*R v Camsell*, 2023 NWTSC 20 S-1-CR-2022-000070

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

IN THE MATTER OF:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

– v –

KELSI CAMSELL

Transcript of the Sentencing Decision delivered by The Honourable Deputy Justice L. A. Charbonneau, sitting in Behchoko, in the Northwest Territories, on the 31st day of May, 2023.

APPEARANCES:

С.	Brackley	Counsel	for	the	Crown
J.	Bran	Counsel	for	the	Defence

Charges under s. 320.14(3) and 320.14(2) Criminal Code

1 THE COURT: Today it is my difficult 2 responsibility to sentence Kelsi Camsell for the 3 two offences that she committed on June 20, 2021. That day, she made the terribly bad decision to 4 5 drive a motor vehicle despite the fact that she 6 had been consuming alcohol. The consequences of 7 that decision were catastrophical and 8 life-changing for a lot of people in this 9 community. One young man was injured, and another one, Felix Black, did not survive the 10 11 crash.

12 Before I go any further, I want to 13 acknowledge at the outset that although Felix's 14 legal last name was "Black", when he was still a 15 baby his name was changed to "Felix Nitsi'izah 16 Wetade". The circumstances of that were 17 explained by his adoptive mother Marjorie Black. She explained that "Nits'i" means "Wind" in the 18 Tlicho language, and that "Nitsi'izah" means "Son 19 20 of the Wind". She also explained that "Wetade" 21 is his adoptive father's last name, and that is 22 how he got this new name. Words and names 23 matter, and I wanted to make sure I acknowledge 24 this in my decision today.

Also, before I go any further, I want to
again express my thanks to those who prepared
Victim Impact Statements and shared with the

1 Court the effect that these events had for them. 2 I know it is difficult to open up about such things, such very painful things, and I hope that 3 the fact that those of you who did, had an 4 5 opportunity to share those feelings, can play, 6 maybe a very small part, but can play a part for closure and healing, and I say, again, I am very 7 8 sorry for your loss.

9 I am also grateful to those who took the time to write letters of support for Ms. Camsell. 10 11 No matter what sentence I impose today, and quite 12 apart from the court process, she, like others, 13 has to live the rest of her life with these 14 events. She has to live with the knowledge of 15 being responsible for the death of her friend, someone she was very close to, and she will need 16 17 your support and the support of all her loved ones to continue on her own healing journey. 18

19 The sentencing process can give people an 20 opportunity to talk about their feelings about a 21 crime. Hopefully it can also provide a space 22 where people affected by a crime, and the 23 offenders themselves, to be heard and to feel 24 that they have been heard. That their 25 perspective has been heard. That the judge 26 understood their point of view regardless of the 27 ultimate outcome. Sometimes, maybe not always,

but sometimes that can help with closure, and I
 do hope that this process has, even in a small
 way, done that.

Sentencing is one of the hardest tasks of a 4 5 judge because it requires taking into account a 6 lot of things and competing interests. It would be much easier if there was only one thing for me 7 8 to consider. If, for example, the seriousness of 9 this offence was the only thing I had to consider. Or, if Ms. Camsell and her 10 rehabilitation was the only thing to consider. 11 12 But it is not like that.

In deciding what sentence to impose I have to take into account the circumstances of the offence; the circumstances of Ms. Camsell; and the sentencing principles that are in the *Criminal Code* and set out in various cases from the higher courts.

Dealing first with what happened, I will start by referring briefly to the events that led to these charges. Everyone here has heard this already, and I know it is painful to hear, but I want to refer to it again now so that anyone reading the sentencing decision later understands what this case was about.

26On June 20, 2021, in the early morning27hours, Ms. Camsell, Felix and two other young

DICTA COURT REPORTING INC.

1 men - Guy Tlokka and Jairen Mantla - were 2 consuming alcohol in various locations in the 3 area of Behchoko, including North Arm Park. 4 North Arm Park is a small Territorial park just 5 off the MacKenzie Highway, roughly ten kilometers 6 southwest of the junction to the Behchoko access 7 road.

8 At one point they all got into Ms. Camsell's 9 vehicle and she started driving on the highway. 10 They passed Behchoko access road and continued 11 east on the highway in the direction of 12 Yellowknife.

About 7.5 kilometers after the intersection to the access road Ms. Camsell lost control of the vehicle. It left the road, it rolled over and it crashed and ended up partly submerged in water.

