

IN THE TERRITORIAL COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES IN THE MATTER: HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN ٧S JOSEPH CLILLIE Transcript of Proceedings of an Oral Judgment given by His Honour Judge R. W. HALIFAX, sitting at Fort Simpson in the Northwest Territories on Monday, December 12, A.D. 1983. APPEARANCES: MR. N. SHARKEY Counsel for the Crown Agent for Coup Defence MR. N. SIBBESTON 

FILED

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N.W.T. 5349 (3/77)



THE COURT: This is a matter that has been adjourned for judgment regarding an application under the provisions of Section 10 of the Canadian Constitution Act 1982, which was set over after a trial originally in Wrigley on the 19th of July after which there was an argument filed regarding the timing of the application. It was found, and this Court ordered, that the accused was entitled to make the application at the time he did. After the argument regarding when the application was heard, the matter stood adjourned to this date for the judgment on that application.

Basically, the application is under Section 10 of the Constitution Act 1982 on the basis that the accused was not informed promptly of the reasons for his arrest or detention; and he was not advised of his rights to obtain and instruct Counsel forthwith without delay.

The evidence is basically that of Constable Mabee as to what occurred. There is no evidence from the Defence. Evidence is that the Constable received a complaint regarding an impaired driver of a snowmobile, that he attended at the accused's residence; the accused was not there; but as he was leaving, the accused pulled up on the snowmobile. He was identified by the Constable. There was some discussion as to the accused's condition. There was at least the one physical test: the heel-to-toe test performed which the accused did not perform very well to say the least. After that, there were the two Coffee-mate jars obtained from the accused's residence with the assistance of an unknown female,



the view of the Police Officer being to obtain urine samples. He advised the accused that he thought he was drunk. The accused said he was not. Basically, it came down to providing the samples to find out whether he was drunk or not and so that a urinalysis could be performed to ascertain the quantity of alcohol in the accused's system.

It is common ground, and I so find, that at no time was the accused arrested; and in fact, the accused was advised by the Peace Officer that he did not want to arrest him. The only issue becomes whether or not the accused was detained.

I have reviewed various cases with regard to detention: There is the case of R. v. Therens from the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal; there is the case of R. v. Haight and R. v. Anderson, both judgments of this Court. I have also reviewed R. v. Trask from Newfoundland, R. v. Currie from Nova Scotia, and the cases following that line, whether or when an accused is detained.

Each case must be looked at in its own circumstances. <u>Trask</u>, <u>Therens</u>, <u>Haight</u>, and <u>Anderson</u> cases deal with 236 charges where there has been a demand made for the accused who is then required to accompany the police officer to provide samples of his breath. Of course, failure to do so after a demand may result in a conviction under Section 235 for failing to provide the samples. At least the accused is put in the position of the possibility bf being charged with an alternate offence.

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Now, we do not have a demand situation here for breath samples. What we do have is a request from the Police Officer for urine samples which the accused voluntar-The evidence almost indicates that it was almost a game situation. Between the first and second samples was the cribbage game which the accused won; even though, I note, for part of it, he was counting backwards instead of forwards. There was obviously, from the evidence, no indication of any force of any nature being used by the Police Officer. As I also indicated, I have no evidence from the accused what he felt about the situation. Did he feel he was detained? he feel he was just going along, and there was no requirement for him to do so? The indication of the Constable's evidence, which is to be expected, is that he did not arrest him; he did not detain him; the accused voluntarily came along and provided the samples to see who was right: whether the Police Officer was right in his view that the accused was drunk or the accused was right in his view that he was not I do not know that the results of the cribbage game have much affect on that situation. I notice the Police Officer did have the good sense, however, when challenged to a game the next day for money to beg off. If the accused was under the influence to the degree that he was alleged to require a conviction under Section 236, the Police Officer could have been in trouble if he was playing him! when he was That is a matter to be dealt with in the future.

The application under Section 24 has been



made by the accused. The onus is, of course, on the applicant on the balance of probabilities to satisfy the Court that there has been an infringement of his Charter rights.

As I said, I have no Defence evidence. The only evidence I have is that of Constable Mabee. I am not satisfied that the applicant has, in this particular case and only in this particular case, fulfilled the onus of satisfying me on the balance of probabilities that his Charter of Rights were infringed. I so find on the evidence before me in this case only that his Charter of Rights were not infringed.

However, if I am wrong and his Charter of Rights were infringed, it seems to me in the circumstances of this case, which are, at least in this jurisdiction in this Court, somewhat peculiar, it is not such that the evidence should be excluded under Section 24(2). It seems to me that the administration of justice would not be brought into disrepute if this evidence with regard to the urine samples and the results of the urinalysis is admitted. It seems to me that a large miscarriage of justice would be done in these circumstances to exclude it.

As well, under Section 24(1), it seems to me appropriate and just and reasonable in the circumstances of this case that the evidence should be admitted.

Therefore, the application under Section 24 is denied to exclude the evidence of the urine samples and the resulting urinalysis testing that was done. I therefore rule it admissible, firstly, on the grounds that I

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am not satisfied the applicant has fulfilled the onus under Section 24 which should be clear as on the balance of probabilities and not beyond a reasonable doubt; secondly, that if that onus was fulfilled and there had been a breach of the Charter of Rights under Section 10, in my view, it is not such that the evidence should be excluded in this case.

Certified Correct:

Margaret Andrusias

Margaret Andruniak Court Reporter