IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

IN THE MATTER OF:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

COREY CARDINAL

Transcript of the Reasons for Sentence delivered by The Honourable Justice L.A. Charbonneau, sitting in Yellowknife, in the Northwest Territories, on the 3rd day of May, 2018.

APPEARANCES:

Mr. J. Major-Hansford: Counsel for the Crown

Ms. K. Oja: Counsel for the Accused

(Charge under s. 244.2(1)(b) of the Criminal Code)

THE COURT: Corey Cardinal has pleaded guilty to a charge of having intentionally discharged a firearm while being reckless as to the life or safety of another person contrary to Section 244.2(b) of the Criminal Code. Today it is my duty to impose a sentence on Mr. Cardinal for that offence. The maximum sentence for this offence is 14 years imprisonment. Section 244.2 sets a mandatory minimum sentence for this offence, but I have decided that that mandatory sentence is contrary to Section 12 of the Charter and is of no force and effect, R v Cardinal, 2018 NWTSC 12.

I made this decision, not on the basis of Mr. Cardinal's own case, but on the basis of a hypothetical situation that his counsel put forward at the constitutional challenge hearing. That hypothetical situation was based in part on Mr. Cardinal's case, but it assumed a much younger offender with no criminal record and with all the aggravating features of Mr. Cardinal's case removed.

The hearing on Mr. Cardinal's challenge to the mandatory minimum was heard at the same time as another similar challenge brought by another offender in an unrelated case, Tony Kakfwi. My decision to strike down the mandatory minimum

sentence based on Mr. Cardinal's submissions
meant that Mr. Kakfwi was also successful on his
challenge. R v Kakfwi, 2018 NWTSC 13.

Earlier this week, I imposed a sentence on Mr. Kakfwi at the conclusion of a sentencing hearing that proceeded in Fort Good Hope.

R v Kakfwi, 2018 NWTSC 30. There are differences between Mr. Cardinal's case and Mr. Kakfwi's case. There are some similarities as well. Some of the things I said in my decision on Mr. Kakfwi's sentencing apply to this case, and to that extent I will refer to it. Some things I said in my written decisions on the constitutional challenges are relevant to Mr. Cardinal's sentencing as well.

I will start with stating again what happened on the night of the events that led to this charge.

On the night of these events, Mr. Cardinal had been drinking alcohol and smoking salvia at his stepfather's home in Inuvik.

In the early morning hours on April 6th, 2016, he and his friend, Jerry Rogers, were in the living room of that residence. Two adult women were also in the house. They had gone upstairs and were sleeping. Mr. Cardinal broke into his stepfather's gun closet and removed a

shotgun. He put the gun to his chin and fired, intending to kill himself. Mr. Rogers intervened at the moment Mr. Cardinal was pulling the trigger. He pushed the gun away. This caused the shot to be fired through the front door. Photos taken at the scene show the hole made by that first shot, at the very stop of the door jamb.

In anger and frustration, Mr. Cardinal fired a second shot through the door. The hole caused by this second shoot, also shown in the photographs, is in the centre of the door just below the height of the door handle.

Mr. Cardinal left the house still holding the shotgun. Mr. Rogers followed trying to convince him to drop the firearm.

Mr. Cardinal fired a third shot into the snowbank on the side of the road. The photos show the trace left by that shot in the snow. The photo also shows that there are houses a short distance behind that snowbank.

Eventually Mr. Rogers was able to convince Mr. Cardinal to drop the firearm. It was left in the snow, and the two men kept on walking.

In the meantime, the RCMP had received a complaint about shots being fired and two men walking on the street with the gun. Police

officers responded to that call. They quickly located Mr. Cardinal and Mr. Rogers walking on the road and arrested them without incident.

Police officers found an unused shotgun round in Mr. Cardinal's jacket pocket. They also found the gun in the snowbank where Mr. Cardinal had dropped it.

The two women who were in the house when this happened told police they had gone there that evening and had consumed alcohol with Mr. Cardinal and Mr. Rogers. They had gone to sleep upstairs. They woke up to the gunshots. They stayed upstairs until Mr. Cardinal and Mr. Rogers left because they were scared.

The stock of the shotgun had been sawed off and taped. The barrel of the shotgun had also been sawed off. The butt stock that had been sawed off and the end of the barrel were found on the kitchen table in the residence. Tape matching the tape on the stock of the shotgun was also found at the residence.

