IN THE TERRITORIAL COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

IN THE MATTER OF:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

and -


ECKART WILLIAM KRAHN

Transcript of the Reasons for Judgment of His Honour Judge R. M. Bourassa, sitting at Yellowknife, in the Northwest Territories, on Wednesday, August 10th, A.D., 1988.

APPEARANCES:

MS. B. KOTHE: Appeared for the Crown

P. FUGLSANG, ESQ.: Appeared for the Defendant



(A charge under Section 237(b) CRIMINAL CODE

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THE COURT: I thank counsel for the work they have done on this.

Obviously, there has been a lot of research and some thought gone into the defence.

The accused is charged with driving with over 80 milligrams of alcohol in his blood, to paragraphase it. He is not charged with impaired driving; he is not charged with anything else.

In the English language, we have 30 or 40 words to describe the status of a person who has been consuming alcoholic beverages. I don't know which one to use here. None of them, perhaps, need to be resorted to. I will try and deal with the issues as they arose.

First of all, I would note that there is some discrepancy in the evidence given by the Defence, versus the evidence given by the Crown, in some minor and some significant areas, direct discrepancies, such as the City of Yellowknife Bylaw Constables testifying that they followed the vehicle, throughout Mr. Krahn's evidence that he was following them until they turned around in the D.P.W. yard and then went after him.

There is evidence of one witness recalling something, and no other witnesses recalling the same thing. Usually, those kinds of conflicts are perhaps more indicative of the truth than of anyone consciously trying to lie, and I don't think anyone was lying in this case, Defence or Crown. It has been quite a while since this event occurred, a lot of water has gone under the bridge for the Crown witnesses, and probably for Mr. Krahn, as well.

I do note, however, that the breathalyzer reading set out in the certificate which has been filed indicates a blood analysis or a blood alcohol analysis of two hundred milligrams of alcohol in one hundred millilitres of blood. That is a significant reading. It represents, and I think I can go this far, far more than two gin and tonics. In fact, I think I could go as far as saying, it would be impossible for two ounce or ounce and a half shots, to give a reading of two hundred milligrams of alcohol in one hundred millilitres of blood.

I have no evidence before me that either the City

Constables or the R.C.M.P. Constable were drinking or in any
way that their faculties were compromised.

In my view, with a blood alcohol ratio of two hundred milligrams of alcohol in Mr. Krahn's system, his ability to perceive, react, recall, indeed, would be affected adversely to some degree. Where his evidence conflicts with that of the Crown witnesses, I accept their version.

First of all, were there reasonable and probable grounds to arrest Mr. Krahn on the charge before the Court? We have to start, perhaps, by working backwards. The City Bylaw officers believed that there was a Yellowknife Bylaw offence in progress, when they saw Mr. Krahn's vehicle completely frosted over, except for a little hole in the windshield. They, in my view, in enforcing the City of Yellowknife Bylaw, had full authority to pull Mr. Krahn over, to bring that matter to his attention. Whether they chose to charge him or

not is a

matter of police discretion. They may have charged him; they may not have charged him. It is up to them. They have that That they didn't charge him, I don't think discretion. amounts to anything. It could very well be that Mr. Eckart, rather than just being charged with 237(b), could be charged with driving with his windshield obscured, driving without full and proper identification, or without producing his license, or a myriad of other charges. That is not the point. City Bylaw officers had the discretion to charge or not. They didn't. I can't make anything of that. I accept their evidence that his windows were clouded over. That's why they stopped him.

There was some discrepancy as to how he got from his vehicle to the City Bylaw wagon, not that much turns on it. In any event, he ended up in the City of Yellowknife Bylaw wagon, approximately a foot or so away from the Constables. He was spoken to. The odour of alcohol was detected. He was seen driving a vehicle. At that point, the City officers felt that the R.C.M.P. had better investigate the matter. I do not believe, on the evidence before me, that Mr. Krahn was under arrest. There is nothing to indicate that. Nor do I believe that he was detained, and I will have more to comment on that later, because the argument was made about interpretation.

