Decision Content
R v Moore, 2018 NWTSC 11 S-1-CR-2017-000147
AMENDED ORIGINAL
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES
IN THE MATTER OF:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
- v -
JOSHUA RYAN CLIFFORD MOORE
Original amended as of October 26, 2018, to: Cover page: Publication ban removed
_________________________________________________________ Transcript of the Reasons for Sentence held before The Honourable Justice L.A. Charbonneau, sitting in Yellowknife, in the Northwest Territories, on the 17th day of January, 2018.
_________________________________________________________ APPEARANCES:
Mr. A. Godfrey: Counsel for the Crown
Mr. R. Clements: Counsel for the Accused
(Charges under s. 255(3), s.255(2) of the Criminal Code)
THIS DECISION IS NOT SUBJECT TO A PUBLICATION BAN
1 THE COURT: Joshua Moore has pleaded
2 guilty to charges of impaired driving causing
3 death and impaired driving causing bodily harm,
4 and I must now sentence him for that offence.
5 Crown and defence have presented the Court
6 with a joint submission. They are jointly
7 suggesting that the sentence that should be
8 imposed is two-and-a-half years' imprisonment
9 together with a driving prohibition for a period
10 of five years. They are also jointly taking the
11 position that a DNA order and a firearms
12 prohibition order should be made.
13 At the time of the sentencing hearing on
14 December 19th, I expressed concern about the
15 joint submission. Counsel said at the hearing
16 that the sentence being jointly proposed was at
17 the low end of the range. And when I questioned
18 counsel about the appropriateness of that joint
19 position, they maintained that it was a fit
20 sentence having regard to the circumstances of
21 the case, and in particular the mitigating
22 factors that are present.
23 Having now taken some time to think about
24 those submissions and having reviewed carefully
25 the cases that were filed, as well as all the
26 other materials that were filed at the hearing, I
27 am going to say at the outset that although I
1 continue to think that this is a very lenient
2 sentence, overly lenient in my view, I have also
3 concluded that because of the law that now
4 governs joint submissions, it is not open to me
5 to depart from what is being proposed as far as
6 the duration of the jail term.
7 There are aspects of the ancillary orders
8 that are being proposed that I am unable to agree
9 with, and I will explain why, but as far as the
10 jail term of two and a half years, I do not think
11 that it is open to me to depart from it.
12 I understand that from the perspective of
13 the public, it may seem contradictory to have a
14 judge say that she disagrees with a proposed
15 sentence and yet still impose that sentence, so I
16 am going to take quite a bit time this afternoon
17 to try to explain this decision.
18 As is always the case in imposing sentence,
19 a judge must take into account the circumstances
20 of the offence, the circumstances of the person
21 who committed the offence, and the legal
22 principles that govern sentencing.
23 Dealing first with the circumstances of the
24 offence. On the day of these tragic events, just
25 before 9 a.m., Mr. Moore was driving in the area
26 of Sissons Court in Yellowknife, and he came upon
27 four people he knew. He offered them a ride, and
1 they accepted. At first Mr. Moore drove around
2 and in Yellowknife. He was driving very fast.
3 One witness thought at one point he was going as
4 fast as 180 kilometers per hour. Whatever the
5 exact speed was, which is something we will never
6 know, it was scaring the passengers, and they
7 asked him to slow down.
8 Eventually Mr. Moore drove outside of
9 Yellowknife down the Ingraham Trail Highway. He
10 stopped at the recreational area at the
11 Yellowknife River Bridge. He and his passengers
12 consumed alcohol there. They got going again and
13 Mr. Moore continued driving down the Ingraham
14 Trail further east. At that point he was going
15 100 kilometers per hour. The posted speed limit
16 for that portion of the road is 70 kilometers per
17 hour. Quite apart from the posted speed limit,
18 it is an agreed fact that 100 kilometers per hour
19 is an excessive speed to be driving on that
20 portion of the road.
21 At one point Mr. Moore went over the centre
22 line and came upon another vehicle going in the
23 opposite direction. He swerved back into his
24 lane, narrowly missing the other vehicle. 300 or
25 400 meters further, Mr. Moore came upon a sharp
26 turn on the road just before the Prosperous Lake
27 pullout area. There is a sign on the road ahead
1 of this turn that warns that it is a sharp turn.
2 Mr. Moore was not able to negotiate this
3 turn. He hit the shoulder and lost control of
4 the vehicle. The vehicle ran off the shoulder,
5 was in the air for a few meters, then hit the
6 ditch where it rolled and came to a stop in
7 nearby water. There was water up to halfway up
8 the doors of the vehicle. Mr. Moore admits that
9 at the time of the crash, he was driving between
10 100 and 130 kilometers per hour.
11 Other motorists came upon the crash site and
12 called for help. Emergency personnel arrived on
13 the scene shortly thereafter. The police officer
14 who spoke to Mr. Moore at the scene did not
15 initially detect any signs of impairment, but
16 when she asked him to blow his breath in her
17 face, she noted an odor of liquor. She demanded
18 that he provide a sample of his breath in a
19 screening device, and the result was a "fail."
20 Mr. Moore was arrested, advised of his rights,
21 and a Breathalyzer demand was read to him. He
22 later provided samples of his breath.
23 The results of the Breathalyzer testing were
24 that there was 100 milligrams of alcohol in
25 100 milliliters of blood on the first sample, and
26 90 milligrams of alcohol in 100 milliliters of
27 blood on the second sample. The legal limit is
1 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 milliliters of
2 blood. Mr. Moore admits that his ability to
3 operate the motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol
4 at the time of this crash, and that the alcohol
5 concentration in his blood was a significant
6 contributing cause to the crash.
7 One of the passengers miraculously was not
8 injured, but others were not so lucky. In fact,
9 the consequence of this crash were disastrous.
10 Karen Lafferty died as a result of the injuries
11 that she sustained in this crash. Another
12 passenger, April Goulet was seriously injured.
13 She suffered a broken shoulder, broken pelvis,
14 fractured ribs, and a fractured sternum, as well
15 as a contusion on her left lung. She was
16 medivaced to the Alberta Hospital in Edmonton,
17 and remained there until May 30th. She was
18 transferred back to the hospital in Yellowknife
19 and received further treatment and was discharged
20 on June 14th.
21 Another passenger suffered a broken arm as a
22 result of the crash, and had surgery. Mr. Moore
23 was injured as well. He broke his arm and
24 required several surgeries and has still not
25 fully healed.
26 Mr. Moore has been in custody since his
27 arrest, which now adds up to 242 days. Credited
1 at a rate of one and a half days of credit for
2 each day in remand, which is what the law says is
3 open to me to grant him, this adds up to
4 363 days, which is just a few days short of
5 one year.
