IN THE TERRITORIAL COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

and -

CLAUDIA KATHLEEN PARISH

Transcript of the Reasons for Sentence and Sentence delivered by Her Honour Judge J. Auxier, sitting at Inuvik, in the Northwest Territories, on Tuesday, January 10th, A. D. 1989.

## APPEARANCES:

MS. S. R. CREAGH

IN THE MATTER OF:

On behalf of the Crown

MS. V. A. SCHULER

On behalf of the Defence

(CHARGE UNDER S.294(b) ,326(i) c.c.)

THE COURT: After a lengthy trial in September 1988,
Claudia Parish was convicted of stealing narcotics and
controlled drugs from her employer, the Inuvik General
Hospital. The thefts occurred between early September, 1987
and late December 1987, during which period the accused was
employed as a nursing supervisor at the hospital. The thefts
were certainly not impulsive acts. They involved a degree of
sophistication and planning. Hospital documents were
falsified, and some of the drugs taken were replaced with
other "harmless" drugs to conceal the loss. In terms of
cash value, the items taken were insignificant - a total of
\$17.70.

of using a forged prescription. She admitted altering a prescription for Tylenol 3 so that it called for 120 tablets to be dispensed, rather than the 20 actually prescribed. This offence occurred on December 2nd, 1987, and is really so intertwined with the other offence that Crown and defence agreed I should impose concurrent sentences for the two offences.

The real issue in this sentencing hearing is whether or not I should send Mrs. Parish to jail, at least for a short, sharp shock, to use the words of the Crown counsel.

Mrs. Parish, as an employee of the victim, the Inuvik General Hospital, clearly committed a breach of trust. Crown and defence agree that the general principle of

sentencing in such cases involves a period of incarceration.

But that principle is not set in stone. As Judge Stuart said in R. v Pearson YTC April 28, 1980, "There are no immutable principles of sentencing except one: The Court must determine an appropriate sentence on the particular and unique facts of each case."

Ms. Schuler referred me to a number of breach of trust cases where a jail sentence was not imposed. Although the facts of each case varied substantially from each other and from the case now before me, I found some of the general principles put forth to be helpful here.

Let me turn to R. v Schell and Moran, decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal from December of 1981, despite its age still widely cited, certainly in the British Columbia courts. On Page 341 of the decision handed in Justice Anderson states: "Imprisonment is not the only means of general deterrence ... much will depend on the circumstances of each case, including the gravity of the offence, the amount involved and whether, because of the prevalence of the offence or otherwise, it is necessary to impose a term of imprisonment". In that case, the Court obviously looked at the group who might contemplate the same offence as the two accused - obtaining loans by means of false statements - and queried whether that group would be deterred by what had happened to these accused: they were convicted and lost their jobs; and secondly they lost any chance of obtaining positions of trust in the future; and

1

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

thirdly the fact of conviction in a small community brings
disgrace to the accused and their families; and fourthly in
that case substantial fines were imposed.

Here I note that the first three of those consequences have already fallen on Mrs. Parish, and I put a lot of weight on that fact.

I have also found similarities between Mrs.

Parish and Cynthia Young, a woman sentenced by Judge Bourassa of the Territorial Court in R. v Young. I conclude, as Judge Bourassa did at the bottom of Page 3 of the decision defence counsel gave me, that the Court is not dealing with a problematic individual, nor one that will be a threat to society in the future. I accept that specific deterrence is not an issue here. In other words I need not concern myself with imposing a sentence that will frighten the accused into never committing this kind of offence again.

Page 6 of that decision. To paraphrase his words, the accused is not the usual offender, she is Claudia Parish, her own person, unique and with her own needs, abilities and disabilities. She committed a criminal mistake, a stupid mistake. However I am not persuaded that society will crumble, that the public will be devastated and morality compromised if this young woman does not go to jail... Surely the apprehension, the arrest, the appearances in Court... the common knowledge of the circumstances of her crime, the humiliation of being publicly branded a thief of the worst

NWT 5349/0687

kind, the obvious unlikelihood of obtaining employment again as a nurse in the near future, surely all of those elements carry with them "deterrence" writ large for those who might be in a similar position or inclined to steal in similar circumstances.

In addition to all of the above, I do feel that this offence, if I put it on the scale of seriousness in comparison with other breach of trust cases, it is low on that scale. I do not mean to downplay it at all, certainly it was a very serious offence, and I accept everything that crown outlined in regard to the seriousness. But I am not dealing with an employee who bilked his employer of thousands of dollars so that he could live in grand style. I am dealing with a nurse who found her job so stressful that she started taking drugs and, for a time, got hooked on them. She is now taking steps to get help for the emotional problems that led to that state of affairs. So I intend to make an order to ensure that she follows through with those steps.

Accordingly, Mrs. Parish, if you would stand please, on each of the two informations I am going to suspend the passing of sentence and place you on probation for a period of two years. I am choosing that two-year period because of Dr. Murray's opinion that help for you may well take that long. The only term of the probation order, other than the standard keep the peace and be of good behaviour, will be that you report forthwith and thereafter as directed to the probation officer, and that you attend for counselling

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13 14

4-

15 16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

under the direction of the probation officer.

I think I made my concerns clear this morning that what I foresee in terms of counselling is that you attend a residential treatment centre, as suggested by Dr. Something more than just a few hours of counselling Murray. each month is clearly warranted. Again, I have the concerns about making an order that would force a particular treatment centre to accept you, or force the Territories to send you to a centre that is out of this jurisdiction. But I want to put it clearly on the record that my intent in imposing that term of probation is that you do get residential treatment. Not necessarily at the centre that Dr. Murray suggests, I am sure there are good resources in Alberta, but some type of residential treatment. I will not try to tie it down any more specifically than that.

(AT WHICH TIME THIS MATTER WAS CONCLUDED)

Certified a correct transcript,

Loretta Mott, Court Reporter