Because of the way in which it was modified, the shotgun falls in the definition of a prohibited firearm. There was a dispute at the sentencing hearing as to whether this is an aggravating factor on sentencing, but it seemed undisputed that Mr. Cardinal was the one who

1 modified the firearm and that he did so because 2 he intended on using it to kill himself.

It is also undisputed that Mr. Cardinal did not intend to harm anyone other than himself when he fired the gun, but he admits that he was reckless as to the safety of others when he fired. That is why he is guilty of this particular offence.

No one else was in the immediate presence of Mr. Cardinal and Mr. Rogers when these shots were fired. The reports that the police had received were of shots being fired and two men walking around with a gun. When police officers located Mr. Cardinal and Mr. Rogers, they were both apprehended and they were both eventually charged. Later on Mr. Cardinal took responsibility for what he had done, and after his guilty plea was entered, the prosecution against Mr. Rogers was stopped.

I now want to turn to Mr. Cardinal's personal circumstances. I did not address those personal circumstances in any great detail in my decision on the constitutional challenge because Mr. Cardinal's challenge, as I have said, was based on a hypothetical situation as opposed to his own circumstances.

His circumstances are outlined in detail in

the Presentence Report that was prepared for this sentencing. I do not intend to repeat everything that is in that report, and I want to say that I am conscious that it must be difficult and painful for Mr. Cardinal to have some of the things referred to in the report talked about yet again. At the same time, because those circumstances are important for the purposes of my decision, I do have to talk about them to some extent.

Mr. Cardinal's lawyer said during the sentencing hearing that this is a case that shows a very clear example of intergenerational trauma, and I completely agree.

Mr. Cardinal's mother went to the Grollier
Hall residential school in Inuvik as did her many
siblings. She noted that when the older siblings
who were attending the school would return home,
they treated their younger siblings in the way
the nuns treated them at the school. She thought
it was as though they were maintaining the
Grollier Hall rules in the home. They did things
like pinch her or pull her ears when she did not
do her chores.

She told the author of the Presentence
Report that looking back, she thinks that the
older siblings were trying to prepare the younger

ones for their own attendance at the residential school. She herself spent two and a half years at Grollier Hall. She was expelled after having tried to come to the defence of one of her younger sisters. Her sister had wet her bed and as punishment was made to stand in her urine in front of the other children in the dorm.

Mr. Cardinal's mother came to her sister's defence during this incident, and apparently this is why she was expelled from the school.

She told the author of the Presentence
Report that as a young mother she did not know
how to raise children. She said to her at the
time "expressing love was hitting you". She
never told her children that she loved them until
she sought treatment for herself. As a result,
the children never heard that until later in
their lives.

For the first three years of his life,
Mr. Cardinal was raised by his cousins in
Tsiigehtchic. Between the ages of 3 and 8, he
lived with his mother and stepfather in Inuvik.
Although the children's physical needs, and by
this mean I mean food, clothing, and shelter,
were met, many other needs were not. The home
environment was dysfunctional. There was alcohol
abuse and domestic violence. There was violence

directed at Mr. Cardinal. He was eventually sent out of the community.

His account and his mother's account on the exact dates and timing is not exactly the same, but what is clear is that he spent a lot of years separated from his family. His mother says he went to the Territorial Treatment Centre in Yellowknife for two years when he was about 9 years old. He returned to Inuvik after that, but there was an incident of him pulling a knife on his sister. And after that, his mother turned his custody over to the Department of Social Services. Mr. Cardinal was sent to group homes in southern Canada. He spent time in group homes in Edmonton, Calgary, and Regina.

There is limited information about what happened in those group homes. Mr. Cardinal chose not to give his consent to have the Department of Social Services share their information about this period of time with the author of the Presentence Report. But there is some information about this time and it suggests that those were very difficult times for him as well. For example, while he was in Alberta, he had to be hospitalized because he had taken OxyContin. There are indications that there was physical abuse in one of the group homes he

stayed at. He also told the author of the

Presentence Report that, while he was in one of
the group homes, he witnessed someone attempting
suicide by jumping in a fire.

Mr. Cardinal returned to the Northwest

Territories when he was 17. He stayed with his sister, and later with an aunt in Tsiigehtchic, but those were temporary arrangements. His only steady residences were when he rented space from his mother for a period of time and when he lived with his girlfriend.

