T-1-CR-2003001424

IN THE TERRITORIAL COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

IN THE MATTER OF:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

- and -

PETER TSETTA

Transcript of the Reasons for Decision delivered by The Honourable Judge B.A. Bruser, sitting in Yellowknife, in the Northwest Territories, on the 28th day of August, A.D. 2003.

APPEARANCES:

Mr. M. Ewenson:

Ms. K. Payne:

Counsel for the Crown

Counsel for the Defendant (Charge under s. 271 of the Criminal Code of Canada)

THE COURT: The test at a preliminary inquiry has been well established by the common law over many 2 The test is set out in Section 548 of the 3 Criminal Code and in the leading case of U.S.A. v. It comes down to whether or not there is 6 sufficient evidence within the meaning of Section 548 upon which a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could find the accused guilty. One might add after 8 the word guilty "beyond a reasonable doubt" because it is a test of beyond a reasonable doubt which governs 10 The onus is on the prosecution to prove its at trial. 11 case to that standard. The onus is not on the accused 12 13 to prove anything, although in some cases, such as assault and sexual assault, there can be an 14 15 evidentiary burden; for example, subsection 265(4). 16 This does not mean the accused has to prove his 17 innocence.

At a preliminary inquiry, the justice is not allowed to draw inferences, nor is the justice permitted to weigh the evidence other than in a very limited context, and the justice is not permitted to test the reliability of evidence.

There is a limited weighing as the assessment of the evidence is happening. It is in the nature of a probing. Without the limited weighing, as the Supreme Court of Canada has approved of recently, it would be very difficult to determine if the evidence is

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The RCMP officer testified that he attended in response to a call to an alley behind the Gold Range, which I take to be the Gold Range bar in the City of Yellowknife. He attended shortly after 10 p.m. As he went down the alley, he saw out of his peripheral vision what appeared to be a naked person, or partially naked person. He immediately attended upon that scene and discovered the following. The female, Diane Cluett, was lying on the ground; her pants were down to her ankles, as were her underpants; her brassiere was up in the area of her neck. The accused was lying on top of her. His head was in the area of her waist. His pants and his underwear were down to his ankles. She appeared to be unconscious, he was His hands were in the area of her vagina. appeared to be trying to insert his fingers into her vagina. His penis was not erect, but it was exposed. The officer interrupted this scene.

The police had difficulty in getting the complainant to awaken. She didn't respond to verbal directions, nor to being shaken, nor to a sternum rub. The trier of fact could, from this evidence, find that she was in a heavy state of intoxication and not likely asleep and that she was deeply unconscious.

The accused was highly intoxicated.

This essentially completes the evidence of the

relationship at that moment in time between the complainant and the accused.

It is evident from this that a trier of fact could find that the two were in sexual proximity to each other and that the actions by the accused toward the complainant were sexual.

In cross-examination, the officer said that the fingers of the accused were actually touching the area of the vagina and the accused "was laying on top of her...as if he was being intimate with her. He was concentrating on the lady in front of him. She was non-responsive."

The next witness called by the prosecutor did not give her age. She asked the Crown prosecutor why she should have to provide her age. The Crown backed off from pursuing this. I think it obvious why she would be asked her age at a preliminary inquiry, but I will fill in the gaps because I did have the opportunity to see her and hear her. She does appear to be an adult over the age of 18.

This witness was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the incident but had not been drinking very much. She stumbled upon what was happening between the accused and the complainant.

The event she was talking about could be found by the jury to be the same event that Constable Pittman testified about. The defence is not raising an issue

in that regard, in any event, and I will proceed on the basis that the evidence is sufficient that this is, in fact, the same event. Although I use the word "sufficient", in fact, I mean, and I hope I'm clear, sufficient within the meaning of the test - there is enough in the way of facts for a jury to find this to be so.

About two minutes before the police arrived, the witness saw the complainant lying on her right side, on her elbow; she recalls the accused to be facing her, and "he was fingering her". When asked what was meant by that, she testified that his finger was in her vagina.

