T-1-CR-2001003399

IN THE TERRITORIAL COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

IN THE MATTER of an Application for the Termination of the Seizure and Return of a Motor Vehicle and its licence plates, seized from the Applicant on 19 July 2001 pursuant to the provisions of the *Motor Vehicles Act*, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. M-6, as amended;

BETWEEN:

DAVID BECKWITH

Applicant

- and -

THE ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE,
THE CITY OF YELLOWKNIFE and THE REGISTRAR OF
MOTOR VEHICLES OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

Respondents

Transcript of the Oral Reasons made on an Originating Notice of Motion heard before The Honourable Judge B.A. Bruser, in Yellowknife, in the Northwest Territories, on the 1st day of August, A.D. 2001.

APPEARANCES:

Mr. J. Brydon:
Ms. H. Potter:
Mr. M. Himmelman:

Counsel for the Applicant
Counsel for the Respondent RCMP
Counsel for the Respondent City of
Yellowknife

THE COURT: This is an originating notice. It was filed in the Territorial Court on July 25th, 2001. The return date was for yesterday. Yesterday was docket day. We had a very busy day but the court was able to accommodate the parties up until about five o'clock, at which time the matter was adjourned until this morning for continuation if time permitted, and time does permit.

The applicant is David Beckwith, who operates a security company in the City of Yellowknife, and three respondents are named. They are: The Royal Canadian Mounted Police, or RCMP from this point on; the City of Yellowknife; and the Registrar of Motor Vehicles of the Government of the Northwest Territories. The Registrar of Motor Vehicles, while named as a respondent, actually has no involvement because of the factual context of the matter. The remarks I have to make from this point on address the issues respecting the other respondents.

Mr. Brydon is counsel for the applicant;
Ms. Potter for the RCMP; Mr. Himmelman for the City of
Yellowknife; and Mr. Toner appeared briefly yesterday
on behalf of the Registrar but determined that he had
no viable need to be here, with which the court
agreed.

There are two affidavits: one is the affidavit in support of the originating notice, it is the

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affidavit of David Beckwith; the other is the affidavit of Terry Scott, a member of the RCMP.

The powers of the Territorial Court are circumscribed by statute. This court is a court of statutory creation. Its jurisdiction flows from statute. The court has limited inherent jurisdiction recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada and by appeal courts, but the inherent jurisdiction that this court possesses, such as maintaining control over its process and other similar matters, are of no concern in this proceeding. In the circumstances of this proceeding, I must find my jurisdiction, my powers and my duties from statute. I cannot capture these necessities through pure logic, sympathy or common sense.

The history of the matter is, in summary, as follows, which I take from the affidavit material. I begin with the affidavit of Terry Scott not because it is more important, but because it is a simpler basis upon which to begin to outline the history.

The RCMP have apparently, as has the City of Yellowknife Bylaw Enforcement, explained to the applicant on more than one occasion that in their view it is a violation of section 132 of the Motor Vehicles Act to have a flashing light bar mounted on the top of his vehicle. In paragraph 4, it is said that the issue was explained to Mr. Beckwith by the Acting

Director of the Motor Vehicles Division of the Department of Transportation, Government of the Northwest Territories. Exhibit A is a copy of the letter written by the Acting Director to the applicant.

Paragraph 5 sets out some involvement of the Municipal Enforcement Division of the City of Yellowknife. Exhibit B supports paragraph 5. On July 8th, an RCMP member stopped the vehicle in issue and informed the applicant that the light bar had to be removed from the top of the vehicle. Exhibit C is material supporting that allegation. It seems that Mr. Beckwith was warned by the officer that if he did not remove the light bar within one week the vehicle would be seized. He was also given a ticket in the form of a SOTI.

On July 18th, the same vehicle was stopped by Municipal Enforcement officers of the City. The light bar had not been removed. They contacted the RCMP. The RCMP attended, seized the vehicle, and removed it via a private company, Age Automotive Limited.

Also on July 18th, it is said that Constable
Doucet told the applicant that the vehicle would be
released to him as soon as he made arrangements to
remove the offending light bar from the roof of the
vehicle. Exhibit D is a copy of the applicable
correspondence. The vehicle and its licence plate

remain with the RCMP. The licence plate has apparently been removed from the vehicle.