From all of this, it is very clear that
Mr. Cardinal lived most of his youth displaced.
As a child and a youth, he did not understand why
he was being sent away and he was upset about
that. He did not grow up with his siblings and
is not close to any of them. He does not feel he
has a family.

At the time the Presentence Report was prepared, he did not want the author of the report to speak to any of his family members except his mother, and that is not surprising under the circumstances.

The report also says he started abusing alcohol at a very early age. The report says that his stepfather found him passed out in a snowbank when he was only 11 years old.

It appears that from a young age and continually over subsequent years he has used drugs and alcohol to cope with the immense pain and anger that he has carried inside of him for years.

In later years, Mr. Cardinal started a relationship with Sasha Larocque-Firth. That was a positive relationship for him. She was a good influence on him and he wanted to be better for her and do better for her. Very tragically she died in a motor vehicle accident in July 2014. She and others were in the vehicle that was being driven by someone who was drunk.

The driver was charged and sentenced for this, R v Kayotuk, 2016 NWTSC 59. At his sentencing hearing, there was reference to Ms. Larocque-Firth, how good a person she was, how much she would be missed in the community. Her death was devastating for Mr. Cardinal. It sent him on a downward spiral. The Presentence Report says he was steadily intoxicated for two consecutive months following her death and that he wanted to die himself.

On the night of the events that I now have to sentence him for he was still in a state of utter grief and despair fueled by his consumption of alcohol and salvia, and he wanted to end his

life. The steps he had to take to modify the firearm are an indication that he had a firm intention to kill himself. And if he is alive today, it is because Mr. Rogers intervened just as he was about to pull the trigger.

In the Presentence Report, there is more information about other losses and challenges that Mr. Cardinal has endured. On the whole, as I have already said, it paints the picture of a traumatic childhood and youth in part resulting from his mother's own trauma and inability to parent in the way I am sure she now wishes she had. She regrets some of the things she did, but then, again, she was a victim of circumstances, too. And all of that is why I agree with Mr. Cardinal's counsel that this is a classic case of intergenerational trauma.

Mr. Cardinal has had many issues in his life; issues of addictions, issues with anger, aggression and despair. Reading about the circumstances he grew up in, this is not surprising at all, and I cannot express this any better than did Justice Greckol, then a Judge of the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench, in R v Skani, 2002 ABQB 1097, when, talking about the difficult background of the person she was sentencing in that case, she said:

Few mortals could withstand such a childhood and youth without becoming seriously troubled.

Mr. Cardinal has a lengthy criminal record which started when he was a youth. It is hardly surprisingly in light of the circumstances I have just been talking about. There are convictions for serious offences on this record. There are weapons offences, assaults, robberies, uttering threats, assaults of peace officers in addition to convictions for several other types of offences.

There are no convictions for firearms offences. However, as a result of the conviction for assault with a weapon in 2015, he was prohibited from being in the possession of a firearm when he committed this offence.

Mr. Cardinal's case manager told the author of the Presentence Report that initially he was difficult to deal with and refused to meet with him when he first arrived at the jail. There was also a disciplinary incident at the jail in December 2016. But over time Mr. Cardinal's attitude seemed to change.

The case manager reported that in the months before the report was prepared (the report was filed in June 2017) Mr. Cardinal had been more willing to meet and discuss his problems.

Mr. Cardinal himself told the author of the report that he wants to address his alcohol and other issues of unresolved grief. He also expressed remorse for his actions.

Mr. Cardinal's change in attitude has continued since the report was prepared over the course of almost a year now. I heard at the sentencing hearing that he has started to see a counselor at the jail. He has also taken some programs offered at the jail. Documents filed at the sentencing hearing show that he has successfully completed three programs. One called, "Taking Responsibility and Control", one called, "Building Better Boundaries", and one called, "Living Without Violence".

He has also written a letter of apology that was filed with the court at the sentencing hearing. It shows some insight into his behaviour, and the realization of some of the root causes of his conduct. In it he expresses a desire to change. He reiterates his apology for his actions. Among other things, he writes that: he realizes that what he did was very serious; that someone could have been hurt very badly or killed; that he put at risk his friend and others; that his intention was to harm himself and no one else; that alcohol and salvia made

things worse for him that night; and that he takes full responsibility for his actions.

