

## IN THE TERRITORIAL COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

## IN THE MATTER OF:

## HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN





Transcript of the Oral Reasons for Judgment and Sentence by The Honourable Judge B.A. Browne, at Iqaluit in the Northwest Territories, on Friday, May 1, A.D., 1998.

## APPEARANCES:

Ms. D. Robinson:

Counsel for the Crown

Ms. S. Cooper:

Counsel for the Accused

Charge under s. 343(d) of the Criminal Code of Canada

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punishment."

I am grateful to counsel for their well-researched and well-presented arguments, both written and oral. They have been helpful to me in grappling with this difficult issue.

In considering the arguments that have been put forward by counsel, it is appropriate to discuss the circumstances of the crime, the personal circumstances of each of the accused, and the factors that are relevant to the sentences of the two accused before the Court to put the arguments on the constitutional issues into the proper context.

Both Mr. Kopalie and Mr. Kuksiak have pled guilty to a charge of armed robbery. On the evening of the 31st of January, 1996, the two accused had been drinking alcohol. They obtained and loaded a gun and went by skidoo to a 24-hour convenience store in Iqaluit. Kuksiak, who was masked, went into the store with the loaded gun. He asked the clerk for money, and pointed the gun at the clerk. When the money was not forthcoming, he fired a shot into the ceiling of the The clerk grabbed the gun, and in the ensuing struggle, took the gun away from Mr. Kuksiak. Kuksiak then left the store, and he and Kopalie left the scene by foot as the skidoo they had come on would not The motive for robbing the store was to obtain start. money for drugs and/or alcohol.

Mr. Kuksiak is 32 years of age. He has lived

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common-law with a woman for 13 years, and they are caring for five children. The pre-sentence report indicates that the accused has struggled with a sniffing problem throughout his teenage and adult life. Since the incident in January, 1996, Mr. Kuksiak has not been involved in further difficulties and has taken some steps to identify and address the problems in his life.

The pre-sentence report indicates that Mr. Kuksiak is very involved in the care and upbringing of his children. Any sentence imposed will, therefore, affect many people, including family members and others in the community that he comes from.

The report also indicates that Mr. Kuksiak completed a painting and decorating course through Arctic College in Broughton Island and may have future employment with the Broughton Island Housing Authority even after he's completed the sentence imposed as a result of this incident. The report indicates that that course was completed during the time that he was released on these charges.

Mr. Kuksiak has, during the two years since the incident, been able to obey the restrictive terms of his undertaking. He cooperated with the police from the time of his arrest, he provided a statement to the police at the time of his arrest, and I believe that included a re-enactment. He has testified against the

co-accused and has pled guilty to the charge without putting the Crown to any proof of the allegations against him. He also cooperated in the preparation of the pre-sentence report, which obviously is to his benefit.

The pre-sentence report also indicates that Mr. Kuksiak is remorseful or sorry for his actions, he accepts responsibility for what he did and is aware that a lengthy jail sentence will follow. Also in the report, there are indications that Mr. Kuksiak recognizes the fear and harm that he caused to the victim.

After the incident and his apprehension, he has taken some steps to deal with the problems that may have led to the commission of the offence. His guilty plea has also saved the Court significant time and money, which should be recognized in the sentence imposed.

Mr. Kuksiak does have a criminal record covering the period 1988 to 1993. He was sentenced to jail on one occasion on a break-and-enter charge in 1990 and served one year. There is also a ten-day sentence imposed on an assault charge in 1988. All of the other sentences imposed on Mr. Kuksiak do not involve periods of time in jail, but rather, probation or fines.

It is obvious from the record that many efforts have been made to help Mr. Kuksiak in the past in

various forms from jail to probation, and unfortunately, those efforts have not been successful and have culminated in the very serious charge before the Court today.

It is important to note, as well, that Mr. Kuksiak is an aboriginal offender from a small community in the soon-to-be territory of Nunavut. There are no federal jails within this territory nor within the Northwest Territories. A federal jail sentence will likely result in Mr. Kuksiak's transfer to a southern penitentiary, far from his culture, language, family, friends, and country food. It is likely if he is sentenced to a federal jail that he will not have access to traditional counselling as he would in the North; he would not have access to Elders and other ways of dealing with difficulties in a traditional Inuit way.

