IN THE TERRITORIAL COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

IN THE MATTER OF:

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HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

VS

KAJ KNUDSEN

Transcript of the Oral Judgment Delivered by His Honour Judge T. B. Davis, sitting at Yellowknife in the Northwest Territories, on Monday, July 23rd, A.D. 1984.

**APPEARANCES:** 

MS. N. BOILLAT:

Counsel for the

MR. D. COOPER:

Counsel for the Defence

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N.W.T 5349-80/0284

THE COURT:

Mr. Knudsen, the charge being that on or about the 11th of December, 1983, at Yellowknife in the Northwest Territories, had consumed a quantity of alcohol so that the proportion in his blood exceeded 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood, and had the care and control of a motor vehicle on that occasion contrary to Section 236 of the Code.

Filed in this court were a certificate of analysis indicating that at 4:01 p.m. on the 11th day of December, 1983, a breathalyzer reading of 320 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood was produced and that at 4:18 p.m. on the same day the reading had dropped to 300 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

It had been acknowledged by the accused that there was a notice of intention to produce the certificate, that the certificate had been served, and therefore, the case was able to proceed to hear evidence.

The general facts in a very abbreviated form are such that the accused was operating a motor vehicle.

He was observed by Mr. James Halpenny who thought the accused was slumped over the wheel of his vehicle and presumed that the accused was an impaired driver who had almost had an accident at an intersection near the home of this witness. The witness, although he did not observe specifically that the accused was operating the motor vehicle, did identify enough of the circumstances surrounding

the involvement of the accused near his home so that I have no doubt that the accused was the operator of the vehicle observed by the witness, because he was the driver of the vehicle that subsequently had been observed by the witness as the one approached by the police officer when the accused was arrested. He also had seen another person get into the accused's vehicle before the police arrived and observed that the accused had problems with walking and used the vehicle for support when he was exiting from it.

Constable Harding observed the usual signs about 3:30 p.m. on that day and observed vehicle tracks where the car had been observed by the first witness going off the main driving portion of the road. The police officer acknowledged that the accused was polite and talkative and somewhat slow in his speech, but able to converse both somewhat logically and somewhat rationally.

He also observed that the accused required some support when moving from one vehicle to another. The accused himself took the stand and indicated that he had been ill for some number of weeks and had admitted that he was driving the motor vehicle after having some three drinks with orange juice in the presence of a friend. He also acknowledged that when he was stopped his employer did enter his vehicle, his employer being a subsequent witness at the trial.

The accused himself did not remember slumping over the

wheel and did not have complete memory of the circumstances and the affairs that took place at the police station when the accused subsequently did attend for a breathalyzer test.

Submissions on behalf of the accused indicated to the court that the court could consider his evidence of having three drinks between 1 p.m. and the time of the test, evidence that the court could consider to the contrary for a high breathalyzer reading.

The employer of the accused, Mr. Rasmussen, was somewhat in favour, I would presume, of the accused in the form of evidence that he had given because he observed that the accused did make the U-turn that other persons observed and that he did back up before coming to a stop, but he also observed that although the accused looked weak and had been sick he did not appear impaired to Mr. Rasmussen, and Rasmussen was almost in doubt as to whether or not the accused had been impaired at all because he was able to carry on a normal conversation.

Another witness, Frank Welna, acknowledged that he had had a few drinks with the accused in Welna's residence and that when the accused had left the residence somewhat after 2 p.m. he was not in too bad condition at that time.

The expert witness that was called on behalf of the Defence was an R.C.M.P. lab forensic toxicologist in the past and is now on his own, by the name of Bruce D. Miller who is a science graduate and who has done analysis of

body fluids for toxic volatiles. He used to train breathalyzer technicians and has monitered large numbers of subjects with alcohol consumption, and their elimination or alcohol release from the bodies.

On review of the certificate filed, it was the opinion of this expert that the breathalyzer itself was not accurate or that the accused himself was not correct about the quantity of alcohol that he would have consumed between 1:30 and 3:30 that afternoon.

He had actually performed some tests on the accused as to his consumption and retention and the effect of alcohol on the accused, and it was his opinion that the accused would have been required to have consumed approximately seventeen and three-quarters ounces of alcohol between the hours of 11 o'clock in the morning and 3 o'clock in the afternoon to produce a reading of over 300 on the breathalyzer by 4 or 4:40 in the afternoon.

Mr. Miller also outlined the normal or usual states of impairment or drunkenness that are observed from people at various readings in excess of 270 on the breathalyzer, and he indicated that above that reading there is a strong approach to paralysis and there is usually problems with the bladder. The subject is sometimes in an in and out of a sleep condition. The subject usually would be staggering to the point of inability to stand and probably knocking things over.

In the case before the court I feel that I must look

at the general evidence of the expert on the breathalyzer and the alcohol consumption and elimination because the case of Regina vs. Madden, Manitoba County Court, seems to outline and is supported by cases of Alberta which outline that evidence to the contrary may be not only evidence that would show that the blood level was below the legal limit, that is, below .08, but it also can be merely evidence that there is some deficiency in the tests either human or functional of such a nature as to lead a reasonable doubt that the blood alcohol content of the accused at the time of the alleged offence was above the limit.

In this instance the charge is not a charge of impairment but a charge that is based on the breathalyzer reading because it is a charge that the accused exceeded the allowable limit. The breathalyzer charges must be based on proof of the accuracy of the machine and of the readings produced. If there is presented to the court some evidence to the contrary which can show or would show that the results were not correct under the circumstances presented.

I recognize and believe the accused to have been impaired when driving, but this is not the charge before the court, and there is some doubt that the readings could have been accurate since there was no dispute that the accused was not at the state where an expert would have expected him to have been if the readings were accurate. In other words, if the readings involving the accused at

300 and 320 were accurate, then the observations by the witnesses as such should have been such that the accused was in a far, far more excessive state of intoxication than any of them had observed.

I did not find that there was any proof of loss of all his mechanical abilities, and that he did retain the ability to be rational as indicated by the witnesses.

Therefore, I feel that there may be some possibility of error in the readings that have been produced by the breathalyzer machine on this occasion. I am satisfied that his condition was not consistent with the person with such a high reading.

Since the criminal law is technical to the extent that charges have to be proven as they are presented, and then proven beyond a reasonable doubt, I am accepting that we have today had evidence to the contrary which puts the burden fully on the Crown to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused did have a reading as presented, and on that basis, I am satisfied that the Defence has produced some reasonable doubt, and therefore, the benefit of that doubt will go to the accused.

In closing, I would like to indicate that I would have been quicker to accept the evidence of the expert witness if instead of merely testing the rate of consumption and elimination of alcohol by the accused on a date subsequent to the date charged, he had actually allowed the accused to consume alcohol under controlled conditions

until such time as he arrived at the readings presented. I feel that that would have been a more likely and more accurate determination rather than just using an extention of scientific inquiry and having a few drinks and determining the absorption and the elimination, but even on the basis of what has been produced, I am satisfied that I still at this time must dismiss the charge against the accused.

(AT WHICH TIME THESE PROCEEDINGS WERE CONCLUDED.)

Certified a correct transcript,

Laurie Ann Young Court Reporter