S.C. #3619

IN THE TERRITORIAL COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

- and -

STEVE SHANNON

Transcript of proceedings of a Trial held before His Honour Chief Judge J. R. Slaven, sitting at Yellowknife, in the Northwest Territories, on Wednesday, December 4th, A.D., 1985.

APPEARANCES:

T. HUMPHRIES, ESQ.:


IN THE MATTER OF:

Counsel for the Crown

J. BASSIE, ESQ.:

Counsel for the Defence

(Transcript of the Oral Judgment)



CRIMINAL CODE FORM 2 (Sections 455, 455-1 and 723) NWT 1961 - 80/1180

THE COURT: To me, there are three issues I must deal with, three decisions I must make here.

Taking the accused's driving and what transpired when he was asked out of his vehicle, I am satisfied that Constable MacLellan had sufficient reason to make the breathalyzer demand on him.

Regarding the taking of the breathalyzer test, I am satisfied that Constable Dempster followed correct procedure and ended up with two suitable samples, the two readings, .13.

Against that, I must balance the accused's testimony, which, as Mr. Humphries properly points out, is self-serving.

It is uncorroborated. If there is any corroboration for it, it would be found in Constable Dempster's testimony, that his eyes were clear and he didn't smell any alcohol on his breath, at all -- and for a good reason; there was a very strong smell of bug repellant about the accused, who had just come from his camp out in the bush.

I find the samples were taken properly and, as far as I am concerned, provided good readings and reflected the amount of alcohol in his blood correctly. I feel I must accept that evidence that the blood alcohol evidence has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, unless there is much stronger evidence to the contrary than has been adduced in court today.

I accept and I have heard Dr. Malicky's testimony and the other testimony that the .16 reading was likely caused by a "burp," if you want to call it that, in any event, an escape

of gas from his stomach after he'd recently consumed an alcoholic drink, and that likely caused the .16 reading, rather than a malfunction of the machine. I accept that the .13 readings, like I say, correctly reflect the amount of alcohol in his blood, and I am satisfied of that beyond a reasonable doubt. That is the first point.

The second is the recording on a checksheet of the times, which are then reflected in the Certificate of Analysis.

The certificate states the times the samples were taken, which follows the requirements of the Criminal Code.

Mr. Bassie refers me to the decision of Regina v. Paul Gregory Gallant, an appeal case to Mr. Justice Moshansky, of the Court of Queen's Bench in Alberta, which followed -- I am sorry, no -- the case of Regina v. Barr, Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta, Mr. Justice Holmes, which followed the decision of, as he was then, District Court Judge Stevenson, who later became Chief Judge of the Appeal Court of Alberta, in Regina v. Berg. There was no proof of the time of the taking; rather, it was the time of the analyzing. I followed that decision in the case of Regina v. Mrdjenovich.

Under examination and cross-examination, as I recall, the technician stated that he had written down on the sheet the time of analysis, rather than the time of taking. Looking at the Exhibits 2 and 3, the breathalyzer operational checklist, items 7, 8 and 9, step 7: "set control at Take, introduce breath sample, then set control at Analyze. Step 8, record time. Step 9: when red light illuminates, wait one and a half

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minutes, then illuminate photo lamp and center nullmeter, record blood alcohol scale reading." And with no evidence to the contrary, I take it from that that the time recorded was the time the breath sample was introduced and the control set at Analyze and before the analysis, if you wish, recording the blood alcohol scale readings.

With the evidence before me today, I find that R. v. Barr, R. v. Berg, and R. v. Mrdjenovich do not apply. I am satisfied that the time of taking was properly recorded on the checksheet and the Certificate of Analysis. So, meeting those arguments, if there were no other matters for me to consider, I would convict.

Now, I have to go to the matter of advice regarding the right to counsel. We don't run into that many cases in breathalyzer up here, that are contested, although we have had quite a bit of experience with the Charter of Rights provisions regarding the right to counsel, when we get into admissibility of statements by accused persons. I had two of them last week. One statement, when the person was arrested, he was given his rights to counsel, along with the right to remain silent. Some hours later, after various things had transpired and the statement was eventually taken, he was not reminded again, if you wish, of his right to counsel, and I disallowed the statement.

In the second case, he had given his statement and he had pled guilty to the charge involved there. He was still under arrest, and about three hours later, the constable had

continued his investigation and come back and said, now, we are going to lay another charge against you. And he gave him the right to remain silent and again gave him his right to counsel, before the taking of that second statement; and I did allow that statement, because the warning and the right to counsel had been given again.

Now, it is my concern regarding the Charter of Rights, the right to counsel, that there is a tendency on the part of some policemen to pay lip service to it and not carry through on the spirit of the provisions. In this case, it is very much like the R. v. Gallant case, Mr. Justice Moshansky. The accused's rights were given to him and he was taken right to the breathalyzer room and eventually blew. It is the same here, that when he was on his way to the breathalyzer room, that the police officer didn't say, there is the phone over there, if you want to call your lawyer. There was plenty of time while preparing the machine, during the 20 minutes that Constable Dempster quite properly allows before he takes a Nothing was mentioned re. his right to counsel, sample. except the original statement on the street, at the time the breath demand was made to him.

The letter of the law was fulfilled, the pro forma requirements were fulfilled, but I feel the police could have gone further at the police office, before the first blow was taken, to reiterate his right to counsel and to tell him that a telephone would be made available to him if he wanted to call counsel.

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On the other hand, seeing the accused on the stand, he is an articulate and obviously intelligent and, I suppose, relatively well-educated man. He said he was upset, but the police described him as polite, co-operative, conversational, friendly. He must have known he had a right to counsel.

I am rather surprised he said the blowing of .16 was a real surprise and a shock to him, but he was quite definite, because he felt he hadn't nearly had enough to drink, where he'd blow over. I am rather surprised that instead of doing push-ups, he didn't call counsel.

If he were younger, more poorly educated, less sophisticated, less skilled in the English language, he would have no problem at all in holding that further explanation of his right to counsel should have been given to him at the police office. I have more difficulty finding that in his case -- and I might have, in the case of another person such as I have described. However, the Gallant case is not binding on me. given that it was a Queen's Bench of Alberta Court judge who gave the decision and that it is very recent, it is very persuasive on me.

I guess it would be natural, for police who are on patrol, and technicians, who have seen many drivers and many breathalyzer tests, that they become very routine, possibly more routine than the taking of the statements on indictable offences. But I do feel in all cases, even those like drinking/driving, when there are so many of them, even in those, that the spirit of the Charter of Rights must be observed and the police must

go further in most instances or, at least, in many instances, than the pro forma requirements, and I feel that applies in this case.

Accordingly, I find that the right to counsel as provided under the Charter of Rights, or the right of advice regarding counsel, was not adequately complied with and, accordingly, I find the defendant not guilty.

(ORAL JUDGMENT CONCLUDED)

Certified a correct transcript,

Debora Chipperfield, Court Reporter.

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