Mr. Kopalie is 34 years of age. He is a carver by trade. He is married and has three children.

Mr. Kopalie obviously cares very much for his family, but is struggling, and has been, with those responsibilities and other responsibilities.

Mr. Kopalie has a significant criminal record dating from 1979 to 1996. The record includes convictions relating to property crimes and crimes of violence. I can only reiterate that many efforts have been made to assist Mr. Kopalie over the years, and

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none of those efforts have been successful in bringing his difficulties with the law to an end. Mr. Kopalie has served time in jail on a number of occasions, and has also been on probation a number of times as well.

While released and waiting for this charge to be dealt with, Mr. Kopalie was convicted of an assault that arose subsequent to the robbery charge and was sentenced to a period of jail on that charge.

Mr. Kopalie's guilty plea is worth some credit. His guilty plea was entered after a lengthy preliminary inquiry, but the guilty plea is worth some credit.

Mr. Kopalie has, as well, been detained in custody, and I believe it is approximately six months as a result of the reserve that I took to write this judgment on the charge, as a result of his undertaking being revoked when the intervening charge occurred. He was initially released on an undertaking, but as a result of the other charge, did spend, now, about six months in custody waiting for this charge to be finally concluded.

Mr. Kopalie is also an aboriginal offender from the community of Iqaluit. He will encounter similar difficulties if sent to a southern penitentiary; that is, he will be far away from family, traditional methods of counselling, he will probably not have access to visits, country food, culture, and the language that he no doubt speaks in the home.

It is clear from Mr. Kopalie's record that he has struggled with an alcohol problem for many years in his life, and no doubt, alcohol was a contributing factor to many of the convictions that are recorded on his criminal record.

It is difficult to make any significant distinction between the involvement of the two accused with regard to the robbery. Although it was Mr. Kuksiak who went into the store and fired the gun, Mr. Kopalie provided the material necessary to carry out the robbery; that is, the gun, the ammunition, and the skidoo. Both accused were involved in the planning and carrying out of the robbery, and I make no distinction between the involvement of the two for the purposes of sentencing.

Counsel on behalf of Mr. Kuksiak and Mr. Kopalie have argued that the Court should find that the mandatory minimum sentence required on a charge of armed robbery is unconstitutional, as the punishment constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. The analysis required to address this argument is set forth in the cases of <u>Smith</u> and <u>Goltz</u>, both decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada.

The first consideration is, is the legislature pursuing a valid purpose in imposing that minimum punishment? It is conceded by both defence counsel that the restriction on firearms and the strict

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sentencing regime regarding the use of firearms in a criminal offence is a valid legislative purpose.

The second consideration is, is the punishment grossly disproportionate to the appropriate penalty, having regard to the usual factors that would be taken into account in any sentencing hearing? This requirement has been divided into two parts for consideration. First, is the minimum mandatory punishment unconstitutional; that is, cruel and unusual on the facts before the Court? Secondly, is the minimum mandatory punishment unconstitutional based on reasonable hypotheticals, which is the basis for the decision in the Supreme Court of Canada decision, Smith.

I will discuss the second test first. I am unable to accede to the arguments put forward by the defence that the hypotheticals they have proposed would necessarily result in a charge of armed robbery being laid and a sentence less than the prescribed minimum being imposed.

A charge of armed robbery presumes the intended use of a firearm to harm or intimidate another person to gain some advantage. The circumstances that support a charge of armed robbery are not as far-ranging as those that could support a charge of importing, as in <a href="mailto:Smith">Smith</a>. That minimum sentence was held to be unconstitutional.

In the recent case of <u>Bill</u> from the B.C. Supreme Court, the manslaughter minimum sentence was held to be unconstitutional based on actual sentences that were imposed for manslaughter charges, and <u>Piscione</u>, which dealt with failure to file income tax returns.

