IN THE TERRITORIAL COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES 2 IN THE MATTER: HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN ٧S ROGER WILLIAM NEEDLAY 8 9 10 11 12 Transcript of Proceedings of an Oral Judgment 13 delivered by His Honour Deputy Judge G. PRICE, 14 sitting at Fort Liard in the Northwest Territories 15 on Wednesday, June 24, A.D. 1987. 16 17 18 19 20 21 APPEARANCES: 22 23 MR. R. PEACH Counsel for the Crown 24 MR. C. REHN Counsel for the Defence 25 26

THE COURT:

I first should say that I wish I had more time to consider the issue; but appreciating that the Accused is entitled to a speedy decision and, secondly, that it is inconvenient for me to return to Calgary and then come back again to deliver Judgment, I choose to give Judgment at this point.

I am also handicapped not having any Court of Appeal or Territorial decisions to consult nor, indeed, any full decisions to consult, relying merely on Snow's Criminal Code and Martin's Criminal Code and an extract from Defence Counsel coming from the Lawyers Weekly.

Mr. Needlay stands charged on the 16th of May, 1987, at the Hamlet of Fort Liard in the Northwest Territories that he, having consumed alcohol in such a quantity that the concentration thereof in his blood exceeded 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood, did operate a motor vehicle contrary to Section 237(b) of the Criminal Code. I should note, looking at the Information, that "motor vehicle" is described as "mogor vehicle;" and I assume that Defence has no problem with correcting that if, indeed, a formal amendment is thought to be necessary.

MR. PEACH: I would ask to amend simply so that the record is clear, Your Honour.

MR. REHN: No difficulty with that.

THE COURT: That amendment will then go.

The evidence to a point is straight-

On the 16th of May, acting on information received, the investigating Corporal observed a Cougar motor vehicle in Fort Liard. He apprehended Mr. Needlay, apprehended him in the sense that he approached him and asked him a series of questions. He asked him his name and got a response that he could not understand. He asked him for his licence, and that was produced. Apparently, he did not ask him for his car registration. He made certain observations of Mr. Needlay. Those were that he did not seem to walk normally. It appeared that one leg dragged. He observed or smelled a strong odour of alcohol. observed that Mr. Needlay appeared a bit confused. Acting on those observations and his information received, he formed the opinion that Mr. Needlay was impaired, or rather, his ability to drive was impaired by alcohol. therefore gave him the Breathalyzer Demand in standard form at 5:28 in the afternoon. This was then followed by the recitation of his Charter Right: his right to retain and instruct Counsel without delay. In response to that Charter advice, if that is the right terminology to use, he got no reply when he specifically asked Mr. Needlay if he understood. In cross-examination, he amplified on that indicating that he explained that "Counsel" meant "lawyer;" and he got no response to that. He then had a discussion with Mr. Needlay concerning the car, and I observe that the Officer received a response to the effect that he could leave the car where it was; but the investigating Corporal indicated

that the car had to be moved. By 5:30, the investigating Officers—there were two of them—'and Mr. Needlay were at the Detachment office. The Breathalyzer was being set up; but then, other events intervened. The test was not administered forthwith. However, there is no issue taken as to the 25- to 30-minute delay; and I observe under the Code that the test is to be within a two-hour time period; and no issue being made of this, I do not comment further.

In any event, Mr. Needlay was arrested, accompanied the Officers handcuffed in the Police vehicle on the separate complaint, and then returned at 6:00 p.m. back to the Detachment. Exhibit T-1 in evidence indicates that at 6:20 the first test was taken. A Breathalyzer reading of 220 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood was obtained; and the second test 20 minutes later at 6:40 was administered resulting in a reading of, again, 220 milligrams in 100 millilitres of blood. These two results are clearly above the legal limit of .08 or 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood. The readings are relatively high.

At one point, while Mr. Needlay was at the Police Detachment, he made the comment that he did not drink and drive and that he had some admiration for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police but not for the Edmonton City Police. He was lodged in cells over night. In the morning at 1011, he was given a copy of the Certificate of Analyses, Exhibit T-1, along with the accompanying Notice

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guile and no attempt to shade the evidence. I find he had a memory gap. But I am not sure that that really helps him because I am persuaded by the Crown that there is a difference between a lack of understanding and a lack of memory. Clearly, Mr. Needlay had a lack of memory; but the issue here is a lack of understanding which puts the issue before the Court nicely into focus; and that really is the Charter Right, Section 10(b): "Everyone has the right upon arrest or detention to retain and instruct Counsel without delay and to be informed of that right." How can you be informed, to ask the rhetorical question, unless you understand what the Officer is advising you of?

