

IN THE TERRITORIAL COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

IN THE MATTER:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

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HENRY HOWARD BEAVER

Transcript of Proceedings of an Oral Judgment given by His Honour Judge R. W. HALIFAX, sitting at Hay River in the Northwest Territories on Thursday, March 29, A.D. 1984.

APPEARANCES:

MR. B. FONTAINE

Counsel for the Crown

MR. G. BOYD

Counsel for the Determine

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Well, it is an interesting point. THE COURT: what you have to do, considering there is very little case law; and the only case that is really on the point is R. versus Thompson, a case from Britain, 1976, 64 Criminal Appeal Reports at page 96, which deals with the situation of a witness that is standing mate, basically, refusing to answer any questions outside of the original questions as to name and residence and that type of thing; but once the Crown has asked questions as to the merits of the matter before the Court, the witness has refused to answer. The Court has also explained the provisions of Section 472 of the Criminal Code to the witness and the possible repercussions, and the witness has indicated in very flowery language that she is not going to answer any further questions.

Now, as a result, firstly, the Crown initially raised the issue of Section 9(2) of the Evidence Act to be allowed without having the witness declared adverse to cross-examine the witness on a previous statement which is inconsistent with the evidence given at the Preliminary Hearing in the present testimony. The only problem is there is no present testimony.

The Thompson case, in a way, seems to infer that although the Court of Appeal did not directly deal with the issue that, standing mute, not giving any answers is tantamount to inconsistent. I have some doubt in my mind that it is the same. However, I think what the Thompson case does stand for even though there are the statutory provisions

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in Britain under Section 3, which is word for word almost our Section 9(1) of the Canada Evidence Act, that even outside of that, there is still the common-law discretion of the Court. That being the case, I will deal with that further later.

It seems to me when you are talking about a witness acknowledging and confirming that there was a previous statement made and confirm the truth of that previous statement that it is admissible in evidence. If you look at what happened—that is under 9(2)—where the witness is giving inconsistent testimony and the Crown applies to cross—examine on a previous statement which is inconsistent with the present testimony—I should point out without having the witness declared adverse. In those circumstances, if the witness says, "Yes, I made that previous statement" and "Yes, that previous statement is true," it is admissible as to the truth of it. If the witness denies making the statement or denies that it is true, then the Crown can call other evidence; and that goes to the credibility of the witness.

We are dealing under Section 9(1) which is a different matter. The normal rule, of course, is that a party calling a witness, in this case, the Crown calling their witness who happens to be the complainant in the matter is not entitled to impeach the credit of that witness by general evidence of bad character; but if the witness in the opinion of the Court proves to be adverse, which is the case before this Court: the witness has been found to be adverse, the Crown in this case in the circumstances may contradict

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her evidence by other evidence or with leave of the Court may prove that she made at another time a statement inconsistent with the present testimony. We are back to whether or not the previous statement is inconsistent with the present testimony when, in effect, there is no present testimony.

I think when you go back to <u>Cross on Evidence</u>, Fifth Edition, and you look at page 253 about two-thirds of the way down the page dealing with hostile witnesses--I am going to read this slowly and apart. It is about a third of a page:

Section 3 of the 1865 Act has not affected the common law according to which the Judge has discretion to allow a hostile witness to be examined by means of leading questions or with reference to a previous statement...

Of course, those are the cases of <u>Clarke</u>

<u>versus Saffery</u> from 1824 and <u>Bastin versus Carew</u>, 1824, both

of which cases are cited in <u>R. versus Thompson</u>. It goes on:

for this does not amount to impeachment of credit "by general evidence of bad character."

In <u>R. versus Thompson</u>, the accused was convicted of incest with his daughter who was called as a witness by the prosecution. After answering some formal questions, she said that she did not wish to give evidence.



Which is our situation exactly.

The Judge allowed her to be treated as hostile with the result that she was examined on a statement that she had made to the police and by means of leading questions. Court of Appeal held that the Judge had acted properly and affirmed the conviction. The witness did not deny making the statement to the police; but even if she had done so, it is doubtful whether Section 3 would have applied to the case for the girl's statement was not "inconsistent with her present testimony." If the Section does not apply in such circumstances, it is questionable whether the statement can be proved.