She was close, about four feet away. She just stood there, amazed, because she thought this was the kind of thing one would normally see in the movies, but she did not regard it as any of her business. When she saw the police arriving, she hid behind a nearby piece of plywood. It was behind the plywood where the police quickly discovered her. She apparently did not come forward because she does not like the police. Her reasons for not liking the police are not something I need comment upon other than to say it is without merit. She was also embarrassed, regarding this as none of her business.

During her observations of the accused and the complainant, including when she was behind the board

(from which location she could not see them but could hear what was happening), it was evident that the complainant was awake and that what the witness saw and heard was consensual. The accused was moaning; he appeared, to the witness, to be enjoying it while he had his fingers in the complainant; the witness heard her speak to the accused saying words to the effect that she liked what he was doing. The witness had the clear impression that there was nothing violent going on; rather, that these were two people "fooling around" or having an "affair"; she thought they knew each other.

The complainant, who did not testify, may or may not have been subpoenaed to be here today. Crown counsel, at the end of the evidence of the second witness, sought an adjournment. When I asked him to produce the subpoena and proof of service, he was unable to produce the document. He then withdrew the application for an adjournment and closed his case.

This is not the sort of case where a complainant testifies that she did not consent, but where there may be other evidence that she did consent, nor is the Court being asked from the evidence to find that the accused had an honest but mistaken belief in consent. This case is different. It is different because the evidence is to the contrary regarding the first part of this observation. The evidence of what occurred

chronologically is that the complainant was consenting. There is no evidence at that point in time that she was not consenting to this. Consent would be an absolute defence to sexual assault as long as it was not a consent that was vitiated.

The Crown says the consent was vitiated. The Crown says that once the complainant became unconscious at the second point in time, the consent that was present earlier became invalid. The Crown added, when I probed this submission, that once the complainant became unconscious, it would have been incumbent upon the accused to make an inquiry that the consent was still alive. This is a strong point. Where somebody provides consent and then slips into unconsciousness, I am in agreement that an inquiry of some sort ought to be made.

Who has the burden, though, on the inquiry issue? Is it on the Crown to prove the absence of an inquiry, or is the burden on the accused to show that he made an inquiry and that the consent remained?

Subsection 265(4) provides that "Where an accused alleges that he believed that the complainant consented to the conduct that is the subject-matter of the charge, a judge, if satisfied that there is sufficient evidence and that, if believed by the jury, the evidence would constitute a defence, shall instruct the jury, when reviewing all the evidence

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relating to the determination of the honesty of the accused's belief, to consider the presence or absence of reasonable grounds for that belief."

The issue here is whether that subsection is even triggered. It seems to me that what the Crown is arguing is that because the complainant became unconscious, it is up to the accused to prove that he made an inquiry and that consent flowed from the inquiry.

I am not allowed at a preliminary inquiry to engage in any speculation, conjecture, or any other kind of guesswork, nor is the trier of fact.

If I were to find that slipping into unconsciousness vitiated the consent and leave it at that, there would have to be an order that the accused stand trial. But the Crown is saying that the inquiry would have to be made. This is what is causing me difficulty. The accused is not alleging, pursuant to subsection 265(4) that he believed the complainant consented. The issue is the inquiry. If the evidence which I have before me were to go to a jury and the accused were not to testify; that is, if the evidence were simply what I have before me, how could the Crown ask the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that no inquiry was made on this evidence? There is no basis, as I see it, for the jury to infer an absence of inquiry any more than there is for the jury to infer

that an inquiry was made. The evidence is simply 1 silent on that point. The jury would be required to 2 speculate or engage in conjecture on this issue, and 3 that, a jury should not be asked to do, and that is what a jury would be instructed by a Supreme Court 5 justice not to do. I find that the evidence is not sufficient because of this issue. The Crown has not led a sufficient body of evidence to show an absence of consent, this being a material element of this charge 10 of sexual assault. For these reasons, I discharge the 11 accused. 12 If he is not in custody on any other matter, he 13 is free to go. 14 Thank you, sir. MS. PAYNE: 15 16 17 Certified to be a true and 18 accurate transcript, pursuant to Rules 723 and 724 of the Supreme 19 Court Rules of Court 20 Jane Romanowich, 21 Court Reporter 22 23 24 25 26 27