
IN THE TERRITORIAL COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

IN THE MATTER OF:



Transcript of the Reasons for Judgment held by The Honourable Judge B. A. Bruser, sitting in Resolute, in the Northwest Territories, on Friday, the 3rd day of April, A.D., 1998.

<u>APPEARANCES</u>:

Ms. E. Bellerose:

Counsel for the Crown

Mr. J. Posynick:

Counsel for the Defence

THE COURT: The Crown (also called the prosecution) and the defence (Mr. Posynick and the accused) have presented fair, thorough, and carefully

prepared cases. This is the third day of this trial.

From time to time, I did not allow some questions to be asked or some answers to be given. This is a normal part of the trial process and is especially common the longer a trial becomes. The reason for this is that as time goes on, there may be a greater chance for the lawyers and for the witnesses to wander off the trail.

The charge before the Court is that the accused, not his company, but him as a person, on or about February 1st, 1996, here at Resolute Bay, knowingly used a forged document, namely, a business license, as if it were genuine, that is, as if it were the real thing or a true copy of the real thing.

There is a history to this proceeding. Some may wonder how it is that this is before the Territorial Court which I am part of. The charge was sworn on August 7th, 1996, close to two years ago. It is not very common in my experience to spend close to two years to conclude a matter, and this is not a particularly complicated matter; therefore, there might be people who, unless I explain something of the history, would think that the courts have been rather turtle-like in concluding the matter.

On August 7th, 1996, the charge was sworn. The charge was first read to the accused on November 7th of that year here in Resolute Bay. The accused had been given a summons to come here. It was given to him August 15th and for one reason or another, perhaps because the court does not come here very often, the November date was chosen for him to be here and for it to be read to him. He did not waste any time in choosing, as was his right, to be tried in the Supreme Court with a jury.

A preliminary hearing into the matter to determine if there was enough evidence to justify a trial was held on September 25th, 1997, at which time the accused was ordered to stand trial. That is a delay of about ten months. Taking into account that the court does not come here very often relative to other communities and the number of witnesses who had to be accommodated and the documents, the ten-month period seems to be reasonable and indeed, I have not heard the defence to complain about it.

The accused changed his mind as he is allowed to do. On December 19th, 1997, the accused elected (or chose) to be tried in this court, and the Crown prosecutor gave her consent on the same date. That consent was required. The prosecutor who gave her consent is not the same prosecutor before the Court today.

The time period from the 19th of December, 1997, to where we are now in April is not very long. These are the reasons why, though, it has taken about two years to complete the matter.

For those who are not parties to this proceeding but who may be interested in this judgment, it is important to know, as the Crown knows and as the accused knows, that I have followed legal principles that in some aspects go back many centuries. One of these principles of law is that the prosecution does not have to prove its case to an absolute certainty. Instead, what it has to do is to prove its case, as we have heard in argument, beyond a reasonable doubt. What does this mean? This means that for me to have a reasonable doubt upon which to find the accused not guilty, such doubt has to be founded or based on reason. That reason has to have a foundation coming from the evidence. I am not allowed to go about gathering my own evidence and deciding on my own where the chips may fall.

If, at the end of my assessment and weighing of the evidence, I have strong suspicions, even a thousand suspicions or even more than that but am not satisfied of the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, I have to find him not guilty.

From what I have said, it is apparent that the prosecution has a heavy burden of proof, and it is

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further apparent that the accused does not have to prove to me that he is innocent. A finding of guilty means that the accused committed the offence of using the forged document as charged. A finding of not guilty does not mean that I do not believe the witnesses for the prosecution or any of them.

There is another principle which is important in this case. Mr. Posynick already referred to it during his argument. It comes from a Supreme Court of Canada judgment called $\underline{D.(W.)}$, and it has to do with the principle of credibility, that is, how to determine issues of credibility. Mr. Posynick summarized what the various principles from $\underline{D.(W.)}$ are. I will go over them again but using my language.

