# IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

# IN THE MATTER OF:

#### HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

- v -

#### CASSIUIS ZANE PARADIS

Transcript of the Reasons for Decision delivered by The Honourable Justice S.H. Smallwood sitting in Yellowknife, in the Northwest Territories, on the 28th day of February, 2019.

# APPEARANCES:

Mr. M. Fane: Counsel for the Crown

Mr. B. Lotery: Counsel for the Accused

(By telephone)

(Charges under s. 354(1), 91(2), 92, 92(2), 94(2) 88(2), 117.01(3) of the *Criminal Code* and s. 5(2) of the

Controlled Drugs and Substances Act)

THE COURT: The accused, Cassiuis Paradis, is facing 12 charges: possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, contrary to Section 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act; possession of money obtained by crime, contrary to Section 354(1)(a) of the Criminal Code; and ten charges pursuant to the Criminal Code related to the possession of firearms, weapons, or ammunition.

The accused has brought an application for the exclusion of evidence: cocaine, money, weapons, and ammunition seized following a vehicle stop, which occurred in Fort Providence, Northwest Territories. The accused alleges that, in stopping the vehicle, detaining and arresting him, and searching the vehicle, the police breached his rights under Sections 8, 9, 10(a) and (b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and that the evidence should be excluded under Section 24(2) of the Charter.

The Crown concedes that the accused's Section 10(a) and (b) Charter Rights were breached but contends that the accused was lawfully detained and arrested and that the items were located in a search that was incidental to a valid arrest. The Crown argues that the evidence should not be excluded under Section 24(2) of the

1 Charter.

# THE VOIR DIRE EVIDENCE

The evidence on the voir dire consisted of the testimony of Constable Steve Beck and Constable Lee Bennett. There was also an Agreed Statement of Facts and photographs entered as exhibits.

On October 20th, 2018, Constable Beck pulled over a blue Volkswagen car in Fort Providence. There were two men in the vehicle: the accused was the driver of the vehicle, and the man in the passenger seat was Echo Delver.

Constable Beck detained the accused before arresting him for trafficking in cocaine.

The vehicle was subsequently searched incident to arrest. A rental record was found in the vehicle in the name of Cassiuis Paradis with a rental term of October 2nd to 16, 2018, from Hertz Rent-A-Car in Edmonton, Alberta.

Inside the glove box, \$579 in cash was located, along with six individually wrapped packages of cocaine totalling a weight of 1.3 grams.

Inside a suitcase in the back seat was a hunting knife, a fully loaded AR-15 type semi-automatic rifle with a 40-round magazine without a trigger lock, a cartridge magazine for

the rifle, and additional cartridges and spare parts for the rifle. Analysis of the rifle determined that it was non-functional as there was an extra spring in the gas system. Once the spring was removed, the rifle was capable of discharging ammunition.

Inside the trunk of the vehicle was a locked safe which contained \$850, two Ziploc bags containing 140 small packages of cocaine weighing approximately 33.67 grams of cocaine; a blue Ziploc bag containing 93 small packages of cocaine weighing approximately 22.19 grams of cocaine, a green Ziploc bag containing 93 small packages of cocaine weighing approximately 18.28 grams of cocaine and a 28-gram single piece of cocaine, as well as \$3,379.50 in cash.

The issues in this case surround the validity of the detention of the accused by the police and what occurred following the detention.

Constable Steve Beck testified that he is a member of the RCMP working in traffic services out of Hay River. He began in traffic services in September 2018; and, prior to that, he worked from April 2011 as a special constable in the Aboriginal Community Constable Program in Hay River.

Constable Beck has experience investigating

matters involving the Controlled Drugs and
Substances Act. He did not say how many CDSA
investigations he has been involved with, but he
did testify that he is from the community of Hay
River and has lived there for most of his life.
He is familiar with the people, the culture, and
there is a level of trust placed in him by
community members. As a result, he worked with
human sources and confidential informants in drug
investigations while he was working in Hay River.

Constable Beck also testified that he was familiar with Fort Providence having travelled there regularly over the years through his employment and having employed people from the community. He testified that prior to the vehicle stop, he had been there approximately three times in the preceding weeks.

On October 20th, 2018, he had left Hay River to attend Fort Providence, which is approximately an hour-and-a-half drive away, to assist with a day-long check stop organized by the Fort Providence detachment and which involved multiple agencies. Constable Beck was in full uniform and was driving a black, unmarked Ford Expedition.

Constable Beck and his supervisor,

Constable Bennett were travelling together but in

separate vehicles towards the check stop location

when a call for service came in for the Fort

Providence detachment.

The call came in through OCC, the

Operational Command Centre, out of Yellowknife.

Constable Beck listened to the call come in over
the radio a couple of times without a response.

Other members from Fort Providence were busy, and

Constable Pardy, another member from Fort

Providence, was at the check stop; so

Constable Beck responded and asked what the

nature of the call was.

Constable Beck testified that he was told that there was a report that three males were travelling around Fort Providence in a blue car trafficking cocaine. Constable Beck inquired what the time delay on the complaint was and was advised that the call had just come in.

There was some discussion between

Constable Pardy and Constable Beck over the radio about the call. Constable Pardy told

Constable Beck that he had received several reports of a blue car, a Volkswagen with Alberta plates, driving around with some Southern males and dealing cocaine.

Constable Pardy was able to locate the car several times, but was unable to identify any

occupants in it or to get a plate number because the vehicle had always been backed into trees or into a house.

It was decided that Constable Bennett and Constable Beck would respond to the complaint.

Constable Beck and Constable Bennett turned around and returned to Fort Providence and began patrolling through the community. Fort Providence has five or six streets that run parallel to each other and then other streets that cut across them. They drove through the community and down the streets several times. The officers then met up by the Youth Centre and at that point had been unable to locate the vehicle. Constable Beck decided to drive the back road, which he had not yet checked.

As he was driving, he noticed a blue car backed into a duplex or a quadplex.

