IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

IN THE MATTER OF:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

- v -

ANDREW SCOTT

Transcript of the Decision delivered by The Honourable Deputy Justice D. Gates, sitting in Yellowknife, in the Northwest Territories, on the 24th day of May, 2024.

APPEARANCES:

Counsel for the Crown A. Piché

J.K. Bran Counsel for the Defence

Charge under s. 271 Criminal Code

1 THE COURT: On December 14, 2023, the
2 accused Andrew Scott was convicted of a sexual
3 assault on J.M. that took place on March the 27,
4 2019 at Yellowknife. J.M. is the mother of their
5 ten-year-old son and a former intimate partner of
6 the accused. He is here to be sentenced today.

The offence of sexual assault carries a maximum sentence of ten years' imprisonment. No minimum sentence is prescribed. The defence urges me to impose a sentence of two years less a day to be served in the community by way of a conditional sentence followed by two years' probation. The Crown, on the other hand, maintains that an appropriate sentence would be three-and-a-half years' imprisonment.

Facts. The facts relating to this matter are set out in my oral reasons for decision delivered on December 14, 2023. Briefly stated, the accused forced unprotected sexual intercourse on the victim while attending her home in response to her invitation to come and smoke marijuana together. The accused and the victim separated in October 2018, so an informal shared-parenting arrangement between them had only been in place for a few months at the time of the offence. They were in regular contact with one another because the victim did not drive

and, as such, regularly relied on the accused to drive her to work and their son to school.

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On the date of the offence the accused was looking after their son while he was on his school break notwithstanding that it was the victim's week to have the child in her care.

After having returned their five-year-old son to his mother's care, the accused returned to her residence later that evening. After smoking a joint outside, they went inside the residence. In the living room they discussed some behavioral issues exhibited by their child. At one point the accused grabbed the victim and tried to pull down her pants. He told her that she was lonely and that she needed his comfort. The victim repeatedly said "no" and attempted to pull up her pants. The accused then flipped her around, pushed her head and shoulders down towards the couch and proceeded to have unprotected sexual intercourse with her without her consent. She was upset and crying. She told the accused that he was disgusting and to stop but he would not listen. She felt helpless and could not fight him any longer. She did not scream as she did not want to wake up their sleeping child. After repeatedly telling him "no" and to "stop" the victim told him to just be done and to leave.

| 1 | After the sexual activity had ended, the accused |
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| 2 | made comments about how wet the victim got and |
| 3 | how much she needed and enjoyed the sex. The |
| 4 | accused left the residence after the victim again |
| 5 | told him that he was disgusting and that he was |
| 6 | to leave. |
| 7 | The Principles of Sentencing. The |
| 8 | principles of sentencing are set out in |
| 9 | Section 718 of the Criminal Code. The section |
| 10 | reads as follows: |
| 11 | "The fundamental purpose of |
| 12 | sentencing is to contribute, along |
| 13 | with crime prevention initiatives, |
| 14 | to respect for the law and the |
| 15 | maintenance of a just, peaceful |
| 16 | and safe society by imposing such |
| 17 | sanctions that have one or more of |
| 18 | the following objectives: |
| 19 | (a) to denounce unlawful conduct; |
| 20 | (b) to deter the offender and |
| 21 | other persons from committing |
| 22 | offences; |
| 23 | (c) to separate offenders from |
| 24 | society where necessary; |
| 25 | (d) to rehabilitate offenders; |
| 26 | (e) to provide reparations for |
| 27 | harm done to victims and to the |

| 1 | | community; and |
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| 2 | | (f) to promote a sense of |
| 3 | | responsibility in offenders, and |
| 4 | | acknowledgement of the harm done |
| 5 | | to victims and the community". |
| 6 | I note | that Section 718.2 is applicable in this |
| 7 | instand | ce: |
| 8 | | " A sentence should be increased |
| 9 | | or reduced to account for any |
| 10 | | relevant aggravating or mitigating |
| 11 | | circumstances relating to the |
| 12 | | events or the offender; |
| 13 | | (b) evidence that an offender, in |
| 14 | | committing the offence, abused the |
| 15 | | offender's intimate partner or a |
| 16 | | member of the victim or offender's |
| 17 | | family, shall be deemed to be an |
| 18 | | aggravating circumstance; |
| 19 | | (c) a sentence should be similar |
| 20 | | to sentences imposed on similar |
| 21 | | offenders for similar offences |
| 22 | | committed in similar |
| 23 | | circumstances; and |
| 24 | | (d) an offender should not be |
| 25 | | deprived of liberty, if less |
| 26 | | restrictive sanctions may be |
| 27 | | appropriate in the circumstances". |