The affidavit of David Beckwith establishes that a significant part of the business that he controls and operates, called Centurion Security Systems

Limited, is maintenance of the security of the clients of Centurion. To that end, the applicant, through his company, leased a Dodge Ram motor vehicle, which is the vehicle in issue. The licence plate number is 85068 of the Northwest Territories.

The company needs to fulfill various duties in order to function, and, in order to maintain the safety of employees, Mr. Beckwith had a light bar installed on top of the vehicle. The components of the light bar include two spot lights, two alley lights, and two flashing amber lights. It is the two flashing amber lights that have attracted the attention of the enforcement authorities, both City and RCMP. According to Mr. Beckwith, the light bar is necessary so that the employees can illuminate locations when they go to investigate various matters. Mr. Beckwith says that his company was informed that the flashing amber lights violated section 132 of the Motor Vehicles Act. He says in paragraph 5 that in consideration of the matter and complaint, he had the two flashing lights disconnected. This made the flashing lights inoperable so that in his view they

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were no longer flashing lights and therefore in his view did not offend the applicable provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. He left the disconnected amber lights on the light bar because to remove them would damage the light bar because the lights are set up in a series. Because they are set up in that way, the alley lights and the spot lights could not properly work if the amber lights were removed. What we are left with, then, is that the amber flash assembly remains on the light bar but is inoperable because of the disconnection. The lights, because they are disconnected, cannot, he says, shine, rotate, or flash. If the light bar were removed as the RCMP have asked Mr. Beckwith to do, the vehicle could not fully operate as intended to fulfill Centurion's contractual obligations.

On July 18th when stopped by the Municipal Enforcement officer, Mr. Beckwith demonstrated that the flashing lights did not operate. The vehicle nevertheless was towed away after the RCMP attended. It was before the vehicle was towed away that the police removed the licence plates.

In paragraph 10, Mr. Beckwith says that he believes the plates were returned to the Registrar, but during argument it appeared that they are with the RCMP. Counsel are not clear whether there is one plate or more than one. Mr. Beckwith says there are

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two. Elsewhere there's an indication of one. It doesn't matter whether there is one or two.

At the time of the seizure, Mr. Beckwith was given a letter marked as Exhibit A to his affidavit. It is a letter from the RCMP dated the same date as the seizure advising that he had been stopped and ticketed pursuant to section 132(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act. It refers to a warning that he had been given to remove the light bar. In paragraph (2) the officer writes that on July 18th the vehicle was stopped and the plate (singular) was removed from it. The RCMP offered in that letter (an offer that remains outstanding) to release the vehicle to Mr. Beckwith when the light bar is removed from it.

The applicant says that in his view he has not violated any applicable section of the *Motor Vehicles* Act, nor was the vehicle abandoned, nor is any public interest engaged in the seizure and continued detention of the vehicle or the plate. He says the vehicle has at all material times been fully registered and properly insured. There were no parking violations and so forth.

In paragraph 18, he flushes out the public interest issue by saying that the existence of the light bar did not engage the public interest requiring the vehicle to be seized. He says that none of the officers involved in the matter of the seizure itself

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have expressed to him any reasonable grounds or even claimed that the seizure was required in the public interest.

It is not up to Mr. Beckwith to determine what the public interest is, nor is it up to him to adjudicate upon whether there were or were not reasonable grounds to seize the vehicle or to continue to detain it. The vehicle was not detained for a 24-hour period referred to in one of the subsections of section 300 of the *Motor Vehicles Act*, which I will have more to say about shortly.

The applicant did know where the vehicle would be stored. He says in paragraph 23 that he has "no idea" if the police have complied with subsection 301(2). He did not receive any notification, he says, pursuant to subsection 301(3) of the Act.

At the end of the affidavit Mr. Beckwith states that the seizure of the vehicle has interfered with the lawful and appropriate business of Centurion and that this has cost Centurion client goodwill and loss of income.

