $10.50 an hour for the paperwork.
[22] However, he did not provide the investigator with this breakdown.
[23] The review of the payroll (Exhibit A-2) did indicate the salaries paid by the payer.
[24] Daniel Langlois used the payer's credit card to buy things for the payer and also to make trips to Québec, though not particularly on business.
[25] During the renovation period he went to buy materials for the payer, even though he was not being paid.
[26] While he was [TRANSLATION] "on unemployment" he worked doing the payroll, paying invoices and preparing cheques, all of which took up perhaps one day a month.
[27] A table (Exhibit A-3) prepared by the unemployment insurance authorities showed his work weeks and the weeks he was unemployed.
[28] He also sometimes worked at the reception desk even when he was unemployed.
[29] Although his work schedule did not always correspond to that of his parents, he was nevertheless supervised as they had frequent discussions.
[30] In any case, it was in his parents' interest to keep an eye on him, and there were even disagreements between the three shareholders when something was not right.
[31] The payer did indeed pay his parents rental for the lease of Le Cormoran.
[32] Employment and Immigration Canada officials have already found his employment to be insurable for his first period at issue (Exhibit A-4).
[33] The same was also true in his mother's case for the first such period (Exhibit A-5).
[34] The same was also true in his father's case for the first such period (Exhibit A-6).
[35] In all three cases it was s. 3(1)(a) of the Unemployment Insurance Act ("the Act") which was relied on.
[36] Daniel Langlois also read the reports of the appeals officer in his mother's case (Exhibit A-7) and his father's (Exhibit A-8).
[37] Other tables (Exhibits I-1 and I-2) prepared by the unemployment insurance authorities indicated the work weeks and weeks of unemployment of his father and his mother.
[38] It was Daniel Langlois who prepared the payer's records of employment and payrolls; however, the payer used an accountant to ensure that everything was in order and to prepare tax returns and annual financial statements.
[39] The matter of the trip to Florida was quite simple: an employee took time off work and the shareholders divided his shift between them thus accumulating work days for which they were then paid.
[40] His father handled daily maintenance: such things as a leaking toilet, for example, but for major work the payer used specialized contractors.
[41] It was his mother who hired chambermaids.
[42] If not many rooms were rented a chambermaid might also work at the reception desk or the desk clerk might do one or two rooms.
[43] Telephone calls were transferred to his or his parents' homes when no one was at the inns, as a quick response was always necessary so as not to lose customers.
[44] On June 10, 1992 the three appellants did indeed borrow the sum of $20,000 net capital for the payer (Exhibit I-3) from a caisse populaire.
[45] There were other loans of this type and the three shareholders may also have stood surety for the payer.
[46] The payrolls (Exhibit I-4) clearly indicate the salaries paid to the payer's employees.
[47] A bundle of invoices from the months of November and December 1993 (Exhibit I-5) indicate that Daniel Langlois had signed a number of them after his lay-off on November 6, 1993.
[48] It was during the renovation work that, to be helpful, he went to make purchases at a hardware store near where he lived.
[49] Moreover, his father did likewise.
[50] Daniel Langlois signed other documents (Exhibit I-6) for the payer in January 1994, including 26 cheques.
[51] He signed a number of other invoices for the payer (Exhibits I-7) in February 1994.
[52] He signed a number of others (Exhibits I-8) in March 1994 and he also signed a ski pass for guests at the inn.
[53] The same was true in April and May 1994 and the bundles of invoices (Exhibits I-9 and I-10) clearly show this.
[54] The renovation work for which all these invoices were issued ended before June 1994.
[55] The cheques (Exhibit I-11) indicate that Daniel Langlois signed a number of them after his lay-off on October 24, 1992.
[56] A bundle of invoices (Exhibit I-12) indicate that a number of them were also signed by his father in November and December 1993 after his lay-off on November 6, 1993: here again these were mostly invoices relating to the renovation work.
[57] There were others (Exhibit I-13) in February, March and April 1994 when his father was collecting unemployment insurance benefits.
[58] A bundle of food invoices (Exhibit I-14) show that there was activity at the inns in October, November and December 1993.
[59] Other invoices (Exhibit I-15) were signed by Daniel Langlois's mother in November 1993 after she was laid off on the sixth of that month.
[60] Purchases (Exhibit I-16) were also signed by her after this first lay-off: in this other bundle, there were two purchases made on a business trip to Québec on November 29, 1993.
[61] Cheques drawn on the payer's account (Exhibit I-17) were signed by his father and his mother after November 6, 1993.
[62] The respondent called no witnesses.