The Crown invites me to rely on the Saskatchewan decision—the name escapes me, but it appears to be a decision of Mr. Justice Noble of the Court of Queen's Bench, basically, to the effect that the recitation of the Right is sufficient unless there are exceptional circumstances to alert the Officer that more is required. On that basis, the Crown's position is that, despite the fact that there was no response to the advice that Mr. Needlay had the right to retain and instruct Counsel without delay, there were no exceptional circumstances that required the Police to go any further. There was nothing, in other words, to put them on the alert that more was required.

The Defence's position is that there was an

issue as to lack of understanding and that if the Crown does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Accused, Mr. Needlay, understood that he had the right to retain and instruct Counsel without delay there, then, has been an infringement of Section 10(b) of the Charter; and then, the operation of Section 24(2) of the Charter comes into effect; and basically, on the basis of the Therens decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, the evidence must be, once the Charter Right is infringed, excluded. If I am to follow the Defence's submission, then, I must ignore Exhibit T-1 since that comes after the infringement (if I find there has been an infringement) and the case falls for lack of evidence on a material aspect of the charge.

I have found three cases that are of some assistance. I firstly make reference to the <u>Clarkson</u> decision, which is the decision recently from the Supreme Court of Canada that deals with the young woman from the Maritimes--perhaps middle-aged woman from the Maritimes--who was charged with murder. The issue there was basically waiver of her Charter Right, but I take the Supreme Court--without having the decision in front of me to refer to--to mean that you can not have waiver unless you understand that you are giving something up. So, really, the issue there was this woman was so drunk that she did not understand; and therefore, she could not waive her right to a lawyer. Because her statement followed from that, the statement was excluded.

The Baig case found at 1985, 46 Criminal Reports, Third Series, 222, a Court of Appeal decision-unfortunately, from what province is not clear--indicates that in the ordinary case, after a Section 10(b) Charter Right has been read, an accused will acknowledge that he understands his Right. In other words, in the ordinary course, the response that the R.C.M.P. Officer should have obtained from the Section 10(b) advice was "Yes" in response to the question: "Do you understand you have the right to retain and instruct Counsel without delay?" If, coming back to the Baig case, the accused does not acknowledge that he understands his Right, there is no duty on the Prosecution to adduce evidence of the suspect's degree of understanding or to adduce further evidence in the absence of such special circumstances as drinking or obvious language difficulty or the absence of words or conduct from which it can be reasonably inferred that the accused did not understand his Right. Now, to me, that suggests two things: One, drinking is a special circumstance and, two, are there words or is there conduct of Mr. Needlay to indicate to the Officer that Mr. Needlay did understand what was going on. Well, clearly, we have in the uncontroverted evidence of Mr. Needlay the fact that he had been drinking. In fact, the Officer smelled a strong odour of alcohol and observed Mr. Needlay appeared a bit confused. Is this a special circumstance, then, that would require that the Officer go further? I think it is.

I also refer to the Mole decision that

Mr. Rehn referred to. The five tests set out in that Court of Appeal decision--again, unfortunately, we only have the extract from the Lawyers Weekly--indicates that the advice must be given at a time when the suspect is capable of understanding and appreciating the right to Counsel without delay. In that particular case, the Mole case, Mr. Mole was very drunk, very intoxicated. He was advised of his Right. He complied with the Demand. He provided Breathalyzer samples, and tests were administered. He was acquitted at trial because the Judge ruled that he had been so drunk that 10 he could not understand what the Police had told him. 11 observe that the evidence showed that the Police knew 12 Mr. Mole could not comprehend what they had told him. 13 So the issue here becomes did the Police know 14 15 16

that Mr. Needlay did not understand. I would answer that in the negative. Yet, they had reason to suspect that he did not understand. It would be different had the discussions as to the vehicle being left, the comment that Mr. Needlay did not drink and drive, the comments about the R.C.M.P. and the Edmonton City Police, the specific answers on the checklist--had all those things come before the Charter advice was given. But they did not. The advice as to his right to retain and instruct Counsel without delay came first, and these other discussions came later. What the Court must look at is Mr. Needlay's comprehension and understanding at the time that the Charter Right was administered.

Returning to the Mole decision, then, I am of

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the view that the Police Officer should have gone further when he did not receive any kind of a response to the guestion, did he understand. He should have probed. That might have elicited some sort of comment or course of conduct that he could observe that would indicate that Mr. Needlay understood what he had been advised. In the absence of that and, clearly, because he had been drinking and appeared a bit confused, I am of the view that Mr. Needlay did not fully appreciate and fully understand the Charter Right that he was being given.

It therefore follows that I find that he was not capable of understanding that Right, and his Charter Right was infringed. I apply Section 24(2) of the Charter. I exclude the Breathalyzer evidence.

Would you stand, please.

You are acquitted of the charge.

Certified a Correct Transcript:

Margåret Andruniak

Court Reporter

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