Constable Beck stopped the vehicle and put it in reverse. He observed two males. There was a larger male, who he later identified as the accused, with a black suitcase over his shoulder, standing in the open driver's door area of the blue car. There was a smaller, Aboriginal male standing in the open passenger side door area of the vehicle. Both males looked at his vehicle.

The accused said something to the other man, and

both of them slammed the vehicle door shut and ran back into the house with the accused carrying the suitcase. Constable Beck thought this behaviour was strange.

Constable Beck radioed Constable Bennett and informed him that he believed that he had located a vehicle matching the description and that he had observed two males running into the house.

The officers decided that, since

Fort Providence had only one exit to the highway, which went past the RCMP detachment, they would head back to the detachment and wait to conduct a vehicle stop. Constable Beck intended to do a traffic stop to further the investigation of the trafficking complaint. Constable Beck and Bennett waited in the parking lot at the RCMP detachment.

approaching and advised Constable Bennett
"there's the car." They got into their vehicles.
Constable Beck observed that the vehicle was a
blue Volkswagen. The vehicle was travelling
approximately 35 kilometres per hour and as the
vehicle came closer to where the police vehicles
were, the vehicle nose dipped and the vehicle
decelerated quickly before continuing on at a
slow speed, about 15 kilometres per hour.

As the vehicle passed, Constable Beck observed two people in the car, the accused, as the driver, and a smaller, Aboriginal male in the passenger seat.

Constable Beck believed this was the vehicle he had seen and believed it was the one, "that was possibly involved in the complaint" so he pulled in behind the vehicle and observed that it had an Alberta licence plate. He turned on his emergency equipment. Constable Beck could see that the two occupants in the vehicle began to fidget around, moving back and forth. The vehicle continued up the road for almost 150 metres before pulling over.

Constable Beck advised OCC of the stop and ran the license plate number. He was advised that it was a Hertz car. He approached the driver's side of the vehicle, and Constable Bennett approached on the passenger side.

Constable Beck observed that the car was in disarray and that there was a black suitcase in the back seat in the centre on top of a pile of various things that appeared to have been thrown in there. In the back seat, there were blankets and various grocery items.

Constable Beck spoke with the accused and

described him as visibly shaking. He asked the accused to produce his documents. The accused produced an Alberta driver's license. While trying to remove the driver's license, the accused was shaking so badly that he fumbled his small wallet trying to get the item out.

Constable Beck also asked for the rental agreement. The passenger, Echo Delver, reached down and opened the glove box and the door fell open. The accused reached over and slammed the glove box back shut and then stared at the passenger. The accused then opened the glove box a small amount and took out a pouch the size of an owner's manual through a small slot in the top of the glove box while holding the glove box partially shut with one hand and reaching in and manoeuvring the pouch through the slot with his other hand. Once he got the item out, he closed the glove box.

The accused had pulled out the rental agreement and attempted to pass it to

Constable Beck several times. Constable Beck testified that the accused was shaking so bad that he crumpled up the document and was having a hard time passing it to the officer. It appeared to Constable Beck that the accused would lose focus and set it back on the centre console of

1 the car and they would continue talking.

At some point in the conversation, the accused asked the officer what it was all about. Constable Beck told the accused that he had a complaint of a blue car with Alberta plates and a couple of males from down South dealing cocaine. He asked the accused what he thought of that. Constable Beck thought this exchange occurred just after the incident with the glove box.

Constable Beck also observed that the accused kept reaching into the front pouch of the pocket of his hoodie, and the officer asked him several times not to reach in there because he did not know what was in the pocket.

While Constable Beck was speaking with the accused, he noticed that there was a phone on the passenger side floor that continued to light up as if it was getting calls or text messages.

Instead of picking it up and answering it or responding, the passenger had his foot on the phone and was trying to push it up to the front of the car. It appeared to Constable Beck that he was using his feet and sliding the phone up into where the centre console was, almost as though he was trying to hide the phone.

The rental agreement was never passed to Constable Beck. He would remind the accused, and

1 the accused would grab it but then set it back 2 down again. It appeared to Constable Beck that the accused was not able to stay focused. 3 Constable Beck asked the accused to step out of 5 the vehicle and he did so immediately. Constable Beck escorted the accused back to the passenger 6 7 side of the police vehicle. Once there, the 8 accused again tried to reach into the front pouch of his hoodie and Constable Beck asked him again 9 10 not to do that. The accused asked the officer if 11 he was under arrest. Constable Beck responded that at that point, he was being detained for a 12 13 drug-trafficking investigation. Constable Beck handcuffed the accused and then reached into the 14 15 front pouch of the accused's hoodie and pulled 16 out what turned out to be a toque. Constable Beck testified that he searched the accused for 17 officer safety reasons primarily but also to see 18 if he had anything pertaining to the drug 19 20 investigation. Constable Beck was concerned 21 because the accused kept reaching into the pocket 22 of the hoodie. This occurred at approximately 23 1:39 p.m. 24 The accused was then provided with his 25 Charter Rights and the police warning verbatim from a card and placed in the back of 26

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Constable Beck's vehicle. The accused indicated

that he understood and that he wished to speak to counsel. He provided the name of a lawyer from Edmonton by the name of Ben.

Once the accused was secured and *Chartered*, Constable Beck told Constable Bennett to detain the passenger for cocaine trafficking as well.

Constable Beck testified that his grounds for detaining the accused were -- and I am going to read the evidence of Constable Beck, which, although lengthy, I think encapsulates his evidence on this point:

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- Q Without referring to anything that Mr. Paradis might have told you, what were your grounds for detention?
- A Well, multiple things. First of all, starting with the complaint itself. Despite the fact it wasn't exact, it was -- there was a lot of details and similarities that drew me to this vehicle. Then the vehicle being -- or, sorry -- Constable Pardy's information stating that, in fact, he had seen a blue Volkswagen around Fort Providence, the hamlet, with some males in it. was unable to identify them. Specifically said that the vehicle had been backed into homes and trees so that he couldn't see the That, in my experience, is consistent with trying to cover an identification of a vehicle; and, being that you're in Fort Providence, the majority of the plates would be Northwest Territories, and an Alberta plate would stand out. So that was strange.

