00074 TCCR 84 033

IN THE MATTER OF:		
HE	R MAJESTY THE QUEEN	
	VS	
	DONALD CADIEUX	
·	DONALD CADIEUX	, ""
Transcript of reason	s for ludgment delive	ered by His Honour
Judge T.B. Davis, si	s for judgment delive tting at Yellowknife, ay, the 24th day of A	in the Northwest
Judge T.B. Davis, si	tting at Yellowknife,	in the Northwest
Judge T.B. Davis, si	tting at Yellowknife,	in the Northwest
Judge T.B. Davis, si	tting at Yellowknife,	in the Northwest
Judge T.B. Davis, si Territories, on Frid	tting at Yellowknife,	in the Northwest
Judge T.B. Davis, si Territories, on Frid	tting at Yellowknife,	in the Northwest
Judge T.B. Davis, si Territories, on Frid APPEARANCES:	tting at Yellowknife,	in the Northwest
Judge T.B. Davis, si Territories, on Frid APPEARANCES: J. SUTTON:	tting at Yellowknife, ay, the 24th day of A	in the Northwest
Judge T.B. Davis, si	tting at Yellowknife, ay, the 24th day of A	in the Northwest



THE CLERK:

Donald Cadieux.

MS. PETERSON:

Good morning, sir. I appear as agent

this morning for Mr. Cadieux.

THE COURT:

Thank you. Before I review the

decision I have come to in this matter on an objection with

regard to admission of exhibits, I wish to congratulate

counsel on the excellent briefs that had been presented to

me in written form. I found that they were very

straightforward, clear and easy to understand in form of

argument, and I appreciate also the reference to various

cases that seem to have been looked through and sent to me by

counsel.

10

11

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

Mr. Cadieux had been charged under Section 236 of the Criminal Code, and during the trial, defence counsel, Miss Peterson, filed an objection to the admissibility of the exhibits and evidence in the form of a blood sample and its certificate of analysis. The admissibility was issued on the ground that the evidence was obtained following an infringement of the accused's rights under Section 10(b) of the Charter because he was not informed of his right to counsel, and also on the ground that he did not provide a full and informed consent to taking of the blood sample.

The Court has, therefore, been asked to rule on the admissibility of the blood sample and the resultant certificate.

The facts, as presented by the Crown's case, in which there appears to be no disagreement, showed that the accused



was observed partially in and partially out of the window of his overturned motor vehicle, which was off the road about ten miles from Providence, in the Northwest Territories. The police officer and a nurse checked the accused before the officer physically assisted the accused from the accident to the police vehicle up on the highway where a breathalyzer demand was made after the accused became fully awake and fully conscious.

Before accompanying the accused to the nursing station for examination and treatment, the officer found a whiskey bottle about 12 feet from the vehicle of the accused. The accused was in the presence of the officer for over an hour, during which time the accused signed a consent form for the taking of the blood sample for the purpose of alcohol analysis. After examination and some X-rays by the nurse, and after the blood sample was taken, the accused was released. At no time did the police officer advise the accused of his right to counsel.

At the trial, Crown introduced the blood sample and a certificate of analysis as exhibits. The accused's solicitor has argued that because the accused was detained for a period and had not been advised under Section 10(b) of the Charter, that the Court should exclude the evidence under Section 24(2) of the Charter.

I will deal first, I believe, with the second argument.

On the other argument presented by defence counsel, that

being the lack of consent, I make a finding that the accused



11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

knew of the intended use to be made of the sample and that he was informed that he was not, by law, required to provide such blood sample. His obvious agreement and signing of the consent form, in my opinion, satisfy all the legal requirements to find that the sample was given voluntarily, thus eliminating any right to exclude the sample or certificate on that ground.

We, therefore, are to deal now only with the objection based on the Canadian Charter of Rights. For the purposes of Section 24, I feel bound by those cases which have determined that subsection (2) must be the guide to determine if evidence is excluded after it has been determined that the Charter of Rights had been infringed. My interpretation of the authoritative cases does not allow the courts any discretion to grant an appropriate or just remedy under subsection (1) if the remedy being sought is the exclusion of evidence, unless the Court finds that, having regard to the circumstances, the admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. And just as a sideline, I am not saying by that notation on restriction of evidence, that there are not other remedies that would be available that would be just and appropriate, but when it is a question of introduction of evidence, I find that it must be controlled by subsection (2).

Now, the first question to be answered before Section
24 would apply, is whether or not the accused was arrested or
detained. The authorities are divided on the finding of when



a person becomes detained by police officers.