| 1 | It is a fundamental principle of sentencing |
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| 2 | that a sentence must be proportionate to the |
| 3 | gravity of the offence and the degree of |
| 4 | responsibility of the offender. In R. v. Lacasse |
| 5 | the Supreme Court explained, at paragraph 12, that |
| 6 | "proportionality is the cardinal |
| 7 | principle that must guide |
| 8 | appellate courts in considering |
| 9 | the fitness of the sentence |
| 10 | imposed on an offender. The |
| 11 | more serious the crime and its |
| 12 | consequences or the greater the |
| 13 | offender's degree of |
| 14 | responsibility the heavier the |
| 15 | sentence will be. In other words, |
| 16 | the severity of a sentence depends |
| 17 | not only on the seriousness of the |
| 18 | crime's consequences but also on |
| 19 | the moral blameworthiness of the |
| 20 | offender. Determining a |
| 21 | proportionate sentence is a |
| 22 | delicate task". |
| 23 | Further guidance is found in the decision of |
| 24 | Renke, J. in R v $Pettitt$, 2021 ABQB 773, at |
| 25 | paragraph 28: |
| 26 | "The 'gravity' aspect of |
| 27 | proportionality focuses on the act |

and its consequences or on what

was done. The 'responsibility'

aspect focuses on the actor, the

offender's level of fault in

committing the offence, how the

act was done, why the act was

done, and by whom the act was

done".

These principles guide and direct courts in what is one of the most difficult judicial tasks, crafting a fit and proper sentence for an offence and an offender.

In assessing the gravity of the offence I am satisfied that the offence of sexual assault is a very serious offence. It strikes at the essence of an individual's dignity, sexual integrity and personal safety. This case involves a non-consensual act of sexual intercourse. As such, the defence concedes that the circumstances surrounding the commission of this offence constitute a major sexual assault as that term has been defined and interpreted by various decisions of the Court of Appeal including R v Arcand and R v A.J.P.J., a decision of the Northwest Territories Court of Appeal. The starting point for a major sexual assault is three years. From this three-year starting point

1 the sentence can be adjusted up or down to 2 account for aggravating and mitigating 3 circumstances.

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These decisions must, in my view, be considered in light of the Supreme Court's decisions in R v Friesen and R v Parranto. The impact of Friesen and Parranto is very thoroughly canvassed by Justice S.E. Pepper of the Alberta Court of Justice in R v Hay. I agree with her conclusion that Friesen tells us that starting points are guidelines only and not "hard and fast rules". I also agree that Parranto tells us that the starting points do not dispense with the requirement for an individualized approach to sentencing that "takes into account all relevant factors and sentencing principles". In Hay Justice Pepper suggested that the offence of sexual assault exists on the spectrum of seriousness. At paragraph 36 of her decision she stated:

"While all sexual assault is 21 22 serious, like all crimes it exists 23 on a spectrum of seriousness. Some factors will push a crime towards a longer sentence often involve planning and deliberation, violence, injury, restraint,

multiple offenders, a young or

therwise vulnerable complainant

or an unconscious complainant. A

crime of sexual assault that does

not contain these aggravating

elements can attract sentences of

shorter duration".

A review of the many cases cited by counsel reveals that the violation of the integrity and dignity of a victim of a major sexual assault is so serious that it will almost always attract a significant jail sentence.

Victim Impact Statement. In accordance with Section 722.1 of the Code, the victim, J.M., read her Victim Impact Statement during the sentencing hearing. Victim Impact Statements allow the victims of crime to take an active and meaningful role in the sentencing process. Through their participation in the sentencing process we gain a broader understanding of how crime affects real people. I want to thank S.M. for sharing with the Court the physical and emotional harm as well as the economic loss that she has experienced because of this offence. It takes courage and strength to come forward in a public setting to share this very personal information.

27 It is clear from the Victim Impact Statement

1 that this offence has caused significant 2 emotional damage and profoundly affected J.M.'s 3 sense of personal security in her own home and in her community. It is also very clear to me that, notwithstanding the passage of almost 5 6 five years since the date of this offence, Ms. M. continues to experience shame, disgust, 7 8 loneliness, and feelings of insecurity. I am pleased to learn that she is receiving support 9 10 and assistance to help her address the 11 accompanying anxiety and depression.