1	And then, once I did make contact,
2	just observation contact with Mr. Paradis, he had a suitcase
	that he appeared to be loading
3	into a car. They appeared to be getting into the car. As soon as
4	I backed up the police vehicle, he said something that I don't
5	know what he said, but there was
6	almost a moment where they slam the doors on a car, which is
	may or may not mean anything, but
7	they took the very same suitcase and ran back into the residence.
8	And then within minutes, we're
9	sitting at the the Fort
10	Providence detachment, and the vehicle is approaching, and as
11	soon as what I believe to be the vehicle became visible to or
	the police vehicle became visible
12	to Mr. Paradis, the speed slams to, you know, approximately 15.
13	He drives by. I pull in behind
14	him. There is a bunch of the
15	fidgeting that's going on. He doesn't stop his vehicle for a
16	period. I get in behind him. It's a rental vehicle from
	Alberta. It's a Volkswagen, which
17	is (a) It's a car; and (b) It's not a common make of vehicle.
18	And then the nervousness, once I
19	approached or the vehicle
20	itself being in complete disarray, just and that's you know,
21	some people they maybe they're just not organized. That on its
	own didn't mean anything, but it
22	just, combined with other things, seemed strange.
23	The types of items I could see,
24	the car almost appeared lived in,
25	if I could put it that way. Blankets, toilet paper, instant
26	foods that can be eaten at any time. Like, instant noodles, you
	can stop and grab a cup of hot
27	water anywhere, and you can have noodles on the road. Energy

1	drinks the car just appeared lived in.
2	Q And why is that lived-in nature
3	and the instant nature of the food, why is that indicative of
4	grounds for detention for trafficking, in your opinion?
5	A Yeah, fair enough. So on that
6	that on its own doesn't mean anything. It could mean that
7	people are trying to save money when they're on a road trip, you
8	know, and that may be it.
9	But what I've learned, in my experience, is that people who are
10	engaged in that type of behaviour don't necessarily want to leave
11	their vehicle because they have items in there that they're, (a)
12	keeping an eye on or (b)
13	protecting. So the they're worth a lot of money, and they
14	don't want, you know, to lose the car, somebody to break in there or
15	whatever it is.
16	Also, they don't want it to draw attention to them, so they're able
17	to just continue down the road with stop shorts for stop or
18	shortstops for fuel and continue on.
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20	Following this, Constable Beck spoke with
21	Constable Bennett and Corporal Forman, who had
22	walked across the street from the Fort Providence
23	detachment. They spoke, and Constable Beck asked
24	Constable Bennett what Mr. Delver had told him.
25	Constable Bennett told Constable Beck that
26	Mr. Delver had said that he was visiting an aunt
27	and had been there for several days.

Constable Beck had been told by the accused that he had come from Edmonton to pick up his nephew, but he could not say who the nephew was. While in the vehicle, the accused asked Mr. Delver his last name. Constable Beck subsequently realized that the accused was talking about the passenger in the vehicle being his nephew.

In Constable Beck's opinion, none of this was adding up. At that point, he decided that he had no reason to believe the accused any further and formed his grounds for arrest and arrested him for trafficking cocaine.

Constable Beck arrested the accused at 1:51 p.m. and gave him his *Charter* rights and warnings verbatim from a card again. The accused indicated he understood and again that he wished to speak to a lawyer, Ben, from Edmonton.

The accused was then transported back to the detachment along with Mr. Delver. Constable Beck stayed with the vehicle. Constable Rondeau arrived and photographed the overall scene and the car. They then searched the vehicle.

Constable Bennett also testified. As he was driving to the check stop, a call for service came in over the radio. It was from a citizen in Fort Providence who said that there was a

vehicle, a blue Volkswagen, driving around Fort
Providence, and the occupants were selling
cocaine.

Constable Bennett heard the call over the radio, and he heard Constable Beck, who was in a different vehicle, answer the radio and ask for details. Constable Bennett testified that the call came in at 12:37 p.m., and the details that were provided were of a blue Volkswagen driving around town in Fort Providence selling cocaine. Constable Beck responded that they would take the complaint.

They turned their vehicles around and headed back towards Fort Providence. As they were heading back, Constable Pardy came on the radio and said that there had been other complaints throughout the week of a similar vehicle, a Volkswagen car, that it was apparently driving around Fort Providence and selling drugs out of the vehicle. Constable Pardy said that he hadn't been able to locate the vehicle moving, it had always been parked and backed into a residence in the community so he was unable to get a licence plate. In Constable Pardy's view, given the number of complaints, he felt there was probably some legitimacy to the complaints.

Constable Beck and Constable Bennett

patrolled through Fort Providence. On their first loop around the town, they were unable to locate the vehicle. Constable Beck and Bennett met at the parking lot of the Band Office to talk and discuss what they had seen.

They continued to patrol and Constable Beck came on the radio and said that he had located a blue Volkswagen backed into a residence on the back road. He advised Constable Bennett that he had seen two males coming out of the house, one carrying a suitcase and when they had seen the police vehicle, they stopped and turned around and went back into the house. The vehicle had been backed in, so no licence plate was obtained.

Constable Bennett testified they continued to patrol, but the vehicle didn't move; so they went back to the parking lot of the Fort Providence RCMP detachment. They discussed what they were going to do. The road was the only way out of town so if the male was going to leave, he would have to drive past the detachment where they were in order to leave town.

At approximately 1:35 p.m., they saw the vehicle approaching. It was a blue Volkswagen and was coming up the road towards the detachment heading out of town. The vehicle was not going at a high speed, but Constable Bennett noted that

as it went past where he and Constable Beck were located, it looked like the nose dipped a little indicating that the driver might have hit the brakes. The officers got in their vehicles and when the car went past, Constable Beck pulled out behind the vehicle and conducted a vehicle stop. Constable Bennett estimated that the vehicle travelled maybe a couple hundred metres before stopping. Constable Bennett pulled in behind Constable Beck's vehicle. The vehicle was pulled over at approximately 1:35 p.m.