6 Mr. Moore pleaded guilty to these charges on
7 November 6th, 2017. The sentencing hearing was
8 adjourned so that a presentence report could be
9 prepared. I heard on December 19th that early on
10 Mr. Moore expressed an intention to plead guilty
11 on this matter, and that, in fact, the resolution
12 discussions between Mr. Moore's counsel and the
13 Crown started even before the disclosure process
14 was complete. There was no preliminary hearing
15 in this case, which means that none of the
16 passengers nor any other witnesses ever had to
17 give evidence on this case.
18 After I heard sentencing submissions on
19 December 19th, the matter was adjourned to last
20 week for my decision. At the time of the
21 sentencing hearing, I had been told that
22 Ms. Lafferty's family and the other victims had
23 been made aware of their right to prepare victim
24 impact statements, but they had chosen not to
25 prepare any. This was, I was told, because they
26 were too overwhelmed by these events to do so,
27 and they were still consumed with their grief.
1 There were comments to a similar effect on the
2 presentence report, because the author had
3 attempted to contact the victims as well.
4 On the day scheduled for my decision last
5 week, counsel advised that members of
6 Ms. Lafferty's family had approached the Crown
7 and did want to provide victim impact statements.
8 So last week, instead of me giving my decision, I
9 heard these victim impact statements.
10 Ms. Lafferty's grandmother, who raised her,
11 read her victim impact statement to me herself.
12 Two others, from Ms. Lafferty's mother and her
13 sister-in-law were read by the Crown. Three
14 more, two from her sisters and one from her
15 12-year-old niece, were not read out loud, but I
16 have read them. They were all very sad. They
17 speak volumes about the immense tragedy that
18 these events have brought to the lives of
19 Karen Lafferty's family.
20 As I said last week to family members that
21 were here, I know that nothing this Court does on
22 sentencing can bring her back and undo the
23 terrible harm that was done. I can only hope
24 that the conclusion of the criminal proceedings
25 might be one step towards healing and closure.
26 I was struck by the last words of the victim
27 impact statement of Ms. Lafferty's grandmother.
1 Those words are: (As read)
2 My husband and I talk about missing Karen a lot, but we also know that we
3 have to find a way to go ahead.
4 Those words are very true, very wise, and very
5 brave, and I do hope that those affected by these
6 tragic events will find a way to go ahead and
7 keep going, as she said.
8 Earlier this afternoon we heard another
9 victim impact statement. It was sent to the
10 Court just yesterday, and it was written by
11 Ms. Goulet. It, too, describes the impact that
12 these events had on her, both from a physical
13 point of view and from a psychological point of
14 view. Her physical injuries were significant,
15 and I do not doubt that there is a long road
16 ahead for her, even longer perhaps to heal from
17 the emotional scars that these events have left
18 on her.
19 She expresses her sadness about
20 Ms. Lafferty's death, and the impact that it has
21 had on her family. She expresses anger towards
22 Mr. Moore, and that anger is entirely
23 understandable under the circumstances.
24 The timing of the presentation of these
25 victim impact statements was unusual in the sense
26 that ordinarily I would have heard them all back
27 in December. These victim impact statements, the
1 ones that were read last week and the one that
2 was read this afternoon, certainly have assisted
3 me in understanding even more the impact that
4 this crime had. But they are not, in law, a
5 basis for changing my decision in this case.
6 The second factor that needs to be
7 considered at any sentencing, as I said already,
8 are the circumstances of the person who has
9 committed the offence. So I turn now to
10 Mr. Moore's personal circumstances. I have the
11 benefit of a detailed presentence report that
12 talks about that; about his circumstances, his
13 family's circumstances, and information about
14 specific factors that relate to his aboriginal
15 heritage. His mother has also written a letter,
16 which was filed as an exhibit, and I have read it
17 carefully.
18 The report was marked as an exhibit, and it
19 is part of the record. I am not going to refer
20 to all its details here. It is very difficult to
21 do justice to a detailed report like that simply
22 by trying to summarize it, but I will say a few
23 things about it. I have considered all of it,
24 whether I mention a specific aspect or not today.
25 Mr. Moore is now 29. He is Gwich'in. He
26 was born in Inuvik and spent the first years of
27 his life there. He has never met his biological
1 father. Until he was six, he lived with his
2 mother, his grandmother, and Jackie Storr, who
3 was his grandmother's partner at the time, as
4 well as an aunt and uncle. When he was six his
5 mother relocated to Yellowknife. For a time he
6 stayed behind in Inuvik with his grandmother and
7 Mr. Storr. Once his mother was able to get a
8 house and get settled in Yellowknife, she brought
9 him to Yellowknife. And that is where he has
10 lived since.
11 According to the author of the report,
12 Mr. Moore views himself as having had a happy
13 childhood. Mr. Moore told the author of the
14 presentence report that he had always felt loved,
15 supported, and provided for, that he had a
16 positive upbringing, free of violence, and that
17 although as a youth he saw some substance abuse
18 within the home, this stopped when he was older.
19 He described himself as having been spoiled as a
20 child, and that he often got to do as he pleased.
21 This is confirmed by his mother and others who
22 were interviewed by the author of the presentence
23 report.
24 There are indications that there was little
25 to no structure in the home. Mr. Moore was not
26 required to participate in chores, did not have a
27 curfew, and did whatever he wanted. The report
1 also says that Mr. Moore had difficulties
2 adjusting after his move to Yellowknife. He
3 associated with a group of peers who did not
4 follow the rules of their homes and did not
5 attend school. At that point his mother tried to
6 establish some rules, but in the words of the
7 presentence report, Mr. Moore was so accustomed
8 to not having any structure that nothing seemed
9 to work.
10 Mr. Moore eventually got into trouble with
11 the law. His criminal record dates back to when
12 he was a youth. It includes a variety of
13 convictions including several convictions for
14 drug offences, property offences, failures to
15 comply with court orders, and one conviction for
16 aggravated assault, for which he was sentenced to
17 23 months imprisonment in 2012. There are no
18 drinking and driving offences on his record,
19 however.
20 It seems clear to me that Mr. Moore has
21 substance abuse issues. He started consuming
22 alcohol when he was 10 and first experimented
23 with drugs when he was 11. For a period of time
24 he was using cocaine on a regular basis. He has
25 on several occasions consumed alcohol to excess,
26 to the point of being held in the drunk tank.
27 Many of the offences that he has been convicted
1 for were committed when he was under the
2 influence of alcohol or drugs.
3 Mr. Moore sustained a head injury as a
4 result of being beaten up some 13 years ago when
5 he was around 16. He was seriously injured and
6 was in a coma for two weeks after this assault.
