T-1-CR-2005-002277/T-1-CR-2006-0000591

IN THE TERRITORIAL COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

IN THE MATTER OF:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

- v -

## LEVI PEETOOLOOT

Transcript of a Ruling (s. 486.3 C.C. - appointment of counsel) made by The Honourable Judge R. Gorin, in Yellowknife, in the Northwest Territories, on the 7th day of April, A.D. 2006.

## APPEARANCES:

Mr. M. Himmelman: Counsel on behalf of the Crown

Ms. P. Taylor: Counsel on behalf of the Accused

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Charges under ss. 279(2) C.C., 271 C.C. 266 C.C. and 145(2)(a) C.C.

BAN ON PUBLICATION OF COMPLAINANT/WITNESS PURSUANT TO SECTION 486 OF THE CRIMINAL CODE

1	THE	COURT:	This is my decision on the
2		Crown's application	n to have counsel appointed for
3		the purpose of cro	ss-examining the complainant at
4		the accused's preliminary inquiry.	
5		Mr. Peetooloo	t is charged with unlawful
6		confinement, sexua	l assault and common assault.
7		The date on which	the offences are alleged to
8		have happened in Y	ellowknife is July the 29th,
9		2005. He is also	charged on a separate
10		Information with fa	ailing to attend court on
11		December the 13th,	2005. That was one of the
12		dates which had be	en scheduled for his
13		preliminary inquir	y on the first set of charges
14		that I have mention	ned.
15		On the first	three charges there have been
16		11 court appearance	es prior to today's date.
17		On these char	ges the accused had elected to
18		be tried by a judge	e and jury. He maintains that
19		election at this n	articular point Recause of

On these charges the accused had elected to be tried by a judge and jury. He maintains that election at this particular point. Because of that initial election, a preliminary inquiry in this court was required. The preliminary inquiry was first scheduled for November the 18th of last year. On November the 18th it was adjourned to November the 23rd. On November the 23rd it was adjourned to December the 13th. It appears that the accused has never retained counsel.

The court record indicates that on December

the 13th a warrant was issued for the accused's arrest when he did not attend court. It appears that the warrant was exercised, that is, the accused was arrested on the warrant on March 22nd of this year in Taloyoak.

Because he is charged with failing to attend court, the onus is now on the accused to show cause why he should be released from pre-trial detention on conditions with or without bail or otherwise. In other words, he is now in a "reverse onus" situation, as it is typically the Crown that would bear the onus of showing why the accused should be detained pending his trial.

It appears that the accused has not attempted to show cause why he should be released. He is currently being held in custody on a Form 19 remand warrant. I do not see a Form 8 on the court file at this particular point.

As I have indicated, the accused has not yet retained a lawyer; arrangements have not yet been finalized even though he is in custody at this particular point.

An order appointing counsel to cross-examine the complainant was previously made. However, as noted by Chief Judge Bruser, the previous order was arguably made without jurisdiction due to the fact that it was made prior to the coming into

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force of section 486.3 of the Code. The Court
that made the earlier order had been advised by
the Crown that the section was in force when it
was not, although the Crown counsel in question
later advised of his error.

Clearly I do have the jurisdiction, that is, the power to order that counsel be appointed for the purpose of such cross-examination. The applicable section is 486.3(2). For the benefit of counsel, that would be in the supplement.

I find that the prerequisites have been made out. The Crown has made the necessary application to allow me to have jurisdiction. Under the circumstances, given the nature of the charge, I am satisfied that the order is necessary to obtain a full and candid account from the witness. In making this determination, I take into account the factors which are set out in subsection 486.1(3) of the Code, as I am required to do. Because I am satisfied that the order appointing counsel for the purposes of cross-examining the complainant is necessary to obtain a full and candid account from the witness, subsection 486.3(2) requires that I "shall" make the order. Because I am so satisfied, I have no discretion. Therefore the order will go.

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The clerk will make the necessary

arrangements to retain counsel. Obviously the

lawyer who is appointed will have to be

compensated. He or she cannot simply be pressed

into service by the court.

I have a letter on the court file from the Executive Director of the Legal Services Board, in other words Legal Aid. The letter was written as a result of the earlier order made prior to section 486.3(2) coming into force. That letter indicates that the board will not be paying the fees of counsel who are appointed pursuant to section 486.3. I certainly do not have the jurisdiction or the power to order that the Legal Services Board pay. In my view, just as the executive branch of government should not attempt to interfere with the judicial branch, the judicial branch should not attempt to interfere with the executive. So I make no comment on the position of the Legal Services Board as expressed through its Executive Director.

However, as is clear, section 486.3 of the Code allows a judge of the Territorial Court to appoint counsel and where certain criterion are met, as they have been in the present case, the section is mandatory, not merely permissive.

As I have already stated, counsel should not

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be pressed into involuntary service and clearly counsel should be compensated if counsel is not salaried by a government department or board.

As stated, the section does not expressly give me the power to order that a particular government department or board pay a lawyer's fees, so I do not know if payment will come from Legal Aid, the Territorial Department of Justice, Court Services, or from the Federal Department of Justice.

Presumably there would be a conflict if the Federal or Territorial Department of Justice were simply to provide one of its lawyers to act on behalf of the accused since both departments are responsible for the prosecution of criminal or quasi criminal charges, although the same could not be said for the Legal Services Board which is theoretically independent of the Territorial Government for that very reason.

However, I will point out the obvious, and that is that ultimately it will be the taxpayer who will be picking up the tab regardless of which department or board pays.

The clerk should take immediate steps to retain counsel, and the clerk should let counsel know that his or her fees will be covered, assuming that the lawyer in question works for a

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private firm. Presumably, the fees will be

covered at the lawyer's full private rate and not

at the reduced legal aid rate.

I note parenthetically that one of the original rationales for the implementation of the legal aid program was to save the government money by allowing for a reduced rate. Before legal aid was implemented, the courts often simply appointed counsel who were then able to charge their full private rate rather than a reduced rate. I will not opine on the topic.

I am directing that a transcript of these proceedings be prepared forthwith and that the following persons be provided with copies of the transcript: Firstly, the Territorial

Government's Deputy Minister of Justice; the Assistant Deputy Minister with the relevant responsibilities; the Director of Court Services for the Territorial Department of Justice; the Executive Director of the Legal Services Board, that is Legal Aid; the Regional Director of the Federal Department of Justice here in Yellowknife; Chief Judge Bruser; and of course there should be a copy for the court file as well.

As I noted earlier, if Mr. Peetooloot ultimately realizes his intentions to retain

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Τ.	counsel, that is retain his own counsel to
2	represent him at the trial, then the need for the
3	order which I have made here today will clearly
4	be obviated. However, in my view the matter has
5	gone on far too long as it is, and the date needs
6	to be set and the necessary steps have to be
7	taken to ensure that there is no further delay.
8	(CONCLUSION OF RULING)
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11	Certified to be a true and accurate transcript pursuant
12	to Rule 723 and 724 of the Supreme Court Rules of Court.
13	Supreme court nures or court.
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15	Annette Wright, RPR, CSR(A) Court Reporter
16	COULD REPULCE
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