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Personal Circumstances of the Offender. In addition to the submissions of counsel the Court had the benefit of a Pre-Sentence Report prepared in relation to Mr. Scott. The accused is currently 39 years of age. He was born in Woodstock, New Brunswick, and moved to St. John at the age of five months where he remained until he finished school. The accused's parents separated prior to his birth, and he has had virtually no contact with his father throughout his life. At the age of 24, Mr. Scott met his father for the first time. He has had some contact with his father in the past 15 years but his father's alcoholism was a barrier during the first ten of these years. Mr. Scott reports that there has been better contact in the past

five years. Mr. Scott has two stepbrothers, a

product of his father's union with another

partner, but he has never met them. The

accused's parents recently reconciled and have

resumed a relationship.

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Mr. Scott had a stable and loving upbringing and was surrounded by very supportive extended family members during his youth and adolescence. He cites them as a very positive force in his life. Based on what I have seen and heard, it is clear to me that the accused has a very strong sense of family. After graduating with honours from high school, and being named the top athlete in New Brunswick, Mr. Scott attended university for two years. He left his university program and enrolled in a one-year machinist course at New Brunswick Community College. He worked as a personal trainer from the age of 17 to 24 years. In 2009 he enlisted with the Canadian Armed Forces as a linesman and was responsible for building military communications towers. He was posted to Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, in 2010 and then to Yellowknife in 2015. He left the military in 2016.

The accused began a relationship with the victim J.M. in 2006 in New Brunswick. Their son was born in 2014. The family moved to

Yellowknife the following year but the accused and the victim separated, as I mentioned a few moments ago, in October of 2018. After leaving the military the accused took two years off to recover from PTSD and be a stay-at-home parent.

When he returned to work he did self-contracting work for various communications companies. In 2023 he commenced employment with Northview as a renovator. Unfortunately, Mr. Scott was terminated a few months ago once his employer learned of the matter now before the courts.

Mr. Scott commenced a new relationship in 2020. Together with his new partner they have a three-month-old son. His spouse also works for Northview as a cleaner. She is currently on maternity leave and collecting Employment Insurance maternity benefits and expects to return to work. They share in the household expenses. In addition to his full-time employment at Northview, the accused and his wife recently started a construction company.

Mr. Scott's goal is to become fully self-employed at some point in the future.

Mr. Scott has one previous criminal conviction in Halifax, Nova Scotia, in 2014 for conspiracy to traffic in a Schedule 2 substance. He received a 12-month conditional sentence in

relation to this matter. According to the defence, Mr. Scott got involved with a friend in the unlawful distribution of steroids.

Mr. Scott's counsel asks the court to place minimal, if any, weight on this conviction given the age of the entry, the fact that it did not involve an offence of violence, and that it resulted in a conditional sentence. The Crown concedes that little, if any, weight should be placed on this prior conviction. I agree. In my view, the age of the conviction and the nature of the offence provide little assistance in the assessment of Mr. Scott's moral blameworthiness for the current offence.

It is clear to me from the Pre-Sentence
Report that Mr. Scott is a very good father to
both of his sons and committed to supporting both
of his children. While he continues to maintain
his innocence notwithstanding the conviction
entered this past December, he told the author of
the Pre-Sentence Report that he fully accepts the
decision of the Court.

The Pre-Sentence Report paints a very positive picture of the accused's current relationship. However, the family is experiencing some serious financial difficulties and are several months in arrears on the rent for

their apartment. The accused is also carrying a significant debt load. In addition, there are hints in the Pre-Sentence Report that the accused may be turning to alcohol to deal with the very many stresses in his life. There is also some suggestion that the accused disappears for periods of time during which his current partner has no idea where he is.

It is clear to me that Mr. Scott is subject to significant sources of stress in his life.

He has been diagnosed and is being treated for PTSD. In addition, he carries the stress of family debt as well as the ongoing conflict relative to a shared parenting arrangement with the victim. He is, doubtless, also suffering stress flowing from the fact that this matter has been hanging over him for nearly five years.

Further, he is a new father and in a relatively new relationship. Finally, up until quite recently he was working two jobs to try and provide for his various family responsibilities.

By the terms of release on this charge
Mr. Scott was prohibited from having contact with
the victim except through a third party and then
restricted to matters pertaining to their shared
parenting of their son. I will have more to say
about that in a moment.