7 He says, and this is confirmed by his mother,
8 that to this day he has issues with his memory,
9 and he thinks that is a consequence of this head
10 injury that he suffered.
11 Mr. Moore has the continued support of his
12 mother, as he does the support of Mr. Storr.
13 Mr. Storr's relationship with Mr. Moore's
14 grandmother ended a long time ago, but Mr. Moore
15 and Mr. Storr have remained close. Mr. Moore is
16 very fortunate to have this support, more
17 fortunate than many offenders who come before the
18 Court.
19 The presentence report notes that attempts
20 were made over the years to set Mr. Moore up to
21 take counselling to address his issues. There
22 are indications in the report that some of these
23 efforts may have failed through no fault of
24 Mr. Moore's, but there are also indications that,
25 in other respects, there was a lack of motivation
26 and engagement on his part. For example, the
27 report says that in 2013, while in custody, he
1 completed the National Substance Abuse Program,
2 but he, "required a lot of assistance to do the
3 work" and "often lacked motivation."
4 Bearing in mind he was serving a sentence
5 for aggravated assault, a very serious offence,
6 this lack of motivation is troubling, to say the
7 least. More recently while on remand he has
8 attended AA meetings. This for sure is a step in
9 the right direction. On the other hand, the
10 report also says that the jail psychologist met
11 with him once, and when other attempts were made
12 to set up other meetings, Mr. Moore did not take
13 the psychologist up on that opportunity. The
14 psychologist is of the view that Mr. Moore could
15 benefit from more sessions, but, of course,
16 unless Mr. Moore himself is motivated to help
17 himself, nothing will come of this. Counselling
18 cannot be forced on a person who does not want to
19 receive it.
20 I recognize that the evidence shows that
21 Mr. Moore, as an aboriginal person, was affected
22 by the systemic and background factors that have
23 had an impact on the lives of aboriginal people
24 in this country. I also recognize that he was
25 exposed to alcohol abuse in the home for part of
26 when he was growing up. He also, no doubt, was
27 affected by not having ever known his father.
1 None of that can be overlooked in deciding what
2 his sentence should be. Mr. Moore's aboriginal
3 heritage and some of the struggles he has faced
4 must be taken into account and do mitigate his
5 blameworthiness to a point.
6 That being said, his background is far more
7 positive than many aboriginal offenders who come
8 before the Court. As has been noted in several
9 cases, the application of the principles set out
10 in the Supreme Court of Canada decisions of R v
11 Gladue and R v Ipeelee should not be interpreted
12 as operating an automatic reduction in the
13 sentence that should otherwise be imposed for an
14 offence, particularly for a serious offence. And
15 this is a very serious offence.
16 No one must lose sight of the fact that
17 Ms. Lafferty was also an aboriginal woman. She
18 and her family were also affected by the systemic
19 issues, disadvantages, and unfairness that Gladue
20 and Ipeelee talk about. And now on top of that,
21 they also have to deal with the added burden of
22 this terrible loss as a direct consequence of
23 Mr. Moore's actions. They have to live with this
24 pain every single day.
25 As I already noted, it appears Mr. Moore was
26 a very spoiled young man. He was not forced to
27 comply with rules, and he spent a lot of his life
1 as a teenager and young adult not following
2 rules. It also seems that Mr. Moore, at least up
3 until the time of these events was continuing to
4 be spoiled, at 29 years old, still living with
5 his mother, still dependent on her and others
6 financially. I realize he has had difficulties
7 in school, but a lot of people who do not have
8 extensive education still work to support
9 themselves. There is no reason Mr. Moore cannot
10 work to support himself, or at least help his
11 mother financially contribute to the expenses of
12 her home if he is going to continue living with
13 her.
14 Mr. Moore's behaviour on the day of these
15 events shows that his problems with the law, his
16 exposure to whatever programs were available to
17 him in custody, the added supervision he had when
18 he was on probation have not worked. They have
19 not made him more inclined to follow the rules of
20 society. He was driving without a licence. He
21 was driving faster, much, much faster, than the
22 speed limit, and he drank before driving and
23 while he was driving.
24 Mr. Moore is not a child anymore, and he has
25 to stop acting like one. Whatever struggles he
26 may have had, those cannot become permanent
27 excuses to do whatever he wants and act
1 recklessly. One can only hope that the
2 disastrous consequence of his actions on
3 May 21st, 2017, will have brought home to him
4 that he needs to make some significant changes.
5 Only time will tell. Although I accept that he
6 is sorry for the harm he has caused, and although
7 I do agree with his counsel that his attendance
8 in AA is a positive step, a step in the right
9 direction, I have to say I find it extremely
10 worrisome and disturbing that he has not shown
11 more interest in taking up the jail psychologist
12 on his offer for more sessions, considering the
13 seriousness of the offence he has committed and
14 its consequences.
15 Based on everything I have heard and read
16 about Mr. Moore, I fear that unless he engages in
17 a meaningful, long-term process to address his
18 substance abuse issues, and whatever else is at
19 the root of his behaviour, he will continue to
20 present a threat to public safety. I am not a
21 psychologist, and I do not know what processes,
22 counselling, or treatment may be needed to help
23 him make progress in this regard, but something
24 has to happen, otherwise he will be back before
25 the Court before long, possibly after having
26 caused great harm again.
27 I turn now to the legal framework. It has
1 been recognized by the Courts for many years that
2 drinking and driving causes a veritable carnage
3 on the roads of this country. Every year
4 innocent people are killed by drunk drivers. It
5 has long been a serious problem, and it continues
6 to be. There have been countless education
7 campaigns, and significant effort has gone into
8 trying to get the message through about the
9 devastation that this totally preventable crime
10 causes. Still, people drink and drive.
11 People from all walks of life, all
12 backgrounds, do this. Notably, people who are
13 normally law-abiding, responsible citizens commit
14 this crime sometimes, and many, many do not get
15 caught. Many do get caught but do not have
16 accidents and do not end up hurting anyone. But
17 sometimes what happened in this case happens.
18 Someone gets seriously hurt or killed.
19 The Courts cannot single-handedly solve this
20 problem, not any more than Courts can
21 single-handedly solve any other social problem.
22 Courts have a limited number of tools, mostly
23 very blunt instruments, to respond to these
24 crimes. Parliament decides what sentence are
25 available and sometimes are mandatory for
26 offences. Parliament has responded to the
27 persistent problem of drinking and driving by
1 increasing the penalties for these offences, and
2 Courts have imposed sentence of increased
3 severity.