The only authority which would give me jurisdiction under the *Motor Vehicles Act* to order the return of the vehicle is section 298. Subsection 298(1) reads:

The owner or any person having an interest in a vehicle referred to in subsection 295(1) may apply to a territorial judge for an order that

2	terminates the seizure and releases the vehicle to the applicant.
3	Subsection (2):
4	Jubsection (2):
	A territorial judge shall order the termination of a seizure and the return of the vehicle to an applicant referred to in subsection (1) where (a) the judge is satisfied that the applicant is the owner or person who is lawfully entitled to possession of the vehicle; and (b) the prosecutor does not satisfy the judge that the vehicle is required for the purposes of any investigation or proceedings in relation to an offence under this Act or the regulations.
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12	In order to understand section 298 better, it
13	follows that section 295 has to be understood.
14	Subsection 295 (1) reads:
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16	Subject to sections 297 and 298, an officer who seizes a vehicle under section 294 or under a search warrant in respect of an offence under this Act or the regulations may cause the vehicle to be taken to and stored in a suitable place until the final disposition of any proceedings in respect of the offence involving the vehicle and may cause tests and examinations to be made of the vehicle that the officer considers proper.
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21	Subsection (2) is inapplicable.
22	Because section 295 makes reference to a seizure
23	under section 294, it is necessary to look at section
24	294.
25	Section 294, being the first section under the
26	heading "Seizure", reads:
27	An officer who finds a person, on a highway,

contravening this Act or the regulations may, if a vehicle is involved in the contravention, seize the vehicle if the vehicle is required for evidence. (Emphasis added)

The affidavit of Terry Scott does not show that the vehicle was seized because it is required for evidence. Nothing before me indicates that the vehicle is or may be required for evidence. Counsel for the RCMP does not say that the vehicle is required for evidence in any proceeding.

I turn now to subsection 300(1)(d):

An officer may seize a vehicle and cause it to be removed from its location to a place of storage that the officer considers appropriate where

(d)... the vehicle is on a highway and is involved in a contravention of this Act or the regulations and the officer on reasonable grounds believes that the public interest requires the vehicle to be seized.

Subsection (3) reads:

A seizure made under subsection (1) terminates 24 hours after the vehicle is seized.

It is my assessment and my conclusion that this was a subsection 300(1)(d) seizure and not a section 294 seizure. This is the only logical and reasonable interpretation of the evidence. Since the vehicle was seized in the public interest, section 298 is not applicable. Because section 298 is not applicable, it does not give me the jurisdiction to order the return

of the vehicle to the applicant.

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I return to section 300.

I have read subsection (3) which governs the termination of a section 300 seizure. Unfortunately for the applicant, a provision comparable to section 298 empowering the court to terminate a seizure lasting longer than 24 hours does not exist. Because I have no inherent power to order the vehicle to be returned to the applicant and because no statutory power is in the Motor Vehicles Act (pursuant to which this proceeding has been instituted), I am without jurisdiction to direct the RCMP to return the vehicle to Mr. Beckwith, although I sympathize with his plight. But although I sympathize with his plight, I also sympathize with the position the RCMP finds itself in. Mr. Beckwith may, and probably does, have other lawful remedies open to him. The issue of whether the light bar or any part of it is lawful or unlawful is for the trial court hearing the summary offence ticket information, which is currently before the Justice of the Peace Court, as shown in Exhibit C of the affidavit of Terry Scott. That issue is not to be resolved in this particular proceeding.

The licence plate was removed, it would appear, pursuant to section 287 of the Motor Vehicles Act. It says that where an officer who has conducted an inspection believes that the vehicle is in such

condition that its operation is likely to endanger the safety of people, the officer may remove the licence plate or plates. There are provisions governing the detention of plates and what the officer removing plates has to do.

In section 288, the officer who has removed plates must return them to the person in whose name the vehicle is registered or an agent where the officer is satisfied within 30 days after removing the plates that the requirements of the notice given in 287(3)(a) have been completed. Subsection (2) provides that where an officer does not return the plates within the 30-day period the officer must deliver or mail the plates to the Registrar along with a copy of the subsection 287(3) notice.

The vehicle and the plate were seized on July 18th. If the 30-day period is operative in these circumstances, it would be too early to direct a return of the plate. In any event, there is no provision in the Motor Vehicles Act that I am aware of which would give this court the power to direct the officer who has detained the plate to return them at any time, whether before or after the 30-day period. Once again, the issue of jurisdiction becomes significant. It may be that the Motor Vehicles Act should be amended to give this court broader powers than it has under the present scheme in order to

safeguard in better ways the rights of citizens. this issue is up to the branch of government that makes legislation. For the reasons given, the application for the return of the vehicle and for the return of the licence plate is dismissed. The Motor Vehicles Act is clear about who pays for all reasonable removal, storage and care charges. There is no need to further comment upon that branch of the originating notice. (PROCEEDINGS CONTINUE REGARDING COSTS) Certified pursuant to Practice Direction #20 dated December 18, 1987. Court Reporter