He also writes that he knows he needs more help to deal with his issues. He knows he needs to learn to control his feelings and that drugs and alcohol are not the answer. He says he knows he has to stop drinking.

When he was given an opportunity to speak directly to the court after the lawyers' submissions, he said similar things. He said that, at first, he did not like counselling very much, but now he realizes it is helping him and he wants to continue with it. And I think that is very positive.

On the whole of the evidence, it appears that possibly for the first time Mr. Cardinal has made some progress and is taking some meaningful steps to try to address his issues.

This is just the beginning of what will be a long process, but those first steps are very difficult to take and he has taken them. The question of counselling I think is a very good example. Why is counselling hard at first?

Well, because it forces a person to look inside, at their own issue, their own responsibility, and their own power to change things as well as the things that are so hurtful inside of them that

are causing all of this behaviour. And starting that process can be very scary.

I imagine that is probably why Mr. Cardinal did not like it very much at first, but they are essential steps. And now that he has taken them, he wants to continue which suggests to me that he now realizes that that is what he has to do if he wants to lead a happy, healthy life. It will continue to be hard, but it is worthwhile.

Mr. Cardinal has plans for when he is released. He has been in contact with a woman in Inuvik who has been supportive of him and his efforts. I heard that they speak every day over the phone and that he hopes to build a relationship with her when he is released. He also wants to relocate to Whitehorse as he thinks there would be more resources there for him and that it would be a more positive place for a fresh start than Inuvik.

There is a saying that says, "Wherever you go there you are". At the same time, from the Presentence Report and, in particular, based on the comments made by Mr. Cardinal's mother, it does appear that the people he associates with in Inuvik may not be leading healthy lifestyles and that it may be best for him not to stay in that environment if he wants to make meaningful

1 changes.

Crown and defence are very far apart in their positions on this matter. Mr. Cardinal has been in custody since his arrest on April 6th, 2016. Today is May the 3rd, 2018. As of today he has been on remand for just a few days short of 25 months. Overall there is no reason not to give him credit for the remand time on the usual ratio of one and a half days of credit for each day spent on remand. This means Mr. Cardinal is entitled to credit for a little bit over three years for the time he has spent on remand.

The Crown has argued that a fit sentence for this offence would be one of five years. This would mean today I would impose a further jail term of approximately two years. The defence has urged me to impose no further jail at all and to sentence Mr. Cardinal to time served.

In deciding what to do in this difficult case, there are several principles and factors that I have to take into account. The first is proportionality. The most important sentencing principle is proportionality. It means that a sentence has to be proportionate to the seriousness of the offence and to the level of blameworthiness of the offender. Neither of these two things can be elevated above the other.

A proportionate sentence is one that reflects both these things.

That balancing is especially difficult to do when a very serious offence is committed by an offender whose blameworthiness is reduced as a result of his or her background and circumstances. My recent decision in R v Bernarde, 2018 NWTSC 27, is a very good example of a case where the balancing was particularly difficult and challenging.

That accused had committed a very serious offence. He had robbed a gas station at night wearing something covering his face, using a firearm and having pointed it at the clerk. But he suffered from Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder, had severe cognitive deficits, and had grown up in a very difficult environment, much like Mr. Cardinal. As I said in that case, no matter how sympathetic the circumstances of an offender, a sentence still has to reflect the seriousness of the offence committed.

In that case I concluded that a sentence of three years imprisonment should be imposed. That decision is now under appeal, so we may eventually receive guidance from the Court of Appeal that will inform the proportionality analysis in these difficult cases. But as of

now, my comments in that case reflect my view of how it has to be undertaken.

In short, although there are many things that reduce Mr. Cardinal's blameworthiness for this offence, I cannot allow those considerations to overtake the entire analysis. I must ensure that the seriousness of the offence is also reflected in whatever sentence I decide to impose.

I want to return briefly to why the misuse of firearms is such a serious thing. Both in the Bernarde case and when I sentenced Mr. Kakfwi earlier this week, I explained why firearm offences must be treated very seriously by this court.

The first reason to treat those offences seriously is that to do so is what is consistent with the will expressed by Parliament.