Constable Beck approached the driver's side window and Constable Bennett approached the passenger side. As Constable Bennett approached the passenger side, there was a young male sitting there looking straight ahead, not making eye contact.

Constable Bennett could not hear what the driver was saying, but he could hear Constable Beck asking for information. It seemed to Constable Bennett as though Constable Beck was having trouble getting information from the driver.

Constable Bennett observed that

Constable Beck had asked the driver for vehicle documents. He saw the passenger reach for the glove box and open it all the way. The driver

quickly slammed it shut and then opened it a

small amount and tried to take out a thick

booklet out of a small opening without opening

the glove box all the way. It appeared to

Constable Bennett that there was something in

there that the driver did not want the officers

to see.

After that, Constable Beck continued to talk to the driver and later got him to exit the vehicle. Constable Bennett chatted with the passenger to get some further information about why they were in town, how long they had been there, where they were going, et cetera. The passenger said that they had just got to town to visit family. When asked where they were going, he said, back to Edmonton, which Constable Bennett found strange as Edmonton is approximately 15 hours away and it was a long trip to make for a quick visit to family.

Constable Bennett thought that the passenger appeared nervous. He was shaking and did not really want to answer the officer's questions.

Constable Bennett testified:

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"At that point, I believed there was grounds to detain him for an investigation given the -- the manner which they were acting, the oddness of how long they were in town, the fact that the driver couldn't really give Constable Beck clear answers,

where I could tell -- I felt there
was grounds to detain for
investigation. That, plus the
information we received of the
trafficking, the -- the drugs out of
the vehicle, given what
Constable Pardy had told us over
the -- the radio; so, at that point,
I detained the passenger."

Constable Bennett testified that he detained the passenger at approximately 1:42 p.m. He provided the passenger with his *Charter* caution and police warning, and then subsequently arrested the passenger when Constable Beck was arresting the driver.

#### ANALYSIS

The accused claims the police breached his rights under Section, 8, 9, 10(a) and (b) of the Canadian *Charter of Rights and Freedoms* and that the evidence should be excluded under Section 24(2) of the *Charter*.

The Crown concedes that the police breached the accused's Section 10(a) and (b) Charter
Rights, but argues that there were no breaches of the accused's Section 9 or Section 8 Charter
Rights with respect to the search of the vehicle.
The Crown concedes that the search of the accused's hoodie pocket following his exit from the vehicle was not a valid search. The Crown also argues that the evidence should not be excluded under Section 24(2).

#### The Detention of the Accused

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Section 9 of the Canadian *Charter of Rights* and *Freedoms* states that everyone has the right not to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned.

The first question is whether the accused was detained. I do not think that there is any dispute about this part. The accused was the driver of a vehicle pulled over by Constable Beck. While both Constable Beck and Constable Bennett, in their evidence, referred to detaining the accused and the passenger for investigation following the vehicle stop and following their initial interactions with them, each officer acknowledged, in cross-examination, that the accused and passenger were detained, they were not free to leave when the vehicle was stopped.

When Constable Beck activated the emergency equipment and the accused pulled the vehicle over, the accused submitted or acquiesced to the assertion of police control, and the accused was detained pursuant to Section 9 of the *Charter*.

See *R v Grant*, 2009 SCC 32; *R v Mellenthin*,[1991]

3 S.C.R. 615; *R v Arabi*, 2007 ABQB 303.

The next question is whether the detention was arbitrary under Section 9. Whether the detention was arbitrary depends on the authority of the police to stop the vehicle. A detention

that is not authorized by law is arbitrary and violates Section 9. The law itself must also not be arbitrary and be constitutionally valid. *Grant, supra* at paragraph 54.

Constable Beck testified that he pulled over the accused's vehicle to further his investigation into the trafficking complaint. He also agreed in cross-examination that he did not have any traffic concerns and there was no concern that the accused's vehicle was not complying with the rules of the road.

Constable Beck agreed that it was not a traffic stop and was clearly a drug investigation.

Police officers have the authority to stop motor vehicles to determine if the person operating the vehicle and the vehicle and its equipment comply with the *Motor Vehicle Act* and its regulations. Section 285, *Motor Vehicle Act*, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. M-16.

The police cannot, however, randomly stop vehicles for the purpose of enforcing criminal laws unrelated to driving unless there are reasonable grounds to suspect that an offence has occurred. See R v Gonzales, 2017 ONCA 53; R v Harrison, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 494; R v Simpson (1993), 79 C.C.C. (3rd) 482 (Ont. C.A.).

The authority of the police to detain the

1	accused for investigative purposes derives from
2	the police duties at common-law to preserve the
3	peace, prevent crime, and protect life and
4	property. As stated in R v Mann, [2004] 3 S.C.R.
5	59 at paragraph 45:
6	Police officers may detain an individual for investigative purposes
7	if there are reasonable grounds to suspect in all the circumstances that
8	the individual is connected to a particular crime and that such a
9	detention is necessary.
10	In considering whether the detention is
11	necessary, the Supreme Court of Canada stated in
12	Mann at paragraph 34:
13	The detention must be viewed as
14	reasonably necessary on an objective view of the totality of the
15	circumstances, informing the officer's suspicion that there is a clear nexus between the individual to
16	be detained and a recent or on-going
17	<pre>criminal offence. Reasonable grounds figures at the front-end of such an assessment, underlying the officer's</pre>
18	reasonable suspicion that the
19	particular individual is implicated in the criminal activity under
20	investigation.
21	In discussing what is meant by reasonable
22	grounds, the Court in Mann endorsed the
23	definition of articulable cause defined in $\it R \ \it v$
24	Simpson, (cited at paragraph 27 of Mann) as
25	being:
26	A constellation of objectively
27	discernible facts which give the detaining officer reasonable cause to suspect that the detainee is
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1	criminally implicated in the activity
2	under investigation.
3	The threshold is lower than the threshold for an
4	arrest, which is reasonable and probable grounds,
5	and it is something more than an officer's hunch
6	based on intuition gained by experience. The
7	standard includes both objective and subjective
8	components. Mann, supra at paragraphs 27 to 30.
9	In the R v Kang Brown, 2008 SCC 18 the
10	Supreme Court of Canada elaborated on the meaning
11	of reasonable suspicion at paragraph 75:
12	Suspicion is an expectation that the
13	targeted individual is possibly engaged in some criminal activity. A
14	reasonable suspicion means something more than a mere suspicion and
15	something less than a belief based upon reasonable and probable grounds.
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17	In considering the criminal activity under
18	investigation, Mann refers to reasonable grounds
19	to suspect that the individual is connected to a
20	particular crime but it is also been held that it
21	is not necessary that the police officer be able
22	to pinpoint the crime with absolute precision.
23	R v Nesbeth, 2008 ONCA 579 at paragraph 18.
24	The Crown's position is that while Constable
25	Beck subjectively did not believe he had grounds
26	to detain the accused for investigative purposes
27	until after the accused had exited the vehicle,