18 The exact time of the crash is not known, 19 but using call information taken from cell phones 20 of two of the passengers, the investigation 21 established that it occurred between 3:26 AM and 22 5:07 AM.

There is no evidence before me as to the pattern of driving between North Arm Park and the moment of the crash, or the speed that the vehicle was traveling at during that part of its journey. The only thing, the only fact that I

have is that the speed of the vehicle immediately prior to leaving the road was 178 kilometers per hour. This information, it is not in the Agreed Statement of Facts, but I understand that from submissions, comes from systems that are part of the car that record these things. The speed limit on the highway is 90 kilometers per hour.

8 The road in that area is flat and straight, 9 and the outside conditions that day were that 10 visibility was clear and the road was dry.

11 Ms. Camsell was able to get out of the 12 vehicle and left the scene to get some help. 13 She was able to get a ride towards Behchoko and 14 called the police during that drive.

15 Felix was ejected from the vehicle in the crash and he died from his injuries. He was 16 17 22 years old. Jairen suffered a bruised lung, 18 lacerated liver and severe bruising to his knees. He was briefly hospitalized in Yellowknife but 19 20 was released the next day. He was 23 at the 21 time. Guy Tlokka was not injured. Ms. Camsell 22 for her part sustained soft tissue injuries for 23 which she received treatment.

24 She was arrested that same evening. She 25 gave a statement to police where she took 26 responsibility for driving the car. She admitted 27 that she drank a mickey of vodka that night. An

DICTA COURT REPORTING INC.

1 analysis of a sample of her blood that was taken about five hours after the crash was done. 2 Police analysts calculated that her blood alcohol 3 content at 5:00 AM was between 137 and 4 202 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of 5 6 blood. The maximum legal limit is 80. Ms. Camsell did not have a driver's license 7 8 in June 2021 when this happened. 9 Those are the facts, at least the ones that are before me about what happened. 10 11 This had huge impact, of course, and I need 12 to talk about that for a little bit. 13 Courts are aware of the devastating impact 14 that drinking and driving causes. We hear about 15 it in the news. There is publicity about it. As a matter of fact, even yesterday as we were 16 17 driving back to Yellowknife, we came upon a 18 tanker truck that had a large poster on the back 19 with a photograph of a family killed in a crash 20 caused by a drunk driver. It was produced by 21 MADD, Mothers Against Drinking and Driving. Last 22 week there was a news article on Cabin Radio, 23 with an interview with the mother of a young 24 woman who was killed by a drunk driver in Fort 25 Smith in 2008, who is also involved with MADD. 26 That mother's plea was, and I quote, "stop normalizing drinking and driving". The tragic 27

1 consequences of drinking and driving have been 2 the subject of countless news articles, publicity 3 campaigns to try to get the message across, and 4 that general knowledge is in the community, this 5 one and others.

6 But nothing brings home the devastation that 7 drinking and driving causes as much as hearing 8 about it firsthand from the parents, 9 grandparents, siblings and loved ones of someone 10 who has lost their life in these circumstances. 11 And we did hear that in this case yesterday.

12 Twelve Victim Impact Statements were filed 13 at the sentencing hearing yesterday. Ten were 14 read in by the Crown prosecutor at the request of 15 those who prepared them. The other two were read out loud by their authors, which took immense 16 17 courage. They were from members of Felix's families, and I say "families", the plural, 18 because I heard from them, members of both 19 families, yesterday, and both his biological 20 21 family and the family that he was adopted into 22 when he was just a few weeks old.

Felix's family members loved him. He brought them joy. They will never forget him or stop missing him. He was a young man with his whole future ahead of him. He had talents. He had plans. He was funny. His loved ones looked

forward to the day he would have children of his
 own because he loved those children so much. His
 youngest niece still asks her mother when Felix
 is coming home. This is heartbreaking.

5 The depth and intensity of the loss that 6 they all feel was palpable in this courtroom 7 yesterday, and no words of mine can fully 8 describe the magnitude of this loss.

9 The growing recognition of this harm is at 10 the root of the evolution in the sentencing 11 principles and practices in this area of the law, 12 which I will turn to a little bit later.

As I said at the beginning, the second thing I must take into account in the sentencing hearing is the circumstances of the offender, in this case the circumstances of Ms. Camsell. I have the benefit of a detailed Presentence Report which gives me a lot of information about her personal circumstances.

20 She is 32 years old and of Tlicho descent. 21 According to the author of the report, she 22 was very cooperative and forthright in the 23 preparation of the report and was very open about 24 some of the difficulties and circumstances she 25 faced growing up.