Parliament's role in our society is to make the rules. And in the rules it has made, Parliament has demonstrated in different ways how seriously it treats firearm offences. And there is a reason for that. Firearms are very dangerous objects that can do a lot of damage. The damage a bullet can cause is the same, irrespective of the intention or level of desperation of the person who pulled the trigger.

As I said when I ruled on the constitutional challenge, firearms are prevalent in northern communities. They are essential tools for those who spend time on the land fishing, trapping, and hunting. They are usually very accessible in most of our northern communities.

I do accept that Mr. Cardinal did not intend to harm anyone that night, but he was highly intoxicated and he discharged the firearm three times. As he himself acknowledges and understands now, the level of risk to others was high. The response of the criminal justice system to the misuse of firearms must be stern and has to reflect the strong condemnation of the courts of this high risk conduct.

The next issue I want to address is the relevance of sentences imposed in cases of careless use of a firearm. I will address this only briefly, but I must address it because in submissions defence counsel referred to a number of cases involving sentencings for careless use of firearm offences and other weapons offences and invited me to use them as a guide to decide what the range of sentence should be here.

I have difficulty with that position.

Mr. Kakfwi had presented a somewhat similar position as part of his constitutional challenge.

In arguing that the mandatory minimum sentence was grossly disproportionate in comparison to sentences that might otherwise be imposed for the same conduct, he, too, relied on several cases for careless use of a firearm. I was not convinced then that those cases made a compelling argument to demonstrate a gap between the mandatory minimum and what would otherwise be a fit sentence, R v Kakfwi, paras 65-70.

For similar reasons, I do not find the sentences imposed for "careless use" cases to be all that helpful in assessing what would be a fit sentence here. The offence created by Section 244.2 is different. The fact that I have struck down one of the mandatory minimum sentences created by this section does not detract from the objective seriousness of the offence that it creates and Parliament's clear signal about how seriously the reckless discharge of a firearm should be regarded.

The next legal principle that I want to talk about relates to the principles that govern the sentencing of indigenous offenders. Mr. Cardinal is Inuvialuit and the principles articulated in R v Gladue, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, and R v Ipeelee, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 433, apply to his sentencing. I am not going to repeat those principles here as

they are well established. Those principles govern this sentencing hearing as they do many of the sentencing hearings that we do in this jurisdiction. Always the court must take judicial notice of systemic factors which may have played a part in bringing Mr. Cardinal before the court.

As I hope I have made clear when I was talking about Mr. Cardinal's circumstances, there are numerous such factors in this case. Even aside from things I can take judicial notice of, his own story is a classic example of what the Supreme Court of Canada was talking about in Gladue and Ipeelee. Those cases do not require the establishment of a causal link between those circumstances and an offender's behaviour; but in this case, I agree completely with Mr. Cardinal's lawyer that the evidence is compelling and establishes that link. His case is a very good illustration of the reality that the Supreme Court of Canada was trying to capture and talk about in those two cases.

Another effect of the application of those principles is that I am required to consider the type of sanction that would be most appropriate for Mr. Cardinal given his heritage. This is not a case where anyone is suggesting that a sanction

other than imprisonment would be appropriate.

But because of the credit that has to be given

for the remand time, the issue of whether there

should be a further term of incarceration is a

live issue. And even if I decide a further jail

term is required, the length of that term must be

considered very carefully.

Gladue and Ipeelee make it clear that there is no automatic reduction of what would otherwise be the sentence if the offender was not indigenous. Always, the ultimate goal is to arrive at a proportionate sentence. The court must exercise restraint and carefully consider the circumstances of the offender and their effect on his or her blameworthiness because that may reduce the sentence from what would otherwise have been appropriate.

The next issue I want to address, and it is central in this case, is the effect of Mr. Cardinal having been suicidal when this happened. These events and this offence stem from Mr. Cardinal's desire and attempt to kill himself.

As the cases filed sadly demonstrate, offences of all sorts, including very serious ones involving the use of firearms are committed by persons who are suicidal. The same issue

1 arose in Mr. Kakfwi's case.

2.7

Deciding what impact that this particularly distressed state of mind at the time of the offence should have at the sentencing stage is not easy. Nor is the effect of that state of mind the same in all cases.

In my view, there is little doubt that the blameworthiness of an offender who is suicidal and commits an offence without actually intending any harm to anyone else is not the same as the blameworthiness of someone who is acting out of anger or retaliation. One difficulty, of course, is that a distressed person can be all those things at the same time. Emotions are not neatly divided into categories at the best of times, let alone when a person is intoxicated.