several minutes after the traffic stop had begun, there were, on an objective basis, grounds to detain the accused for investigative purposes when the vehicle stop was conducted. The Crown's position is that, when viewed objectively, there was reasonable suspicion that an offence had been committed when considering all of the factors.

The Defence position is that this was clearly a drug investigation, where the officer lacked reasonable grounds to stop the vehicle and used the traffic stop to get around not having the requisite grounds to conduct the drug investigation. The Defence argued that the police received a tip and they did not know where it came from or the basis of it and did no investigation to attempt to confirm or corroborate the tip before stopping the vehicle to investigate the accused and see whether there was any merit to the complaint.

The totality of the circumstances must be examined to determine whether, on an objective basis, there were reasonable grounds to suspect that the accused was connected to a particular crime. The evaluation of the circumstances is necessarily fact specific.

For example, in *Mann*, the Court concluded that the police officers had reasonable grounds

to detain. The police officers were responding to a call of a break and enter in progress. As they approached the scene, they observed the accused. The accused closely matched the description of the suspect given by the radio dispatch and was only two or three blocks from the scene of the reported crime. As stated in Mann at paragraph 47:

"These factors led the officers to reasonably suspect that the appellant was involved in recent criminal activity, and at the very least ought to be investigated further."

In Arabi, supra the Court concluded that the police officers did not have reasonable grounds and were operating on a hunch only. In that case, the police officers were on patrol when they approached a convertible. A male was standing next to the passenger door leaning into the convertible. As the police vehicle approached, the pedestrian looked at the officers and began walking towards the police vehicle on the sidewalk. The officer observed the pedestrian place his hand to his mouth and make a swallowing motion. The convertible pulled away from the curb and the vehicle was then stopped by the police. Moreau J, as she then was, noted that the officers had not observed any hand-to-hand movements; there was nothing unusual

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1 about the vehicle as it pulled away from the curb 2 and that the vehicle was a rental car, did not: 3 "Add any objective element of significance to the officers' observations of the pedestrian such as to elevate their hunch to 4 5 reasonable grounds for the subsequent detention.' 6 7 Arabi, supra at paragraph 30. 8 In R v Simpson, the Court concluded that the 9 detention was unlawful. The police officer had 10 been told that a residence was a suspected crack The officer stopped a car that had left 11 the house after the driver briefly went into the 12 13 residence. The Court stated at paragraph 68 to 14 69: 15 Turning to this case, I can find no articulable cause justifying the detention. Constable Wilkin had 16 information of unknown age that another police officer had been told 17 that the residence was believed to be 18 a crack house. Constable Wilkin did not know the primary source of the 19 information and he had no reason to believe that the source in general, 20 or this particular piece of information, was reliable. doubtful that this information 21 standing alone could provide a 22 reasonable suspicion that the suspect residence was the scene of criminal 23 activity. Any glimmer of an articulable cause disappears, however, when one 24 25 considers whether Constable Wilkin had reason to suspect that the 26 appellant or the driver of the car was involved in criminal activity. 2.7 He knew nothing about either person and he did not suggest that anything

1	either had done, apart from being at the house, aroused his suspicion or
2	suggested criminal activity. Attendance at a location believed to
3	be the site of ongoing criminal activity is a factor which may
4	contribute to the existence of articulable cause. Where that is the
5	sole factor, however, and the information concerning the location
6	is itself of unknown age and reliability, no articulable cause
7	exists.
8	As well, in the case of $R\ v\ Ha$ , 2018 ABCA 233 the
9	Alberta Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's
10	finding that the officer had reasonable and probable
11	grounds for arrest. In that case, the officer had
12	witnessed a suspected drug transaction between the
13	driver of two vehicles. The officer then put out a
14	call over the police radio asking if either of the
15	names of the registered owners of the vehicles were
16	known. He received information in reply from an
17	experienced drug investigator that the registered
18	owner of one of the vehicles was involved in
19	high-level drug trafficking and would likely be a
20	supplier in any drug transaction. The officer then
21	subsequently pulled over the vehicle. The Court of
22	Appeal stated at paragraph 29:
23	In my wier the twist indee was
24	In my view, the trial judge was correct in concluding that the
25	<pre>information provided by [the experienced drug investigator], combined with [the officer!s]</pre>
26	combined with [the officer's] experience and knowledge about drug
27	transactions and his observation of a suspected drug transaction between the drivers of the two vehicles,

sufficiently grounded the objective reasonableness of the subjective belief in the requisite reasonable and probable grounds for arrest.

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There are many cases on this issue, and as has been noted, each case turns on its own facts.

In this case, the complainant provided minimal information, the information being, as testified to by Constable Beck, that there were three males driving around Fort Providence in a blue car trafficking cocaine. Constable Beck inquired about the time delay of the complaint and was told that the call had just come in.

Constable Pardy provided further information that he had received several reports over the past week of a blue Volkswagen car with Alberta plates driving around with some Southern males dealing cocaine. Constable Pardy had been able to locate the vehicle several times but was unable to identify an occupant or get a licence plate as the vehicle had always been backed into the trees or a house.