26 She was exposed to the consequences of 27 alcohol abuse and verbal and physical violence in

the home. Her parents separated as a result of this violence and she went to live with her grandparents. They maintained a traditional lifestyle, and Ms. Camsell was able to enjoy a lot of positive experiences with that traditional lifestyle. It was, according to her, a loving and caring home.

8 She has experienced a tremendous amount of 9 losses throughout her life, more recently the death of the father of her children last summer. 10 11 The Presentence Report says he died in a car 12 accident, and I do not have any other details, 13 but whatever the details, it obviously had a huge 14 impact on her as well as on her three children 15 now age 5, 11 and 13.

I read in the report that she started experimenting with alcohol when she was 12 years old and that alcohol abuse has been an issue for her, as well as drug use. This got worse after the passing of her grandmother, who she was very close to, in 2006.

The report says that Ms. Camsell's grandfather used to abuse alcohol but stopped drinking several decades ago after a tragedy involving one of his brothers. There was a fishing trip, alcohol was consumed, and three people drowned. Ms. Camsell's grandfather never

1 touched alcohol again after that. Sometimes the 2 only good that can come out of a tragedy is that 3 it triggers drastic change. That is something to 4 think about.

5 Ms. Camsell has taken concrete steps in the 6 last two years to address her issues. She has attended Poundmaker's Lodge Treatment Centre. 7 8 She's taken advantage of counselling sessions and 9 is going to AA. As she said herself yesterday though, it is not going to be a short process. 10 11 Addictions, trauma and other personal issues do 12 not get resolved overnight. She is very right 13 and realistic about that; it will take time. But 14 it is within her power to continue working at 15 making those changes. She wants to continue with counselling and treatment, and I was very happy 16 17 to read that the Tlicho Government is working 18 with Poundmaker's Treatment Centre to provide 19 On-the-Land treatment programs and offering 20 workshops here in Behchoko because access to 21 those services is crucial.

22 She wants to pursue her education as well 23 and is interested in enrolling in nursing or 24 possibly a home-care program.

25These are some of the things that are26mentioned in the Presentence Report. There is a27lot more. Some aspects of the report relate to

very personal issues that I need not to talk
 about here, but they are all part of the overall
 picture of her circumstances, and I have taken
 all of it into account.

The Crown acknowledges that Ms. Camsell's 5 6 moral blameworthiness for the offences is reduced due to these circumstances, and I will get into 7 8 that, again, in a moment. In this case the 9 disagreement between the Crown and the defence, and the much more difficult issue, is to what 10 11 extent it does mitigate things and what impact it 12 should have on the sentence to be imposed.

13 It is with this in mind that I turn to 14 sentencing principles. Section 718 of the 15 Criminal Code says that the fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to 16 17 contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the 18 19 maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society 20 by imposing just sanctions that have one or more 21 of the following objectives, and these objectives 22 are:

(a) to denounce unlawful conduct and the
harm done to victims or to the community that is
caused by unlawful conduct;

(b) to deter offenders and other personsfrom committing offences. That means to

DICTA COURT REPORTING INC.

discourage people from committing offences; 1 2 (c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary; that is usually applicable when 3 someone is actually violent and harms other 4 people deliberately or because they are unable to 5 6 control their anger; (d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders, 7 8 and that says what it says; 9 (e) to provide reparations for harm done to 10 victims or to the community; and finally, (f) to promote a sense of responsibility in 11 12 offenders, and acknowledgement of the harm done 13 to victims or to the community. 14 These objectives have to be balanced 15 carefully. Inevitably, in any case some must 16 take precedence over others. 17 In drinking and driving offences it is well established in law that denunciation and 18 19 deterrence are the paramount sentencing 20 principles. The Criminal Code also outlines various 21 22 principles that governs sentencing. The 23 fundamental one is proportionality, and all that 24 means is that a sentence has to be proportionate 25 to the gravity of the offence and the degree of 26 responsibility of the person. It goes without saying that drinking and 27

1 driving that results in a death is one of the most serious offences in our criminal law. 2 This 3 is despite the fact that in virtually every case, as is the case in this one, the offender did not 4 5 intend to harm anyone, and often, like in this 6 case, the person killed or injured is a friend or loved one who was a passenger in the offender's 7 8 car.

9 People who get behind the wheel of a vehicle 10 after drinking are most probably always convinced 11 that nothing bad will happen, and sometimes 12 nothing does. What sentencing must address and 13 sanction is the decision to drive after having 14 consumed alcohol.