Argument
According to counsel for the appellants:
[63] The Minister had a discretion to exercise and according to the Federal Court of Appeal in Attorney General of Canada v. Jencan Ltd. (A-599-96), this involves two stages. As the Chief Justice wrote for the court in that case (at p. 25):
In other words, it is only where the Minister's determination lacks a reasonable evidentiary foundation that the Tax Court's intervention is warranted. An assumption of fact that is disproved at trial may, but does not necessarily, constitute a defect which renders a determination by the Minister contrary to law. It will depend on the strength or weakness of the remaining evidence. The Tax Court must, therefore, go one step further and ask itself whether, without the assumptions of fact which have been disproved, there is sufficient evidence remaining to support the determination made by the Minister. If that question is answered in the affirmative, the inquiry ends. But, if answered in the negative, the determination is contrary to law, and only then is the Tax Court justified in engaging in its own assessment of the balance of probabilities.
[64] Given the report by the appeals officer (Exhibit A-1), the Minister had little choice as the officer really exaggerated and even went overboard.
[65] The trip to Florida has nothing to do with the insurability of the appellants' employment.
[66] The appeals officer distorted the facts.
[67] The appellants do not deny they did some things they should not have done, but that is not a sufficient reason to reject the insurability of their employment.
[68] The appeals officer made much of the invoices signed outside the periods at issue, but clearly the date of an invoice does not necessarily correspond to the date of the purchase.
[69] Likewise cheques are not always prepared on the date shown on them.
[70] There was control as sometimes there was heated discussion even among the three shareholders.
[71] It should not be forgotten that there were three managers who shared the duties between them and kept an eye on each other.
[72] Thérèse Bouchard worked at the inns nearly all the time.
[73] It was better to have calls transferred to their private homes than to open the business when there were no customers.
[74] If the mere fact of taking risks as a shareholder were to be an impediment to the insurability of employment, no shareholder would ever be entitled to unemployment insurance benefits.
[75] It is not all that serious a thing to go and make a few purchases at the corner hardware store, even when one is on unemployment insurance.
[76] In the case of Daniel Langlois, under s. 43(1) of the Act time has expired with respect to the first period at issue, namely June 21 to October 24, 1992. That provision reads as follows:
43. (1) Notwithstanding section 86 but subject to subsection (6), the Commission may at any time within 36 months after benefit has been paid or would have been payable reconsider any claim made in respect thereof and if the Commission decides that a person has received money by way of benefit thereunder for which he was not qualified or to which he was not entitled or has not received money for which he was qualified and to which he was entitled, the Commission shall calculate the amount that was so received or payable, as the case may be, and notify the claimant of its decision.
[77] In Jencan, supra, the Chief Justice of the Federal Court of Appeal wrote for the court (at p. 18):
The Tax Court is justified in interfering with the Minister's determination under subparagraph 3(2)(c)(ii) - by proceeding to review the merits of the Minister's determination - where it is established that the Minister: (i) acted in bad faith or for an improper purpose or motive; (ii) failed to take into account all of the relevant circumstances, as expressly required by paragraph 3(2)(c)(ii); or (iii) took into account an irrelevant factor.
He added (at pp. 20 and 21):
An important point needs to be made here. While all interested parties, including the Worker and the respondent, are given the opportunity to make submissions to a Revenue Canada appeals officer prior to a determination by the Minister under subsection 61(3) of the UI Act, there is no opportunity to respond to the evidence collected by the appeals officer or to make submissions directly to the Minister prior to his determination. It was, presumably, in recognition of this fact that Parliament provided claimants with an appeal as of right from a determination by the Minister under section 70. On appeal, the facts relied upon by the Minister in making his determination are treated as assumptions, or allegations, of fact. Although the claimant, who is the party appealing the Minister's determination, has the burden of proving its case, this Court has held unequivocally that the claimant is entitled to bring new evidence at the Tax Court hearing to challenge the assumptions of fact relied upon by the Minister.
[78] The Court has more to go on than the appeals officer had, as the evidence has disclosed new facts that could be used to challenge the assumptions of fact relied on by the Minister.
[79] In Marcel Perreault v. M.N.R. (93-1736(UI)), the Chief Judge of this Court wrote (at pp. 7 and 8):
I have always considered that an appellant's testimony under oath at a civil trial, such as that of an appeal before the Curt, constituted legal evidence and that that evidence was sufficient to confirm his allegations, unless the judge doubted his integrity and thus his testimony's validity or it was contradicted by evidence in rebuttal. It is obviously up to the presiding judge to determine whether or not that testimony is credible. Such a conclusion is possible by observing the witness's conduct, the manner in which he answers the questions that are put to him. The judge may fairly quickly determine whether or not he can believe a witness.
[80] Daniel Langlois was credible and gave the Court a very good explanation of the entire situation.
