Territorial Court

Decision Information

Decision information:

Abstract: Transcript of the Reasons for Sentence

Decision Content














                                            T-1-CR-2005000624



              IN THE TERRITORIAL COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES



              IN THE MATTER OF:





                                HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

                                        - V -

                                MICHAEL BRUNO CHINKON



             __________________________________________________________

             TRANSCRIPT OF THE REASONS FOR SENTENCE DELIVERED BY THE

             HONOURABLE CHIEF JUDGE B.A. BRUSER, SITTING IN YELLOWKNIFE, IN

             THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES, ON THE 3RD DAY OF FEBRUARY,

             A.D. 2006.

             __________________________________________________________






             APPEARANCES:

             MR. B. GAUNT:                  COUNSEL FOR THE CROWN

             MR. H. LATIMER:                COUNSEL FOR THE ACCUSED



               (CHARGE UNDER S. 271 OF THE CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA)


                  BAN ON PUBLICATION OF COMPLAINANT/WITNESS PURSUANT
                          TO SECTION 486 OF THE CRIMINAL CODE








        OFFICIAL COURT REPORTERS





                THE COURT:             THE CHARGE IS THAT ON OR ABOUT

                    THE 26TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2005, AT WHAT IS

                    REFERRED TO AS THE HAMLET OF RAE-EDZO, NOW

                    BECHOKÖ, IN THIS JURISDICTION, THIS OFFENDER,

                    BORN JANUARY 27TH, 1986, COMMITTED A SEXUAL

                    ASSAULT ON THE COMPLAINANT, WHOSE INITIALS ARE

                    T.M.

                         THERE IS A COURT-ORDERED BAN PROTECTING THE

                    IDENTITY OF THE COMPLAINANT FROM BEING BROADCAST,

                    PUBLISHED, OR TRANSMITTED.  MADAM REPORTER,

                    SHOULD A TRANSCRIPT BE ORDERED, THE TRANSCRIPT IS

                    TO MAKE REFERENCE TO THE BAN ON THE COVER PAGE.

                         I RETURN TO A THEME THAT MR. LATIMER TOUCHED

                    UPON AND WHICH HAS BEEN MADE ABUNDANTLY CLEAR TO

                    THIS COURT.  MICHAEL CHINKON IS AN IMMATURE

                    20-YEAR-OLD.  THERE IS NO QUESTION ABOUT IT.  HE

                    HAS NO CRIMINAL RECORD.  HE IS ABORIGINAL; A

                    FACTOR THAT I CAN TAKE INTO ACCOUNT UNDER THE

                    CRIMINAL CODE.  HE WAS ONE DAY SHORT OF HIS 19TH

                    BIRTHDAY WHEN HE SEXUALLY ASSAULTED THIS VICTIM

                    ON THE DATE I REFERRED TO.  THE VICTIM WAS 18

                    YEARS OF AGE WHEN SHE TESTIFIED.

                         THE CROWN PROCEEDED BY WAY OF SUMMARY

                    CONVICTION.  AT LEAST TWICE IN THE PROCEEDINGS, I

                    FELL INTO THE ERROR OF TREATING THIS AS AN

                    INDICTABLE OFFENCE BECAUSE OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF

                    WHAT OCCURRED, AND I FIND IT REMARKABLE THAT THE






       OFFICIAL COURT REPORTERS
                                        1





                    CROWN DID PROCEED IN THIS WAY.  BUT THIS IS THE

                    DISCRETION OF THE CROWN TO EXERCISE AND IT IS NOT

                    FOR THE COURT TO QUESTION OR TO TRY TO UNDERSTAND

                    HOW IT IS THAT THIS OCCURRED.  I MERELY POINT OUT

                    THAT AS WEIGHED AGAINST THE EVIDENCE, IT APPEARS

                    TO BE A REMARKABLE CHOICE OF THE WAY TO PROCEED.

                    AND BECAUSE THE CROWN PROCEEDED THIS WAY,

                    MR. CHINKON, BY WAY OF SUMMARY CONVICTION, IF

                    THERE IS TO BE IMPRISONMENT, THE CAP ON IT AT THE

                    UPPER LEVEL IS 18 MONTHS.  I CANNOT GO FURTHER

                    THAN THAT.  HAD THE CROWN GONE BY INDICTMENT, I

                    COULD HAVE CONSIDERED UP TO TEN YEARS.

                THE ACCUSED:           TEN YEARS.

                THE COURT:             THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF WHAT


                    OCCURRED ARE NOW IN MORE DETAIL AS FOLLOWS.  I

                    WILL NOT GO INTO ALL THE EVIDENCE.  I WILL FOCUS

                    ON WHAT OCCURRED IN THE BATHROOM OF THIS HOME

                    WHERE THE VICTIM HAD BEEN VISITING AND WHERE A

                    SMALL PARTY HAD BEEN HAPPENING.

                         THE ACCUSED HAD BEEN DRINKING.  THE VICTIM,

                    DURING THE COURSE OF THE EVENTS, WENT INTO A

                    WASHROOM.  THERE HAD BEEN NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN

                    HER AND THE ACCUSED BEFORE SHE WENT INTO THE

                    WASHROOM.  THEY APPEAR TO HAVE KNOWN EACH OTHER

                    AND APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN FRIENDS AND THAT WAS THE

                    EXTENT OF IT.  SHE WAS ABOUT TO CLOSE THE DOOR OF

                    THE WASHROOM.  THAT IS WHEN THE ACCUSED ENTERED.






       OFFICIAL COURT REPORTERS
                                        2





                    ONLY THE TWO OF THEM WERE INSIDE.  THE OFFENDER

                    TURNED THE LIGHTS OFF.  HE LOCKED THE DOOR.  THE

                    VICTIM ENDED UP AGAINST THE WALL OF THE BATHROOM.

                    HE WENT AGAINST HER.  HE PINNED HER AGAINST THE

                    WALL.  SOMEHOW SHE ENDED UP ON THE FLOOR.  HE WAS

                    ON TOP OF HER.  HE PULLED HER PANTS DOWN TO HER

                    ANKLES AND HE PULLED HER UNDERPANTS DOWN.  HE

                    PULLED HIS OWN PANTS DOWN.  IT SEEMS TO ME FROM

                    THE EVIDENCE THAT HIS OWN PANTS WENT DOWN BEFORE

                    HE WENT TO THE FLOOR, BUT IT IS NOT IMPORTANT FOR

                    THE PURPOSES OF THE SENTENCING WHICH OCCURRED

                    FIRST, THE FLOOR OR THE PANTS COMING DOWN,

                    REGARDING BOTH PERSONS.

                         IN ANY EVENT, THERE THEY WERE ON THE FLOOR.

                    SHE TOLD HIM TO STOP.  SHE TRIED TO PUSH HIM OFF,

                    BUT HE WAS TOO HEAVY.  THERE WAS A KNOCK ON THE

                    DOOR.  IT WAS THE FRIEND OF THE VICTIM, SAYING

                    WORDS TO THE EFFECT, "TRISHA, OPEN THE DOOR."

                    THE ACCUSED HAD TOLD THE VICTIM NOT TO SAY

                    ANYTHING, SO SHE SAID NOTHING.