15 It is mentioned in many cases, including 16 *R. v. Lacasse*, 2015 SCC 64, at paragraph 73, that 17 this is a crime that is often committed by people 18 who are otherwise law-abiding citizens.

19 The problem is that when people have been 20 drinking, even when they have not been drinking 21 to the point of being really drunk, they are the 22 worst judge of their own level of intoxication 23 and how it may affect their judgment and 24 reflexes. The message that has to be hammered at 25 is simply "don't do it". We need to get to the 26 point where people simply will not do it. Just 27 like you do not jump into icy rapids full of

1 shoals and rocks without a life jacket just 2 hoping to come out on the other side without 3 injury because you are a good swimmer. There is no such thing as a good driver when that driver 4 has consumed alcohol. Driving while intoxicated 5 6 is inherently very dangerous for others, and inherently highly blameworthy. Because we know, 7 8 we know that even though many people drive 9 intoxicated do not get caught, or get caught at some road block without anyone having been 10 11 harmed, sometimes, and too often, there are 12 terrible outcomes like the one in this case.

13 This is why the law has evolved the way it 14 Minimum penalties for some of the drinking has. and driving offences have increased. 15 The sentencing ranges, as was noted by this Court and 16 17 others, have increased. At paragraph 7 of Lacasse, the Supreme Court of Canada said that 18 19 this offence continues to cause more deaths than any others in Canada. That deserves being 20 21 repeated. Drinking and driving causes more 22 deaths than any other offence in Canada. And 23 when the Supreme Court of Canada said that, it 24 quoted from a decision 20 years earlier where 25 another judge of the Supreme Court of Canada had 26 said exactly the same thing. When you think of it this way it is astonishing that so many people 27

1 still do it.

2 That is why the objectives of denunciation 3 and deterrence have to take precedence over other objectives in these cases. This does not mean 4 5 that other objectives, like rehabilitation, 6 should be ignored, but they cannot take precedence, because while this sentencing is 7 8 about Ms. Camsell and the offences that she 9 committed, it is also about the pressing need for this Court to continue to continue repeating the 10 11 same message and continue to acknowledge the 12 immense harm that is caused by these offences so 13 that people understand it before tragedy strikes 14 in their own lives. This does not just happen to 15 other people.

16The available sentencing options for these17offences are broad. There is no minimum penalty.

18 But ranges have developed in the case law. 19 Ranges are guides. They are helpful, especially 20 because parity is another sentencing principle. 21 Parity means that offenders in similar 22 circumstances who commit similar offences should 23 receive sentences that are similar. That is a 24 question of justice. Of course no two cases are 25 ever alike, but wide disparity in sentencing can 26 diminish public confidence in the justice system. 27 In the case of R. v. Moore, 2018 NWTSC 11,

I reviewed the legal framework that governed sentencing in this area. This was just a few years after *Lacasse* was decided in the Supreme Court of Canada, and I do not think the legal framework or applicable principles has really been altered.

In R. v. Moore, I referred to paragraph 65 7 8 of *Lacasse* where the court mentioned that a 9 review of sentences across the country showed that in cases of impaired driving causing death, 10 11 sentences vary from 18 months to two years for 12 the so-called less serious situations, and from 13 seven to eight years in the so-called most 14 serious cases. I say "so-called" because 15 obviously by their very nature all these offences 16 are very serious.

17 In R. v. Altiman, 2019 ONCA 511, the court 18 said that typically sentences for these offences 19 over the past decade in Ontario have been in the 20 range of four to six years unless there are 21 aggravating factors such as past convictions for 22 related offences, in which case longer sentences 23 have been imposed. What does that suggest? Ιt 24 suggests that even between when Lacasse was 25 decided and when Altiman was decided four years 26 later the ranges had started to increase. 27 The NWT is a vast jurisdiction but its

1 population is small. Even though sadly we get 2 cases of this sort regularly, we do not get the 3 same volume of cases as the more populated jurisdictions, and for that reason the sample of 4 cases to try to identify a range that would be 5 6 specific to this jurisdiction is much smaller. In addition, there are important nuances to 7 8 consider. If a sentence is, like was the case in Moore, the result of a joint submission, it may 9 10 carry no precedential value at all, for reasons I 11 explained in that case. The other case from this 12 jurisdiction, R. v. Kayotuk, 2016 NWTSC 59, which 13 is also relatively recent, is another example. 14 There, a joint range of two-and-a-half to 15 three-and-a-half years was suggested. The Court 16 imposed a sentence at the top of that range but 17 did so with reluctance, noting that the sentencing ranges had increased. 18

19 It is for appellate courts to give guidance 20 to trial courts, and maybe eventually we will get 21 that guidance in this jurisdiction, but for 22 today's purposes, my conclusion is that the 23 ranges outlined in Altiman at paragraph 70 are 24 what should be considered in this jurisdiction 25 when dealing with drinking and driving offences 26 that lead to a death.