If I believe the accused who said he did not do it, I have to find him not guilty. If I do not believe the accused but if his evidence raises a reasonable doubt in my mind, I have to find him not guilty. If I do not believe the accused and if his evidence does not raise a reasonable doubt in my mind, I still have to consider all the evidence in the trial to determine if the prosecution has proven its case to the required standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, if I am unable to determine what or who to believe, the benefit of the doubt has to go to the accused in which case in a trial with a judge sitting alone as this one is he has to be found not guilty; whereas if there were

a jury and the jury could not agree about what to do, if some believed the accused was guilty and if even one believed the accused to be not guilty, there could be no verdict -- there would be a hung jury as it is often called.

Another long-established principle has to do with motive. We have heard quite a bit about motive throughout this trial: motive by the accused to falsify a document, motive by the accused to use a false document, and motive by witnesses for the prosecution to fudge the truth or otherwise not to remember accurately because of bad blood between one or more of them and the accused. The defence calls the last part of this "bias."

While it may be useful for the Court to know about any motive which an accused may have to commit a crime, the prosecution does not have to prove motive. It is simply not a standard that it has to meet, but, where motive is established, it can often be helpful to the Court in its assessment and weighing of all the evidence.

The case for the prosecution is that the accused, who is a Resolute Bay businessman, used a forged copy of a business license in his dealings with officials of the Northwest Territories Housing Corporation. It may be more accurately stated that the Crown says that the accused used a falsified copy of the document. I will

say more about this shortly. The Crown says that the motive for doing so is connected to the accused's ongoing need to make a profit in his business, Kheraj Enterprises.

The accused is not charged with forging any document; therefore, the Crown need not prove that the accused did so. For someone to be guilty of using a forged or falsified document, certain things have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. These include a document which is forged or falsified, knowledge before using it that it is forged/falsified, using it in some manner and, in using it, doing so or passing it off as if the document, or copy thereof in this case, were genuine. A document that is forged is a false document. There are any number of ways in which a document can be falsified. The human imagination is without limit.

During my assessment and weighing of the evidence, I have had to pan for gold. This has involved a sifting of the sand from the flakes of gold. There is a great deal of sand in the form of evidence in this trial which ultimately has been of little assistance to me.

The theory of the prosecution is that the accused doctored a copy of a Hamlet of Resolute Bay business license to trick an official with the Northwest Territories Housing Corporation into believing that the

copy, Exhibit 16, was a true copy of a genuine license, Exhibit 25, to operate a room and board establishment in Resolute Bay without any conditions imposed on the license. In fact, the Crown argues, the copy of the license was not a genuine copy at all.

The Crown says that the real license issued by the Hamlet had a restriction imposed on it. The Crown says that the restriction was not included in the copy of the license, Exhibit 16, used by the accused in his dealings with the Housing Corporation employee. The original license, Exhibit 25, had the following restriction on it. Underneath the block words "COMMERCIAL ROOM AND BOARD," there is in smaller print and in brackets the following: (Kheraj Enterprises employees only), all of which is underlined.

Exhibit 16 which is the alleged false document and which had been presented to the witness Christine Klazinga of the Housing Corporation does not have the bracketed restriction on it. According to the Crown, there is no evidence in this trial to show that the accused could have been issued or provided with a copy of a license from the Hamlet which did not have the restriction on it.

The evidence of Ralph Alexander of the Hamlet of Resolute Bay and who is the assistant senior administrative officer is less than clear. He was shown Exhibit 12. Exhibit 12 appears to be a copy of a

business license issued to the accused for commercial room and board and which does not have a restriction on it. The expiry date is the 31st of March, 1995. This document is not dated, and it is not signed by the Hamlet or by the accused. It is, in effect, a piece of paper or another way to put it, an imperfect document with no legal effect insofar as being a license is concerned.

