Supreme Court

H.M.T.Q. v. Stromberg, 2002 NWTSC 49
Date: 20020723
Docket: S-1-CR2002/062

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

IN THE MATTER OF:


HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN


- vs. -


CRAIG BERTIL STROMBERG


Transcript of the Oral Reasons for Sentence by The Honourable Justice J.Z. Vertes, at Yellowknife in the Northwest Territories, on July 4th A.D., 2002.


APPEARANCES:

Ms. L. Colton:   Counsel for the Crown

Mr. R. Gorin:   Counsel for the Accused


Charge under s. 236(b) Criminal Code of Canada


THE COURT:   Craig Bertil Stromberg has entered a plea of guilty to a charge of manslaughter; specifically, the unlawful killing of Yves Lebel in Hay River on January 16th, 2002.

The facts were placed before me by way of a Statement of Agreed Facts. These facts make reference to Mr. Stromberg's involvement in this death along with another individual who will be unnamed for now but who, I am told, is expected to stand trial in the near future on a similar charge.

The agreed facts are that on January 16th, 2002, Mr. Stromberg and this other individual, both of whom had been drinking, had decided to teach the deceased a lesson, as Crown counsel put it. They were apparently angry and resentful over the fact that Mr. Lebel may have been involved in an affair with this other individual's wife and so they were going to take it out on Mr. Lebel.

The two of them forced entry into Mr. Lebel's apartment, they beat him up, and they left him unconscious. This raises some particularly aggravating factors.

One, Mr. Stromberg did not act alone, he was acting in the company of someone else, and there is no doubt that in such a circumstance the two of them fed off each other. It may very well be that in that type of a situation, each of them did things

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that they would not ordinarily do or be brave enough to do if they were alone. So the fact that he was acting in conjunction with someone else is an aggravating feature.

The fact that they forced entry into Mr. Lebel's home is an aggravating feature.

The fact that they left Mr. Lebel unconscious is an aggravating feature. This is particularly so because the information given to me is that Mr. Stromberg was aware that the deceased was seriously injured because he was quoted as saying afterwards to others that he thought they may have killed the deceased. And also, information was given to me that Mr. Stromberg has some training in first aid. He could have either readily gone to the deceased's assistance, he could have at least checked to see what condition the deceased was in, or he could have at least notified the authorities afterwards to send aid to the deceased's residence. Whether that aid or whether he could have done anything, we will never know. It is quite likely the outcome might not have been any different but the fact that he did not take any of those steps are certainly aggravating features.

Mr. Lebel's body was found on January 17th, and it was noted that his face was bruised and bloodied. The cause of death, as revealed by the autopsy, was

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a subdural hematoma caused by blunt force injuries to the head.

There is some reference in the autopsy report to the fact that the deceased had suffered a previous hematoma sometime earlier, perhaps some years ago, and that this may have made him more susceptible to serious injury in this case. That, of course, would have been unknown to the accused. But, in any event, the charge is manslaughter, that being the unintentional killing of another human being. There is no suggestion that Mr. Stromberg intended to cause the death of Yves Lebel. But his actions were certainly such that they were a significant causative factor in the death of Yves Lebel.

The accused is 35 years old. He has lived most of his life in Hay River. I am told that he has a steady work record in construction and seasonal trades. He has a criminal record although it is relatively minor and dated and, in my opinion, it is not pertinent to the sentencing disposition that I am making.

As counsel have both acknowledged, the crime of manslaughter is one that can result in a wide range of sentences. Counsel have placed before me numerous cases - dispositions in manslaughter cases over the years in this jurisdiction under varying circumstances. There are unfortunately many more

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cases that counsel could have referred to as well. I say unfortunately simply because of the vast choice that counsel have in this area.

What all of these cases show is that the sentencing in any manslaughter case depends overwhelmingly on the particular circumstances of the case. There is a general approach obviously, because manslaughter cases involve the death of a human being, that in all but extremely rare cases those convicted of manslaughter are sentenced to imprisonment and to significant periods of imprisonment. But the range does vary significantly. And that is because, as counsel have also mentioned, the conduct that is labelled as manslaughter can range from conduct that is almost accidental to conduct that is almost murder.

Here, in this case, the accused and the other individual certainly set out to cause harm to Mr. Lebel. In that sense, it is not on the accidental side of the manslaughter continuum. They set out to cause harm to him, to, as Crown counsel put it, “teach him a lesson”, and they did not evidence much care for the harm that they did cause. So, in that sense, this is not one of those rare cases where anything other than a significant period of incarceration can be imposed.

There are a number of mitigating factors that

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counsel have identified.

First and foremost, of course, is the accused's entry of a guilty plea. He waived his right to a preliminary hearing. Crown counsel has acknowledged that, in effect, this is an early guilty plea. Notwithstanding how strong or how weak a case may be against an accused, the fact that a guilty plea is entered is always significantly mitigating in my view. It serves as an acknowledgment of accountability on the part of the offender. It is a sign that he is strong enough to stand up and take accountability for his actions and that, of course, is a significant sign of remorse and a sign that the prospect for future reformation and rehabilitation is positive.

I also note what I take to be the sincere expression of remorse on behalf of Mr. Stromberg. I give effect to that, and I also note the impact that this has had on him as I was informed by his counsel; specifically, I am told that he spent several weeks in the hospital in a state of clinical depression.

All sentencing is guided by the principle of proportionality. The sentence in any particular case must be proportionate to the seriousness of the crime and the blameworthiness of the offender.

In this particular case, the crime is obviously

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very serious - a human life has been lost.

The circumstances of the offender, while certainly his level of blameworthiness in terms of this offence is also high because of the aggravating features that I noted previously, that is ameliorated to a great extent by the guilty plea, by his expression of remorse, and by his willingness to be accountable for his actions.

Counsel recognize, I think, that there is really no alternative to a significant period of incarceration although I think I can exercise restraint considering all of the circumstances of this case.

Stand up, Mr. Stromberg.

Mr. Stromberg, you are a mature man but you are still young enough that you will have a long life and future ahead of you once you are released from the sentence that I am about to impose, so that I hope that you will use this time to plan for that future and plan for how you are going to live your life after you are released.

I sentence you to serve a term of imprisonment of four years.

In addition, there will be the order pursuant to Section 487 of the Criminal Code providing for the taking of a sample for DNA analysis. I will sign the order and you can retrieve it from the clerk,

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Ms. Colton.

In addition, there will be the order prohibiting you from having in your possession any firearms or ammunition for a period of ten years -- is it ten years? Is that the mandatory minimum in this case or is it life? I believe it is ten years.

MS. COLTON:   I believe it is ten years, sir. For a first offence, it is not earlier than ten years.

THE COURT:   The firearm prohibition order will be in place for a period of ten years starting from the date of your release.

Do you understand all of that?

THE ACCUSED:  Yes, I do, Your Honour.

THE COURT:   You may have a seat.

Under the circumstances, there will be no surcharge.

Have I neglected anything, counsel?

MR. GORIN:   I don't believe so, sir.

MS. COLTON:   No, sir.

THE COURT:   Then my appreciation once again for your submissions. Madam Clerk, the exhibits are there, and we will close court.

(AT WHICH TIME THE ORAL REASONS FOR SENTENCE CONCLUDED)

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Certified pursuant to Rule 723 of the Supreme Court Rules.

Lois Hewitt,
Court Reporter

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