                         WITH HIS HANDS, HE WAS TOUCHING HER VAGINA

                    WHILE THE EVENTS WERE OCCURRING.  AND SHE

                    TESTIFIED IN CHIEF THAT HIS PENIS TOUCHED HER

                    VAGINA.  IN CROSS-EXAMINATION, WITH RESPECT TO

                    THE ISSUE THAT I REFERRED TO EARLIER IN THE

                    EXCHANGE WITH DEFENCE COUNSEL, THE PENIS, SHE

                    SAID, WENT INTO HER "ALMOST".  I FIND ON THE






       OFFICIAL COURT REPORTERS
                                        3





                    EVIDENCE THAT HE TOUCHED HER VAGINA AREA WITH HIS

                    HAND AND THAT HIS PENIS DID TOUCH HER VAGINA.  I

                    AM NOT PREPARED TO FIND THAT THE PENIS WENT

                    FURTHER INTO IT.  THIS STILL TAKES IT INTO A

                    CATEGORY OF A VERY SERIOUS SEXUAL ASSAULT.

                         AT ONE POINT WHEN SHE HAD CONSIDERED YELLING

                    FOR HELP, HIS HAND COVERED HER MOUTH.

                         THE IMPACT ON THE VICTIM HAS BEEN

                    SIGNIFICANT.  IT IS SUMMARIZED WELL AT PAGE 6 OF

                    THE PRE-SENTENCE REPORT.  I WILL REFER NOW TO

                    PARTS OF THE REPORT UNDER THE HEADING "INTERVIEW

                    WITH VICTIM".  I HAVE ALSO TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT THE

                    VICTIM IMPACT MATERIAL FILED AS AN EXHIBIT.

                         IN THE PRE-SENTENCE REPORT, SHE IS QUOTED AS

                    SAYING "I HAVE NIGHTMARES AND TROUBLE SLEEPING SO

                    I MISSED LOTS OF SCHOOL AND IT'S HARD TO

                    CONCENTRATE ON SCHOOL."  SHE MAKES OTHER COMMENTS

                    AT THE THIRD PARAGRAPH DOWN, UNDERNEATH THE

                    HEADING "INTERVIEW WITH VICTIM".  I AM NOT GOING

                    TO READ IT.  I DO NOT THINK THAT THE PUBLIC OUGHT

                    TO BE PRIVY TO WHAT IS IN THAT PARAGRAPH; BUT I

                    HAVE TAKEN IT INTO ACCOUNT.

                         IN THE LAST PARAGRAPH UNDER THAT HEADING,

                    THE VICTIM REPORTS THAT THE INCIDENT AFFECTED HER

                    RELATIONSHIP NOT ONLY WITH HER FRIENDS BUT ALSO

                    WITH HER FAMILY, ESPECIALLY HER MOTHER.  IT HAS

                    AFFECTED HER ABILITY TO GO TO SCHOOL, AND SHE






       OFFICIAL COURT REPORTERS
                                        4





                    JUST WANTS TO PUT IT BEHIND HER.

                         THE BACKGROUND OF THE OFFENDER IS EXPLORED

                    IN DEPTH BY THE AUTHOR OF THE REPORT.  I HAVE

                    CONSIDERED ALL OF IT ALONG WITH EVERY OTHER PART

                    OF THE PRE-SENTENCE REPORT.  THE ACCUSED HAD SOME

                    ROUGH SPOTS IN HIS BACKGROUND.  HIS FATHER LEFT

                    THE FAMILY HOME.  THE PARENTS SEPARATED IN 2000.

                    AS A CHILD, A YOUNG ONE, HE WITNESSED HIS FATHER

                    BEATING UP ON HIS MOTHER WHEN THE FATHER DRANK.

                    THE PARENTS FOUGHT.  WHEN THEY DID SO,

                    MR. CHINKON WOULD BECOME FRIGHTENED.  HE WANTED

                    TO LEAVE.  HE REPORTS ON HOW SAD HE FELT.  HIS

                    BACKGROUND HAS NOT BEEN WHAT ONE WOULD CALL

                    PRIVILEGED.

                         WHEN I PUT TOGETHER THE PRE-SENTENCE REPORT,

                    THE MATERIAL FILED TODAY, THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF

                    WHAT OCCURRED AND HOW IT OCCURRED, THE SENTENCING

                    EVIDENCE AND THE SUBMISSIONS, I ARRIVE AT THE

                    CONCLUSION I REFERRED TO EARLIER, THAT BEYOND ANY

                    DOUBT MICHAEL BRUNO CHINKON, COMMONLY REFERRED TO

                    AS JONATHAN, IS IMMATURE.  HE IS YOUNG, BUT HE IS

                    IMMATURE FOR HIS AGE.  HE IS AN IMMATURE ADULT

                    AND HE IS AN IMMATURE 20-YEAR-OLD.  THE MATERIAL

                    I HAVE REFERRED TO BEARS THIS OUT.

                         WHEN HE COMMITTED THE SEXUAL ASSAULT, WHICH

                    WAS ONE OF OPPORTUNITY AND IMPULSE RATHER THAN A

                    CAREFULLY PLANNED COURSE OF ACTION, HE DID NOT






       OFFICIAL COURT REPORTERS
                                        5





                    THEN APPEAR TO APPRECIATE HOW HIS BEHAVIOUR

                    IMPACTED UPON THE VICTIM.  THIS REALIZATION

                    SLOWLY SEEPED INTO HIS CONSCIOUSNESS AFTER HE WAS

                    ARRESTED AND RELEASED ON A PROMISE TO APPEAR AT

                    THE BEGINNING OF FEBRUARY LAST YEAR.

                         THE CROWN IS ASKING THE COURT TO IMPOSE A

                    PERIOD OF INCARCERATION IN THE RANGE OF 12 TO 15

                    MONTHS.  THE CROWN IS OPPOSED TO A CONDITIONAL

                    SENTENCE ORDER.

                         A CONDITIONAL SENTENCE ORDER, FOR THE

                    BENEFIT OF THE PUBLIC, IS A PERIOD OF

                    IMPRISONMENT, BUT IT IS NOT IMPRISONMENT IN A

                    CORRECTIONAL CENTRE.  USUALLY IT IS SERVED IN A

                    HOME IN THE COMMUNITY.

                         THE CROWN HAS ASKED THE COURT TO MAKE A DNA

                    ORDER, AND I DO NOW MAKE IT.  IT IS A PRIMARY

                    DESIGNATED OFFENCE.  THERE IS NO REASON NOT TO

                    MAKE IT.

                         THE CROWN IS NOT ASKING THE COURT TO MAKE A

                    STAND-ALONE FIREARM PROHIBITION ORDER, AND THE

                    CROWN IS NOT ASKING THE COURT TO HAVE THE

                    OFFENDER REGISTER UNDER THE SEX OFFENDER

                    REGISTRATION INFORMATION ACT.

