2002 NWTTC AZ

T-1-CR-2001003743

IN THE TERRITORIAL COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES IN THE MATTER OF:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

- v -

ALLAN SHORTT



Transcript of the Reasons for Sentence (Oral) delivered by The Honourable Judge B.A. Bruser, in Yellowknife, in the Northwest Territories, on the 22nd day of February, A.D. 2002.

APPEARANCES:

Mr. S. Niblock:

Counsel for the Crown

Mr. P. Smith:

Counsel for the Defence

Charges under ss. 266, 264.1(1) x 2, 811 C.C.

THE COURT: Most certainly there is no need to review the facts again. That I won't do.

The first thing for me to do is to resolve the application for a conditional discharge. If there is a ruling against the application, then the next step is for the Court to move on to the other considerations, such as a suspended sentence, a fine, imprisonment, and so forth.

Section 730 is the provision that allows courts to impose discharges, both absolute and conditional.

If there is an absolute discharge, the offender is deemed not to have committed the offence. To be more technically precise: He is deemed not to have been convicted of the offence even though he committed it.

If there is a conditional discharge and the discharge runs its term successfully, then it is deemed to be absolute, in which case the same conclusion follows, as if it had been absolute in the first instance.

The court may, if it considers it to be in the best interests of the offender and not contrary to the public interest, grant one of the two types of discharges.

Note that I said the word "may", because the court can conclude that it would be in the best interests of an offender and not contrary to the

public interest to grant a discharge and still the court is not mandated to grant one. The court could still, applying all the objectives and principles and keeping in mind the underlying purpose of sentencing, refuse to grant a discharge. Making the findings then in favour of the defence does not necessarily mean that a discharge will follow.

I concur with the Crown and the defence that it would in the circumstances of this offender, for having committed these offences in these circumstances, be in his best interest to grant a discharge.

Is it the case that the accused has met the second condition? Can I find that it is not contrary to the public interest to grant one?

The case law says that the discharge provisions are not restricted to trivial, minor or technical offences. A discharge is available unless there is a sentencing provision that makes it unavailable. In the case of Count 1, Count 2, Count 3 and Count 4, a discharge is in each case available.

What about the public interest?

Even though a person who assaults a spouse may receive a discharge, even though somebody who threatens to kill somebody may receive a discharge, it is not common at all and probably unusual, if not rare, for discharges to be given for these offences

when combined as they are in this case. Why are they unusual? They are unusual because of the need to send a message to the public that the conduct of assaulting one's spouse - which involves a breach of trust even if separated - and conduct of threatening to kill people will not be treated unreasonably leniently by the courts. All of this is designed to give the public confidence that the courts are treating public protection as the single most important goal of the sentencing process, there being a number of principles and objectives to apply in attaining that goal.

In determining whether it would or would not be contrary to the public interest to grant a discharge, there are two approaches to take. In some cases it is obvious that to grant a discharge would be contrary to the public interest. In other cases - and this is one of them - at first blush it is difficult to see how the accused could not meet the second condition. In approaching it from that particular perspective, I ask myself this question: Can it be said that it is not contrary to the public interest by identifying any particular public interest criteria that would be offended by granting the discharge? How could it be contrary to the public interest, is a way to phrase it, while at all times keeping the specific language in s. 730 in mind. In other words, there are a number of ways of approaching it while keeping the central

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criterion in mind; the public interest criterion in this case.

If there were a conditional discharge that could protect the public, protect Mrs. Shortt, affect rehabilitation, address denunciation and that could meet the other objectives and principles of sentencing, then it could be said that it is not contrary to the public interest to grant one. If all of those factors could be met, the answer to the issue of the public interest would be addressed in the accused's favour.

Defence counsel says that there is no demonstrable reason not to grant a discharge. The defence says it is not contrary to the public interest to grant one. I agree with defence counsel. I am in agreement because in addressing all of those factors that I mentioned a few moments ago, I am unable to conclude that it would harm the public interest to grant a conditional discharge. If I cannot conclude that it would harm the public interest to grant one, it follows that I conclude it is not contrary to the public interest to grant one.

The conclusions then that I draw are that it would be in the best interests of the accused to grant a conditional discharge and not contrary to the public interest, although I do not find that it would meet the test to grant an absolute discharge.

I began by saying that the court "may" but not "shall" grant a discharge having resolved the issues in the accused's favour. This is a discretion which the court has. A discretion which the court has is a judicial discretion that must be exercised according to law. The law states that the least restrictive, least onerous form of sentencing should be adopted by the courts.

In my view, a conditional discharge is a fit and proper sentence for this offender for having committed these offences in these circumstances in this community toward these victims, so why refuse him that sentence? There is no reason to refuse it.

If there is no reason to refuse to grant a discharge, one, it follows, should be granted.

Accordingly, there will be one.

It will be for a period of one year. During this period, Mr. Shortt, you will have to obey the conditions of a probation order.

It has not escaped my attention that one of the charges is a failure to obey an order made by the court. Hence, the conditions will be firm and I urge Crown counsel, if any information comes to the attention of the authorities, to consider having this matter brought back to court, in which case the court can revoke the discharge and impose any other lawful sentence that I could have made today, including,

Mr. Shortt, imprisonment. But it is my intention, and I cannot make this too clear, that the sort of conduct that you entered into and your wife entered into after the two of you were placed on a peace bond is not going to be tolerated or condoned. This warning cannot be made more clear.

Also, if you do not obey the probation order you could be charged with failing to do so. That is a separate crime punishable by imprisonment of up to two years and also punishable by a number of other things.