The Crown relies on a series of authorities including R v A.J.K., R v A.J.P.J., R v D.J.A., R v H.P.M., and R v T.S.I. The defence asked me to consider the decision in R v Hudson, a decision of Justice Shaner, dated November the 15, 2023. In addition, I invited counsel to consider the decision of both the Court of Appeal and the Alberta Court of Justice in R v Hay, previously mentioned.

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Conditional Sentences. As previously indicated, the defence seeks a sentence of two years less a day to be served in the community. Section 742.1 sets out the circumstances in which a court may impose a conditional sentence of imprisonment. Certain conditions apply. First, the section requires that the court impose a sentence of less than two years in relation to the offence. Second, the offence must be one for which no minimum term of imprisonment is prescribed. Third, the offence must not be one for which a maximum term of imprisonment of 14 years or life may be imposed. In addition, the court must be satisfied that serving the sentence in the community would not endanger the safety of the community and would be consistent with the fundamental principles set out in Section 718 to 718.2. While the section in the

Code which provides for conditional sentences
also sets out other limits, counsel agree that
none of these other limits apply in this
instance.

In R v Hay, Justice Pepper provides a very comprehensive history of the availability of conditional sentences in cases of sexual assault.

I am grateful to her for this very helpful review set out at paragraphs 48 to 57 of her decision.

I do not propose to repeat this entire section of her judgment but would summarize her review as follows:

- Conditional sentences were introduced in September 1996;
- 2) In 2000, the Supreme Court found that parliament's intention in introducing conditional sentences was to enhance restorative justice principles in the sentencing process and to reduce reliance on the use of prison. The authority for that is *R v Proulx*;
- 3) From 1996 to 2007, Section 742.1 conditional sentence orders were available for any offence, including sexual assault, if the proposed sentence was less than two years and the other preconditions referred to above had been met;
- 27 4) In 2007 the Criminal Code was amended

| Τ. | to restrict conditional sentences and, as such, |
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| 2 | they were no longer available for serious |
| 3 | personal injury offences including sexual |
| 4 | assault; |
| 5 | 5) The Criminal Code was further amended |
| 6 | in 2012 to remove the phrase "serious personal |
| 7 | injury offences" but the amendment specifically |
| 8 | precluded conditional sentences for the offence |
| 9 | of sexual assault when prosecuted by indictment; |
| 10 | 6) In November 2022 a further amendment |
| 11 | to the Criminal Code reinstated the option of |
| 12 | conditional sentences for sexual assault |
| 13 | offences, again subject to the various conditions |
| 14 | described above; |
| 15 | 7) A conditional sentence order is a |
| 16 | form of incarceration served in the community |
| 17 | under strict conditions for up to two years less |
| 18 | a day. |
| 19 | In Proulx the Supreme Court found that a |
| 20 | conditional sentence can provide significant |
| 21 | denunciation and deterrence, |
| 22 | "particularly so when onerous |
| 23 | conditions are imposed and the |
| 24 | duration of a conditional sentence |
| 25 | is extended beyond the duration of |
| 26 | the jail sentence that would |
| 27 | ordinarily have been imposed in |

the circumstances",

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and that's found at paragraphs 102 and 127 of Proulx. However, the court also recognized that there may be some instances where the requirement for denunciation and deterrence is so pressing that only a custodial sentence will be a suitable sentence. In my view this is one of those cases.

Hay was a case involving a consensual sexual encounter where consent was withdrawn when the offender initiated a new form of sexual activity without having first obtained the victim's consent. At that point the victim abruptly moved away, got angry and asked the offender to leave her house. Hay immediately apologized to the victim and made no attempt to continue the sexual activity. He was acquitted at trial but the acquittal was overturned by the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal entered a conviction and the matter was remitted back to the trial judge for sentence. He received a sentence of two years less a day to be served in the community on a conditional sentence order. Of note, the court found that the very brief duration of the assault was a neutral factor, not a mitigating factor as advocated by the defence, but that it was a factor in assessing the moral blameworthiness of the offender.

The case relied on by the defence Hudson involved facts that are similar to those in Hay though Hudson involved a guilty plea. In that case the offender and the victim were intimate partners. As in Hay, Mr. Hudson penetrated the victim's anus without first having obtained her consent to that sexual activity. Both the offender and the victim were Indigenous, and the offender had significant Gladue factors that the court found diminished his moral blameworthiness relative to the offence. A sentence of 18 months to be served in the community was imposed in that instance.