When shown Exhibit 12, Mr. Alexander said that if he had called that document up in his computer from which licenses are generated, as a renewal document of a prior valid license, he would have changed the expiry date, dated it at the bottom, and he would have signed it. In his words, "it is barely possible" that this happened.

He testified that he would have checked the document carefully because he was aware of the restriction that the Hamlet wanted and which is in evidence from minutes of a Hamlet meeting from December 1994; and he would have added the restriction to the license. He testified that to his knowledge, Exhibit 12 was never issued. He went on to add that he would have treated Exhibit 12, if he had dealt with it, as a first license and not as a renewal. He was the one apparently who actually issued Exhibit 25 with the restriction.

It is appropriate to say something about what is

not essential to the case for the prosecution. I have touched on one or two of these factors, but I intend now to go into them in more detail given the way in which the evidence unfolded and the way in which the arguments were presented.

It is not necessary for the Crown to prove whether a license issued by the Hamlet supersedes a license issued by an agency or department of the Government of the Northwest Territories or whether the converse is true. (For the interpreter, the other side, the other way around.) Some time was spent on this issue in the evidence. This is an issue which has little to do with my task.

It is not necessary for the Crown to prove at what point or in what manner a document was falsified if, in fact, I find that falsification has been proven at all. It is not necessary for the Crown to prove that the accused falsified any document -- I made reference to this earlier.

It is not necessary for the Crown to prove whether or not the Hamlet had any authority to impose restrictions on the license or whether or not the Hamlet had a statutory duty to issue a business license once various preconditions had been met. Again, these are issues that have little to do with the task at hand.

It is not necessary for the Crown to establish

what approach any government agency including the Housing Corporation and including Economic Development & Tourism, called the E. D. & T., would have taken had it or they had knowledge of the Hamlet-imposed restriction on the accommodation liçense issued to the accused.

It is not necessary for the Crown to prove harm or prejudice to the Government of the Northwest

Territories or to any of its departments or agencies.

It is not necessary for the Crown to prove that the accused used his accommodation license from the Hamlet contrary to any existing condition.

This case is not a civil lawsuit. It is not a case involving whether or not the accused broke a contract or promise or anything else. It is about whether he committed a crime according to what it is that the Crown has to prove. The focus, therefore, is narrower than what it might be in a broader-ranging civil case. From time to time, this trial wandered into the realm of civil law. I wish to make it clear that this case is not a civil lawsuit.

The Crown also need not prove that any lawful motion or lawful resolution was made prior to the Hamlet, through Ralph Alexander, issuing Exhibit 25.

The case for the defence is simple: there is no false document. If any false document was created, it was not the accused who did it and he had no knowledge

of it. That is the case for the defence.

In support of it, the defence says that the accused was provided, in fact, with a copy of the original license, and the copy faxed in this case to the accused did not have conditions on it. The license which had conditions on it, I infer from the defence argument, was either a separate document or else the conditions were added by someone else after the accused was given the copy.

In an interview with a police investigator, an interview that took considerable time and which began as a written document but which was later taped and transcribed, the accused repeatedly denied having altered any document or having knowledge that the copy of the license he gave to Christine Klazinga was falsified. The statement is Exhibit 24. This statement in its entirety was put into evidence by the Crown as part of its case. The Crown did not have to do so.

What do I make of this? The fact that I have before me a statement full of denials is some evidence to be weighed along with all the other evidence in the trial for the Crown and for the defence. What the statement shows at the end of the day is that at the time he was interviewed by the police, the accused was adamant that he had not committed a crime, and he continued with that denial in the courtroom under

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oath.

At the heart of the defence is that if the accused falsified a copy of the original license, he would quickly have been caught. He would have stood to lose credibility within the community, with his business contacts including the government, and his reputation would have suffered greatly. By doing this, he would stand to lose future business opportunities and ultimately would bring more harm onto himself than any good which could have flowed from the act of trying to trick Christine Klazinga.

The Crown argues that the accused had everything to gain and if that theory is not found to be proven by the Court, there is another aspect of the matter which I ought to consider and which I raised in argument with counsel. I should refer to it because there is evidence to support it.

