

IN THE TERRITORIAL COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

IN THE MATTER OF:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

- and -

JOSEPH LOUIS ABEL

Transcript of the Oral Judgment delivered by His Honour Judge R. M. Bourassa, sitting at Yellowknife, in the Northwest Territories, on Monday, October 31, A.D. 1983.

APPEARANCES:

MR. M. E. N. ZIGAYER On behalf of the Crown

MS. P. SPENCE

On behalf of the Defence



THE COURT: Joseph Louis Abel is convicted today of four serious offences: He is convicted of an offence of pointing a firearm, contrary to Section 84(1) of the Criminal Code; he is convicted of resisting a peace officer, contrary to Section 118(a) of the Criminal Code, those two offences occurring on the twenty-fourth of June; and offences of aggravated assault, contrary to Section 245.2 of the Criminal Code, and further resisting a peace officer, contrary to Section 118(a) of the Criminal Code. Convictions have been entered. It is the Court's duty today to impose a sentence.

The offences occurred in the Hamlet of Snowdrift, located on the east arm of Great Slave Lake--it is a small community. It has been often said in Territorial Court, by Mr. Justice de Weerdt in Supreme Court of the Northwest Territories, and by Mr. Justice Tallis as he then was of the Supreme Court of the Northwest Territories, that the Courts are justified in taking community conditions into account in imposing sentence. I believe I can, to a small degree, in this case note or take into account the conditions in Snowdrift--and that is that there is a significant problem in Snowdrift with crimes of violence, and there is a significant problem in Snowdrift with respect to the control or abuse of alcoholic beverages. I can't go any further than that.

The Crown has invited me to find or infer that there is a gross or severe problem with violent offences in Snow-drift. I don't believe that I can or that it would be safe to do so without statistics to that effect. I think



statistics would be most helpful in some sentencing situations, and if the Crown is able to provide them in these situations, I think the Court would welcome them.

The offender is twenty-three years of age, I understand. He has been before the Court and convicted of criminal offences in every year since 1978, totalling approximately twenty criminal offences since 1978. He has experienced the whole gambit that the Canadian correctional systems offer: He has had the passing of sentence suspended, he has been placed on probation on a number of occasions. He has had concurrent sentences; consecutive sentences; short, sharp sentences; long sentences; one day in jail; months in jail; years in jail. In fact, he was not out of jail two or three months when he was back in a confrontation with the law in June of this year.

Defence counsel makes an impassioned argument that because the offences that the Court is dealing with here today are liquor related, and that there has been a liquor problem in the past, that there is a spark of hope with respect to Mr. Abel; therefore rehabilitation is still open to Mr. Abel and the Court. As I say, the argument is an impassioned one, but I have to say that I am not presuaded. I feel that at some point in this man's career, the Court must start weighing the concerns of the community as being more important than the concerns of a particular offender. I believe that Mr. Abel has passed that balance point. The Court has shown in 1978, in 1979, in 1980, and as late as



1981, by way of suspended sentences or very lenient sentences its concern for this individual, its concern for Mr. Abel, its concern that he be afforded every opportunity to rehabilitate himself. Without denying that the opportunity and the possibility of rehabilitation is still open to Mr. Abel, I believe that the issue of rehabilitation is best left now, at this stage in this man's life, to the administrative boards and tribunals that are set up within the penitentiary system. In that regard, I follow and I adopt, with respect, the position taken by the Quebec Superior Court in R. v. Levesque, (19 Criminal Reports, p. 43) and leave the matter of rehabilitation to those tribunals. It has very little weight in my deliberations today.

Dealing with the offences, I believe it was properly brought to my attention by the Crown as an aggravating situation was that the accused, firstly, was out of jail not three months when he was again in conflict with the law. After having made his election and awaiting trial for the offences that allegedly took place on the twenty-fourth of June, the accused on the twenty-eighth of August is back in another confrontation with the law. As I understand our law, this is an aggravating factor.