That is essentially the information that

Constable Beck had. Dealing first with the

information, Constable Beck had no information

about the source or the recency of the

complainant's knowledge. The information itself

was innocuous and easily obtained by anyone who

was in Fort Providence: a blue Volkswagen car
with Alberta plates being driven around by males
unfamiliar to residents of Fort Providence.

Neither officer took any steps to investigate this information or to obtain further information prior to searching for the vehicle. There was no indication as to the reliability of the information provided by the complainant. This was not an anonymous tip. There was a complainant that could have been spoken to, as Constable Beck testified that, at some point, he became aware of the complainant's name. But the complainant was not spoken to prior to the vehicle stop.

With respect to the report of trafficking in cocaine, there was nothing to indicate how the complainant was aware of this information, whether this was from a personal observation, from purchasing cocaine themselves, information from a family member or a friend, or whether it was just a rumour in the community. As well, there was no information about when this had occurred or whether it was ongoing.

Constable Beck testified that the complaint had just been made when the call came in and was recent but that does not clarify when the observations might have been made by the

1 complainant, assuming the complainant had firsthand knowledge of the trafficking activity.

> As well, there were no details provided in the complaint itself which might have been checked out or corroborated by an independent investigation. The fact that cocaine and cash were ultimately found when the accused was arrested does not constitute corroboration. Corroboration must occur prior to the detention or arrest of the accused and not after.

Considering the observations of Constable Beck, once he located the vehicle parked at a residence, it matched the description of what had been conveyed to him by OCC and Constable Pardy. It was a blue car, at that point he could not tell if it was a Volkswagen or had Alberta plates. It was also backed into the residence as Constable Pardy had related that he had observed the car backed in to a residence or trees when parked.

Constable Beck testified that the vehicle being backed into homes and trees was consistent with trying to cover the identification of a vehicle and that most people simply drive into a driveway. Added to this was Constable Beck's thought that the majority of licence plates would be from the Northwest Territories in

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Fort Providence and that Alberta plates would stand out. This information is inconclusive, people back into driveways for various reasons, it is not always consistent with trying to prevent identification of a vehicle.

Constable Beck also observed two males standing outside the car and not three as reported in the complaint. There was no description of the males beyond what Constable Pardy referred to as Southern males, which could mean anything as I am uncertain on what basis someone could differentiate a Southern person from a Northern person. Fort Providence is a small community, so it could mean that the males were not from the community, but that is just a guess.

Constable Beck's observations of the two males and their reaction to him is significant. It appeared that, as they noticed the police vehicle, they slammed the door shut on the car and ran into the residence, the accused carrying the suitcase he had with him. Constable Beck viewed that behaviour as strange, and that is a valid observation.

Following this, Constable Beck determined that he would conduct a traffic stop of the vehicle to further the drug investigation if the

1 vehicle passed by the RCMP detachment as this was the main road out of town. 2 3 Prior to the vehicle stopping, Constable Beck made further observations. 5 able to observe that it was a blue Volkswagen and had Alberta plates. He observed that the two 6 7 occupants were fidgeting and moving around in the The vehicle continued down the road for 8 vehicle. approximately 150 metres before stopping. 9 10 At the point that Constable Beck stopped the 11 vehicle, he was suspicious about the vehicle and 12 its occupants which was demonstrated in his 13 evidence in cross-examination: 14 Q You had suspicions. You thought 15 it was odd behaviour, correct, but --16 I believed it to be odd, yes. 17 And later in cross-examination: 18 19 Q This was a ruse to further your drug investigation? 20 21 A I wouldn't call it a ruse. I was 22 identifying him, and I was looking 23 to see whether there was some 24 merit, and this was, in fact, the 25 quy that -- that I had received

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the complaints about. I didn't

know at that point. I didn't know

him. I didn't know the car. I

had my suspicions that something

wasn't right; but at that point I

couldn't say for sure that this

was, in fact, the guy or the car.

Q Okay. So you had no idea at this

point? This is -- you detained an

Q Okay. So you had no idea at this point? This is -- you detained an individual with no clue who they are on the off chance they may be the person is what you're saying?

A I stopped the car, yes.

Based on the evidence, the officer subjectively had suspicions which in his mind did not amount to grounds to detain until after his initial interactions with the accused. Viewed objectively, I find that, at the point that the accused's vehicle was pulled over, the officer was operating on bare suspicion but did not have reasonable grounds to suspect that the accused was connected to a particular crime and that detention was necessary, to use the language from Mann.

As such, the accused's Section 9 *Charter*Rights were breached and the initial stop of the vehicle was unlawful. The sole purpose of the stop was to further the drug investigation and determine if the accused might be involved.

1	Had the initial stop of the vehicle been
2	lawful, the observations of the officer of the
3	vehicle and the accused following the stop would
4	have been sufficient to ground an investigative
5	detention. However, as the stop was unlawful,
6	the detention of the accused and subsequent
7	arrest were unlawful.
8	Section 10(a) and (b) of the Charter
9	Section 10 of the Charter states:
10	10. Everyone has the right on arrest
11	or detention  (a) to be informed promptly of the
12	reasons therefor; (b) to retain and instruct counsel
13	without delay and to be informed of that right;
14	ende 11gne,
15	Individuals who are detained for investigative
16	purposes must be advised of the reasons for
17	detention in accordance with Section 10(a) of the
18	Charter. There are no particular words that need
19	to be used by the police provided that the
20	detainee is advised in "clear and simple
21	language" of the reason for detention: Mann,
22	supra at paragraph 21.
23	The Section 10(b) right to counsel arises
24	immediately upon detention, whether or not the
25	detention is solely for investigative purposes:
26	Grant, supra at paragraph 58.
27	The Crown concedes that the vehicle was

stopped and Constable Beck approached the vehicle and began to speak to the accused, and that he did not advise the accused of the reasons for detention or provide him with his right to counsel, thus breaching the accused's 10(a) and (b) Charter Rights.