27 It bears repeating: Ranges don't define the

1 sentence to be imposed. Each sentencing decision 2 remains an individualized process, and the 3 Supreme Court of Canada recognized that in 4 Lacasse that ranges are not straightjackets. In 5 that case the trial judge had imposed a sentence 6 much higher than the usual range because of the prevalence of this offence in the region where 7 8 that judge was sitting, and the Supreme Court of 9 Canada said that it was not an error. The same 10 could be true of circumstances that could justify 11 the imposition of a sentence much lower than the 12 usual range.

13 Restraint is always an important 14 consideration on sentencing, but the law is that 15 it is of particular importance when sentencing an 16 indigenous offender.

Again, these principles are well established, and I will not go over all of them in all detail. They are referred to in *Altiman* at paragraphs 77 to 85. For today I just want to underscore a few points.

First, the application of restraint in this context does not mean an automatic reduction of the sentence that would otherwise be imposed. Second, the principles apply to all offences even serious ones.

27 Third, there is no need for Ms. Camsell to

establish a causal link between her circumstances 1 2 as an indigenous offender and the commission of 3 these offences I am sentencing her for today. Fourth, for the offender's indigenous 4 background to have an impact on the ultimate 5 6 sentence, the systemic and background factors must have had an impact on that offender's life 7 8 in a way that: 9 (a) reduces the moral blameworthiness of 10 that offender or 11 (b) suggests what sentencing objectives 12 should be prioritized, 13 and sometimes it could be both. 14 This requires judges not to assume that all 15 communities share the same values and recognize 16 that given those different world views there are 17 times where sanctions other than imprisonment may more effectively achieve the objectives of 18 19 sentencing in a particular community. 20 Those are the principles. The challenge is, 21 as always, the concrete application of these 22 principles to the facts of this case. 23 First, as I have already said, I find that the 24 range of sentence for this type of offence for 25 someone who does not have a previous related record 26 should ordinarily be between four to six years 27 imprisonment.

In this case there are aggravating factors:
 There were three passengers in the car, so
 more people put at risk.

4 The second aggravating factor was the 5 incredibly high speed that the vehicle reached 6 immediately before the crash.

7 The third is the alcohol concentration in Ms. 8 Camsell's blood, which was extrapolated to be, even 9 on the lowest of the two figures, above readings of 10 120, which makes it statutorily aggravating 11 pursuant to Section 320.22(e).

I would add that even before that section was put in place, high readings were always treated as aggravating factors in the courts across the country.

16 I also consider it aggravating that 17 Ms. Camsell drove the vehicle for some distance and, in particular, continued down the MacKenzie 18 19 Highway past the access road to Behchoko. I cannot 20 assume that there was excessive speed or erratic 21 driving, there is no evidence of that, and that is 22 not what I mean when I refer to her driving. My 23 point is simply that she drove for some time while under the influence of alcohol. She did not drive 24 25 five blocks home, not that that would not have been 26 illegal, but the level of risk increases with the 27 duration of driving, and she did not go back into

town either. She simply continued down the
 highway.

I will mention in passing that Ms. Camsell has a criminal record, but given that it is unrelated, that it is somewhat dated, there is a gap, I do not think it has any significant bearing on my decision today.

There are mitigating factors as well:

9 The guilty plea is a significant one. Although it came a long time after she was charged, 10 which I recognized prolonged the uncertainty for 11 12 the victim's family, there are extenuating 13 circumstances. The COVID pandemic slowed things 14 down; there was a change of counsel; no date was ever set for a hearing; disclosure issues had to be 15 16 worked out. The guilty plea avoided the 17 uncertainty of trial, the impact that a trial would have had on everyone, the families of the victims, 18 19 the surviving passengers who likely would have had 20 to testify. I heard that there were issues that 21 Ms. Camsell could have taken to trial, including 22 the admissibility of her statement to police. A person who gives up their right to trial gives up a 23 24 lot. I accept that Ms. Camsell should get maximum 25 credit for this guilty plea. I take into account 26 her remorse, which I believe is genuine. It is evidenced by the guilty plea but also by her words 27

8

1 in the courtroom and as early as her cooperation 2 with the police when she first had contact with 3 them the very night this happened. She has made 4 the concrete steps to address her addiction and 5 underlying issues that she has struggled with for a 6 long time, and that is to her credit.