One reason - and you may have seen me hesitate somewhat as I worked my way through the discharge reasoning process - one major reservation which was an impediment to arriving at the conclusion that I did was the failure by you on the evidence to honour your commitment to this court regarding that peace bond. I was the one who placed you on it. That is why I say it is incumbent upon the Crown to do what it can to assist the administration of justice in ensuring, as well as the Crown and the police can, that this order is complied with.

I will do what I can by having return dates in this court. At those times the probation officer will prepare reports to give the court and the Crown and the defence better assessment of whether this is working or not. If it is not working, then that is the time to get on top of it, not after it has

expired.

The conditions are: You will keep the peace and be of good behaviour; appear in court as required by the court.

I would like to be the judge here when the review dates are happening. There will be the first review on Tuesday, April 2nd, at 1:30 p.m.

I continue.

You are to report to a probation officer by 4:00 p.m. today in Yellowknife, and after that when and as directed by the probation officer. The clerk can tell you how to go about doing that. You will be under the supervision of the probation officer for the entire one year period. You are to participate actively in any counselling as the probation officer may direct from time to time. You are to have no contact or communication with Tambria Shortt of any sort, unless she initiates it or unless it is through another adult. For the entire one year, you are not to have any firearms in your possession, nor any ammunition or explosives of any sort.

Madam Clerk, this is not a separate firearm prohibition order; it is part of the probation order. It will additionally contain the other named items that are in section 109 of the *Criminal Code* though, I don't have to get into all them now - crossbow and so forth - I'd like all of them to get into the order.

It may seem farfetched, but everything mentioned in sections 109 and 110, every type of weapon of that sort has been used in the past by husbands to kill wives. That's one reason why they are in there. Even crossbows. It is important that they get into the order. But I think it need only be for one year. With the passage of one year, emotions will have cooled, the divorce should be probably close to over with and may be well behind the two of them.

I continue.

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You are not to attend at her place of work for any purpose. You are not to attend at her home or on her property for any purpose. If you need to pick up the children or drop them off, find out another way to do it, but you are not going to do it at her home. Note that your prohibition against attending at her home, property or place of work does not have the exception "unless she initiates it". You just cannot do it, even if she does initiate it. That is how the order will be worded. You are not to attend at her home, her property or place of work even if she does initiate it; however, you may have other communication and contact if she does initiate it but through a third party. So for example, if she says "Let's meet with the kids at McDonald's", that's fine. You can do that. Not at her home or on her property or place of work.

You are to do, on the four matters in total, 100 hours of community service work. That is not 100 on each, that's 100 in total. If it has to be broken down for technical reasons to make it legally perfect, it will be 25 hours on each count. The work is to be done when and as directed by the probation officer to that person's satisfaction, and not less than 20 hours per month beginning March of this year.

There will be an exception to the firearm prohibition. You can have firearms in your possession but only on the land. If you want to go caribou hunting with Wylie Grimm, you can do that, but you cannot keep them at your home and you cannot even take them from town to the land. But when you are out there, then you can have them on the land for the purpose of hunting and for protection.

There cannot be a plea of hardship regarding the victim fine surcharge. He has plenty of income coming in. That will be \$50, that being the statutory amount. I see no need to increase it. The \$50 will be on each count. Any default time in prison will be consecutive.

I will get to time to pay in a moment.

Does the Crown have anything further regarding the probation order?

MR. NIBLOCK: Yes, sir, perhaps a no contact order for Mr. Krestel.

1	THE	COURT: Thank you. You are to have no	
2		contact or communication with Kevin Krestel of any	
3		sort, nor attend at his home or place of work.	
4		Does the defence have anything further regarding	
5		the probation order?	
6	MR.	SMITH: Two questions, Sir. You indicated	
7		not less than 20 hours community service; is that per	
8		month beginning in March?	
9	THE	COURT: Yes. I thought I said that but	
10		maybe I didn't.	
11	MR.	SMITH: Yes, you indicated it commenced in	
12		March and I wasn't sure if that was per month.	
13	THE	COURT: Not less than 20 hours per month	
14		beginning March.	
15	MR.	SMITH: Thank you. And \$50 on each count,	
16		so \$200 total; is that the victim fine surcharge?	
17	THE	COURT: Yes. No DNA order, I see no need to	
18		make one in this case.	
19	MR.	SMITH: Pardon me, sir?	
20	THE	COURT: No DNA order, this is not the case	
21		one needs to be made.	
22	MR.	SMITH: With respect to time to pay, sir,	
23		Mr. Shortt does not need time to pay, he can pay the	
24		victim fine surcharge today.	
25	THE	COURT: Payable today, at your request.	
26	Anything more in this matter from the Crown?		
27	MR.	NIBLOCK: No, sir, thank you.	

	1		THE	COURT: Does	the defence have anything more?
	2		MR.	SMITH: Noth	ing, Your Honour, thank you.
	3		THE	COURT: I th	ank both of you again for a job
	4			well done, and that ca	n be passed along in particular
	5			to Ms. Bond.	
	6		The probation order will be prepared later. You'll have to attend at the court office to sign it		
	7				
	8			between 3:30 and 4:00	today, and that will give the
	9			court clerk time to ha	ve lunch today and still prepare
	10			the order.	
	11		THE	COURT CLERK: Than	k you, sir.
	12		THE	COURT: It c	an't be prepared for next week
	13			because I'll be travel	ling and I need to sign it.
	14		So 1:30, Madam Clerk.		
	15		(AD	JOURNMENT)	
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	18				ified pursuant to Practice ction #20 dated December 18,
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	21			Anne	tte Wright, RPR, CSR(A) t Reporter
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