The evidence of Constable Beck was that he did not advise the accused of the reason for his detention or his right to counsel until the accused exited the vehicle and walked back to the police vehicle several minutes after the vehicle stop had begun. Therefore, the accused's Section 10(a) and (b) Charter Rights were breached.

## Section 8 of the Charter

Section 8 of the *Charter* states that everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure.

A warrantless search is prima facie unreasonable. When a search is conducted without a warrant, the Crown must establish, on a balance of probabilities,

- (1) that the search was authorized by law,
- (2) the law itself is reasonable, and
- (3) the manner in which the search was carried
- out was reasonable. *Mann, supra* at paragraph 36.
- 26 On the evidence, there are two searches:
- 27 The search of the pocket of the accused's hoodie

by Constable Beck after the accused exited the vehicle and the search of the vehicle following the arrest of the accused.

Where there is an investigative detention, a police officer may engage in a protective pat-down search of a detained individual where the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that his safety or the safety of others is at risk. *Mann, supra* at paragraph 45.

As I have concluded that the detention was unlawful, it follows that the ensuing searches incident to the detention and the later search incident to arrest were also unlawful.

But with respect to the search of the accused's hoodie pocket, even if the detention had been lawful in this case, the actions of the officer went beyond what is permitted in a search incident to investigative detention.

While the officer's concerns about the accused's actions in continually reaching into his hoodie pocket even after being repeatedly told not to would justify a pat-down search for protective purposes in an investigative detention, they did not justify him reaching into the accused's hoodie pocket.

Constable Beck testified that, once he handcuffed the accused, he observed that there

1	was a bulge and he reached into the pocket of the
2	hoodie. He was concerned about safety but he
3	also testified that he was concerned about
4	locating evidence which would assist in the
5	drug-trafficking investigation. Constable Beck
6	did not first engage in a pat-down search of the
7	area to determine if there were any items which
8	might place officer safety at risk and which
9	would justify putting his hand into the accused's
10	hoodie pocket. The more intrusive search of the
11	accused's pocket was an unreasonable violation of
12	the accused's reasonable expectation of privacy.
13	Exclusion of Evidence under Section 24(2) of the
14	<pre>Charter:</pre>
15	Having found breaches of the accused's
16	Charter Rights, the issue becomes whether the
17	evidence should be excluded. Section 24 of the
18	Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms says:
19	24. (1) Anyone whose rights or
20	freedoms, as guaranteed by this  Charter, have been infringed or
21	denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such
22	remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the
23	circumstances.
24	(2) Where, in proceedings under subsection (1), a court concludes
25	that evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed or denied any
26	rights or freedoms guaranteed by this Charter, the evidence shall be
27	excluded if it is established that, having regard to all the

circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The Supreme Court in *Grant* set out what must be considered in determining whether the evidence obtained in breach of an accused's *Charter* Rights should be excluded. A Court must assess and balance the effect of admitting the evidence on society's confidence in the justice system, having regard to:

- (1) The seriousness of the *Charter* infringing state conduct;
- (2) The impact of the breach on the *Charter* protected interests of the accused; and
- (3) Society's interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits.

## 17 The Seriousness of the Breach

The Court has to assess the seriousness of the conduct that led to the breach. There is a difference between admission of evidence obtained through inadvertent or minor violations of the Charter and evidence obtained through a wilful or reckless disregard of Charter rights. The admission of evidence in the latter situation will have a negative effect on public confidence in the justice system and risk bringing the administration of justice into disrepute, Grant,

1 supra at paragraph 74.

Whether the police were operating in good faith is another consideration in assessing the seriousness of the police conduct. However, the Court in *Grant* also noted that ignorance of *Charter* standards must not be encouraged, and negligence or wilful blindness do not constitute good faith. As stated in *Grant*, at paragraph 75:

Wilful or flagrant disregard of the Charter by those very persons who are charged with upholding the right in question may require that the court dissociate itself from such conduct.

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Considering the circumstances of this case, there are multiple breaches of the accused's Charter
Rights. This chain of events was started when the officer stopped the vehicle without reasonable grounds to detain the accused. The officer had suspicions based on what he had heard and observed but no steps were taken to elevate those suspicions to reasonable suspicion. The approach appears to have been to conduct a traffic stop and see what happened, to see if any evidence on the drug-trafficking complaint would be found.

The unlawful detention was then compounded by the failure to advise the accused of his Section 10(a) and (b) rights and the search of

the hoodie pocket and later the search of the vehicle.

The actions of the police, while not in conformity with the *Charter*, were not abusive in their dealings with the accused. The officers appeared to be candid in their testimony about their observations, their actions, and the decisions they made. The officer was not deliberate in violating the accused's *Charter* Rights, the accused was provided his *Charter* Rights, Section 10(a) and 10(b), after he exited the vehicle; although, by then, his Section 9, 10(a) and (b) rights had already been violated.

This case is different from the case of R v Harrison, 2009 SCC 34 where the Court found there was a blatant disregard for the accused's Charter Rights which was aggravated by the officer's misleading testimony at trial. The Supreme Court of Canada viewed the police conduct as serious and not to be condoned.

In this case, I do not find that the officers acted in bad faith which does not necessarily equate to good faith but it appears that there was a lack of recognition of the Charter standards.

The Court in *Grant* referred to the spectrum of seriousness of *Charter* violations with

inadvertent or minor violations at one end and wilful or reckless disregard for *Charter* Rights at the other end. There is no evidence of systemic or institutional abuse, which would aggravate the seriousness of the breaches.

I find that the conduct of the officer that led to the multiple *Charter* breaches in this case reflects a lack of care for the accused's *Charter* Rights which is in the mid to serious end of the spectrum. The *Charter* breaching conduct can be considered serious and tends to support the exclusion of the evidence.

## Impact on the Accused's Interests

The Court must also evaluate the extent to which the breach undermined the Charter protected interests of the accused. The impact of a Charter breach may range from fleeting and technical to profoundly intrusive. The more serious the impact on the accused's interests, the greater the risk that admission of the evidence will bring the administration of justice into disrepute, Grant, supra at paragraph 76.