                         THE DEFENCE ARGUES THAT A CONDITIONAL

                    SENTENCE OF IMPRISONMENT OR PROBATION WOULD BE A

                    MORE FIT AND PROPER SENTENCE.  THE PROBATION

                    SENTENCE, IF IT WERE TO BE GRANTED, WOULD HAVE TO






       OFFICIAL COURT REPORTERS
                                        6





                    BE IN ADDITION TO IMPRISONMENT.  IMPRISONMENT

                    COULD BE ONE DAY, OR IT COULD BE BY WAY OF A

                    SUSPENDED SENTENCE.  THE DEFENCE IS NOT ASKING

                    THAT IT BE BY WAY OF A CONDITIONAL DISCHARGE.

                         THE DEFENCE ARGUES THAT REHABILITATION AND

                    REINTEGRATION, TWO IMPORTANT SENTENCING

                    CONSIDERATIONS, WOULD BE BEST ACHIEVED BY MEANS

                    OF A COMMUNITY-BASED SENTENCE.  THE DEFENCE

                    ARGUES THAT THE IMMATURITY OF THE OFFENDER, THE

                    ABSENCE OF A RECORD, THE FACT THAT THIS WAS OUT

                    OF CHARACTER OR AN ISOLATED INCIDENT, ARE

                    MITIGATING.  THAT IS, THEY COUNT IN FAVOUR OF THE

                    ACCUSED.  THE CROWN, ON THE OTHER HAND, SAYS THAT

                    THERE IS NOTHING MITIGATING.  I PREFER THE

                    ARGUMENT OF THE DEFENCE IN THIS RESPECT.

                         THE DEFENCE SAYS THAT MR. CHINKON IS NOT A

                    DANGER TO THE COMMUNITY.  THE CROWN DOES NOT

                    ARGUE THAT HE POSES A DANGER TO THE COMMUNITY.

                    BUT WHETHER OR NOT HE IS A DANGER TO THE

                    COMMUNITY IS NOT BY ITSELF DETERMINATIVE.  THE

                    DEFENCE PLEADS FOR ONE LAST CHANCE FOR

                    MR. CHINKON BY WAY OF SOMETHING OTHER THAN

                    INCARCERATION.

                         IN ARGUING THAT THERE ARE SUFFICIENT

                    AGGRAVATING FACTORS TO MAKE INCARCERATION

                    NECESSARY, AND SUPPORTING THAT ARGUMENT WITH THE

                    GOALS OR OBJECTIVES, PURPOSE AND PRINCIPLES OF






       OFFICIAL COURT REPORTERS
                                        7





                    SENTENCING, THE CROWN HAS ADDRESSED THE

                    CIRCUMSTANCES OF WHAT OCCURRED, THE KEY PARTS OF

                    WHICH I HAVE ALREADY REVIEWED, THE EFFECT ON THE

                    VICTIM, WHICH I HAVE ALREADY REVIEWED, AND THE

                    ABSENCE OF AN INDICATION THAT HE FULLY ACCEPTS

                    RESPONSIBILITY FOR WHAT HE DID, PARTICULARLY IN

                    THE PRE-SENTENCE REPORT.  ALTHOUGH IN COURT

                    TODAY, HE ACKNOWLEDGED, WHEN I ASKED HIM, THAT

                    WHAT HE DID MADE HIM -- OR MAKES HIM FEEL BADLY,

                    AND HE ACKNOWLEDGES THAT IT WAS AGAINST HER WILL.

                         THE CROWN SAYS THAT PRIMARY DETERRENCE (THAT

                    IS, A NEED TO DISCOURAGE THIS OFFENDER FROM

                    REOFFENDING), SECONDARY OR GENERAL DETERRENCE,

                    WHICH IS THE NEED TO DISCOURAGE THE PUBLIC

                    GENERALLY (THAT IS, THOSE OUT THERE WHO MIGHT DO

                    THIS SORT OF THING), AND DENUNCIATION, ALONG WITH

                    PARITY (THAT IS, HOW OTHER OFFENDERS IN THESE

                    TYPES OF CIRCUMSTANCES ARE TREATED), MAKE

                    IMPRISONMENT NECESSARY.

                         CROWN COUNSEL ALSO ARGUES THAT THE OFFENDER

                    IS NOT CREDIBLE.  CERTAINLY THERE ARE GAPS IN HIS

                    CREDIBILITY.  HE TESTIFIED ON THE LAST DATE THAT

                    HIS MARKS WERE 80 PERCENT OR BETTER.  THE

                    EVIDENCE TODAY SHOWS THAT THIS WAS NOT SO.  BUT I

                    DO NOT FIND THAT HE WAS LYING.  I THINK THIS IS

                    AN ASPECT OF HIS IMMATURITY.  HE HAD TWO MARKS 80

                    PERCENT OR BETTER AND ASSUMED THAT IS HOW HE MUST






       OFFICIAL COURT REPORTERS
                                        8





                    HAVE DONE.  HE DOES NOT HAVE A GREAT DEAL OF

                    INSIGHT, AND THIS IS THE POINT I AM MAKING AT

                    THIS JUNCTURE.

                         THE CROWN SAYS, ADDITIONALLY, BECAUSE THERE

                    IS SUCH A HIGH PREVALENCE OF THIS SORT OF OFFENCE

                    IN THIS JURISDICTION, A CONDITIONAL SENTENCE

                    ORDER, ALONG WITH THE OTHER FACTORS, WOULD BE

                    INAPPROPRIATE, AND I INFER FROM THIS THAT THE

                    CROWN IS ALSO ARGUING THAT PROBATION ALONG WITH A

                    SUSPENDED SENTENCE WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE,

                    BECAUSE THE CROWN IS STRONGLY ARGUING FOR

                    INCARCERATION.

                         I TURN TO SECTION 742.1 OF THE CRIMINAL

                    CODE.  THIS IS THE SECTION COVERING THE

                    IMPOSITION OF A CONDITIONAL SENTENCE.  IT READS

                    THAT:

                           "WHERE A PERSON IS CONVICTED OF

                           AN OFFENCE, EXCEPT AN OFFENCE

                           THAT IS PUNISHABLE BY A MINIMUM

                           TERM OF IMPRISONMENT, AND THE

                           COURT (A) IMPOSES A SENTENCE OF

                           IMPRISONMENT OF LESS THAN TWO

                           YEARS, AND (B) IS SATISFIED THAT

                           SERVING THE SENTENCE IN THE

                           COMMUNITY WOULD NOT ENDANGER THE

                           SAFETY OF THE COMMUNITY AND WOULD

                           BE CONSISTENT WITH THE






       OFFICIAL COURT REPORTERS
                                        9





                           FUNDAMENTAL PURPOSE AND

                           PRINCIPLES OF SENTENCING ... THE

                           COURT MAY, FOR THE PURPOSE OF

                           SUPERVISING THE OFFENDER'S

                           BEHAVIOUR IN THE COMMUNITY, ORDER

                           THAT THE OFFENDER SERVE THE

                           SENTENCE IN THE COMMUNITY,

                           SUBJECT TO THE OFFENDER'S

                           COMPLYING WITH THE CONDITIONS OF

                           A CONDITIONAL SENTENCE ORDER MADE

                           UNDER SECTION 742.3."