4 It's relatively rare that the Supreme Court
5 of Canada has occasion to deal with sentence
6 appeals, but it did a few years ago in R v
7 Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, a case of impaired driving
8 causing death. That gave the Court a opportunity
9 to make some comments about sentencing in these
10 types of cases. Ultimately, the Supreme Court of
11 Canada restored a significant jail term that had
12 been imposed by the sentencing judge and had been
13 overturned by the Court of Appeal.
14 The case engaged a number of issues, but I
15 want to refer here primarily to the general
16 comments that the Court made, and this is the top
17 court in the country, about the sentencing
18 principles that are paramount in drunk driving
19 cases. First the Court said that deterrence and
20 denunciation are the sentencing objectives that
21 must be emphasized in these cases to convey
22 society's condemnation of drinking and driving.
23 The Court then said: (As read)
24 While it is normal for trial judges to consider sentences other than
25 imprisonment in appropriate cases, in the instant case, as in all cases in
26 which general or specific deterrence and denunciation must be emphasized,
27 the Courts have very few options other than imprisonment for meeting
1 these objectives, which are essential to the maintenance of a just,
2 peaceful, and law-abiding society.
3 The increase in the minimum and maximum sentences for impaired
4 driving offences shows that Parliament wanted such offences to be
5 punished more harshly. Despite countless awareness campaigns
6 conducted over the years, impaired driving offences still cause more
7 deaths than any other offences in Canada.
8
This sad situation, which
9 unfortunately continues to prevail today, was denounced by Justice Cory
10 more than 20 years ago.
11 And the Court here quotes what Justice Cory had
12 said, which was: (As read)
13 Every year, drunk driving leaves a terrible trail of death, injury,
14 heartbreak and destruction. From the point of view of numbers alone, it
15 has a far greater impact on Canadian society than any other crime. In
16 terms of the deaths and serious injuries resulting in
17 hospitalization, drunk driving is clearly the crime which causes the
18 most significant social loss to the country.
19
20 The Supreme Court noted as well, as I did a
21 moment ago, that this type of offence is often
22 committed by law-abiding citizens, and that those
23 people may be more sensitive to harsh sentences
24 than other types of offenders. Then after
25 speaking of ranges of sentences for these types
26 of offences across the country, the Supreme Court
27 noted at paragraph 65 of the decision that in
1 most jurisdictions, for impaired driving causing
2 death:
3 Sentences vary from 18 months to two years in the least serious
4 situations and from seven to eight years in the most serious.
5
6 These are the general legal principles that
7 emerge from that Supreme Court of Canada case.
8 Aside from that case, counsel filed a number of
9 cases at the sentencing hearing. I am not going
10 to refer to each of them in detail, but I do want
11 to make some comments about those cases. No two
12 cases are ever alike, and because of this,
13 looking at the outcome in other cases to identify
14 what the sentence should be in this case is
15 always difficult. Looking to other cases usually
16 is more helpful to identify governing principles
17 than it is in assisting in the determination of
18 what the bottom line decision should be. At the
19 same time, one of the principles of sentencing is
20 parity; the idea that similar offences committed
21 by similar offenders should result in similar
22 sentence. And because of that, it is quite
23 proper, as counsel have done, to refer to other
24 cases and their outcomes and note similarities
25 and differences between those cases and the case
26 at bar.
27 The cases provided by counsel are useful,
1 but I disagree with some aspects of counsels'
2 comparative analysis between those cases and this
3 one. I am not convinced that those cases support
4 a two-and-a-half year jail term that is being put
5 forward for this offence committed in these
6 circumstances. My view is that the cases filed,
7 in particular, the ones that have most persuasive
8 weight, support the proposition that a much more
9 severe sentence ought to be imposed in the
10 circumstances of this case. I find that this is
11 so, in particular, based on the cases from the
12 Alberta Court of Appeal, those cases being
13 particularly persuasive in this jurisdiction
14 given the composition of our own Court of Appeal.
15 For example, in R v Gibson, 2015 ABCA 41,
16 the sentencing judge imposed a sentence of
17 two years and eight months, which was challenged
18 on appeal. At the sentencing hearing, there had
19 been a joint submission for a sentence of
20 two years. Not only did the Court of Appeal not
21 reduce the sentence imposed at trial, but it said
22 that a sentence of four to five years could have
23 easily been justified. The Court of Appeal also
24 referred to cases from other jurisdictions where
25 sentences of four-and-a-half years were imposed
26 in less egregious circumstances than the ones in
27 that case.
1 I certainly agree with counsel that the
2 circumstances in the Gibson case were more
3 aggravating than the circumstances in this case.
4 In particular, the accused had passed a vehicle
5 and then stayed in the wrong lane long enough to
6 drive two other vehicles off the road before
7 crashing into a third, killing its occupant. And
8 the accused blood alcohol level in Gibson was
9 higher than was the case here.
10 Still, that was a case where the accused was
11 only 22, pleaded guilty, and had no criminal
12 record. So there were mitigating factors. So I
13 question whether the additional aggravating
14 features in the Gibson case justify a gap of some
15 one-and-a-half to two-and-a-half years between
16 what the Court of Appeal said in that case could
17 easily be justified and what is been proposed
18 here.
19 The case of R v York, 2015 ABCA 129, is
20 another Alberta Court of Appeal decision. The
21 accused in that case crossed the centre line and
22 struck a motorcyclist who was going in the
23 opposite direction, killing him. The accused's
24 blood alcohol contents in that case were very,
25 very high at 240 milligrams of alcohol in
26 100 milliliters of blood. In addition, the
27 accused had two prior convictions for drinking
1 and driving and two prior convictions for driving
2 while disqualified. And a further aggravating
3 factor was that he walked away from the scene
4 when the victim, who eventually died, was in
5 distress. So there were aggravating factors in
6 that case that are not present in this one.
7 There was an early guilty plea, and the Court
8 found there was genuine remorse, and the
9 principles that I talked about emerging from the
10 cases of Gladue and Ipeelee were not engaged in
11 that case.
12 The sentence imposed at trial in York was
13 six years with the driving prohibition of
14 10 years. Mr. York appealed and the Court of
15 Appeal upheld the sentence. One of the things
16 the Court of Appeal noted, which can be said of
17 Mr. Moore as well, is that the accused would have
18 been aware of his alcohol problem for several
19 years before these events. In its decision the
20 majority quoted from another case, this one from
21 the Manitoba Court of Appeal, R v Ruizfuentes,
22 2010 MBCA 90, which identified the proper range
23 for these offences as being one to four years for
24 offenders who have no prior convictions for
25 drinking and driving or serious personal injury
26 offence. And that for those who do have a prior
27 record for driving and driving or a serious
1 personal injury offence, the range is five to
2 six years. This is in line with my view that
3 Mr. Moore's criminal record, although unrelated
4 to drinking and driving, is aggravating because
5 it does include a conviction for aggravated
6 assault, which should be taken into account in
7 deciding what a fit sentence is.