Returning to Hay, Justice Pepper identifies three types of cases involving major sexual assault. While not determinative I find her analysis to be helpful. At paragraph 58 she states:

"There are three main types of cases cited by the Crown, all of which involve major sexual assault. There are cases involving an unconscious victim, cases with significant acts of overcoming resistance through force, and cases where consent is removed but the assault is

discontinued with no act of

overcoming resistance".

In my view, both Hay and Hudson fall into the third category discussed by Justice Pepper. As such, both cases involve situations where consent had previously been given but subsequently withdrawn. In both instances the offender immediately discontinued the sexual activity.

In my view, this case does not fall within this same category. Rather, this case involved significant acts on the part of Mr. Scott in overcoming the resistance of J.M. The decisions in Hay and Hudson are, in my view, readily distinguishable from the matter before me.

Aggravating Circumstances. I agree with the Crown that there are several aggravating circumstances in this case. First, this was a case where Mr. Scott persisted in a sexual assault after the victim made it clear that she was not consenting to his actions. As such, I agree that this case is, as I mentioned a moment ago, readily distinguishable from the line of cases involving an offender who immediately desists from sexual activity once he becomes aware of his partner's lack of consent. This is clearly not such a case, and the assault took place over a significant period of time. I also

find aggravating the fact that the victim was Mr. Scott's former intimate partner and that he engaged in unprotected sexual intercourse with her. Also aggravating is the fact that the offence took place in the victim's home, a location where she was entitled to feel safe. The fact that the child was present and sleeping at the time is also a somewhat aggravating circumstance. I agree that the impact on the child of witnessing his mother being sexually assaulted by his father would, doubtless, have been very negative. Fortunately this did not occur. Finally, the significant continuing impact of this offence on the victim is an aggravating circumstance in this instance.

One of the terms of Mr. Scott's release on these charges was that he is not to communicate directly or indirectly with the victim except through a sober third party to arrange child care access. He entered into this undertaking on January 21, 2021. During the sentencing hearing the Crown introduced copies of text messages exchanged between Mr. Scott and the victim in October 2023. These are found in Exhibit S-2 and Exhibit S-3. The defence consented to the introduction of this evidence.

1 Mr. Scott seeking his agreement to a form of 2 medical treatment recommended for their son. 3 J.M. initiated this direct communication in the mistaken belief that the parties were permitted by the terms of Mr. Scott's release conditions to 5 6 communicate in relation to their son. Several messages were exchanged between the parties. 8 Mr. Scott's hostility towards J.M. is quickly revealed. His messages are aggressive and filled 9 10 with profanity and veiled threats while J.M. 11 remains relatively calm. A second exchange of 12 text messages was initiated by Mr. Scott relating 13 to his request for the return of clothing items he had purchased for their son. Again, the tone 14 15 of Mr. Scott's messages is aggressive, even hostile. As with the first text messages he 16 17 makes threats against J.M. and members of her 18 family. I am advised that Mr. Scott was charged 19 with breach of undertaking but the Crown has 20 elected not to proceed with those charges. The 21 Crown does, however, points to this conduct and 22 urges the Court to find that he is not a suitable 23 candidate for a community-based sentence. While I find Mr. Scott's failure to comply 24 25 with the terms of his release to be an aggravating circumstance, I place limited weight 26

on this evidence. First, these two text messages

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1 took place while Mr. Scott was in Edmonton with 2 his new partner and involved in medical 3 complications relating to the birth of their child. Second, no other breaches over the very extended period of time that he was subject to 5 6 these release conditions were noted. Nevertheless, the content of Mr. Scott's messages is concerning, particularly the threats directed 8 towards J.M. and members of her family. 9

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Mitigating Circumstances. I find that various aspects of Mr. Scott's background to be mitigating in this instance. First, he is reported to be a loving and caring father to his two sons. While the victim, the mother of his elder son, gave evidence during the trial of the toxic nature of her relationship with Mr. Scott post separation, she acknowledged that he was a good father. The various individuals who provided input into the Pre-Sentence Report all spoke highly of Mr. Scott as a parent. Second, Mr. Scott has a solid Record of Employment including ten years as a member of the Canadian Armed Forces. He served overseas in Kuwait, Syria, Afghanistan and the United States. While not directly involved in combat, his time with the Armed Forces certainly involved service in combat zones. He has been diagnosed with PTSD

arising from his military service. In addition to his service in combat zones, Mr. Scott has lost former colleagues to suicide because of PTSD. To his credit, Mr. Scott is reported to regularly access on-line counselling through Veterans Affairs to address his trauma and PTSD.