I take into account that there were weapons involved, that there was a very real risk to the public, and that this is a situation that is all the common in the North. In his instructions to counsel. Here Abel has set forth his rationalizations of the events, and there are just that—rationalization

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They don't impress this Court. Mr. Abel states that he didn't really mean to stab anyone, that he held a knife to Mathew Abel's throat only to scare him a little bit. didn't really mean to hurt anyone by pointing a rifle, that the rifle was broken, that it wouldn't shoot anyway. It was just to scare a few people. The Court has heard these kinds rationalizations so often in the past. Recently, in Igloolik, two youngsters were drinking, and after one youngster had killed the other youngster by putting a broom handle through his eye, he comes to Court saying, "I really didn't mean to do it," I know he didn't mean to do it, but the combination of the drink and atmosphere led to tragic results. No one "means to do it"--but "it" is done time and time again when weapons are mixed with liquor. I point out to Mr. Abel that I am sure he is aware that under our law a man is taken to intend the natural consequences of his acts. And if Mr. Abel is going to drink and carry out this kind of conduct, he is going to have to accept the consequences. See, for example, R. v. Ross, (1983 NWTR 254). It is no salvation, it is nothing that can be accepted in mitigation for Mr. Abel to come to Court to say that he wouldn't have done this if he had been sober, or he really didn't mean to do it, and maybe because he was drunk the knife slipped. Nobody has any business holding a knife to somebody else's throat. Nobody has any business pointing a gun at anyone else, under any circumstantes.

This kind of offence so common in the North, in fact almost half of all criminal offences cleared by charge in



1981, which is the last year that the Government of the Northwest Territories has complete statistics for, are crimes of violence, crimes involving the very same factors the Court is presented with today.

There must be a deterrent sentence, notwithstanding the fact that the community of Snowdrift has washed its hands of Mr. Abel and, it is submitted to me, have no interest in what happens to Mr. Abel. There must be, in my view, a sentence that is going to deter any other people who are likeminded so that those kinds of people, when they are sitting down having an afternoon drink, think twice before they pick up the nearest knife or nearest gun or nearest club. There is no room in our communities for this kind of violence. If the only way they are going to be prevented from committing this kind of crime is through deterrence—that is to say, causing them to fear to offend—then so be it.

With respect to the two offences of assaulting a peace officer, I would only opine that in both instances the peace officers exhibited incredible restraint, admirable restraint in their dealings with Mr. Abel. It is a credit to both the constables and their training that they were able to handle this situation without someone being killed or wounded. It has been sair by Mr. Justice Tallis that the peace officers in the fact and scattered settlements of the Northwest Territories, cartually alone, are entitled to protection by the Court of the tull support of the Courts when, in carrier out their

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duties, they are assaulted or the arrests that they lawfully perform are resisted. It must be clearly understood in these isolated and remote communities that the peace officers acting legally have the right to arrest and take people into custody, and conversely that those that seek to question their authority, fight with them and assault them, can expect to be treated harshly by the Courts. The peace officers are

A potential for the complete breakdown of law and order in the event that these kinds of charges are not met with deterrent sentences is self-evident.

in these communities to protect the community.

Mr. Abel, would you stand please? I am taking the principle of totality into account by imposing consecutive sentences, which in my estimation will add up to a total sentence which is appropriate for all of the offences, but by looking at each one individually they may be less than what is called for. Mr. Abel, on the Section 84(1) offence, I sentence you to five months in jail. With respect to the Section 118(a) offence of the twenty-fourth of June, I sentence you to four months in jail consecutive. With respect to the Section 245.2 offence, the wounding, I sentence you to ten aunths in jail consecutive. With respect to the Section 118(a) offence of the twenty-eighth of August, I sentence you to five conths in jail consecutive. These times will be served in a federal penitentiary.

26 MB. ZIGAYER: Your honour. The matter of the Section 98 order?
-7 The COURT: Yes. the Crown has asked for an order pursuant to



Section 98 of the Criminal Code as a result of the conviction under Section 84(1), and as well as a result of the conviction under Section 245.2. I am satisfied that an order should issue. I am aware of the Weyallon case; however, I note that that case is currently under appeal. I secondly note that the facts of this case are significantly different than the facts of the Weyallon rase. And thirdly, I note that there is no evidence before we that this accused requires firearms or weapons for his personal survival or survival of family. There will be an order prohibiting this accused from possessing firearms or ammunition for a period of five years from toda,.

Thank you Mr. Zigayer, Ms. Spence. (AT WHICH TIME THIS MATTER WAS CONCLUDED.)

Certified a correct transcript

Edna Thiessen, Court Reporter