8 There was a dissenting judge in York, but it
9 is noteworthy that although that judge would have
10 allowed the appeal, he would have reduced the
11 sentence but still imposed a sentence of
12 five years. So, again, as with the Gibson case,
13 York has some aggravating factors that are not
14 present in this case, most significantly, the
15 higher readings, the related criminal record, and
16 the fact that the offender walked away from the
17 accident scene, but that case did not involve a
18 prolonged dangerous driving pattern as is the
19 case here. And, again, comparing the features of
20 that case with this one, I find the gap between
21 the sentence upheld by the Court of Appeal in
22 that case, even the one that would have been
23 imposed by the dissenting judge, and the sentence
24 proposed here, difficult to reconcile.
25 Counsel appear to have placed great reliance
26 on R v Schwarz, 2017 ABQB 224, a decision from
27 the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench. It's a
1 recent decision rendered after the Supreme Court
2 of Canada decision in Lacasse. The sentencing
3 judge in that case imposed a sentence of
4 two-and-a-half years in jail in the case of
5 impaired driving causing death.
6 That case, as all these cases are, was
7 tragic. The accused had been drinking, he had
8 been having a heated conversation on the phone,
9 and had thrown the phone on the floor of his
10 vehicle in frustration. He then bent over to
11 pick up the phone while driving, went through an
12 intersection at a red light, and crashed into
13 another vehicle, killing a young child who was in
14 that other vehicle.
15 In submissions I understood counsel to say
16 that those circumstances are more aggravating
17 than what Mr. Moore did, and with respect, I
18 disagree with that assessment. Yes, the
19 behaviour in Schwarz was very dangerous. Yes,
20 the evidence was that his blood alcohol level was
21 higher than Mr. Moore's. Still, the crash in
22 that case was the result of decisions made over a
23 short period of time and at the worst possible
24 moment.
25 Unlike here, there was no evidence of a
26 prolonged pattern of fast and risky driving,
27 despite passengers being scared and asking the
1 driver to slow down, and despite an accident
2 having nearly happened just before the fatal
3 crash. Here we have Mr. Moore picking up people
4 just before 9 a.m. and crashing the car somewhere
5 around 9:15 and 9:30, and a lot of driving in
6 between, even taking into account the stop at the
7 Yellowknife River. So that is much, much more
8 than a brief lapse in attention or a very
9 short-lived loss of control of the vehicle. It
10 suggests reckless and risky behaviour for a long
11 period of time, all things relative.
12 When comparing the circumstances of this
13 case to those in Schwarz, another significant
14 factor is that in that case, the Crown put before
15 the Court evidence showing that the credibility
16 of one of the investigators, who have been a
17 critical witness for the Crown, was very much an
18 issue. That officer had falsified notes in an
19 unrelated investigation and had committed various
20 policy violations. His credibility would have
21 been challenged had the matter gone to trial.
22 That is a very unusual and very problematic
23 situation that the Crown in that case would have
24 faced if it had gone to trial. I cannot think of
25 a case that I ever heard in my experience as a
26 judge, or as a lawyer, where that particular fact
27 was put before a sentencing Court; that is, that
1 a key police witness presented with that serious
2 a credibility problem right from the start.
3 The Crown in Schwarz obviously recognized
4 this, because the Reasons For Sentence state that
5 the Crown said that a sentence of four years
6 would have been fit but for that weakness in the
7 Crown's case. That is mentioned at paragraph 33
8 of the decision.
9 Here, I accept that there were triable
10 issues. There usually are triable issues in
11 these types of cases. A number of technical
12 defences can be raised in impaired driving cases.
13 The admissibility of Breathalyzer results can be
14 challenged through a number of means. But still
15 there were passengers in the vehicle who could
16 have provided direct evidence about Mr. Moore's
17 drinking and his erratic driving pattern.
18 I am not dismissing the fact that Mr. Moore
19 did give up his right to put the Crown to the
20 proof of its case. I simply note that the
21 difficulties that the Crown was facing in the
22 Schwarz case were far more significant and far
23 from routine. It seems to me that the issues
24 that the Crown might have faced in this case, had
25 it gone to trial, were, as Chief Justice Fraser
26 put it in Gibson, "problems of a general nature
27 that would be often engaged in these types of
1 cases."
2 For that reason, I find the Schwarz decision
3 entirely distinguishable. And as well, although
4 it is a decision from a very experienced judge,
5 it remains a trial decision and carries less
6 persuasive weight than do decisions from the
7 Court of Appeal or from the Supreme Court of
8 Canada in Lacasse.
9 Other cases referred to, such as R v
10 Stimson, 2011 ABCA 59, and R v Cameron, 2016 SKQB
11 83, also did not involve an extended pattern of
12 risky driving. The Court of Appeal made it clear
13 in Gibson that the Stimson decision did not stand
14 for the proposition that the range for impaired
15 driving causing death cases was two to four years
16 in Alberta. It commented that the circumstances
17 in that case involved a momentary loss of control
18 by the accused on an unfamiliar road after she
19 had been asked to take the wheel from the driver
20 who had become tired. Those circumstances bear
21 no resemblance to what Mr. Moore did.
22 Finally, I want to say a few words about R v
23 Kayotuk, 2016 NWTSC 59, because it is a recent
24 decision of this Court. The sentence in that
25 case was three-and-a-half years. The accused had
26 past convictions for drinking and driving, and
27 his blood alcohol level was much higher than
1 Mr. Moore's was. But as was the case in Schwarz,
2 there is no indication that his pattern of
3 erratic and dangerous driving was as prolonged as
4 was the case here. And very significantly,
5 Kayotuk was a case where the judge was presented
6 with a joint submission as to range. The
7 sentencing judge followed it, but said at
8 paragraph 15 of the decision, that he was
9 following it "somewhat reluctantly."
10 One of the consequences of the current state
11 of the law about joint submissions, which I will
12 get to in a moment, is that the precedential
13 value of a case where a judge has followed a
14 joint submission is very limited, unless of
15 course the judge says that he or she agrees that
16 the joint submission is a fit sentence. And this
17 often happens. We have had numerous cases before
18 this Court in the recent past, including a number
19 of sentencings on major drug cases, where joint
20 submissions were presented to the Court, and the
21 Court accepted them without question.
22 But when a joint submission is followed
23 reluctantly, it does not represent an endorsement
24 by the Court of the fitness of what is being
25 proposed. For those reasons, I do not find that
26 the outcome in the Kayotuk case is of any
27 assistance in supporting the joint submission
1 that is being presented here.
