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IN THE TERRITORIAL COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

IN THE MATTER:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

VS

KENNETH WALTER PUTNAM

Transcript of Proceedings of an Oral Judgment on Sentencing delivered by His Honour Deputy Judge G. PRICE, sitting at Fort Simpson in the Northwest Territories on Tuesday, June 23, A.D. 1987.

APPEARANCES:

MR. R. PEACH

Counsel for the Crown

MR. C. REHN

Counsel for the Accused

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N.W.T. 5349-80/0284

THE CLERK OF THE COURT:

Kenneth Walter Putnam.

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COURT: Firstly, I would like to thank Counsel for their helpful remarks.

Mr.

Mr. Putnam stands convicted that he on the 7th of January at Fort Simpson assaulted Troy Wayne Bradbury, contrary to Section 245 of the Criminal Code. The Crown has proceeded by summary conviction offence.

I have taken some brief time to consider the matter. Appreciating that I do not have an extensive library here, I have not been able to located any Northwest Territories Supreme Court or Court of Appeal decisions; although, I am advised by Counsel that the <u>Fallowfield</u> decision from the British Columbia Court of Appeal in 1973 has been generally relied upon in this jurisdiction.

The facts are straightforward. It appears that Mr. Putnam was provoked. It appears that his actions were not premeditated. It appears his actions were hasty and arose out of his impression of a threat to his family. Specifically, in response to a question put to him by Mr. Bradbury: "Are you threatening me?" the accused reacted and slapped Bradbury. The evidence is clear that the slap was minor in the sense that it did not cause any injury. There is no evidence of any medical attention. In fact, the senior Officer observed Bradbury later; and the slap seemed to be unascertainable or at least any evidence of it.

The position of the Crown is that a fine is appropriate and that this particular accused should receive

no special treatment because he is a serving Officer of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. In other words, within the eyes of the community, there should be no perceived difference and no special exception made for this particular accused that any other member of the public would not receive. The position of the Defence is that a discharge is appropriate.

I make some general observations on discharges.

I make first reference to Stuart's <u>Canadian Criminal Law</u>
and the general observation at page 483 of the learned author
that:

For many, the traumatic experience of a first appearance in a criminal trial court is a sufficient deterrent. It makes eminent sense for judges to be liberal in the exercise of their discretion to discharge where the social consequences of the conviction are deliberately minimized.

I take "social consequences" in the sense to be just another way that the Crown has put before the Court the submission that this accused should get no special treatment. Do, then, the social consequences warrant a discharge?

Coming closer to home and still making a general observation about the use of discharges, I make reference to Ruby's Second Edition of <u>Sentencing</u> at page 211 where the learned author comments on the <u>Griffin</u> case. This case arose in Prince Edward Island. It involved a young police officer who was escorting a drunken prisoner to the cells and struck

the prisoner in the face and injured him. His eye had to be surgically removed. I hasten to add that, clearly, on the circumstances of this case, that type of injury did not result. The Court of Appeal looked at the discharge provisions; and Mr. Ruby in commenting on the Court of Appeal's approach to this particular situation observed when a discharge was granted, on appeal, that:

One would hope that the fact that the accused was a police officer did not in itself influence the judgment towards leniency.

Again, I take that observation to be just another way of putting the Crown's position that this accused should get no special treatment.

Having made those general observations, I move now to the particulars of this offence. The first hurdle that the accused must meet is that the Court must be satisfied that a discharge is in the best interests of the accused.

Obviously, if it is not in his best interests, that is the end of the matter. Only if that hurdle is met need the Court move to the second hurdle which is that the granting of a discharge is not contrary to the public interest. Coming back, then, to the first hurdle, having reference again to Ruby on Sentencing, I note that the author has observed at page 214 with respect to "Factors Considered In Assessing 'The Best Interests Of The Accused'" that future considerations,

 that have played a part in the Court recognizing that it is in the best interests of the accused that a discharge be granted, have included the possible jeopardy to a career. The position advanced by the accused is that this situation is going to be of no benefit to the Officer in his career development and that the registration of a conviction in lieu of a discharge would create some possible jeopardy, and I accept that. So, in my view, the first hurdle that the accused must meet has been met; and in fact, in fairness to the Crown, the Crown Prosecutor did not take issue with the first hurdle and, in fact, directed his remarks to the second hurdle that must be met: that a discharge is not contrary to the public interest.

Generally, in having regard to the <u>Fallowfield</u> decision at page 654 as summarized in Martin's Criminal Code, a number of factors have been considered:

... the first condition would presuppose that the accused is a person of good character, without previous conviction, that it is not necessary to enter a conviction against him in order to deter him from future offences or to rehabilitate him, and that the entry of a conviction against him may have significant adverse repercussions.

I accept in these particular circumstances that those factors are present. The material before me, Exhibit S-I on sentencing,

indicates that this particular accused is a person of good character without previous conviction. I am of the view that he needs no rehabilitation, the entry of a conviction is not necessary to deter him from future offences, and that the entry of a conviction may have significant adverse repercussions for him.

Ruby assists again in observing at page 216 of his text that in an assault situation—and having particular regard to the <u>Sanchez-Pino</u> case, which is also referred to at page 654 of Martin's Criminal Code—a discharge would not be appropriate in a situation which was not the result of a sudden, momentary impulse. In the <u>Sanchez-Pino</u> case, the theft was of a number of articles from different places. There was premeditation. It was not some momentary reaction or, as in this case, what I choose to call "overreaction to a situation."

In my view, it is important that there was some provocation. So, in the result, the issue really comes down to whether or not the Court should conclude that deterrence of others would in any way be diminished by a failure to impose a formal conviction. Will the people of Fort Simpson if a discharge is granted be of the view that this particular Police Officer has received something that because of his position other accused persons coming before this Court would not receive?

I am of the view that a discharge in appropriate in this case. I have a discretion to exercise under

Section 662.1 of the Code. I exercise this discretion in favour of the accused, primarily because of the nature of the assault and the provocating circumstances surrounding it. In my view, any other member of the public coming before this Court in these particular circumstances would have been treated by this Court in the same way. I attach no special importance to the fact that this accused was a serving Member of the R.C.M.P.

Would you stand, sir.

I impose a conditional discharge. The terms will be that you enter into a probation order to keep the peace and be of good behavior and that you will report before the Court when you are required to do so. The term of the conditional discharge will be a term of three months, and I impose a further term that you serve 10 hours of community service work under the direction of the probation officer here in Fort Simpson.

Certified a Correct Transcript:

Margaret Andruniak

Court Reporter