                         THERE YOU HAVE IT.  THAT BRIEF SENTENCE HAS

                    SPAWNED A CONSIDERABLE VOLUME OF LAW, INCLUDING

                    CASES FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA.  I WILL

                    REFER TO SOME OF THE KEY PRINCIPLES THAT HAVE

                    EMERGED FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA THAT I

                    MUST FOLLOW AND DO FOLLOW.  THE EASIEST WAY TO DO

                    THIS IS FROM THE ANNOTATIONS FOLLOWING SECTION

                    742.1 IN MARTIN'S CRIMINAL CODE, 2006 EDITION.  I

                    BELIEVE THE ANNOTATIONS ARE CORRECT.  THEY ARE

                    OFTEN REFERRED TO IN THESE COURTS.  THE

                    PRINCIPLES ARE EXTENSIVE, AND I WILL NOW REFER TO

                    SOME OF THE MOST IMPORTANT ONES, ALTHOUGH I HAD

                    CONSIDERED A WIDER BODY OF LAW IN ARRIVING AT THE

                    ULTIMATE SENTENCE.

                         FROM THE SUPREME COURT CASE OF PROULX IN

                    2000, THE COURT HELD THAT "UNLIKE PROBATION,"






       OFFICIAL COURT REPORTERS
                                        10





                    WHICH IS PRIMARILY A REHABILITATIVE SENTENCE, "A

                    CONDITIONAL SENTENCE IS INTENDED TO ADDRESS BOTH

                    PUNITIVE AND REHABILITATIVE OBJECTIVES."

                         THE PROULX JUDGMENT MAKES IT CLEAR THAT

                    CONDITIONAL SENTENCES SHOULD GENERALLY INCLUDE

                    PUNITIVE CONDITIONS THAT OPERATE TO RESTRICT THE

                    LIBERTY OF THE OFFENDER.  "THEREFORE," THE

                    SUPREME COURT SAID, "CONDITIONS SUCH AS HOUSE

                    ARREST OR STRICT CURFEWS SHOULD BE THE NORM."  IN

                    DECIDING WHETHER TO IMPOSE A CONDITIONAL

                    SENTENCE, THE COURT, AT THE FIRST STAGE, MERELY

                    CONSIDERS WHETHER TO EXCLUDE THE TWO POSSIBILITIES

                    OF A PENITENTIARY TERM OR A NON-CUSTODIAL TERM.

                         IN THIS CASE, THE CROWN IS NOT ASKING THAT

                    MR. CHINKON RECEIVE A PENITENTIARY TERM, AND I AM

                    NOT CONSIDERING A PENITENTIARY TERM.  THAT

                    POSSIBILITY IS EXCLUDED.  IN MY VIEW, A

                    NON-CUSTODIAL SENTENCE IS SIMPLY OUT OF THE

                    QUESTION.  THERE ARE TOO MANY FACTORS THAT

                    OPERATE IN THIS CASE TO MAKE IMPRISONMENT

                    NECESSARY BUT NOT TO THE POINT WHERE IT WOULD BE

                    A PENITENTIARY SENTENCE.  I HAVE NOW EXCLUDED

                    THOSE TWO TYPES OF SENTENCE.

                         IN MAKING THESE PRELIMINARY DETERMINATIONS,

                    A PENITENTIARY SENTENCE BEING EXCLUDED AND A

                    NON-CUSTODIAL SENTENCE BEING EXCLUDED, THE PROULX

                    CASE SAID THAT ALL I HAVE TO CONSIDER, AS I HAVE






       OFFICIAL COURT REPORTERS
                                        11





                    DONE, IS THE FUNDAMENTAL PURPOSE AND PRINCIPLES

                    OF SENTENCING TO THE EXTENT TO NARROW THE RANGE

                    OF SENTENCES FOR THIS OFFENDER FOR HAVING

                    COMMITTED THIS OFFENCE IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES

                    UPON THIS VICTIM.

                         NOW, WHAT I HAVE TO DO IS CONSIDER THE

                    PRINCIPLES OF SENTENCING IN A COMPREHENSIVE WAY

                    IN DETERMINING WHETHER TO IMPOSE A CONDITIONAL

                    SENTENCE.


                         THE PROULX JUDGMENT HAS ALSO SAID THAT AT

                    THIS STAGE THE COURT "MAY PROPERLY CONCLUDE THAT

                    THE TERM OF A CONDITIONAL SENTENCE," IF MADE,

                    "SHOULD BE LONGER THAN IT WOULD HAVE BEEN IF THE

                    OFFENDER WERE SENTENCED TO IMMEDIATE

                    INCARCERATION."

                         THE THIRD PRINCIPLE ANNOTATED IN MARTIN'S

                    FROM PROULX IS THAT THE SAFETY OF THE COMMUNITY

                    ISSUE IS MERELY ONE OF THE THREE PREREQUISITES.

                    IN OTHER WORDS, IF THE COURT CONCLUDES THAT THE

                    OFFENDER DOES NOT POSE A DANGER TO THE SAFETY OF

                    THE COMMUNITY, AS I HAVE DONE IN THIS CASE, THIS

                    IS ONLY ONE FACTOR.  IT IS NOT THE PRIMARY

                    CONSIDERATION.  IT IS NOT ENOUGH FOR THE DEFENCE

                    TO SAY MY CLIENT DOES NOT POSE A THREAT FOR THE

                    COMMUNITY, THEREFORE, THERE MUST BE A CONDITIONAL

                    SENTENCE.  INDEED, I DO NOT HEAR MR. LATIMER TO

                    BE MAKING THAT ARGUMENT.  IT IS SIMPLY A BRANCH






       OFFICIAL COURT REPORTERS
                                        12





                    OF HIS ARGUMENT, AS IS APPROPRIATE FOR HIM TO

                    ARGUE.

                         THE SAFETY OF THE COMMUNITY, TO BE MORE

                    SPECIFIC, REFERS ONLY TO THE THREAT BY THE

                    OFFENDER BEFORE THE COURT AND NOT IN A GREATER

                    CONTEXT.

                         WHEN THE COURT CONSIDERS THE DANGER TO THE

                    COMMUNITY, THE COURT WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER THE

                    RISK OF THE OFFENDER REOFFENDING AND THE GRAVITY

                    OF THE DAMAGE THAT HE COULD DO.  A SMALL RISK OF

                    VERY HARMFUL FUTURE CRIME, PARTICULARLY IN THE

                    CASE OF VIOLENT OFFENDERS, MAY WARRANT A FINDING

                    THAT THERE IS A DANGER TO THE COMMUNITY.  THE

                    POSITION TAKEN BY THE CROWN AND MY INDEPENDENT

                    ASSESSMENT RESOLVE THIS ISSUE.

                         THE FOURTH ANNOTATED PRINCIPLE IS THAT A

                    CONDITIONAL SENTENCE IS AVAILABLE FOR ALL

                    OFFENCES IN WHICH THE STATUTORY PREREQUISITES

                    HAVE BEEN MADE OR SATISFIED.  THERE IS NO

                    PRESUMPTION THAT CONDITIONAL SENTENCES ARE

                    INAPPROPRIATE FOR SPECIFIC OFFENCES.  THIS IS

                    IMPORTANT IN THIS CASE BECAUSE IT IS NOT THE CASE

                    THAT BECAUSE THERE IS A HIGH PREVALENCE OF SEXUAL

                    ASSAULTS IN THIS JURISDICTION, THAT THERE IS A

                    PRESUMPTION AGAINST A CONDITIONAL SENTENCE ORDER.