Chief Justice Howland and Mr. Justice Tarnopolsky, had made a complete and thorough review of the cases relating to the meaning of detention and the Charter requirements to advise a detained person on the right to retain and instruct counsel without delay.

In the case of the Q v. Laura Mary Simmons, heard on November the 24th and 25th, 1983, and released on April 11, 1984, the case dealt with actions of Customs inspectors at the Canadian Border, but referred to and analyzed all the written and reported Canadian cases as well as a number of the appellate decisions of the United States Courts.

From the complete analysis done by the judge, it is obvious that there are two lines of cases with authorities, as noted by my brother Halifax as well, on September 23, 1983, when he also reviewed the cases then available to him in the Q v. Terry Lee Haight.

The majority of the reported cases support the theory that a person is not detained unless he becomes subject to some form of compulsory restraint by process of law. Many cases also have concluded that a brief restraint, even under compulsory process, is not detention under the terms of Section 10 of the Charter.

The more voluminous line of cases also hold that evidence should be excluded only when to admit to it would be so repugnant to the community as a whole, that the administration of justice would be brought into disrepute.



Courts have also accepted the test for this categorization as something shocking to the community, although it is also stated and believed that a shock is not the only test for the wording of the statute.

The other line of cases seems to follow the jurisprudence enunciated by Mr. Justice Tallis in the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal decision, Rv. Therens, reported 1983, 33CR (3d) at page 204, which decision is now under appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. In that case, His Lordship gave the word "detention" its ordinary meaning so that, as he states, "the fundamental rights accorded to a citizen under the Charter should not be blunted or thwarted by technical or legislative interpretations."

The reported cases all refer to a different circumstance, and it is generally acknowledged that each case must be determined on its own merits, using as a basis for a decision the most appropriate, reasonable, proper and just interpretation of the law.

In the case at bar, the accused was in the presence of, and to some extent obeying the orders of and complying with the requests and directions of the police officer for so long a period that I must find that he was, in fact, detained under the meaning of Section 10 of the Charter.

Having found that the accused was detained, and he, therefore, became entitled to be advised of his right to counsel, does the admission of the voluntary blood sample and its certificate of analysis cause the administration of



justice to be brought into disrepute? That is, without having been advised of his right to counsel. Again, the case authorities are split on when, how and why the evidence is or is not to be admitted on this basis. The Charter of Rights, as also noted in the Young Offenders Act, specifies some fundamental rights that are accorded by the recent passage, both to the public generally, and under the Young Offenders Act, to young persons.

The implementation of the Charter, and the future implementation of the Young Offenders Act, must be effected in such a way that Canadian citizens will not be of the belief that the rights are in theory only. Unless the courts take the position that the rights must be enforced in a practical and authoritative way, then the words in the Charter will be of no benefit to our citizens. In the same way, I feel that the requirements in the Young Offenders Act must also be required to be enforced in a practical way or there will be no method of ensuring that young offenders get special treatment designated and directed by the Young Offenders Act as a sideline, but it is going to be basically dealt with by me in the same way as the case before us today.

I agree with Mr. Justice Jean-Guy Boilard, an associate judge of the Northwest Territories Supreme Court, as expressed in Supreme Court No. 2863, when he quotes from Rv. Nelson, 1982 case, reported in 3CCC (3d) at page 147, which says, "the proper information in the proper form should



be given to permit access to legal advice upon arrest or detention of any person." He further quotes, "to make the Charter of Rights effective, particularly in the case of an unsophisticated and uneducated accused, the accused should obviously be asked if he wishes to retain counsel and that a reasonable opportunity must then, without delay, be given to him to obtain counsel."

I feel this is the appropriate interpretation of the Charter and its terms to be emphasized in the Northwest Territories, where people are often so far removed by distances and access to larger centers of population that we must demand strict compliance with the terms of the Charter to protect the rights of the people of the North. To do otherwise would or could cause some persons to have less than others and, therefore, less protection under the law, which would, by so doing, put the administration of justice into disrepute.

On that basis, and because I think this is the more appropriate law in the Northwest Territories, I will order that, in this instance, the case before me, the blood sample and the certificate of analysis associated therewith, are to be excluded and not accepted as evidence by the Court.



I, Cindy Littlemore, Court Reporter, hereby certify that the above Transcript of Reasons for Judgment was taken by my faithful and accurate shorthand notes and the foregoing is a true and accurate transcript of my shorthand notes to the best of my skill and ability. Dated at the City of Calgary, Province of Alberta, this 28th day of September, A.D. 1984. Cindy Littlemore / per KH. 10 Court Reporter CL/mjp 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 20 21 22 23 24 25