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Collateral Consequences. At the request of the court counsel had provided supplementary written submissions on the impact of collateral consequences on Mr. Scott's two children as well as his current family if he were to receive a penitentiary term of imprisonment as requested by the Crown. In Pham the Supreme Court recognized that collateral consequences flowing from an offender's personal circumstances, including the impact on the offender's family, may be relevant in the determination of an individualized sentence in appropriate circumstances. If applicable, collateral consequences are not, however, mitigating factors as they do not relate either to the seriousness of the offence or the offender's degree of responsibility.

In *R v Suter*, the Supreme Court explained that collateral consequences may be found to relate to the sentencing principles of individualization of sentences and sentencing parity. In both instances the court explained

1 that the presence of collateral consequences 2 cannot take a sentence outside of the appropriate range of sentences the offender would otherwise receive. At paragraph 53 of Suter the court 5 stated: "I agree with the Court of Appeal that the fundamental principle of proportionality must prevail in 9 every case - collateral 10 consequences cannot be used to 11 reduce a sentence to a point where 12 the sentence becomes 13 disproportionate to the gravity of the offence or the moral 14 15 blameworthiness of the offender. 16 There is, however, no requirement 17 that the collateral consequences 18 emanate from state misconduct in 19 order to be considered as a factor 20 in sentencing". 21 In R v Kogvik, the decision of the Nunavut Court of Appeal, the offender entered a plea of 22 23 guilty to aggravated assault and was sentenced to 24 a three-year suspended sentence. He viciously 25 attacked a stranger while she was out hiking,

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inflicting serious injury including a broken arm,

multiple other fractures and head wounds. The

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1 offender was the primary care-giver and income 2 earner for his partner and children. His incarceration would also deprive his parents of his assistance. The Nunavut Court of Appeal found the sentence to be demonstrably unfit and 5 substitute a sentence of seven months imprisonment followed by probation for a period of one year. At paragraph 34 they outline the 9 proper approach to the inclusion of collateral 10 consequences in the sentencing process: 11 "It is an unfortunate reality that 12 collateral consequences flow from most criminal convictions, their 13 14 seriousness increasing in step 15 with the seriousness of the 16 offence and consequent sentence. Those sentenced for serious crimes 17 18 may lose their employment and 19 housing. Professional licenses 20 and designations may be revoked. 21 Their standing in the community 22 may be diminished and their 23 reputation destroyed. Their 24 future opportunities may be 25 limited by a criminal record. 26 As here, those for whom an 27 offender is responsible may be

forced to adapt to the loss of a care-giver or provider. These are not irrelevant considerations, however, collateral consequences, no matter how sympathetic, must not eclipse the overarching duty of a sentencing judge to impose a proportionate sentence in consideration of all of the circumstances".

In this instance Mr. Scott points to the very damaging effect of sending him to the penitentiary on his family responsibilities, both as 50/50 parenting arrangement for his ten-year-old son with the victim of this offence and his new son and new partner who is currently on maternity leave. During the sentencing hearing he reported that he had recently lost his current employment because of his outstanding legal matter. While he is still developing his construction company, his ability to support his children and partner would be compromised if he were to be sentenced to a penitentiary term of imprisonment.

As previously indicated, Mr. Scott never knew his own father until he was 24 years of age. While he now has some relationship with his

father that obviously was completely missing in Mr. Scott's life during his formative years. I am mindful that sending Mr. Scott to the penitentiary as requested by the Crown will lead to two other young boys being deprived of their father for a significant period. It will also result in two other mothers being left to care for children on their own. Ironically, it would also result in the victim being left to carry a significantly greater burden in terms of child care.

I cannot ignore these collateral consequences, particularly the risk it creates for two young children. Mr. Scott's current partner was previously employed as a cleaner at Northview, the same company that employed Mr. Scott. While I do not have detailed information before me, there is some financial information in the Pre-Sentence Report relating to Mr. Scott's current financial circumstances that include reference to his partner's contribution to the support of the family. As such, it is reasonable to conclude that her current employment would not provide an adequate basis for her to support herself and her son.