                    NEVERTHELESS, THE SERIOUSNESS OF WHAT THE

                    OFFENDER HAS DONE AND THE GRAVITY OF THE OFFENCE






       OFFICIAL COURT REPORTERS
                                        13





                    ARE CLEARLY RELEVANT TO DETERMINING WHETHER A

                    CONDITIONAL SENTENCE IS APPROPRIATE IN THE

                    CIRCUMSTANCES.

                         THE FIFTH PRINCIPLE ANNOTATED IS THAT THERE

                    IS NO PRESUMPTION IN FAVOUR OF A CONDITIONAL

                    SENTENCE ONCE THE PREREQUISITES HAVE BEEN

                    SATISFIED.  BUT PROULX SAID THAT SERIOUS

                    CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO A CONDITIONAL

                    SENTENCE IN ALL CASES WHERE THE STATUTORY

                    PREREQUISITES HAVE BEEN SATISFIED.

                         THE SIXTH PRINCIPLE ANNOTATED IS THAT A

                    CONDITIONAL SENTENCE CAN PROVIDE A SIGNIFICANT

                    AMOUNT OF DENUNCIATION (DENUNCIATION IS A KEY

                    PART OF THE CROWN'S ARGUMENT TODAY) PARTICULARLY

                    WHERE ONEROUS CONDITIONS ARE IMPOSED AND THE TERM

                    OF THE SENTENCE IS LONGER THAN WOULD HAVE BEEN

                    IMPOSED BY A TERM OF INCARCERATION.  THE COURT

                    HELD THAT "GENERALLY, THE MORE SERIOUS THE

                    OFFENCE, THE LONGER AND MORE ONEROUS THE

                    CONDITIONAL SENTENCE SHOULD BE."

                         THE SEVENTH ANNOTATED PRINCIPLE IS THAT A

                    CONDITIONAL SENTENCE CAN PROVIDE SIGNIFICANT

                    DETERRENCE IF SUFFICIENTLY PUNITIVE CONDITIONS

                    ARE IMPOSED AND IF THE COURTS ARE WARY OF PLACING

                    TOO MUCH WEIGHT ON DETERRENCE WHEN CHOOSING

                    BETWEEN A CONDITIONAL SENTENCE AND INCARCERATION.

                    WE HAVE TO BE WARY OF PLACING TOO MUCH WEIGHT ON






       OFFICIAL COURT REPORTERS
                                        14





                    THE DETERRENCE ASPECT OF IT.  BUT PROULX ALSO

                    SAYS THAT THERE MAY BE CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE THE

                    NEED FOR DETERRENCE WARRANTS INCARCERATION.

                         THE EIGHTH PRINCIPLE ANNOTATED IS THAT "WHEN

                    THE OBJECTIVES OF REHABILITATION, REPARATION AND

                    PROMOTION OF A SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY MAY

                    REALISTICALLY BE ACHIEVED, A CONDITIONAL SENTENCE

                    WILL LIKELY BE THE APPROPRIATE SANCTION..."  BUT

                    THEN THE COURT WENT ON TO ADD THAT THIS WOULD

                    HAVE TO BE SUBJECT TO CONSIDERATIONS OF

                    DENUNCIATION AND DETERRENCE.

                         THE NINTH ANNOTATED PRINCIPLE IS THAT WHILE

                    AGGRAVATING FACTORS, POINTED OUT BY THE CROWN

                    TODAY, RELATING TO THE OFFENCE AND/OR TO THE

                    OFFENDER "INCREASE THE NEED FOR DENUNCIATION AND

                    DETERRENCE, A CONDITIONAL SENTENCE MAY BE IMPOSED

                    EVEN IF SUCH FACTORS ARE PRESENT".

                         THE NEXT ANNOTATED PRINCIPLE IS AN IMPORTANT

                    ONE IN EVERY CASE OF THIS KIND WHERE A

                    CONDITIONAL SENTENCE IS SOUGHT:  "NEITHER PARTY

                    HAS THE ONUS OF ESTABLISHING THAT THE OFFENDER

                    SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT RECEIVE A CONDITIONAL

                    SENTENCE."  THE OFFENDER IS USUALLY IN THE BEST

                    POSITION TO CONVINCE THE JUDGE THAT THE

                    CONDITIONAL SENTENCE IS APPROPRIATE, AND, AS

                    PROULX SAYS, IT WILL BE IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF

                    THE OFFENDER TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY






       OFFICIAL COURT REPORTERS
                                        15





                    INFORMATION, HELPING THE COURT TO ARRIVE AT THE

                    CONDITIONAL SENTENCE AS OPPOSED TO INCARCERATION.

                         IN ANOTHER SUPREME COURT OF CANADA JUDGMENT

                    FROM THE SAME YEAR, 2000, THE COURT IN R. V.

                    S(R.N.) HELD THAT "IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE EITHER

                    A SENTENCE OF INCARCERATION OR A CONDITIONAL

                    SENTENCE WOULD BE APPROPRIATE, A CONDITIONAL

                    SENTENCE SHOULD GENERALLY BE IMPOSED..."  THIS

                    WOULD APPLY EVEN IF IT WOULD BE LONGER THAN AN

                    APPROPRIATE SENTENCE OF INCARCERATION.

                         IN ANOTHER CASE OUT OF THE SUPREME COURT OF

                    CANADA FROM THE SAME YEAR, THE COURT HELD THAT

                    "WHILE NO OFFENCE IS PRESUMPTIVELY EXCLUDED FROM

                    THE POSSIBILITY OF A CONDITIONAL SENTENCE, AS A

                    PRACTICAL MATTER, AND NOTWITHSTANDING S. 718.2(E),

                    PARTICULARLY VIOLENT AND SERIOUS OFFENCES WILL

                    RESULT IN IMPRISONMENT" -- AND BY "IMPRISONMENT",

                    THE SUPREME COURT MEANT INCARCERATION -- "FOR

                    ABORIGINAL OFFENDERS AS OFTEN AS FOR

                    NON-ABORIGINAL OFFENDERS."

                         THESE ARE SOME OF THE MANY PRINCIPLES THAT I

                    HAVE HAD TO CONSIDER, INCLUDING ALL THE OTHER

                    PROVISIONS OF THE CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA

                    RESPECTING THE PURPOSE, PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES

                    OF SENTENCING.  IT SHOULD BE APPARENT THIS IS

                    NEVER AN EASY TASK.

                         THE IMMATURITY OF MR. CHINKON IS A FACTOR






       OFFICIAL COURT REPORTERS
                                        16





                    SUGGESTING THAT HE MAY NOT BE SUFFICIENTLY

                    RESPONSIVE, NOR SUFFICIENTLY RELIABLE TO BENEFIT

                    FROM A COMMUNITY-BASED SENTENCE OF IMPRISONMENT

                    (I.E. A CONDITIONAL SENTENCE ORDER).  ON THE

                    OTHER HAND, HIS IMMATURITY COULD ACT LIKE A

                    SPONGE IN A PRISON SETTING, SOAKING UP THE

                    CRIMINALITY OF THE CHARACTERS HOUSED WITH HIM.