The other mitigating factor is the impact of 7 8 her circumstances as an indigenous offender. Ι 9 will say that as far as the impact of those circumstances on what would be an appropriate 10 11 sanction, there is nothing before me to suggest 12 that the community of Behchoko and Tlicho 13 community, in general, hold views about the problem 14 of drinking and driving that should cause me not to treat denunciation and deterrence as a paramount 15 sentencing principle here. The devastating 16 17 consequences of this type of offence affects members of this community just as deeply and 18 traumatically as it does people from other regions 19 20 in this jurisdiction and elsewhere in the country. 21 Given the size of the community and the close 22 connections between various families and people the 23 impact might be even more deeply felt. These 24 tragedies are preventable, and that is as true here 25 as it is anywhere else.

26 However, as acknowledged by the Crown, Ms.
27 Camsell's circumstances do reduce her moral

blameworthiness for this offence, given the things that she has experienced growing up and the struggles that she has had, the issue is really to what extent it does and what effect it should ultimately have on the sentence.

6 Several people wrote letters of support for Ms. Camsell, including her 15-year-old daughter 7 8 whose letter, I must say, was particularly heartbreaking to read. As is often the case in 9 these situations, these events had a huge impact on 10 Ms. Camsell herself and on her loved ones and will 11 continue to. As she said yesterday, she is 12 13 grieving too. Felix had been a part of her life 14 always and she was close to him. She is fortunate 15 to have the support of the people who are there for her and she will continue to need it. 16 I understand 17 why those people are asking me to show her 18 leniency. But the reality is that my sentence has 19 to be aligned with the law, has to be based on the 20 law, and cannot be based on any sympathy or empathy 21 I may feel for those affected, including her 22 children.

The Crown is asking that I impose a jail term of three-and-a-half years for the drinking and driving causing death charge and two years concurrent for the other charge. Defence counsel is urging me to impose a jail term of two years

less a day to allow Ms. Camsell to serve that 1 2 sentence in the community under a regime of house 3 arrest with exceptions, with conditions to also continue treatment and counselling, and with a 4 5 community service work order. This type of 6 sentencing that the defence is asking for is called a conditional sentence, and the Criminal Code sets 7 8 out the legal framework that governs this 9 sentencing tool. It is only available if the sentence imposed is less than two years, and also 10 11 the Court has to be satisfied that allowing the 12 person to serve their jail term in the community would not endanger the safety of the community and 13 14 would be consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing. 15

16 There are certain offences for which this 17 sentencing tool is not available. That list 18 started off as a relatively small one when the 19 section was first added to the *Criminal Code* and 20 then it grew longer through various amendments, and 21 there came a point where that sentencing tool was 22 not possible for a large number of offences.

23 Until recently, one of the exclusions was an 24 offence that resulted in bodily harm and where the 25 maximum punishment was ten years imprisonment. 26 That took out conditional sentencing, as I say, for 27 many, many of the offences in the *Criminal Code*.

1

2

With these most recent amendments, it is available again for many offences including this one.

3 But the other criteria remain. As I just said, they include that a sentence must be less 4 than two years and that a conditional sentence 5 6 would be consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing. Here, the safety of 7 8 the community is less of a concern given the lack 9 of related criminal record and the steps that Ms. 10 Camsell has taken to address her issues.

11 As defence counsel has pointed out, the 12 amendments restoring the possibility of a 13 conditional sentence for this type of offence are 14 recent, so we do not have cases in the Northwest 15 Territories where a court had to decide on the 16 issue that arises here, and I was not referred to 17 any case from anywhere else in the country where a 18 conditional sentence was imposed in a case of 19 drinking and driving causing death since these recent amendments came into force. 20

I have already said what I think the appropriate range is for this type of offence. Here, there are aggravating factors suggesting that a sentence at the low end of that range may not be appropriate. That being the case and even balancing that against the mitigating factors and giving full effect to the mitigating impact of the

1 guilty plea and recognizing that Ms. 2 Camsell's circumstances reduce her moral blameworthiness, I do not think a conditional 3 sentence can be considered because I simply do not 4 5 think that a sentence under two years is 6 appropriate under the circumstances. I am unable to bring myself to conclude that such a sentence 7 would reflect the need for denunciation and 8 deterrence, and I also do not think it would be in 9 line with what this Court has said in other 10 relatively recent cases of this sort. It would be 11 12 very difficult to reconcile such a sentence, for 13 example, what I said in the case of *R. v.* 14 Moore and what the Court said in Kayotuk.