2 I generally agree with counsel in their
3 identification of the aggravating and mitigating
4 factors that are present in this case, but I do
5 not share their view as to the weight that ought
6 to be attached to those factors. Where I agree
7 completely with counsel is that the most
8 mitigating factor is by far the guilty plea. It
9 has provided certainty of outcome. It has
10 avoided the need for witnesses to relive these
11 terrible events and have to testify about what
12 happened. It has saved the time and resources
13 needed to run a preliminary hearing and a trial.
14 And avoiding that is important because both
15 levels of court are under pressure, and the
16 ability to use resources for other cases is an
17 important factor. And, finally, the guilty plea
18 is an indication of remorse. And I want to make
19 clear that I accept Mr. Moore is sorry for what
20 happened.
21 Mr. Moore's personal circumstances as an
22 aboriginal offender must also be taken into
23 account, and I accept that they reduce his
24 blameworthiness to a point, but only to a point.
25 As I have said, Mr. Moore's circumstances compare
26 favourably to those of many aboriginal offenders
27 who come before the Court.
1 As far as aggravating factors, the most
2 significant one is something I have already
3 alluded to, the persistent pattern of reckless
4 driving, despite the protests of the passengers,
5 and despite the near collision with the oncoming
6 vehicle before the fatal crash. Defence counsel
7 argued during submissions that what happened
8 after the passengers asked Mr. Moore to slow down
9 was that he stopped at the Yellowknife River.
10 With the greatest of respect, that is not what
11 the agreed facts say. There is no link in the
12 agreed facts between the passengers asking
13 Mr. Moore to slow down and the vehicle stopping
14 at the Yellowknife River. And even if there was,
15 the fact is that after that stop, when they got
16 going again after consuming more liquor,
17 Mr. Moore again drove way too fast, and he
18 continued to drive too fast, even after having
19 gone over the centre line and nearly having a
20 collision with another vehicle. I find that
21 highly aggravating, because it shows persistent
22 recklessness and disregard for the safety of the
23 others.
24 It's also aggravating in my view that there
25 were several passengers in the vehicle whose
26 safety he endangered. These were all potential
27 victims. It is not because of anything Mr. Moore
1 did that Ms. Lafferty was the only one who died.
2 The reality is that Mr. Moore could have killed
3 them all.
4 The record is aggravating to a far lesser
5 degree than if it was a drinking and driving
6 record, but it is not neutral, because it shows
7 that Mr. Moore, despite being exposed to various
8 sentencing options, supervision, despite the
9 significant sentence he received for the
10 aggravating assault, has not addressed his
11 underlying issues. He cannot be treated as
12 though he is a youthful first offender. Far from
13 it. In that respect, he is different from the
14 offenders in some of the cases that I was
15 referred to.
16 To summarize, my main disagreement with the
17 positions advanced by counsel about how all of
18 these factors interplay boils down to this:
19 Number 1, I view Mr. Moore's driving pattern as
20 an aggravating factor of enormous significance
21 given the persistence of his conduct and despite
22 things that should have shaken some sense into
23 it; Number 2, I do not attach as much weight as
24 counsel seem to have to the fact that his blood
25 alcohol readings were at the low end of what is
26 illegal.
27 Higher readings are an aggravating factor.
1 Low readings are not mitigating. Our Court of
2 Appeal has stressed the importance of not
3 confusing the absence of an aggravating factor
4 with the presence of a mitigating factor in R v
5 A.J.P.J., 2011 NWTCA 2, at paragraph 14.
6 Drinking and driving is dangerous because
7 alcohol impairs motor skills but also because it
8 impairs judgment. When they reach a certain
9 level, high blood alcohol readings become
10 statutorily aggravating, but as this case
11 demonstrates, impairment caused by alcohol
12 concentration in the blood that falls short of
13 that threshold can still lead to disastrous
14 consequences. A case involving a lower level of
15 impairment does not necessarily put a case at the
16 low end of the scale in seriousness, and it does
17 not necessarily justify a less severe sentence if
18 other aggravating factors are present.
19 Number 3, while I agree that aspects of
20 Mr. Moore's circumstances as an aboriginal
21 offender reduce his blameworthiness to a point, I
22 would not have attached as much weight to that as
23 counsel seem to have.
24 I have already talked about the ranges that
25 the Supreme Court of Canada referred is to in
26 Lacasse. I would have placed this case neither
27 in the least serious category nor in the most
1 serious category. I would have characterized it
2 as falling in the middle of the range, and
3 considering this, I would have thought that a
4 sentence in the range of three-and-a-half to
5 four years would have been fit under the
6 circumstances. To be sure, that would not be a
7 lenient sentence by any stretch of the mind. But
8 in my view, such a sentence would have adequately
9 reflected the seriousness of the offence and been
10 in line with the stern comments of the Supreme
11 Court of Canada in Lacasse.
12 But I am not free in this case to simply
13 impose a sentence that I think is fit, and this
14 takes me to the law dealing with joint
15 submissions.
16 When a joint submission is presented at a
17 sentencing hearing, it alters, in a profound way,
18 the legal framework that governs the task of the
19 sentencing judge. It has long been the law that
20 joint submissions are to be given serious
21 consideration by sentencing judges, but since the
22 Supreme Court of Canada decision in R v
23 Anthony-Cook, 2016 SCR 204, the threshold that
24 must be met before a judge can decline to follow
25 a joint submission has been raised considerably.
26 Lawyers and judges know this. I want to
27 make sure that others be clear on this as well.
1 By "others" I mean Ms. Lafferty's family,
2 Ms. Goulet's family, and Ms. Goulet herself,
3 other passengers who were injured in this crash
4 and the public in general.
5 Sentencing is a highly individualized
6 process. It is anything but an exact science.
7 For any crime committed by any offender, there is
8 never only one appropriate sentence. Typically
9 there's a range of sentences that can be said to
10 achieve the various sentencing objectives and
11 conform with the principles of sentencing,
12 primarily the fundamental principle that a
13 sentence should always be proportionate to the
14 degree of gravity of the offence and the degree
15 of blameworthiness of the offender.
16 There is much to consider, and ordinarily
17 the sentencing judge considers all of those
18 principles and the positions put forward by Crown
19 and defence, and ultimately makes the call as to
20 what a fit sentence is in that particular case.
21 And in law, great deference is afforded to that
22 determination. Even the Court of Appeal is not
23 permitted to vary a sentence simply because the
24 Court of Appeal judges would have imposed a
25 different one.
26 But when a joint submission is presented,
27 that legal framework is significantly altered.