The charge of armed robbery is a very serious crime and would certainly demand a significant sentence. Sentences in the past have usually ranged between two and six years. The minimum mandatory sentence has not changed significantly the kind of sentences that were regularly imposed on offenders for these kinds of offences.

I am not prepared to make a finding that Section 344 of the <u>Criminal Code</u> is unconstitutional based on the hypotheticals proposed.

Returning to the first part of the test, is the minimum mandatory unconstitutional on the facts before the Court? This test involves a consideration of whether the sentence required by law is so grossly disproportionate to the sentence that might otherwise being imposed as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment.

I am summarizing in this paragraph a number of the phrases that have been taken out of the various cases that have dealt with this issue:

Is the required minimum punishment so excessive as to outrage the standards of decency?

To invoke the unconstitutionality of the minimum penalties section, the penalty must be more than merely excessive.

Where minimum sentences are required by law, the imposition of those sentences may not perfectly reflect the appropriate principles of sentencing, but the greater goal of the protection of society.

The imposition of severe penalties in certain cases is paramount, and in the case of a crime involving the use of a firearm, understandable.

The <u>Charter</u> exemption should not be used as a tool that allows legislation to be tinkered with, but must only be used to interfere with legislation in clear and unequivocal terms.

In reviewing the principles that other Courts have applied to the discussions of cruel and unusual punishment and whether appropriate sentences are grossly disproportionate to the minimum required sentence, it is also important to point out a couple of other sections of the <a href="Criminal Code">Criminal Code</a>. Section 718.2(e), is a legislative factor that must be taken into account in imposing a sentence. A Court that imposes the sentence shall take into consideration the following principles, and I refer, for the purposes of this judgment, to paragraph (e):

"All available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders."

That section clearly points out that the

circumstances of aboriginal offenders must be considered carefully, and presumably, that's because of the very high incarceration rate involving aboriginal pffenders.

The other section that is referred to in the <u>Wust</u> case, particularly, is Section 719(3) of the <u>Criminal</u> <u>Code</u>, which is also a legislated factor to consider in imposing a sentence. That section reads:

"In determining the sentence to be imposed on a person convicted of an offence, a court may take into account any time spent in custody by the person as a result of the offence."

All of those legislative factors to consider in imposing a sentence are important in the considerations with regard to these two matters.

In assessing the appropriate sentence for Mr. Kuksiak, I have struggled with the credit that should be given to him for his guilty plea. He indicated that a guilty plea would be entered shortly after his apprehension, and he must be given appropriate credit for that.

He has cooperated with the authorities at every level in providing a statement to the police upon his apprehension and in providing testimony against the co-accused, without which the co-accused may not have been implicated or convicted of the charge.

Particularly with regard to his testimony against

Mr. Kopalie, that is significant because that may well

affect the way his sentence is served because of the concerns for his safety.

It is imperative that any accused receive significant credit on sentence for that kind of cooperation. Society would agree that solving crimes, apprehending those involved in crimes, and the entry of prompt guilty pleas are all legitimate factors that should be recognized in imposing a proper sentence. Without proper credit being given for those actions, there is little incentive for guilty pleas or cooperation with the authorities, and particularly, testimony in court.

With regard to Mr. Kopalie, it is significant in recognizing that he has spent some time in custody awaiting these charges to be dealt with. The case of <u>Wust</u> that I mentioned, the decision of the British Columbia Supreme Court, is instructive. In that case, the Judge held that under all of the circumstances, a sentence of four-and-a-half years was appropriate on a charge of armed robbery, but having regard to the time that the accused had spent in jail, the sentence was reduced to three-and-a-half years. I am not aware if that decision has been appealed.

Perhaps I should note at this time, as well, that that case, from all of the cases that I have had the opportunity to review, was the only case of armed robbery that actually imposed something less than the

required minimum sentence.

With regard to the sentence involving Mr. Kuksiak, the minimum sentence of four years presumes a robbery and presumes the use of a firearm in the planning that would go into the commission of that crime.

