IN THE TERRITORIAL COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

IN THE MATTER OF:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

VS

ROBINSONS' TRUCKING LTD.

Transcript of the Oral Judgment Delivered by His
Honour Judge R. M. Bourassa, sitting at Yellowknife
in the Northwest Territories, on Thursday, June
21st, A.D., 1984.

APPEARANCES:

MR. G. BICKERT:

Counsel for the Crown

MS. G. LANG:

Counsel for the Defence

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(COPY AS EDITED BY PRESIDING JUDGE.)

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 THE COURT:

OURT: To fully respond to the issues raised during trial, these written reasons, incorporating and elaborating the oral reasons previously given have been prepared.

The defendant, Robinsons' Trucking Ltd. has been tried for two offences contrary to s. 33(2) of the Fisheries Act, RSC 1970 c F-14 as amended.

"...That on or between the 1st and 2nd of March
AD 1984 Robinson's Trucking Ltd. did deposit
or permit the deposit of a deleterious substance,
namely fuel oil in water frequented by fish or
in a place under conditions where such deleterious
substance may enter such water, namely the
Cameron River..."

and that,

"...on or about the 7th of March, 1983, at or near Ross Lake in the Northwest Territories, did deposit or permit the deposit of a deleterious substance namely fuel oil, in water frequented by fish, or in a place under conditions where such deleterious substance may enter such water, namely Ross Lake contrary to Section 33(2) of the Fisheries Act."

Separate trials were conducted on each alleged offence, however on consent of Crown and Defence some evidence given on the first trial was applied to the second trial. This being in accordance with the law as set out in a number of decisions particularly Matheson v.

The Queen (1981) 59 C.C.C. (2d) 289, and R. v. Carver (1979) 34 N.S.R. (2d) 541 (SC App. Div.)

I would note that each case, the facts, exhibits and evidence relating thereto have been considered separately and my conclusions on each arrived at independently of the other, however, for the sake of convenience I will deal with both offences in these reasons.

The findings and decisions of this court are as follows:

The defendant operates an extensive trucking enterprise based in Yellowknife, N.W.T. Its experience in the trucking industry as it exists in the Northern environment extends over seventeen years. The defendant has grown and prospered over the years from a four truck operation at its inception to its present size of in excess of 100 trucks plus related support and other equipment.

The defendant's president, namesake and driving force has in excess of 30 years in the industry and specifically, experience with Winter Roads.

At all material times, in both cases, the defendant was executing its contractual obligations in delivering fuel oil from Yellowknife to Lupin Gold Mine over a winter road of approximately 400 miles. Niney-two tractors (trucks) and tankers (trailers) were being utilized for this.

A portion of the winter road was a public road known

as the Ingraham Trail; a road which gives access to various public and private recreational facilities, lakes, camping grounds, cottages, fishing holes and the like.

At one point, the Trail near its end crosses the Cameron River. The bridge and its approaches are a hazard to any traffic. The road continues on over innumerable frozen lakes and portages until it ends at Lupin.

The defendant had contracted to carry 3.7 million gallons of fuel oil, quantities of cyanide and other substances over that road during the winter of 1982 and 1983. This represented a significant increase in the defendants work and in order to discharge its obligations it resorted to hiring tractors, tankers and drivers as a unit. Of 75 tractor/tankers that worked out of Yellowknife forty were "leased" units.

Driving winter roads is difficult at the best of times. The extremes in temperatures, treacherous road surfaces and other elements all combine to make accidents, that is to say, motor vehicle accidents inevitable. This fact is confirmed by both Crown and Defence witnesses.

In both cases before the Court, leased units of tractor/tankers were involved. In both cases the drivers were from the South and totally inexperienced with winter road conditions; neither had ever travelled this road before; neither had anything more than marginal experience pulling fuel tankers; and in both cases, the drivers

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arrived in Yellowknife, loaded their tankers with fuel oil and were sent on their way without the benefit of any kind of briefing as to road hazards, oil spill response techniques, emergency procedures or a driving skills test or checkout. The defendant says "I figured if they owned a truck they could drive it".

In both cases the tractors involved were not equipped with radio communications, emergency equipment - not even a shovel.

There is evidence before me that there are, and have been, numerous types of damage control kits commercially available, "off the shelf" at marginal cost. These kits are designed to cope with the precise problems that the defendant was confronted with, indeed their utilization would have prevented the very actus reus.

I find that the fuel oil carried by the defendant and involved in each case is a "deleterious substance" i.e. deleterious to fish within the meaning of the Act. Proof that fish were present at the material times or that the water itself was rendered deleterious is not required. See R. v. Canada Forest Products (1978) 7 C.E.L.R. and R. v. MacMillan Bloedel (1979) 4 W.W.R. 654 BCCA.

On the evidence, I find that Ross Lake and the Cameron River are waters frequented by fish.

The Cameron River Incident.

On March 1, 1983, a tractor and tanker left Yellowknife

loaded with 7400 gallons of fuel oil. The driver was unable to negotiate the North approach to the bridge. While trying to reverse the tractor and tanker slipped off the road and rolled over. Fuel oil started leaking from the tanker vents. The tractor/tanker were lying approximately 150 - 200 feet uphill from the Cameron River. Sometime later, the defendants' president arrived with more equipment and salvage operations commenced. Approximately 3,500 gallons of the fuel oil escaped during these operations. It fell to the snow covered ground and not surprisingly acted in accordance with its nature as a liquid and flowed down hill into the Cameron River - both over and under the ice. evidence of fuel oil contamination was found in both fish and quiet areas downstream. Ross Lake Incident. On the 7th of March, another of the defendants'

"leased" units was travelling across the ice on Ross Lake in clear daylight when the driver lost control at a curve in the road resulting in the tractor/tanker rolling over and coming to rest on its side. Again fuel oil began to leak from the vents. As in the earlier incident, the vents could not be closed for want of as little as a wooder lever.