I fully understand that the position taken by the Crown and the words that I have spoken now may appear to be harsh to Ms. Camsell and her loved ones, but the reality is that the position taken by the Crown is actually quite restrained. The sentence for this could be longer, and it certainly would have been much longer after a trial.

To make sure that this record is complete, and by this I mean the record of these proceedings, in case my decision is reviewed by a higher court, I do want to note that I am aware of one precedent, albeit quite dated, from this jurisdiction where a conditional sentence was, in fact, imposed in a

case of drinking and driving causing death. 1 It is a dated case from 1998 from Fort McPherson. 2 This 3 was right after or shortly after the conditional sentencing was first introduced in the Criminal 4 5 Code and before drinking and driving causing death 6 offences were excluded from this application. Ιt is a decision that does not have a citation but it 7 is on the Northwest Territories court's website. 8 9 R v. Hugh Colin CR03394, January 7, 1998. The 10 accused had been camping by the Peel River crossing in Fort McPherson. He had been drinking. He went 11 12 to sleep for a while and woke up to someone having 13 stuck his truck in the water. He got into another 14 truck to get his own out, and as he was backing up, 15 he ran over his grandmother, a very respected elder 16 in the community. Tragically, she died from her 17 injuries. He pleaded guilty at a very early opportunity and was obviously completely 18 19 devastated. Crown and defence had agreed that a 20 two-years-less-a-day sentence was appropriate. The 21 only issue was whether it should be a conditional 22 In that case the Court granted that sentence. 23 request.

These were unusual facts, but the accused did have a related record. But that case was decided over 25 years ago. As I have said many times already, the range of sentences for this type of

DICTA COURT REPORTING INC.

1 offence has consistently increased since. 2 Parliament has increased the minimum sentences for some of the drinking and driving offences. Courts 3 have said that sentences should be more severe. 4 Today, in 2023, with the circumstances that are 5 6 before me I simply do not think that a sentence of two years less a day would be fit and 7 8 proportionate. But because I am aware of that 9 case, I thought I should mention it.

I will begin with the ancillary orders that 10 have been sought. The Crown seeks a DNA Order and 11 the defence opposes this. These offences are 12 13 secondary designated offences as they are defined 14 in the Criminal Code. The Code says that when 15 sentencing someone for such an offence, the Court may, on application by the prosecutor and if it is 16 17 satisfied, if the Court is satisfied that it is in the best interests of the administration of 18 19 justice, order a person to provide a sample for inclusion in the DNA databank, which is used by 20 21 authorities for investigative purposes. The 22 Criminal Code also says that in deciding whether to 23 make the order the Court is required to consider 24 the person's criminal record, whether they have 25 been found guilty of a designated offence before, 26 the nature of the offence that they have committed, 27 the circumstances surrounding its commission, and

1 the impact that the order would have on the privacy 2 and security of that person. The Court also says 3 that the Court is required to give reasons for its 4 decision.

I reviewed the cases that were filed in this 5 6 matter for many reasons but also with this issue in There was no mention at all of DNA orders in 7 mind. Lacasse, Altiman and R. v. Smoke, 2014 MBCA 91, but 8 9 they were all appellate decisions, so it is possible that the issue was not part of the appeal. 10 11 In Kayotuk, the Court said at page 10 that the DNA 12 order was mandatory, and this was in fact an error 13 because the offence is not a primary designated 14 offence. So since the Court in that case was 15 operating under the assumption that the order was 16 mandatory, there is no analysis of the relevant 17 criteria.

In *Moore*, I noted that this was a secondary designated offence but the request for a DNA order was part of a joint submission, and the law is very clear that one should not depart from what is sought unless it is clearly unreasonable. So there is no analysis of the criteria in that decision either.

In Lagrelle, 2019 ABQB 702, at paragraph 145,
the judge noted that the offences were secondary
designated offences and made the order. However,

1 there was no discussion of the criteria set out on 2 the section that I have referred to. And all the 3 judge said was "Accordingly this Court exercises 4 its discretion" to order that a sample be provided.