1 The framework that the Supreme Court has
2 prescribed is that a sentencing judge must follow
3 a joint submission unless to do so "would bring
4 the administration of justice into disrepute or
5 is otherwise not in the public interest." That
6 is at paragraph 29 of Anthony-Cook.
7 This is a higher threshold than a simple
8 fitness test, and it is a higher threshold than a
9 "demonstrable unfitness test." Both these tests
10 were considered by the Court and rejected in
11 Anthony-Cook at paragraphs 27, 28, and 46 to 48.
12 As a result, a sentencing judge's discretion not
13 to follow a joint submission is very, very
14 limited.
15 To illustrate in explaining just how high a
16 threshold the test entails, the Supreme Court
17 adopted language such as: (As read)
18 A joint submission will be...contrary to the public interest if...it is so
19 "markedly out of the line with the expectations of reasonable persons
20 aware of the circumstances of the case that this would view it as a
21 break down in the proper functioning of the criminal justice system."
22
23 Or in deciding whether to follow a joint
24 submission: (As read)
25 Trial judges should "avoid rendering a decision that causes an informed
26 and reasonable public to lose confidence in the institution of the
27 Courts."
1 At paragraph 34 of the decision the Court
2 said: (As read)
3 Rejection denotes a submission so unhinged from the circumstances of
4 the offence and the offender, that its acceptance would lead reasonable
5 and informed persons, aware of all the relevant circumstances, including
6 the importance of promoting certainty in resolution discussions, to believe
7 that the proper functioning of the justice system has broken down.
8
9 So in summary, the question today is not
10 what sentence I would have imposed absent the
11 joint submission. The question I must answer is
12 whether sentencing Mr. Moore to two-and-a-half
13 years' imprisonment for this offence would bring
14 the administration of justice into disrepute or
15 otherwise not be in the public interest, whether
16 it would be so unhinged from the circumstances of
17 the case that it would make that reasonable and
18 informed persons, aware of all the relevant
19 circumstances and aware of the importance of
20 promoting certainty in resolution discussions,
21 believe that the proper functioning of the
22 justice system has broken down.
23 After having given the matter careful and
24 very anxious consideration, I cannot say that
25 this high threshold is met as far as the duration
26 of the jail term. As I've said, were my
27 discretion not limited by this framework, I would
1 have imposed a higher sentence than what is being
2 proposed. I would have done so because I think
3 that for this type of offence, stern sentences
4 are needed to send a consistent, firm message and
5 reflect the devastating consequence and tragedy
6 that result from drinking and driving across this
7 country.
8 The sentence being proposed places far more
9 emphasis than I would on the mitigating factors
10 in this case, and far less emphasis than I would
11 have on the aggravating features of this case.
12 But in the final analysis, I cannot say that what
13 is being proposed is so lenient that I would be
14 justified in not following it. Because in law,
15 my disagreement is not a sufficient reason to
16 reject a joint submission.
17 But as I am sure will be clear from
18 everything I have said, I accept this joint
19 submission with extreme reluctance. The sentence
20 imposed in this case should not be treated as
21 having any precedential value whatsoever, and it
22 should not be regarded as a reflection of what
23 this Court sees as a fit sentence in
24 circumstances when drinking and driving results
25 in serious injury or death following actions such
26 as the one described in this case. In following
27 this joint submission, I am simply following the
1 binding direction of the Supreme Court of Canada
2 and applying the extremely strict test that I am
3 duty-bound to apply when considering a joint
4 submission.
5 However, with respect to the proposed length
6 of the driving prohibition, I cannot impose a
7 driving prohibition of only five years. I do
8 think that doing so would be contrary to the
9 public interest.
10 I do think that reasonable and informed
11 members of the public, even knowing of the
12 importance of resolution discussions and
13 promoting certainty in outcome, would lose faith
14 in the justice system if Mr. Moore was not
15 prohibited from driving for a much longer period
16 of time than what is being proposed. I base this
17 assessment on the length of driving prohibitions
18 imposed in some of the cases that were filed, on
19 the extent of risky driving that he engaged in,
20 and on the fact that he did not even have a
21 licence at the time of these events.
22 The information about the lack of license,
23 and, in fact, a lot of information about
24 Mr. Moore's circumstances, comes from the
25 presentence report. I do not know if the Crown
26 had the benefit of that information when it
27 negotiated the joint submission, both from the
1 point of view of the length of the jail term and
2 from the point of view of the length of the
3 driving prohibition. But with the evidence
4 available to me at this stage, I think that the
5 length of driving prohibition that is being
6 proposed is wholly inadequate and would cause
7 reasonable, informed members of the public to
8 lose confidence in the Courts, especially
9 considering the extreme leniency of the jail term
10 being proposed.
11 I'm going to deal first with the ancillary
12 orders that were included in the joint
13 submission. For the reasons that I have just
14 given, I am going to depart from the joint
15 submission as far as the driving prohibition is
16 concerned, and it will be for a period of
17 ten years in addition to the jail term that will
18 be imposed today. Driving is a licenced
19 activity. It's a privilege, not a right. I find
20 the circumstance of Mr. Moore's driving egregious
21 and that to prohibit him from driving for only
22 five years would bring the administration of
23 justice into disrepute.
24 The second issue that arose during
25 submissions was the possibility of probation.
26 Given the credit that Mr. Moore will receive for
27 his remand time, the further jail term that will
1 be imposed today will be in a range that would
2 allow probation to be made part of the sentence.
3 That may well have been helpful to him. It would
4 have permitted including a no-contact condition
5 with the members of Ms. Lafferty's family, and I
6 was told they wanted that. But probation was not
7 part of the joint submission. It was raised by
8 the Crown at the sentencing hearing, and it is
9 not being agreed to by defence.
10 The time for the Crown to think about this
11 and ask for it, or discuss this possibility,
12 would have been while the terms of the joint
13 submissions were being discussed with defence.
14 The Supreme Court has made it clear that joint
15 submissions have to be approached on an as-is
16 basis and specifically guarded against the idea,
17 for example, of adding a probation order when it
18 is not part of what is being proposed. So,
19 again, following those directions from the
20 Supreme Court, I do not think it is open to me to
21 include a probationary period as part of his
22 sentence.
23 The next ancillary order that is being
24 sought is the DNA order. This is a secondary
25 designated offence, so the DNA order will issue.
26 The next ancillary order that is being
27 sought is a firearms prohibition order. Counsel
1 jointly suggest that it is mandatory pursuant to
2 Section 109 of the Criminal Code. That section
3 says that a firearms prohibition order is
4 mandatory for an offence when the offender is
5 liable to ten years' imprisonment or more, which
6 is the case here, for an offence in the
7 commission of which violence against a person was
8 used, threatened, or attempted.