By the time the defendants' salvage equipment arrived some five hours later, and righted the tanker approximately 2000 gallons had leaked out onto the surface of the ice

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road, into the lake through cracks in the ice and under the snow beyond the road's perimeters. In early summer there was still significant evidence of oil on the surface of the lake.

I am satisfied that on all of the evidence the Crown has established a prima facie case in each case. It is, of course, open to the defendant to resist conviction by establishing on the balance of probabilities that it exercised "all due diligence" to prevent the actus reus.

What is actus reus? The defendant argues that the words in the Act "...did deposit or permit the deposit..." relates to the overturn of the vehicles. That is to say 'permitting the accident' and that the due diligence defence is related to the accidents/rollovers themselves. Evidence was called describing the poor conditions of the road, the bridge, the ice and the like. The defendant argues secondly that once the rollovers occurred, due diligence was exercised in the salvage, containment and following clean up procedures.

The offence is - and I paraphrase - 'the depositing of fuel oil in water frequented by fish'. The actus reus is causing or permitting those two substances from coming together.

"The depositing itself of a deleterious substance is not a wrongful act; the wrongfulness of the act is depositing such a substance in water frequented by fish..."

per McCarthy J R. v. Canadian Pacific Limited, FPR p.99,

B.C. Prov. Ct. Feb. 11, 1977.

To succeed, the due diligence defence must relate to that act and the events leading to that act. One can operate a motor vehicle in a careless and even a negligent fashion or spill fuel oil without falling under the provisions of s. 33(2).

Ideally, the defendant had at least three opportunities to avoid or prevent the prohibited act, and therefore three opportunities to exercise all due diligence. They are,

(1) The prevention of accidents or rollovers, (2) The

(3) Preventing the oil from reaching the water which could be effected by proper land based containment and clean up.

What duty of care lies upon the defendant?
The duty is a flexible one:

"The extent the accused must go in exercising due diligence will depend upon the circumstances of each case. The standard of care required must be commensurate with the seriousness of the injury."

Stuart CJ, YTC R. v. Gander 62 C.C.C. (2d) 326.

That rollovers are inevitable is a given fact; two principles must flow from that fact, one that the defendant minimize the accident rate as best as possible; and two that the defendant is forewarned of the very real risk and danger of an oil spill and an offence under the Act.

In both these cases the defendant did nothing to

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minimize the risk of an accident. The new drivers were not briefed, trained or familiarized with what was expected of them. They were simply loaded and put on the road. This is just not enough.

With respect to the second point - under these conditions can it be said that the defendant exercised "all due diligence" (my emphasis)?

In the Cameron River case, the defendant itself through its president admitted to "being caught with our pants down". Upon arriving at the scene (the tanker still leaking through the vents for want of a method to close them) it was determined that the only way to drain the tanker which had to be done prior to righting it, was to allow a quantity of fuel oil to escape until the level in the tank was low enough to admit an evacuationhose. In conducting this operation a large quantity of fuel oil escaped onto the ground when the hatch was opened. The defendant had equipment on site to protect and salvage the truck and tanker but absolutely no equipment to effect such a draining without spillage.

The defendants' actions were strictly ad hoc demonstrating a complete lack of planning or forethought. This was the scene on site notwithstanding the ready availability of 'off the shelf' equipment which would have solved the defendants' problems.

The defendant was still in a position to prevent the prohibited act by the exercise of all due diligence in

preventing the fuel oil from flowing into the Cameron River. For the same reasons given above, it was unable to do so. Lacking even a shovel and a few meters of plastic sheeting the defendant was reduced to attempting to make a catchement basin and dyke with a broken windshield. It didn't work and the fuel oil escaped into the river.

Throughout the salvage efforts the defendant appeared more concerned with the costs involved in terms of man power and equipment rather than its obligations under the Act. I cannot conclude that all due diligence was exercised in the prevention of the spill or in preventing the oil from reaching and entering the Cameron River.

Dealing with the Ross Lake incident: The defendant arrived at the scene with salvage equipment and was confronted with substantial quantities of oil leaking from the vents. This time the defendant brought some plastic which was used to make a rough catchement basin from which the fuel was pumped into a standby tanker. The job was poorly done - much oil escaped. When the tanker was emptied, the defendant ignited the oil on the roadway and just left. Later, investigators found oil under the snow hundreds of feet from the road limits. As in the Cameron River incident the defendants' actions reveal a low priority to the obligations imposed under the Act; a Virtual absence of any proper equipment,

trained personnel or dedicated oil spill prevention equipment.

The defendant virtually admits this by stating that the Corporate officer in charge "...was in my bad books for a while". The effort as a whole does not display the exercise of all due diligence.

Ice is porous and inevitably fissured. For the purposes of this case I find that oil on the ice is "in the water" within the terms of s. 33(2).

In R. v. Westcoast Reduction Ltd. 1 FPR, May 1, 1973, Selbie B.C. Prov. Ct. J.:

"The substance involved, fuel oil, is proven deleterious, therefore there is no need to prove the receiving waters were rendered deleterious."

In summary therefore - the defendant operates a business to which a real certainty of risk to the public is present. This risk is manageable using inexpensive readily available technology and a modicum of skill.

The defendant was virtually unprepared in equipment or planning to meet this risk. The defendant did not exercise all due diligence prior, during or after the respective rollovers. The defendant is convicted on each charge.

The text of this transcript varies from this Reporter's verbatim notes taken at this hearing, such variation having resulted from editing by the presiding judge.

Laurie Ann Young
Court Reporter

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