An unreasonable search that intrudes on an area in which an individual enjoys a high expectation of privacy, or that demeans their dignity, is more serious than one that does not.

Grant, supra at paragraph 78.

In considering physical evidence, the issue of privacy is the principal interest to consider. An individual has a higher expectation of privacy in a dwelling house than in a place of business or a vehicle. *Grant, supra* at paragraph 113.

A person in a motor vehicle has a lesser expectation of privacy than a person in a home. Drivers of vehicles are subject to being stopped in random check-stops to detect things like impaired driving offences. They may also be stopped pursuant to the Motor Vehicle Act to determine if they and their vehicle are in compliance with the Act and its regulations. This is known and drivers understand that this may occur at any time.

There was nothing in the stop itself to suggest that the encounter was demeaning to the dignity of the accused and there was nothing particularly unusual about the treatment of the accused by the officers. The searches were relatively non-intrusive.

Balanced against this is that the accused was stopped without justification and his expectation of liberty and privacy was interfered with. Following the stop, he was subjected to searches of his person and the rental vehicle.

I conclude that the impact of the breach on

1	the accused's Charter-protected interests was
2	more than minimal but not significant.
3	Society's Interest in Adjudication on the Merits
4	Society generally expects that criminal
5	charges will be determined on their merits.
6	Society has a collective interest in ensuring
7	that those who violate the law are brought to
8	trial and dealt with according to the law.
9	There is a public interest in seeking the
10	truth, which is a relevant consideration in a
11	Section 24(2) analysis. As stated in Grant,
12	supra at paragraph 82:
13	The fact that the evidence obtained in breach of the Charter may
14	facilitate the discovery of the truth and the adjudication of a case on its
15	merits must therefore be weighed against factors pointing to
16	exclusion, in order to balance the interests of truth with the integrity
17	of the justice system.
18	The reliability of the evidence is an important
19	factor to consider under this aspect of the test.
20	As stated in <i>Grant</i> , supra at paragraph 81:
21	If a breach undermines the
22	reliability of the evidence, this points in the direction of exclusion
23	of the evidence. The admission of unreliable evidence serves neither
24	the accused's interest in a fair trial nor the public interest in
25	uncovering the truth. Conversely, exclusion of relevant and reliable
26	evidence may undermine the truth-seeking function of the justice
27	system and render the trial unfair from the public perspective, thus

1 bringing the administration of justice into disrepute. 2 As noted in Grant, supra at paragraph 115: 3 4 Reliability issues with physical 5 evidence will not generally be related to the Charter breach. 6 7 Other factors to consider under this aspect of 8 the test will include the importance of the 9 evidence to the prosecution's case and the 10 seriousness of the offence in issue. 11 The evidence obtained, in this case, consisting of drugs, money, weapons, and 12 13 ammunition, is highly reliable and relevant 14 evidence. It is critical evidence to the Crown's 15 case and essential to a determination on the 16 merits. The charges the accused faces are serious. 17 Weapons and drug offences are serious and society 18 has a significant interest in having these types 19 20 of charges determined on their merits. Firearm crimes are treated seriously and of 21 22 particular concern to Canadian society. 23 people in the Northwest Territories own firearms, 24 often to participate in traditional activities 25 like hunting. This does not mean that people of the Northwest Territories are not concerned about 26

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the safe use and storage of firearms.

potential for misuse of firearms is always a serious safety issue and the risk of serious injury or death is one that is always present.

People are rightly concerned about the safe use and storage of firearms. The use and storage of firearms, and particularly this type of firearm, which is so often associated with school shootings and other mass shootings, raise serious public safety concerns.

Drugs offences are also serious. This Court has for many years been concerned about the trafficking in cocaine in the Northwest

Territories and the offence has been treated seriously by the Courts in this jurisdiction for many years. Trafficking in cocaine has been described as a scourge on society. The movement of the activity of trafficking in cocaine and other drugs from the city of Yellowknife to smaller, more isolated communities is of serious concern to the residents of small communities and to the residents of the Northwest Territories in general.

Balanced against this is that the seriousness of the offence also makes it important that the accused's rights be respected. The consequences, if the accused is convicted, are high and the accused could be subjected to a

significant period of imprisonment. In serious cases, there is also an interest in ensuring that the justice system is beyond reproach.

Having considered the seriousness of the Charter infringing state conduct, the impact of the breach on the Charter protected interests of the accused, and society's interest in adjudication of the case on its merits, a judge must determine whether, on balance, the admission of the evidence obtained by the Charter breach would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

I think this is a close case. It is also an unusual case with unique facts. While drugs are often seized by the police from motor vehicles in this jurisdiction, the presence of firearms is less usual, although it does occur and the presence of a fully loaded AR-15 type of rifle is even rarer. I hesitate to say that there has never been a similar case in the Northwest Territories because inevitably someone will find a case or a report of an instance of where it has happened. But I cannot recall one, and I think the circumstances are rare.

The conduct of the police was serious but not at the most serious end of the spectrum. The impact of the breach on the accused was

significant but again not at the most serious end of the scale. The value of the evidence is considerable and it is reliable evidence.

Society has a significant interest in having serious matters like these determined on their merits while at the same time ensuring that those who are facing serious charges are treated fairly.

In my view, balancing these factors weighs in favour of admission and the admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Exclusion of this evidence, in my view, would risk bringing the administration of justice into disrepute. For these reasons, I find that the evidence seized following the vehicle stop is admissible.

## ADJOURNED TO MARCH 8, 2019 AT 10:00 A.M.

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1	CERTIFICATE OF TRANSCRIPT
2	I, the undersigned, hereby certify that the
3	foregoing transcribed pages are a complete and
4	accurate transcript of the digitally recorded
5	proceedings taken herein to the best of my skill and
6	ability.
7	Dated at the City of Edmonton, Province of
8	Alberta, this 23rd day of April, 2019.
9	
10	Certified Pursuant to Rule 723
11	Of the Rules of Court
12	garex Below.
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14	Janet Belma, CSR(A), B.Ed.
15	Court Transcriber
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