The aggravating factors that must be considered are that a shot was fired, that a mask was worn, and that Kuksiak has a criminal record, as I have noted above.

In the case of Mr. Kuksiak, there are significant mitigating factors, and I will just summarize them as they have been discussed in detail already. The early guilty plea is an important factor that must be taken into account on the sentence, his cooperation with the police, his testimony against the co-accused, and the difficulties that that may cause him while he is serving his sentence. It is also important to note that aboriginal offenders should be carefully considered when sentences are imposed, and that the jails that are available to serve federal terms are very far from here.

Having regard to all of the factors noted above, I am satisfied that a proper sentence for Mr. Kuksiak is three years in the penitentiary. I am satisfied that having regard to all of the factors that I have mentioned above, a statutory exemption from the statutory minimum sentence provided in Section 344 is

appropriate, as the imposition of a four-year sentence would not properly address all of the principles of sentencing in this case, particularly, his significant cooperation with the authorities.

I am satisfied that society would clearly recognize that the need to cooperate with authorities is essential to the proper administration of justice, and that in all of the circumstances of Mr. Kuksiak, the imposition of the statutory minimum sentence would be grossly disproportionate to the appropriate sentence having regard to all the facts that I have mentioned.

With regard to Mr. Kopalie, I would reiterate that the minimum sentence of four years presumes a robbery and it presumes the use of a firearm and the planning that would go into the commission of that crime.

With regard to Mr. Kopalie, the aggravating factors are that he has a significantly more serious criminal record than Mr. Kuksiak, and he was involved in further offences during the time that he was awaiting disposition on this charge. The other factors, as well, that were mentioned in relation to Mr. Kuksiak, that there was planning for a mask to be worn and that a shot was fired, are also aggravating factors in dealing with Mr. Kopalie's sentence.

The mitigating factors in dealing with Mr. Kopalie's sentence are that there was, as I say, a late guilty plea. Mr. Kopalie's guilty plea is worth

something, although as I have indicated, it was after a lengthy preliminary inquiry. Mr. Kopalie has spent about six months in custody awaiting disposition of his charge. He is, as well, an aboriginal offender, and all of the factors that should be taken into account, including the location of the jails where someone would serve a federal penitentiary sentence, must be taken into account as mitigating factors with regard to his sentence.

Having considered all of those factors and balancing them, the proper sentence with regard to Mr. Kopalie is four years in a federal penitentiary.

Having regard to that decision, there is no need to discuss whether or not he may be entitled to a constitutional exemption.

Mr. Kopalie and Mr. Kuksiak, please stand up.

Mr. Kopalie, Mr. Kuksiak, I have had to deal with some, I think, complicated legal issues in dealing with the arguments that your lawyers have made in front of me.

Mr. Kuksiak, with regard to your charge, the sentence is three years to be served in a federal penitentiary.

Mr. Kopalie, the sentence with regard to your charge is four years to be served in a federal penitentiary.

Having regard to the sentences imposed on the

substantive charges, with regard to each of you, from the date of your release from custody, neither of you shall have possession of firearms or ammunition within any community in the Northwest Territories for a period of ten years.

I make that order to prohibit these two individuals from having guns within a community. However, having regard to both of them being aboriginal people from this region and having regard to the significant sentences I have imposed on the armed robbery charges, I am prepared to allow them to continue hunting once they have served their sentences.

Mr. Kopalie and Mr. Kuksiak, I hope that while you serve your sentences, you have learned that firearms must be treated with respect and that they cannot be abused, and I hope that when you return to your communities, you will treat firearms with proper respect.

Just in closing, I have spent many, many hours struggling with these issues and the sentences that are appropriate for these individuals. I hope that the sentences that I have imposed today will, as Parliament hopes, send a message to all the people of the communities in this region and other northern regions where guns are a part of everyday life and are readily available to individuals; that is, if guns are used in

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1	the commission of crime, the penalties are severe, and
2	hopefully, those sentences will discourage others from
3	being involved in similar activities.
4	I believe that concludes these matters.
5	(AT WHICH TIME THE PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED)
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