The Economic Development & Tourism license is before the Court. That license has an expiry date on it of December 31st, 1995. It licenses the business of the accused as a staff house. It is dated December 16th, 1994. There are no stated conditions apart from the maximum guest capacity and so forth. The wording used is that the business is licensed "as staff house, a lodge, at a maximum guest capacity of nine persons."

There are minutes before the Court from the Hamlet. One is from December 5th, 1994, and the other,

December 19th, 1994. The December 5th one is Exhibit 10. The December 19th one is Exhibit 11. Curiously, the license issued by E. D. & T. falls between those dates. On the 19th of December, the Hamlet purported not by resolution and not by motion to agree to "issue him (the accused) a business license for commercial room and board (Kheraj Enterprises employees only)." There is evidence that the accused was aware of this. He would have been aware of it, I infer, shortly after it was issued.

Later on in February 1996, the accused was issued an

E. D. & T. license. That one had terms and conditions on it: "Accommodation for construction and subcontractor employees only," that condition not being on the 1994 one.

There is also evidence that the accused did not believe that the Hamlet had any authority to impose conditions on his use of the accommodation once he had an E. D. & T. permit. Therefore, to continue along this line of reasoning, it is possible that the accused had a strong motive to delete the Hamlet condition from a copy of a license he had received from the Hamlet that had conditions on it. His reasoning would be that because the Hamlet had no authority to do this, no harm could be done by his deleting it. This is a strong suspicion that I have been harbouring. I continue.

The evidence of the accused is that he asked to be faxed in July 1995 copies of licenses that he had with the Hamlet and which he claims to have misplaced or lost. He informed the Hamlet that he needed the material for his purposes. The theory of the defence is that he must have been faxed a copy that did not have conditions on it. Exhibit 12 would be an example of this sort of document. Exhibit 12 does not have any facsimile indicator along the top of it as is missing from other exhibits before the Court.

The accused also testified that Ralph Alexander told him that what he, Alexander, was faxing to him would have no valid effect. That is, it would not be a legal license because it lacked the signature of the accused. The accused said that when he received the fax of the license, Exhibit 16, that he took the telephone conversation with Ralph Alexander to be permission to add his (the accused's) signature to the document which he then passed along to Christine Klazinga. This is how, according to the theory of the defence, the two signatures are on Exhibit 16 while only that of Ralph Alexander is on Exhibit 25.

Apparently, it is not the usual practice for the Hamlet to fax a license to anyone, but the evidence supports the claim of the accused that Mr. Alexander did, in fact, do this.

The Crown says that the accused should be

disbelieved by the Court. The reasoning is as I have already outlined, but part of the reasoning process of the Crown is the one of profit motive -- the need to make a profit and to cut costs. While being alive to this motive, I believe it would be most dangerous to infer that because the accused runs his business with these basic lawful business principles in mind that he would be susceptible to engaging in criminal conduct.

The evidence of his character is before the Court. The Crown has not led evidence to show that he is of bad character. Once an accused opens his character to the Court, it is open to the Crown to rebut the evidence with evidence of bad character.

The accused is meticulous, and he is a careful, aggressive business person. The Crown says that if he is so careful, how could he possibly misplace such an important document as a Hamlet business license? The accused does not have to answer that question. He has nothing to prove; however, for the accused to produce to Christine Klazinga, as I have already said, a false document which likely would be checked against Hamlet records thereby exposing the falsification is not consistent with the care in which the accused does things. That argument goes some way to neutralizing the argument advanced by the Crown on the issue of the meticulous, careful nature of the accused.

I turn my attention now to the filing system of

the Hamlet of Resolute Bay. There is evidence before the Court that the filing system, including other aspects of the issuing of licenses, was not, during the time in question, well organized. It is now, but it was not then.