9 At the time of the hearing I asked counsel
10 if they had any authority to support the
11 proposition that this offence fits within that
12 definition. They were unable to refer me to any.
13 Reviewing the cases that were filed at the
14 hearing and other cases, I do see that in some,
15 the Section 109 order was made. It was, for
16 example, made in Kayotuk. In other cases, there
17 is no mention of a Section 109 order being made.
18 In the cases where the order was made, there was
19 no analysis on this topic. It does not appear
20 that this was ever raised before.
21 I have looked into this issue, and I have
22 been unable to find any cases that have examined
23 this issue in the context of drinking and driving
24 where bodily harm or death it caused. There are
25 a few cases that have examined the issue in the
26 context of sexual offences. There are cases
27 going both ways, but the bulk of the authorities
1 seem to have concluded that sexual assault is an
2 inherently violent offence, and I agree with that
3 analysis. But it is not helpful in resolving the
4 issue in the context of drinking and driving.
5 I note that the Youth Criminal Justice Act
6 defines the term "violent offence," in a very
7 broad way. It includes, among other things, an
8 offence that has as one of its elements causing
9 bodily harm. It also includes offences where the
10 safety of others is endangered. So in that
11 context, impaired causing death would clearly be
12 included. But the Criminal Code does not include
13 any such definition.
14 The Code does define "serious personal
15 injury offence," and it defines it as including
16 offences involving the use or attempted use of
17 violence or conduct endangering or likely to
18 endanger the life and safety of others. The fact
19 that in that context "conduct that endangers" is
20 included specifically, in addition to the word
21 "violence," seems to confirm that the concept of
22 violence, on its own, does not include conduct
23 that merely endangers safety.
24 In the absence of a definition in the
25 Criminal Code, whether in general or specifically
26 applicable to Section 109, I am left with the
27 ordinary meaning of the word. The Oxford
1 Dictionary defines "violence" as:
2 Behaviour involving physical force intended to hurt, damage, or kill
3 someone or something.
4 The unlawful exercise of physical force or intimidation by the
5 exhibition of such force.
6
7 Violence implies an element of
8 deliberateness of intention. One of the features
9 of drinking and driving offences that results in
10 injury or death is, in a large majority of cases,
11 that the driver never intended for anyone to get
12 hurt or to be killed. It is a crime of
13 recklessness, of gross negligence, and we can
14 attach many adjectives to it, but I do not think
15 that it fits within the concept of use of
16 violence referred to in Section 109 of the Code.
17 As I have explained at length, the joint
18 submission curtails my discretion considerably,
19 but not to the point of going along with a
20 position that I think is wrong in law. I decline
21 to make a firearms prohibition order because, in
22 my view, Section 109 is not engaged in this case.
23 The victim of crime surcharge is mandatory,
24 so there will be one in the amount of $200 for
25 each of the two counts. The default time and the
26 time to pay are statutorily provided for. I will
27 also credit Mr. Moore for the time that he has
1 spent on remand on a ratio of roughly
2 one-and-a-half days of credit for each he has
3 spent on remand. Again, there is clear direction
4 from the Supreme Court of Canada that that should
5 be the norm.
6 Stand up, please, Mr. Moore. Mr. Moore, I
7 am going to follow the joint submission on
8 Count 1. But for the time that you spent on
9 remand, the sentence would have been
10 two-and-a-half years' imprisonment. For the
11 242 days you have spent on remand, I give you
12 credit for 11-and-a-half months, so the time
13 remaining to be served will be 18-and-a-half
14 months.
15 On Count 2, the sentence will be two years'
16 imprisonment. The one-and-a-half month credit
17 for the remand time applies to that as well, so
18 the time remaining to be served on that count
19 12-and-a-half months, and that will be
20 concurrent, which means served at the same time.
21 You may sit down.
22 There will also be, as I said, a driving
23 prohibition of ten years plus 18-and-a-half
24 months in accordance with Section 259(2)(a.1).
25 Is there anything that I have overlooked from the
26 Crown's point of view?
27 MR. GODFREY: I don't believe so, Your
1 Honour. Thank you.
2 THE COURT: Thank you. Anything from the
3 defence that I have overlooked?
4 MR. CLEMENTS: No.
5 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Mr. Moore,
6 before we close court, there are a few things I
7 want to tell you. I hope you understand you are
8 getting a huge break, huge, huge break today. I
9 believe you when you say you are sorry, but being
10 sorry is not good enough. It has to come with
11 action. You are 29 years old, and it is time you
12 grew up. You need to seriously work on your
13 issues. Keep going to AA while you are in jail,
14 and keep going to AA when you get out of jail.
15 While you are in jail, spend some time with the
16 psychologist and make the most use possible of
17 the resources that are there.
18 You are very lucky. You have the support of
19 your mother, of Mr. Storr, and of others. You
20 cannot bring Karen Lafferty back. You cannot
21 undo what you have done. But the least you can
22 do is to work on yourself in a very serious
23 long-term way.
24 You can talk to other people about what you
25 have done. You can talk to other people about
26 what happened. How it has made you feel. How it
27 has hurt others. The kind of harm that can never
1 be undone. That is something that you actually
2 can do. That is one way you might be able to
3 start making amends. Maybe you can prevent other
4 people from doing what you did. No one ever gets
5 behind the wheel of a car thinking this is going
6 to happen. No one. So if you are able to, you
7 might want to try to be part of the solution and
8 talk about this, even if it is very hard, and
9 even if it does not put you in a very nice light.
10 But you cannot just be sorry. Sorry is not
11 good enough this time. So I hope you think
12 carefully about that, and I hope although you are
13 getting a lenient sentence today, I hope you do
14 not look at it as having gotten away with
15 something. I hope you look at it as a chance to
16 make real changes, because I hope to never have
17 to see you in court again as an accused person.
18 I hope no Court ever sees you in court again as
19 an accused person. But that is not up to me. It
20 is completely up to you.
21 So I hope you were listening. I hope you
22 were listening when those victim impact
23 statements were read last week and today, because
24 that is the reality of what is happening because
25 of what you have done. So I hope that you do
26 something about your issues.
27 Close court.
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2
3 CERTIFICATE OF TRANSCRIPT
4
5 I, the undersigned, hereby certify that the
6 foregoing pages are a complete and accurate
7 transcript of the proceedings taken down by me in
8 shorthand and transcribed from my shorthand notes
9 to the best of my skill and ability.
10 Dated at the City of Edmonton, Province of
11 Alberta, this 31st day of January, 2018.
12
13 Certified Pursuant to Rule 723
14 Of the Rules of Court
15
16
17
18 __________________________
19 Karilee Mankow
20 Court Reporter
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