I am very sympathetic to the potential impact that a sentence of two years or more will

have on Mr. Scott's family and his relationship with his two sons. However compelling this argument may be, I cannot allow these collateral consequences to displace what is otherwise a proportionate sentence in this instance. Sexual assault is a very serious offence in which the primary sentencing objectives are denunciation and specific and general deterrence given the generally very high moral blameworthiness associated with the offence.

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All of the circumstances relating to this offender as well as the circumstances relating to the offence have been carefully considered in this sentencing process in assessing Mr. Scott's degree of responsibility for moral blameworthiness. I have very carefully considered the various cases cited by counsel. While the sentencing authorities are helpful, I would observe that no two cases are alike and that the role of the court is not to dissect sentencing authorities to find a perfect fit. The sentencing process is not a mechanical one but rather the delicate balancing of sentencing principles, the unique circumstances of both the case and the offender and the application of relevant and mitigating and aggravating circumstances.

Again, having carefully considered both the aggravating and mitigating circumstances that exist in this case, I am not persuaded that a sentence of less than two years would be appropriate. As such, I cannot accede to the defence request for a conditional sentence to be served in the community in this instance.

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Would you please stand up, Mr. Scott. On the charge of the sexual assault of J.M. I sentence you to three years of imprisonment. In addition, I direct the following ancillary orders: There will be a DNA Order pursuant to Section 47.051 subsection (1) of the Criminal Code. You are to provide a sample of your DNA within 72 hours of having been taken into custody which is now. In addition, there will be a Firearms Prohibition Order for ten years. I further make an order under Section 743.21 of the Code that you are to have no communication, directly or indirectly, with J.M. during the course of your sentence of imprisonment except via a third party and in relation to issues pertaining to your child. Have a seat, Mr. Scott.

Counsel, we had a brief discussion during the sentencing hearing about the potential application of the provision of the Code dealing

- with a SOIRA Order. Forgive me but my
- 2 recollection, Ms. Piché, is that you sought a
- 3 SOIRA Order and, Mr. Bran, you took the position
- 4 that it was not mandatory, that it should not be
- 5 made in this instance.
- 6 J. BRAN: That's correct, Sir.
- 7 A. PICHÉ: I only pointed to the fact
- 8 that it is presumptive in this case under the new
- 9 legislation, and the burden is on the defence to
- 10 convince the court it shouldn't be made.
- 11 THE COURT: Mr. Bran, what do you want to
- 12 say about that, if anything?
- 13 J. BRAN: I agree with my friend the
- 14 burden is on the defence, and in my respectful
- 15 submission this is an individual with no record
- of any relevance. His background and the
- 17 circumstances of this case I would suggest inform
- 18 us that this is not something that would be in
- 19 the best interest to have him on a SOIRA Order.
- 20 The order is -- is not required under the
- 21 circumstances would be my position, Sir.
- 22 THE COURT: Ms. Piché?
- 23 A. PICHÉ: I don't really have comments.
- I -- I don't disagree with Mr. Bran.
- 25 THE COURT: Thank you. Under the
- 26 circumstances I decline to make a SOIRA Order in
- 27 relation to this matter.

1 Mr. Bran, one of the points that you made in 2 your brief was your client's concern that on 3 sending him to the penitentiary, likely down south, I'm going to ask you about that in a moment, would have a negative impact on the 5 6 relationship between the two step-siblings -7 the ten-year old that Mr. Scott has with J.M. and 8 the much younger child that he has with his new partner. I'm concerned about that. In my view 9 10 the relationship that you have with your siblings 11 is the only relationship you have for your entire 12 life, and so in my view it's a very important 13 relationship. What, if anything, do you have to say to me about how we can address that issue? 14 J. BRAN: Sir, I'm not sure that, that 15 this court given the decision that it just made 16 17 is in a position to do that. I've recently been 18 advised by my client that the mother of his eldest child is actively making plans to remove 19 20 that child from this jurisdiction to be sent back 21 east to live with her family. I've not been able to confirm that, but this is the information that 22 I've been provided. This is something that I 23 mentioned in -- in my brief in regard to not only 24 25 Mr. Scott losing that day-to-day contact with his 26 children but also his two children losing that 27 contact between them. It is a concern.