5 So in short, this is the long way to say that 6 the Code gives me discretion, says I have to provide reasons, provides factors that I ought 7 to 8 consider. Clearly, Parliament did not intend these 9 orders to be automatic for secondary designated The circumstances of this offence were 10 offences. 11 that the accused took immediate steps to get 12 assistance; she did not try to evade her 13 responsibilities for this; her record is dated and 14 unrelated; and although the procedure to obtain a 15 DNA sample is not particularly intrusive, privacy interests are still engaged any time a person's DNA 16 17 is put into the national databank.

18 So in my view, in the circumstances of this 19 case, the factors listed in the *Criminal Code* weigh 20 against making that order, and for that reason I 21 decline to make it.

The second ancillary order sought, driving prohibition order, it too is a discretionary order. For this offence the Code says I may make this order for any duration that I consider appropriate plus the entire period for which the offender is sentenced to imprisonment. The Crown is asking me

1 to impose a driving prohibition of seven years, and 2 the defence is asking that I make it for a shorter 3 period, between four to five years. There is no doubt that being prohibited from driving for an 4 extended period of time is an inconvenience to most 5 6 people, but Ms. Camsell was not even entitled to drive when these offences occurred. 7 The driving 8 prohibition has to reflect this and also has to 9 reflect the aggravating factors that are present in this case, in particular the speed at the time of 10 11 the crash and the high readings.

12 Given that I have concluded that a jail term 13 will be imposed, it will have the effect of 14 increasing the actual duration of the prohibition order, because the duration of the sentence is 15 added to the driving prohibition. If Ms. Camsell 16 17 gets early release that period still counts part of her prohibition, and for those reasons I have 18 19 decided the driving prohibition should be for a 20 period of six years.

The Crown is not pressing for the imposition of a victim of crime surcharge, and in my view given Ms. Camsell's precarious financial position and her overall circumstances, this is an appropriate case to waive the imposition of a surcharge.

As for the sentence itself, it gives me no joy

27

1 to impose a jail term on Ms. Camsell. I know this 2 has been a traumatic event for her too. I know 3 that she has made efforts to address the issues, and I commend her for those efforts. But as I have 4 5 said many times already, this sentencing is about 6 her but it is not just about her. I sincerely hope that even though she was hoping for a different 7 8 outcome, she will make the most of what is available while she is in custody and will also, 9 once released, continue accessing counselling and 10 11 treatment available in the community, especially if 12 On-the-Land programs are available. Because Ms. 13 Camsell got a foundation with her grandparents. A 14 foundation of traditional skills and traditional 15 ways of living, skills, land skills, and these are all very positive things from her background that 16 17 she can build on. She is still very young and has a lot of life ahead of her and very important 18 19 people to continue living for.

20 Stand up please, Ms. Camsell. Ms. Camsell, 21 for the charge of causing Felix Black's death my 22 sentence is three-and-a-half years imprisonment, 23 and for the other count, two years imprisonment, 24 concurrent. You can sit down.

25 Madam Clerk, I direct that you endorse the 26 Warrant of Committal with the Court's strongest 27 recommendation, and I can help you with the wording

1 if you need it, but I want the Warrant of Committal 2 to include the strongest recommendation that Ms. Camsell be permitted to serve her sentence in the 3 Northwest Territories so that she can access the 4 programming that is available in the facility. 5 6 There is a good facility in Fort Smith, and also so that she can remain as close as possible to her 7 8 children and to the people who are here to support 9 her. The authorities will get copy of my decision 10 as well so hopefully my reasons for what I am doing 11 today will be very clear to everyone.

Before we close court, I want to thank counsel 12 13 for their work on this case. I want to thank again 14 the people who shared their experiences and 15 feelings. I thank Ms. Camsell for her words 16 yesterday. I know this is a long sentence, but I 17 really feel under the circumstances and with the harm it has caused by the repetition of these kinds 18 19 of offences I do not have any choice. And I wish you the best of luck in your work and continued 20 21 healing, and I hope that this community can also 22 continue its work towards closure and healing. 23 (END OF EXCERPT) 24

- 25
- 26
- 27

## 1 CERTIFICATE OF TRANSCRIPT

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that the foregoing pages are a complete and accurate transcript of the proceedings taken down by me in shorthand and transcribed from my shorthand notes to the best of my skill and ability. Judicial amendments have been applied to this transcript.

Dated at the City of Edmonton, Province of Alberta,this 9th day of June 2023.

15 Darlene Sirman, CSR(A)

16 Official Court Reporter

DICTA COURT REPORTING INC.