                    CLOSE SUPERVISION BY A SENTENCE SUPERVISOR COULD

                    BE SUFFICIENT TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF IMMATURITY,

                    AND IT OUGHT TO BE.

                         THIS CASE IS ONE THAT, UPON CAREFUL

                    REFLECTION OVER A CONSIDERABLE PERIOD OF TIME

                    (GIVEN THE ADJOURNMENTS IN THIS MATTER), FALLS

                    WITHIN THE NARROW CATEGORY WHERE EITHER A

                    SENTENCE OF INCARCERATION OR A COMMUNITY-BASED

                    PERIOD OF IMPRISONMENT WOULD BE A FIT SENTENCE

                    FOR THIS OFFENDER FOR HAVING COMMITTED THIS

                    SERIOUS CRIME IN THESE SERIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES UPON

                    THIS VICTIM, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE IMPACT UPON

                    THIS VICTIM.  THIS CONCLUSION LEADS ME TO AWARD A

                    CONDITIONAL SENTENCE ORDER.

                         A TIPPING POINT IN MY ANALYSIS IS A PASSAGE

                    AT PARAGRAPH 15.25 OF THE SIXTH EDITION OF RUBY

                    ON SENTENCING.  IT READS:

                           IN REGARD TO DETERRENCE, A JUDGE

                           SHOULD BE WARY OF PLACING TOO

                           GREAT AN EMPHASIS ON DETERRENCE






       OFFICIAL COURT REPORTERS
                                        17





                           IN CHOOSING A CUSTODIAL SENTENCE

                           OVER A CONDITIONAL ONE, FOR THE

                           EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE SUGGESTS THAT

                           THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF

                           INCARCERATION IS UNCERTAIN.

                           MOREOVER, A CONDITIONAL SENTENCE

                           WITH SUFFICIENTLY SERIOUS

                           CONDITIONS WILL OFTEN SERVE AS A

                           SUFFICIENT DETERRENT.

                    THE CITATION IS GIVEN FOR SUPPORT OF THE ABOVE

                    PARAGRAPH.

                         I SAID EARLIER THAT CERTAIN CONSIDERATIONS

                    LEAD ME TOWARD A CONDITIONAL SENTENCE ORDER.

                    THIS OFFENDER DOES NOT NEED INCARCERATION TO

                    DETER HIM.  OTHERS CAN BE DETERRED BY A HARSH

                    CONDITIONAL SENTENCE ORDER INCORPORATING, AS IT

                    DOES, AND AS ANY SENTENCE OUGHT TO INCORPORATE, A

                    MEASURE OF RESTRAINT WITHOUT SACRIFICING PUBLIC

                    SAFETY.

                         HIS REHABILITATION CAN BE BEST ACHIEVED, AS

                    CAN HIS REINTEGRATION, BY A CONDITIONAL SENTENCE

                    ORDER.  DENUNCIATION, WITH SUFFICIENTLY HARSH

                    CONDITIONS AS SUGGESTED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF

                    CANADA, CAN ALSO BE ADEQUATELY ACHIEVED.  TO BE

                    CLEAR, HOWEVER, I HAVE PLACED THE FACTORS OF

                    REHABILITATION AND REINTEGRATION SECOND TO

                    PRIMARY DETERRENCE, SECONDARY DETERRENCE AND






       OFFICIAL COURT REPORTERS
                                        18





                    DENUNCIATION.

                         THERE WILL BE A CONDITIONAL SENTENCE OF

                    IMPRISONMENT.  THE PERIOD WILL BE FOR 15 MONTHS.

                    HAD THERE BEEN INCARCERATION, I WOULD HAVE MADE

                    IT IN THE RANGE OF 9 TO 12 MONTHS.

                         MR. CHINKON, IF YOU DISOBEY ANY OF THE TERMS

                    OF THIS ORDER, YOU COULD BE REQUIRED TO SERVE ALL

                    OR A PORTION OF THE REMAINDER OF YOUR SENTENCE BY

                    WAY OF INCARCERATION AT THE CORRECTIONAL CENTRE

                    EITHER HERE IN YELLOWKNIFE OR HAY RIVER.  IS THIS

                    CLEAR TO YOU?

                THE ACCUSED:           YES.

                THE COURT:             THIS IS VERY SERIOUS BUSINESS.

                    THIS IS NOT LIKE ATTENDING SCHOOL.  YOU REGISTER

                    FOR SCHOOL, YOU ARE THERE FOR A MONTH OR TWO OR

                    WHATEVER AND THEN YOU QUIT.  THIS IS DIFFERENT.

                    IF YOU DO NOT FOLLOW THIS, YOU WILL BE CAUGHT;

                    THIS I CAN ASSURE YOU.  AND IF YOU ARE BROUGHT

                    BEFORE THE COURT AND IF THE COURT IS SATISFIED

                    THAT YOU HAVE BREACHED THIS CONDITIONAL SENTENCE

                    ORDER, EXPECT TO BE LOCKED UP.

                THE ACCUSED:           ALL RIGHT.

                THE COURT:             THE STATUTORY CONDITIONS IN

                    SECTION 742.1 WILL ALL OF COURSE HAVE TO APPLY.

                    ACTUALLY, THEY ARE IN 742.3.  YOU HAVE TO KEEP

                    THE PEACE AND BE OF GOOD BEHAVIOUR.  THIS MEANS,

                    IN EFFECT, YOU WILL HAVE TO BE ON YOUR BEST






       OFFICIAL COURT REPORTERS
                                        19





                    BEHAVIOUR.  IF YOU CAN DO THAT, EVERYTHING ELSE

                    OUGHT TO FALL INTO PLACE NEATLY FOR YOU.  YOU

                    WILL APPEAR BEFORE THE COURT WHEN REQUIRED TO DO

                    SO BY THE COURT.  YOU ARE TO REPORT TO A

                    CONDITIONAL SENTENCE SUPERVISOR NO LATER THAN

                    THIS COMING MONDAY, FEBRUARY -- IS IT FEBRUARY

                    6TH, COUNSEL?

                THE COURT CLERK:       YES, SIR.

                MR. LATIMER:           YES.

                THE COURT:             AT 4 P.M., IN PERSON, AND

                    THEREAFTER, WHEN AND AS REQUIRED BY YOUR

                    SUPERVISOR AND IN THE MANNER DIRECTED BY YOUR

                    SUPERVISOR.  YOU ARE TO REMAIN WITHIN THE

                    NORTHWEST TERRITORIES UNLESS YOU HAVE WRITTEN

                    PERMISSION TO GO OUTSIDE THE JURISDICTION FROM

                    THE COURT OR FROM YOUR SUPERVISOR.  YOU ARE TO

                    NOTIFY THE COURT OR THE SUPERVISOR IN ADVANCE OF

                    ANY CHANGE OF NAME OR ADDRESS, AND PROMPTLY

                    NOTIFY THE COURT OR THE SUPERVISOR OF ANY CHANGE

                    OF EMPLOYMENT OR OCCUPATION.  ARE YOU WITH ME SO

                    FAR?

                THE ACCUSED:           YEAH.