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1 Mr. Scott has advised me that he's going to, of
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- 2 course, take steps to protect his interest
- 3 through the family courts, but again, what this
- 4 court may be able to do I'm not sure. There's
- 5 nothing before the court so I'm not sure
- 6 there's anything --
- 7 THE COURT: Of course not. I can't make a
- 8 Family Law order. I'm not suggesting that that's
- 9 even in my contemplation, but I am concerned
- 10 about it.
- 11 J. BRAN: As we are.
- 12 THE COURT: As I understand your client is
- 13 as well. The other thing that I want to ask you
- 14 about is do you want me to make a recommendation
- that he serve his sentence in the Territories?
- 16 J. BRAN: I would ask that the Court
- 17 make that recommendation. I know it's not
- 18 binding but I can advise my understanding is that
- 19 when those recommendations are reviewed by the
- 20 correctional authorities they do take them
- 21 seriously and they do look into those requests
- 22 diligently. So I would ask the Court to make a
- 23 judicial recommendation that if at all possible
- Mr. Scott have the opportunity to serve that
- 25 sentence here in the community.
- 26 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Ms. Piché,
- 27 do you have anything you want to say about that?

A. PICHÉ: 1 No. 2 THE COURT: Okay. I am going to direct 3 that a copy of these reasons and a copy of the Pre-Sentence Report be - obviously these reasons will have to be transcribed, they can't be done 5 immediately - but they should accompany the 6 7 Warrant of Committal or they should be sent to 8 the Correctional Service of Canada so that they are aware of what this case is about. They also 9 10 need a copy of the Pre-Sentence Report in my 11 view, so a copy of the Pre-Sentence Report should 12 be appended to the Warrant of Committal. 13 Mr. Scott, this is a very, very sad case. I found you guilty of sexually assaulting your 14 15 former partner. It is a very serious matter. But today the focus is on you, and my concern for 16 17 you, Mr. Scott, is, reading between the lines, 18 looking at the content of your text messages, 19 hearing what is in the Pre-Sentence Report, the 20 limited information that I have about the 21 counselling that you are getting for PTSD, I am seriously concerned about your well-being. You 22 23 are a very angry man. I am not saying you do not have good reason to be angry. Your experience in 24 25 the military, your other life experiences, may 26 well explain this anger that I see in you. But

you are a young guy. You have your whole life

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ahead of you, and being angry for the rest of your life is not what I think you want to be because you can not be the kind of father that I know you want to be if you spend the rest of your life in anger. Angry parents create angry children and it goes on and on and on, and we never break the vicious circle.

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I am sure you think that this is the worst day of your life. I understand that. I hope in the next short while that you will come to see this as the first day of the second part of your life, and that the second part of your life is going to be a much happier one. You are going to deal with your demons. You are going to take whatever counselling is available to you in the correctional system. You are going to come to terms with your own issues and that you will take every single course or program that is offered to you while in the prison system. Do not waste a single day, Mr. Scott, by sitting in your cell and not doing anything. Use the time to better yourself, to heal, and to figure out how you are going to navigate the second part of your life. I believe that you can do that but you need to deal with your demons first.

Thank you very much, Counsel, for your assistance. Ms. Piché, is there anything else?

| 1 | A. PICHÉ: Ju | ast the victim of crimes |
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| 2 | surcharge | |
| 3 | THE COURT: OF | n, I'm sorry. What's your |
| 4 | position on that? | |
| 5 | A. PICHE: Sh | nould be waived considering |
| 6 | your order. | |
| 7 | THE COURT: | nank you. Mr. Bran, I'm sure |
| 8 | you are not going to | object to that. Crown says |
| 9 | that I should waive t | the victim crime surcharge. |
| 10 | J. BRAN: Ye | es, thank you. I missed |
| 11 | that. I appreciate t | that. |
| 12 | THE COURT: | o, that's okay. So ordered. |
| 13 | I want to thank you k | ooth very much, particularly |
| 14 | you, Ms. Piché, for s | stepping in at the last |
| 15 | minute on a case when | re you did not do the trial. |
| 16 | Thank you. | |
| 17 | (PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED) | |
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| 1 | CERTIFICATE OF TRANSCRIPT |
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| 2 | |
| 3 | I, the undersigned, hereby certify that the |
| 4 | foregoing pages are a complete and accurate |
| 5 | transcript of the proceedings taken down by me in |
| 6 | shorthand and transcribed from my shorthand notes |
| 7 | to the best of my skill and ability. Judicial |
| 8 | amendments have been applied to this transcript. |
| 9 | |
| 10 | Dated at the City of Edmonton, Province of |
| 11 | Alberta, this 11th day of June 2024. |
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| 16 | |
| 17 | Darlene Sirman, CSR(A) |
| 18 | Official Court Reporter |
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