Now, I just read that from <u>Cross</u> because it seems to me to be an appropriate comment on the <u>Thompson</u> case.

It seems to me that the Crown hasn't proved an inconsistent statement under Section 9(1) in the present case. What the Crown has established in the voir dire is the witness has confirmed the statement was made and is true. That, in my view, does not allow it directly in the normal course to be admissible as evidence and accepted for the truth of the contents of what is in the statement.

It seems to me you cannot jump from Section 9(1) by route of an adverse witness application back to what is the normal law with regard to confirming the contents of a previous statement or what amounts to the same thing under Section 9(2) of the Evidence Act; and therefore, the statement

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would be admissible not only to the fact that it was made but also to the truth of the statement.

I come to this conclusion, I must say, with some hesitation; but it seems to me when you put the matter in full perspective, to allow the Crown to put the complainant's evidence before the Court via an application under Section 9(1) after the witness having been declared adverse, having it put before the Court as to the truth, not only that the statement was made but the truth as to the contents, and then put the Defence in the position of having to attempt to cross-examine the witness who is refusing to answer questions, in the normal course and, in my view, of what is right and fair would prejudice the defence of the accused substantially; and that is a part that has caused me some concern.

It may well be that procedurally it would be more sensible to allow the Defence to cross-examine the witness at this stage with regard to the statement and the contents of the statement. However, that is not the law as I understand it.

As I have said, there is really no case law outside of the <u>Thompson</u> case which really, in effect, talks about the common-law discretion and has not been changed as a result of the statutory provisions in England in the Criminal Procedures Act with regard to hostile witnesses. As I have said, that is basically the same as our Section 9(1) of our Canada Evidence Act. I could assume that there still is the common-law jurisdiction in our country as well in this area

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and whether or not the Judge wishes to allow the evidence in under Section 9(1) or a finding that the evidence does not come within Section 9(1) and exercise his common-law jurisdiction and allow it to be admitted. It just seems to me in this case that it is not proper.

For the reasons I have said: firstly, the prejudice to the accused; and secondly, it does not seem to me that you can go by the adverse witness route under Section 9(1) get a witness who has been declared adverse and is refusing to answer questions even under threat of possible incarceration to all of a sudden be able to say, "Well, this is a previous statement. She's affirmed that it is true. There is no evidence that there is any previous inconsistent statement as required by the Section, so it should be admissible as an exhibit and as evidence not only as to the statement but as to the truth and the contents." That seems to me to go far beyond the bounds of fairness, and it seems to me to go far beyond what is the normal course in our criminal justice system as to the rules of admissibility. seems to me we would be creating a new rule as to admissibility in our criminal justice system.

For those reasons, I rule that the statement that has been filed as an exhibit on the woir dire will not be admitted as an exhibit and as evidence on the Preliminary Inquiry.

MR. FONTAINE:

Sir, in view of the Court's ruling, I would

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like to direct the Clerk of the Court to enter a Stay of Proceedings on these matters.

THE COURT:

You don't wish to go back to Fort Smith?

MR. FONTAINE:

Not considering the ruling of the Court, sir

THE COURT:

I just wonder, Mr. Fontaine, if it would be sensible to go back to Smith to do that in the circumstances of this case so the accused is before the Court.

MR. FONTAINE:

My view, sir, is that under recent amendment to the Code, the accused may be excused from being present before the Court as Counsel is here. Perhaps we can hear

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12 THE COURT:

Perhaps we can adjourn for five minutes.

Can I see Counsel in my Chambers, please.

from Mr. Boyd as to that.

14 THE CLERK OF THE COURT: All rise. Court stands adjourned for

five minutes.

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17 (Court commences after a short adjournment.)

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19 THE COURT:

Just prior to the adjournment, the Crown has

directed a Stay of Proceedings.

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21 MR. FONTAINE: Yes, sir. . .

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Certified a Correct Transcript:

Margaret Andruniak Court Reporter

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