In addition, as I noted in my ruling on Mr. Cardinal's constitutional challenge at Paragraph 73 and 74, and as I have alluded to this afternoon, the fact that a person who is misusing a firearm is suicidal does not reduce the risk that this person presents. On the contrary, it often enhances it. A suicidal desperate person has nothing to lose and may act in the most reckless of ways. R v Lyta, 2013 NUCA 10 Court of Appeal, and R v Mikijuk, 2017 NUCJ 2, are very good examples of this.

Another very good example is Mr. Kakfwi's case. He too was suicidal, but he also wanted to make a point and draw the community's attention to his problems before killing himself. So in his desperate suicidal state, he marched to the Fort Good Hope community hall while the Band's annual meeting was taking place and fired five shots in the air with a high powered rifle in the parking area. This caused chaos and a general panic.

He then went to a nearby building, and a two-and-a-half hour standoff resulted. During this time he fired two more shots; one as police approached because he wanted to keep them away and a second one when he thought police were trying to get close to where he was. He also fired a third shot out the window at a 45 degree upwards but in the general direction of the community hall to make people who had come outside go back inside.

Mr. Kakfwi was suicidal, yes, but the shots he fired were not intended for himself. One aspect of his use of that firearm was that he used it to frighten others and control their movements.

In my decision in that case I noted that these things fall somewhere on a spectrum. At

one end we have the hypothetical situation, discussed during the constitutional challenge, of the very young offender who intends a shot for himself, the gun being moved away at the last minute, and who immediately drops the firearm without doing anything else.

At the other end of the spectrum, we have offenders like Mr. Lyta who is definitely suicidal and whose goal is to get the police to shoot him and kill him but who, in the process of trying to accomplish this, engages in extremely high risk behaviour, shooting repeatedly at the house of police officers.

The same is true for an offender like Mr. Mikijuk who has an entire neighbourhood under siege for several hours and fires the gun at one point in the direction of police as they are attempting to bring the situation to a peaceful end.

In emphasizing the seriousness of Mr. Cardinal's conduct and drawing a distinction between his situation and that of the reasonable hypothetical discussed in the constitutional challenge, the Crown focused, during sentencing submissions, on the second and third shots fired by Mr. Cardinal because clearly those shots were not intended for himself. The Crown argued that

this takes this case well outside the reasonable hypothetical that was examined, and that this, combined with the criminal record, the fact that he was under a firearms prohibition, and the fact that the firearm he used was prohibited, justifies the imposition of a five-year sentence.

I agree with the Crown that Mr. Cardinal's case is different from the hypothetical situation, but I disagree with the suggestion that the second and third shot fired should be looked at in isolation from the first one. Those shots were fired very soon after the failed suicide attempt.

I draw an important distinction between the facts in Kakfwi and the facts in this case. Although here the second and third shots were fired in frustration and anger, that anger and frustration was not directed at anyone. And although those shots created an enhanced risk, it was not the same level of risk as was the case in Lyta or Mikijuk.

Importantly, unlike Mr. Kakfwi, Mr. Cardinal did not confront police, hold siege in a building, use the firearm to direct or control the movement of others. Mr. Rogers persuaded him to drop the firearm relatively quickly after it was used because by the time police received the

call about the shots and made their patrol,

Mr. Cardinal had already abandoned the firearm in

the snow.

In my view, Mr. Cardinal's conduct is closer to that presented in the reasonable hypothetical than to Mr. Kakfwi's and, for that matter, it is at a lower position on the spectrum than most of the cases that were referred to.

That said, the fact remains that

Mr. Cardinal did more than try to kill himself

that night. The seriousness of what he did and

the risk he created cannot be subsumed completely

by the fact that his core intention was to kill

himself. There are aggravating factors here not

present in the hypothetical situation that I

examined as part of the constitutional challenge.

Judging by the photograph, the second shot in particular could easily have had devastating consequences. In particular since one shot had already been fired and even if this took place at night, someone could well have come to the door of the residence to investigate what was happening. Had that happened and had someone been on the other side of that door, we probably would not be dealing with a Section 244.2 charge today. Firing through a door not knowing who or what is on the other side is extremely reckless

and dangerous and it carries a high level of blameworthiness.