[81] In Ranjit Darbhanga v. M.N.R. (A-259-94), Pratte J.A. wrote for the Federal Court of Appeal (at p. 2):
a contract may be a contract of service even though the employer does not supervise the work of the employee if he actually has that right.
[82] It is apparent that the Board of Directors had a supervisory power over the appellants.
[83] In The Attorney General of Canada v. Gayle Hennick (A-328-94), Desjardins J.A. wrote for the Federal Court of Appeal (at p. 5):
Besides, what is relevant is not so much the actual exercise of a control as the right to exercise a control.
According to counsel for the respondent:
[84] There is no time limit in insurability matters and counsel would submit a decision to this effect to the Court. As recorded in the transcript, counsel for the appellants could respond if necessary before August 17, 1998.
[85] Counsel for the respondent submitted to the Court on or before August 7, 1997, and said she had sent to counsel for the appellants, an order by Deputy Judge Somers of this Court in Nicole Poirier v. M.N.R. (95-831(UI)) in which it is stated (at pp. 2 and 3):
The respondent argued that this Court always has jurisdiction to determine the insurability of the employment of a person who claims unemployment insurance benefits, regardless of the actions of the Employment and Immigration Commission; the respondent also submitted that the Commission was not out of time when it reconsidered the appellant's claim for benefits.
Subsection 61 (3) of the Unemployment insurance Act gives the Commission the right to apply to the Minister of National Revenue for a determination concerning the insurability of employment. Time is not a factor to be considered. The English version of this subsection of the Act specifies that this application may be made “at any time”.
The appeal of this decision was brought under section 70 of the Unemployment Insurance Act and this Court has the authority to decide any question of fact or of law necessary to be decided in determining the question under section 71 of the Unemployment Insurance Act.
Thus, the only question that this Court must decide is the correctness of the decision rendered by the Minister of national Revenue concerning the appellant's insurability. Time limits are not a factor to be considered.
[86] Counsel for the appellants did not respond before August 17, 1998, which indicates that he decided there was no reason to do so.
Also according to counsel for the respondent:
[87] The employment is excepted and the Minister was right not to include it in insurable employment.
[88] It is true that, according to Jencan, supra, there may be two stages, but as there is sufficient evidence in the instant case to warrant the decision by the Minister the inquiry must be closed and it is not for the Court to undertake its own assessment of the balance of probabilities.
[89] The appellants have not discharged their burden of proof and two of them did not testify, although there were three reports by the appeals officer, one for each case.
[90] The Minister said he relied on evidence supplied to him by the appeals officer and there were large gaps in the evidence presented at the hearing.
[91] In Lola Lévesque et al. v. Martin Comeau et al., [1970] S.C.R. 1010, Pigeon J. wrote for the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada (at pp. 1012 and 1013):
This is not all. Appellant Lola Lévesque's expert examined her for the first time more than a year after the accident, and after she had consulted several doctors and undergone different examinations in the meantime. She alone could bring before the Court the evidence of those facts and she failed to do it. In my opinion, the rule to be applied in such circumstances is that a court must presume that such evidence would adversely affect her case.
[92] Daniel Langlois admitted he had not given the appeals officer the breakdown of his hourly rate.
[93] In these cases under review the appeals officer used questionnaires and prepared his report on the basis of the answers received.
[94] The trip to Florida is important and proves that there was hour banking, which is not allowed.
[95] The many invoices filed indicate that a lot of work was done when the appellants were receiving unemployment insurance benefits and it is clear that unrelated persons would not have acted in this way.
[96] Exhibits A-3, I-1 and I-2 indicate clearly that the periods of unemployment were very significant in the appellants' year.
[97] In 1993, from November 6 onward, the three shareholders were unemployed for a time.
[98] The business in question was a service business and, even if all rooms are not rented, someone must be present and there must be management on the spot at all times.
[99] The three shareholders each had their own duties and there was no relationship of subordination.
[100] They borrowed money for the payer and also stood surety for it.
Analysis
[101] In a letter of January 5, 1996, to Revenue Canada, for the attention of the head of the Appeals Division, Jean-Claude Langlois wrote inter alia:
[TRANSLATION]
without accessibility to unemployment insurance the company would have to adjust our annual salaries upwards by large amounts, which, in view of the fragile nature of tourism, would amount to bankrupting the company . . .
[102] That clearly indicates his view of unemployment insurance and requires no comment.
[103] The non-arms-length relationship existed and so the appellants' employment was excepted at the outset under the Act.
[104] The Minister could have included it in insurable employment, but did not do so, and the Court must decide whether or not he acted properly in this regard.
[105] The appellants denied subparagraph (g) above, but they did not establish the contrary and what appears therein is presumed to be true.
[106] The appellants denied subparagraph (l), but in the case of the female appellant and her husband there is no evidence to the contrary.