Constable Marcoux arrived within minutes. He conversed with one of the City of Yellowknife Bylaw Constables and was appraised of the situation. I take those words in an

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ordinary context, Marcoux was told what was going on, what had happened. Marcoux went into the vehicle, smelled the breath, asked a few questions, and, in my view, reasonably suspected that an offence was being committed, such as to entitle him to demand Mr. Krahn to provide a sample of his breath on the A.L.E.R.T. Mr. Krahn did so after three attempts, and it indicated a fail. The very slight slurring, the smell of alcohol, the failure of the A.L.E.R.T. test, in my view, is reasonable and probable grounds, justifying Constable Marcoux in making the breath demand upon the accused. At that point, the accused, in my view, without question, was detained. He was not given his Charter rights.

Within four minutes, Krahn was at the R.C.M.P. detachment.

At the R.C.M.P. detachment, before he gave his samples of breath, I am satisfied that he was advised as to his rights with respect to counsel and that he understood them. Constable

Marcoux testified to that fact. Mr. Krahn testified that he didn't recall, which is quite possible, given the level of alcohol in his blood. The four or five minutes, being very generous at the outset, that it took from the time that he was asked to provide the A.L.E.R.T., or given the A.L.E.R.T. demand, until the time he was brought to the detachment, in my view, cannot be seen as a significant delay.

The two breath tests were administered. They both indicated readings of two hundred milligrams of alcohol. Halfway through, after the first test, Mr. Krahn indicated to Constable Tyrrell when he was providing a sample that he

wanted a blood test. That is completely up to Mr. Krahn. He can have as many blood tests as he wishes. The law does not authorize the police to take a blood test; nor are the police equipped or obliged by law to have a doctor or a nurse on-site to take blood tests. Mr. Krahn was free to take a test following his release. He, in fact, was released.

Constable Marcoux testified he was brought to the front door, and Marcoux went around to the back door to pick up his vehicle, with the intention of driving him home, assuming that Mr. Krahn would wait. Mr. Krahn didn't wait and started walking towards the taxi stand, to take a cab, either to the hospital or to home. Marcoux picked him up and took him home, apparently cautioning him to stay at home and not to drive and, indeed, cautioning him, in some fashion or another, that it would be in his best interests to stay at home.

Now, much, I think, turns on Mr. Krahn's interpretation of all this. Mr. Krahn interpreted the very polite request of the Bylaw officers as a command. He interpreted the very polite actions and conduct -- and I use the words, very polite here, from the evidence of Mr. Krahn -- of Constable Marcoux as an order, a command, an imperative directive. It would seem to me, in the ordinary course of events, that it is not unreasonable or untoward for a police constable, after releasing someone on an undertaking after being apprehended for a drinking-driving offence, to caution them to stay at home, to caution them not to drive. I think the interpretation I am urged to take, that Mr. Krahn validly

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assumed that that was an order to stay at home, regardless, I think is going too far.

Mr. Krahn's interpretations are extremely subjective, and they are very subjective interpretations of very normal events. There is nothing here to indicate bullying or pushing around or posturing by the police, intimidation by In fact, throughout, I only have evidence of how polite the people were, both Mr. Krahn and the police.

I can agree with Defence counsel that if the pressure had been put on Mr. Krahn in no uncertain terms and there was clear evidence that he was told to stay home, obviously in the hope that he wouldn't get a blood test and somehow prove the machine wrong, that that would have significant impact on my decision, but I have none of that, whatsoever, have come to the conclusion that Mr. Krahn's apparent interpretation that the urging of Constable Marcoux that he stay at home and not drive any more, that that was somehow a post-event imprisonment or detention, I think that's going to extremes. Mr. Krahn was free at any time to take a cab and go to the hospital. I dare say he was free to ask Constable Marcoux to take him to the hospital for his blood test.

I don't think I can make any findings that will benefit Mr. Krahn, based on his subjective interpretations, apart from his personality, whatever it may be. Those subjective interpretations were made by an individual with two hundred milligrams of alcohol in one hundred millilitres, of blood. Those interpretations are too extreme, given the circumstances

On the circumstances that are before me, I can't before me. see or find anything that would hint or indicate that anything remotely near those interpretations is justified or 3 valid, even in the mind of someone who is mildly intoxicated or even heavily intoxicated. With respect to the argument on Mr. Iacobucci's authority to sign the Canada Gazette, this is an administrative act. I think the case is readily distinguishable from Pitfield's 8 Foods, and I can find no merit in that particular submission. 9 The accused is convicted. 10 (REASONS FOR JUDGMENT CONCLUDED) 11 12

Certified a correct transcript,

Debora Chipperffield, Court Reporter.

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