                THE COURT:             YOU DO NOT HAVE TO MEMORIZE

                    ALL OF THIS.  DO NOT BE FEARFUL.  THE CLERK WILL

                    GO OVER IT ALL WITH YOU AND LEAVE A SIGNED COPY

                    FOR YOU TO TAKE HOME.

                         THERE WILL BE WHAT WE CALL ADDITIONAL






       OFFICIAL COURT REPORTERS
                                        20





                    CONDITIONS OR OPTIONAL CONDITIONS, AND THIS IS

                    WHERE IT GETS TOUGH.

                         YOU ARE TO DO COMMUNITY SERVICE WORK.  THE

                    MAXIMUM NUMBER OF HOURS ALLOWED UNDER THE

                    CRIMINAL CODE IS 240.  YOU ARE TO DO 200 HOURS OF

                    COMMUNITY SERVICE WORK WHEN AND AS DIRECTED BY

                    YOUR SUPERVISOR, BUT AT A RATE OF AT LEAST 20

                    HOURS PER MONTH BEGINNING THIS MONTH.

                         NEXT.  THE OFFENCE WAS IN SOME WAY RELATED

                    TO YOUR CONSUMPTION OF ALCOHOL.  YOU ARE

                    PROHIBITED FROM CONSUMING OR HAVING IN YOUR

                    POSSESSION ANY ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES ANYWHERE FOR

                    THE ENTIRE 15-MONTH PERIOD.  YOU WILL OBEY A

                    DEMAND FOR BREATH, URINE, OR BLOOD SAMPLES MADE

                    TO YOU BY A PEACE OFFICER WHO HAS REASONABLE

                    GROUNDS TO BELIEVE THAT YOU HAVE VIOLATED TO ANY

                    DEGREE THE ALCOHOL PROHIBITION CONDITION.  ARE

                    YOU STILL WITH ME?

                THE ACCUSED:           YEAH.

                THE COURT:             YOU APPEAR TO BE FOLLOWING

                    KEENLY.

                         SUCH DEMAND ON THE COLLECTION OF SAMPLES

                    MUST BE CARRIED OUT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS

                    OFFENDER'S RIGHTS UNDER THE CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND

                    FREEDOMS.

                         NEXT.  YOU WILL ACTIVELY PARTICIPATE IN

                    COUNSELLING WHEN AND AS DIRECTED BY YOUR






       OFFICIAL COURT REPORTERS
                                        21





                    SUPERVISOR.

                         NEXT.  YOU ARE TO HAVE NO CONTACT OR

                    COMMUNICATION OF ANY SORT WITH THE VICTIM, AND

                    YOU ARE NOT TO ATTEND AT HER PLACE OF RESIDENCE,

                    WHEREVER IT MAY BE FROM TIME TO TIME.  YOU ARE TO

                    LIVE WITH YOUR AUNT, JULIA SANGRIS, IN N'DILO, IN

                    THIS JURISDICTION, AT TELEPHONE NUMBER 873-2660,

                    LOCATED AT 146 N'DILO.  SHOULD THE LIVING

                    ARRANGEMENT BREAK DOWN, YOU MUST INFORM YOUR

                    SUPERVISOR IMMEDIATELY AND YOU MUST MAKE

                    IMMEDIATE ARRANGEMENTS TO HAVE THIS ORDER

                    REVIEWED BY THE COURT, PREFERABLY BY MYSELF

                    BECAUSE I HAVE THE MOST FAMILIARITY WITH THIS

                    PARTICULAR MATTER.

                         NEXT.  FOR THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF THIS

                    ORDER, YOU ARE CONFINED TO THE HOME OF YOUR AUNT.


                    THAT IS GOING TO BE YOUR PRISON.  SHE HAS SAID

                    SHE CAN KEEP YOU THERE.  AND I ASKED HER, IF

                    THERE WERE HOUSE ARREST, IF SHE COULD ACCOMMODATE

                    THAT AND SHE SAID YES.  YOU ARE CONFINED TO HER

                    HOME SEVEN DAYS A WEEK, TWENTY-FOUR HOURS A DAY,

                    EXCEPT TO DO COMMUNITY SERVICE WORK, TO

                    PARTICIPATE IN COUNSELLING AS DIRECTED BY THE

                    SUPERVISOR, FOR MEDICAL OR DENTAL REASONS OR FOR

                    RELIGIOUS OBSERVANCES OR FOR SCHOOL OR

                    SCHOOL-RELATED ACTIVITIES OR OTHER EDUCATIONAL

                    PURPOSES WITHIN A RECOGNIZED EDUCATIONAL






       OFFICIAL COURT REPORTERS
                                        22





                    INSTITUTION.  AND YOU MAY BE OUTSIDE THE HOME

                    WITH PERMISSION FROM YOUR SUPERVISOR FOR URGENT

                    PURPOSES NOT ADDRESSED BY THIS ORDER.  HERE WHAT

                    I HAVE IN MIND IS SOMETIMES THINGS HAPPEN AND YOU

                    MAY NEED PERMISSION.

                         NEXT.  YOU MAY ALSO HAVE UP TO TWO HOURS A

                    WEEK IN THE COMMUNITY FOR LAWFUL PURPOSES, THE

                    TERMS OF WHICH WILL BE IN WRITING FROM YOUR

                    SUPERVISOR.

                         NEXT.  YOU MAY NOT ATTEND THE COMMUNITY OF

                    BECHOKÖ, FORMERLY KNOWN AS RAE-EDZO, UNLESS YOU

                    HAVE WRITTEN PERMISSION FROM YOUR SUPERVISOR

                    BEFOREHAND.

                         AFTER THE SIX MONTHS OF THE 24-HOUR-A-DAY

                    HOUSE ARREST, THERE WILL BE A CURFEW FOR A

                    FURTHER SIX MONTHS.  IT WILL BE FROM 7 P.M. TO 7

                    A.M.  YOU ARE STILL TO BE LIVING AT THE HOME OF

                    YOUR AUNT THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE PERIOD OF THIS

                    ORDER, FOR 15 MONTHS.  BUT FOR THE SECOND BLOCK

                    OF SIX MONTHS, YOU ARE BOUND BY A CURFEW, 7 P.M.

                    TO 7 A.M.  THE SAME EXCEPTIONS ARE TO APPLY.

                    HOWEVER, A FURTHER EXCEPTION WILL BE TO ALLOW YOU

                    OUTSIDE THE HOME DURING THE CURFEW HOURS IF YOU

                    ARE WITH YOUR AUNT; AND BY "WITH" HER, I MEAN IN

                    HER IMMEDIATE PRESENCE.  IT IS NOT ENOUGH TO BE

                    IN YELLOWKNIFE WITH HER.  YOU HAVE TO BE RIGHT

                    WITH HER.






       OFFICIAL COURT REPORTERS
                                        23





                THE ACCUSED:           ALL RIGHT.

                THE COURT:             THAT EXCEPTION DOES NOT,

                    HOWEVER, APPLY TO THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF HOUSE

                    ARREST.  THE FIRST SIX MONTHS, YOU ARE NOT TO BE

                    GOING OUT WITH HER UNLESS THERE IS AN EXCEPTION

                    AS I ALREADY MENTIONED.