[107] As for Daniel Langlois, he did more than his normal shift, but that does not in any way alter the conclusion below.
[108] The appellants denied subparagraph (o), but it has been established that their hours worked were not recorded.
[109] They admitted that after their alleged annual lay-offs they were paid at an hourly rate.
[110] They denied that after their alleged annual lay-offs they worked over 15 hours most weeks, until their alleged return to full-time work each year, but the documentary evidence clearly showed this to be the case.
[111] They also denied that after their alleged lay-offs they provided services to the payer without pay, but the evidence as a whole demonstrates that they did.
[112] The three appellants worked at the reception desk, but apart from that they each had very specific duties.
[113] Daniel Langlois said that it was the Board of Directors that had control, but the minutes book was not filed although it was the appellants who had the burden of proof.
[114] It would have been interesting to consult it to see what was decided regarding control.
[115] Daniel Langlois did not give the investigators a breakdown of his salary, but this does not in any way alter the conclusion below.
[116] Daniel Langlois used the payer's credit card for his own personal purposes and an unrelated person certainly would not have been able to do that.
[117] During the renovations he went to make many purchases without being paid; an unrelated person certainly would not have done that either.
[118] The same is true of the cheques signed by him and the payrolls he prepared when he was on unemployment insurance.
[119] He even did a little work at the reception desk when he was collecting unemployment insurance benefits.
[120] An occasional squabble among shareholders is not necessarily indicative of control.
[121] The Minister can always review decisions of Employment and Immigration Canada officials as it is he who has the last word before an appeal to this Court.
[122] The tables in Exhibits A-3, I-1 and I-2 indicate that the appellants laid themselves off for extended periods and then claimed unemployment insurance.
[123] No inference can be drawn from the transfer of telephone calls.
[124] The appellants borrowed money for the payer and stood surety on its behalf, which unrelated persons certainly would not have done.
[125] The documentary evidence regarding the invoices signed by Daniel Langlois and by his father and mother when they were on unemployment insurance is overwhelming.
[126] The same is true of the documentary evidence concerning the cheques made outside the periods at issue.
[127] The female appellant made a business trip to Québec after being laid off.
[128] Considering the evidence as a whole, it was sufficient to warrant not proceeding to the second stage contemplated in Jencan, supra. With great respect for the opposite view, the Court is of the opinion that the appeals officer performed his duty properly and did a good job of putting the Minister in the picture as he was required to do.
[129] The trip to Florida affects insurability as it indicates that there was hour banking, a practice which is not permitted.
[130] Counsel for the appellants admitted that there were things which his clients should not have done, and this is a major admission.
[131] The date on an invoice may not necessarily correspond to the date of the purchase, but the large number of invoices filed proves beyond any doubt that a significant number of purchases were made outside the periods at issue.
[132] The same applies to the cheques, also issued outside the said periods.
[133] In unemployment insurance matters each case is sui generis.
[134] The order of Deputy Judge Somers in Poirier, supra, clearly indicates that no time limit applies in matters of insurability for unemployment insurance purposes.
[135] The Minister did not act in bad faith or for an improper purpose or motive; he took all of the relevant circumstances into account and he did not take any irrelevant factors into account.
[136] Two of the three appellants did not even come to the Court to submit new evidence and challenge the assumptions of fact relied on by the Minister.
[137] As in Lévesque, supra, the rule to be applied is that in such circumstances the court must assume that such evidence would have adversely affected the appellants' case.
[138] Daniel Langlois testified, but he was not able to make any valid challenge to the assumptions of fact relied on by the Minister.
[139] As is stated in Perreault, supra, it is true that testimony under oath may constitute legal evidence, but still the witness must say something valid and soundly based to counter the ministerial decision being challenged.
[140] Darbhanga, supra, and Hennick, supra, clearly establish that the power to exercise control may suffice, but in the instant case the best evidence would have been the payer's minutes book, and it was not filed. Further, control is only one aspect to be considered in resolving this case.
[141] The breakdown of the hours worked by Daniel Langlois and of the hours for which he was paid is a new fact which the Minister could not consider as he was unaware of it, but that clearly cannot constitute sufficient grounds for allowing his appeal.
[142] The reports of the appeals officer clearly indicated that his method consisted in using telephone conversations and questionnaires and that the workers even asked him to give them a month to send him the documents required.
[143] It is very strange that the three appellants who managed the business were at one point all on unemployment insurance at the same time.
[144] The three appeals must therefore be dismissed and the three decisions appealed from affirmed.
Signed at Laval, Quebec, this 23rd day of September 1998.
"A. Prévost"
D.J.T.C.C.
[OFFICIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION]
Translation certified true on this 30th day of April 1999.
Erich Klein, Revisor