The evidence of how poorly the paperwork was handled comes from more than one witness, and it comes from people in the know -- not people who were guessing. There is Gary Guy who was elected as a Hamlet councillor in 1995 and who is now the mayor of Resolute Bay. He described the Hamlet files at the time as having been "mixed up" before he became a councillor. It is open on the totality of the evidence for me to conclude that when it came to the preparation and management of paperwork, the Hamlet practice was, and I emphasize the past tense, not the present, somewhat lax. Evidence leading me to use the word "lax" comes from the testimony of Mayor Guy. describing the minutes which are taken of council's meetings, he said "the minutes are very lax." He added "they are condensed," but he did say that the minutes do not vary from what council has said because they are checked by Hamlet staff. The problem is that the Hamlet staff who were doing the checking during the material time were the very people who were in charge of the day-to-day mismanagement of the paperwork.

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system was in need of improvement came from the evidence of the assistant S.A.O. (Senior Administrative Officer) Ralph Alexander who described the system in place as "informal" but which was improved once the investigation into this matter got underway.

Mr. Alexander acknowledged that the files from time to time were misfiled. We heard more evidence about that today. This evidence was supported by that of Susan Salluviniq who worked as the S.A.O. for about nine years.

The office, I conclude, ran on a largely informal basis and on a somewhat ad hoc one with little in the way of concrete, well-defined, clear principles to follow. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that when the Hamlet witnesses testified, they were less than clear in the delivery of their testimony. How can one be clear about that which is unclear? This caused the lawyers and to some extent the Court to require this category of witness to go over the same ground repeatedly to enable us to understand what went on in the Hamlet office with the issuing of the licenses and with their filing.

Another complicating factor in this matter is that documents that are supposed to be copies of other documents differ when looked at carefully. Exhibit 16 and 30 are good examples. They are copies, it would appear, of the Form A business license from the

Hamlet. They are both dated June 30th, 1995. Each has the signature of Ralph Alexander on it. Each has the signature of the accused on it and so forth; yet the clarity of the documents is not similar and when these two are compared against other copies, Exhibits 28 and 29 which the Crown says belong together as do 16 and 30 according to the Crown, the words "Hamlet of Resolute Bay" we can see across the top of 28 and 29. Both of these are dated again June 30th, 1995. The Court has had filed before it many copies of what is supposed to be an original document. The copies vary, leading me to wonder what direction I ought to be following.

Another principle of law that I have to follow is that the Court is not allowed to speculate or to engage in conjecture. What this means for the benefit of the interpreter is that the Court is not allowed to guess. The Court cannot guess that one document is more persuasive than another. There has to be evidence from which I can comfortably follow a trail to the end where the Crown says lies proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Similarly, I am not allowed to guess in order to find a reasonable doubt.

On the totality of the evidence, applying the appropriate law to it, I find that it would be dangerous to convict the accused who by the end of his testimony stuck to his guns. There are no significant inconsistencies within his evidence. There is no way

that I could properly apply the credibility principles from the Supreme Court of Canada and find the accused guilty.

I have a strong suspicion that the theory I earlier identified having to do with the

E. D. & T. permits and the accused's belief that they in some way superseded any Hamlet right to impose conditions is the correct theory, but I am not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the Crown has proven the elements of the offence, in particular, that the accused knew when he handed over to Christine Klazinga Exhibit 16, that it was a false document.

Had the Hamlet practices been more precise, had they avoided the sloppy practice of faxing an original document that missed a signature, had those checks and balances been in place at that time, the ultimate outcome in this matter may or may not have been different. I do not know.

My final words, because I find you, sir, not guilty, are to the elders who are here. The Court is very pleased that you were able to come for the three days. The Court is very pleased too, and please keep in mind that I have never been here before, with the friendliness and the hospitality which this community has shown to us. Thank you.

I thank the interpreter for his very hard work, counsel.

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2	THE CLERK:	Thank you, Sir.
3	All rise. Th	is court is now closed. God save
4	The Queen.	
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