                         ANY REFERENCE -- THIS IS THE NEXT CONDITION.

                    ANY REFERENCE TO WRITTEN PERMISSION IN THIS ORDER

                    WILL REQUIRE YOU TO HAVE THE WRITING IN YOUR

                    PHYSICAL POSSESSION AT ALL TIMES.

                         NEXT.  YOU ARE NOT TO HAVE IN YOUR

                    POSSESSION THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE 15-MONTH PERIOD

                    ANY FIREARMS AND SO FORTH AS MENTIONED IN SECTION

                    109 OF THE CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA.  ALTHOUGH THE

                    CROWN HAS NOT SOUGHT A FIREARM PROHIBITION ORDER,

                    THIS KIND OF AN ORDER IN A CASE LIKE THIS, I

                    THINK BENEFITS AND ENHANCES PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN

                    THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IF THE OFFENDER IS

                    NOT TO HAVE IN HIS POSSESSION FIREARMS.  IN OTHER

                    WORDS, PRISONERS SHOULD NOT HAVE FIREARMS.  HE IS

                    A PRISONER, BUT A DIFFERENT KIND OF PRISONER.

                         THE CLERK, AND LATER YOUR SUPERVISOR, WILL

                    BE TAKING GREAT CARE IN REVIEWING CONDITIONS WITH

                    YOU, MR. CHINKON.  THE SUPERVISOR WILL HAVE TO

                    MONITOR THIS VERY CAREFULLY, GIVEN THE IMMATURITY

                    OF THIS OFFENDER, TO ENSURE THAT HE HAS THE BEST

                    TOOLS AVAILABLE TO HIM TO MAKE THIS SENTENCE






       OFFICIAL COURT REPORTERS
                                        24





                    WORK.

                         IT IS A RECOMMENDATION OF THE COURT THAT

                    IMMEDIATE STEPS BE TAKEN TO BREACH THIS OFFENDER

                    IN THE EVENT OF A VIOLATION OF ANY OF THE

                    CONDITIONS.  I AM NOT PREPARED TO SUGGEST

                    OTHERWISE.  THERE IS NO TOLERANCE FOR BREACHING

                    THIS ORDER.

                         THERE WILL NOT BE ANY VICTIM SURCHARGE GIVEN

                    THE APPARENT HARDSHIP THAT WILL FOLLOW.  THE DNA

                    I HAVE DEALT WITH, AND THE CROWN IS NOT ASKING

                    THAT THE OFFENDER REGISTER UNDER THE SEX OFFENDER

                    REGISTRATION.  IS THERE ANYTHING FURTHER FROM THE

                    CROWN?

                MR. GAUNT:             NO, YOUR HONOUR.

                THE COURT:             MR. LATIMER?  IS YOUR CLIENT

                    TO -- IS ON THE LINE HERE.

                MR. LATIMER:           YES.

                THE COURT:             IS THERE ANYTHING THAT MIGHT

                    BE WORDED DIFFERENTLY?  SHOULD BE ADDED?

                MR. LATIMER:           I'M JUST WONDERING -- THANK

                    YOU, YOUR HONOUR.  THIS IS VERY -- IT'S A

                    WELL-THOUGHT-OUT ORDER.  I'M JUST WONDERING IF --

                    SUPPOSING THAT HE'S SEEKING EMPLOYMENT.  I THINK

                    THAT WE HAVE -- I KNOW IT IS GEARED TOWARD HIM

                    TRYING TO GET HIS EDUCATION AND EVERYTHING, BUT

                    WHAT IF THINGS TURN OUT IN THE NEXT MONTH OR SO

                    THAT HIS -- THAT HE CAN'T DO ANY OF THESE THINGS







       OFFICIAL COURT REPORTERS
                                        25





                    AND HE HAS TO SEEK EMPLOYMENT?  COULD WE -- WOULD

                    IT BE BETTER TO COME BACK TO THE COURT THEN TO

                    CHANGE THEM?

                THE COURT:             THAT IS RIGHT.  I WOULD LIKE

                    THE HOUSE ARREST FOR THE FIRST SIX MONTHS TO BE

                    HOUSE ARREST.  I AM NOT ANTICIPATING --

                MR. LATIMER:           RIGHT.

                THE COURT:             -- EMPLOYMENT DURING THAT

                    PERIOD.

                MR. LATIMER:           NO.  ALL RIGHT.

                THE COURT:             BUT IF SOMETHING COMES UP AND

                    HE HAS GAINFUL EMPLOYMENT THAT MIGHT BE OF

                    ASSISTANCE TO HIM AND TO THE COMMUNITY, I WOULD

                    ENTERTAIN --

                MR. LATIMER:           RIGHT.

                THE COURT:             -- AN APPLICATION.  BUT I AM

                    NOT SUGGESTING FOR A MOMENT THAT THE COURT WILL

                    GRANT IT.

                MR. LATIMER:           NO.  NO, THAT'S FINE.  I

                    UNDERSTAND.  THAT'S MORE CLEAR, YOUR HONOUR.


                THE COURT:             YOU ARE WELCOME TO MAKE ANY

                    APPLICATION TO CHANGE THE ORDER THAT YOU DEEM

                    APPROPRIATE.

                         THE CURFEW, HOWEVER, FOR THE SECOND PERIOD

                    OF TIME WILL HAVE ANOTHER EXCEPTION - THAT IS THE

                    SECOND BLOCK OF SIX MONTHS - THAT HE MAY BE

                    OUTSIDE DURING THE CURFEW HOURS IF IT IS FOR THE






       OFFICIAL COURT REPORTERS
                                        26





                    PURPOSE OF GOING TO EMPLOYMENT, WORKING AT

                    EMPLOYMENT, AND RETURNING DIRECTLY HOME FROM IT.

                         MR. CHINKON, THE CLERK WILL BE WORKING ON

                    THE ORDER, I AM SURE, AS WE ARE DOING BUSINESS

                    HERE.  I AM NOT SURE WHAT IS HAPPENING WITH THE

                    NEXT MATTER, BUT I WOULD LIKE THIS ORDER

                    COMPLETED TODAY.  BUT I WILL GET A BETTER SENSE

                    IN A MOMENT.  DO NOT GO AWAY YET.

                         MS. NGUYEN, WHERE DO YOU THINK YOU ARE

                    HEADING WITH YOUR CASE?

                (OTHER MATTER SPOKEN TO)

                THE COURT:             MR. CHINKON, YOU ARE NOT TO

                    LEAVE THIS FLOOR.  YOU MAY HAVE A SEAT IN THE

                    COURTROOM OR IN THE WAITING AREA OUTSIDE THE

                    COURTROOM.

                THE ACCUSED:           ALL RIGHT.

                THE COURT:             THERE IS A WASHROOM ON THIS

                    FLOOR.  BUT YOU ARE NOT TO LEAVE THIS FLOOR.

                THE ACCUSED:           ALL RIGHT.

                         .................................





                                  CERTIFIED PURSUANT TO RULE 723
                                  OF THE RULES OF COURT




                                  JANE ROMANOWICH, CSR(A), RPR
                                  COURT REPORTER







       OFFICIAL COURT REPORTERS
                                        27

   
 You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.