The third shot in the snow, given the proximity of residence also involved a high level of risk, but not as much as the second shot, because at least then Mr. Cardinal could see where he was shooting. But still he was drunk and high, and a firearm in the hands of someone in that state is an extremely dangerous thing.

Turning to the other factors that the Crown has identified as aggravating factors justifying a five-year sentence, the criminal record is aggravating because it includes so many convictions for crimes of violence and for uttering threats. The many convictions for assaults against peace officers and resist arrest would be much more aggravating if Mr. Cardinal had used the firearm to engage in any kind of confrontation with police. In Kakfwi, for reasons I expressed in giving my decision, I found this to be highly aggravating. In this particular case, where no such confrontation took place, I find those convictions of limited relevance.

As far as the aggravating effect of the record generally, I have kept in mind first that a person should not be resentenced over and over

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

for the convictions that appear on his or her criminal record.

I also think that the record must be weighed against the broader context of Mr. Cardinal's circumstances: his inability to properly express feelings and anger is easily explained by his life's experience. That does not give him a defence or excuse his behaviour, but it puts the criminal record in context.

What I mean by that is that, just as
Mr. Cardinal's blameworthiness for this offence
is reduced by his circumstances, so, too, at
least in my mind, is the weight that should be
attached to his criminal record, particularly
since it does not include any convictions for
misusing firearms.

Another factor put forward by the Crown, as I have referred to already, is the fact that the firearm was a prohibited firearm and that it was abandoned in the snow. There are, of course, reasons why certain types of firearms are prohibited. A modified rifle or shotgun can be concealed more easily, and this is usually associated with criminal activity. Here the firearm was modified for the specific purpose of suicide. In my view, this places this situation completely outside the scope of harm that the law

is intended to capture. So I attach no weight at all to the fact that the firearm was a prohibited firearm.

As for it having been abandoned in the snow, that is obviously not a good thing as someone else could have come upon it. Had it been loaded, it would have been far more aggravating because of the enhanced risk for an accident.

But in a way, as far as impact on the community and possible escalation of events, the fact that Mr. Cardinal was no longer carrying the firearm when the police found him may well have been a better thing than if he had still been carrying it, especially since he had ammunition on him.

So on the whole, while I understand the point the Crown was making in submissions about this being a dangerous object having been abandoned, I do not see the fact that the firearm was prohibited or the fact that it was left in the snow as carrying any particular weight on sentencing.

Similarly, I find the existence of the firearm prohibition of very limited effect.

Breaching a court order in the commission of another substantive offence is an aggravating factor, and court orders should be obeyed, of

course. But this is not a case where

Mr. Cardinal had guns in his home or carried a
gun for a period of time in blatant violation of
the firearms prohibition. He took possession of
the firearm for the sole purpose of ending his
life and he abandoned it shortly thereafter. So
I don't attach much weight to the existence of
the firearm prohibition, given the overall
context in terms of it being an aggravating
factors.

I said in my decision on Kakfwi, and I reiterate here, that I accept general and specific deterrence are not particularly relevant sentencing objectives when dealing with crimes committed by highly distressed, intoxicated, and suicidal people. The suicidal person cannot be expected to care much about the sentences of the court and the possible sentencing consequences of his or her action, because at the time of the events they want to be dead and they are expecting to die. But denunciation is still an important objective to show the court's disapproval of the misuse of firearms for the reasons that I have already given.

At the same time, rehabilitation cannot be completely overlooked even when denunciation is paramount. Mr. Cardinal is 30 years old, so he

still has a lot of time to change the direction of his life. He has now taken concrete steps to address his issues. Based on the evidence before me, this may be the first time that this happened. He appears to be on a better path. The road ahead will be long because no matter when he is released, when he is released he will have to make difficult choices every single day; the choice not to numb the pain with alcohol or drugs, the choice to continue with his efforts at treatment and counselling even on those days where it is more difficult, the choice to continue working on himself.

Mr. Cardinal seems to have reached a point where he knows what he needs to do. He is aware and he has some support, but he is going to have to be very strong to stick to his plan to choose healthier ways, steer clear of people who are not healthy, and move forward. All this to say the objective of rehabilitating him should not be set aside. To put it in simple terms, I do not think society or the courts should give up on Mr. Cardinal at this point.

Obviously the court has to be consistent with itself. I have to be consistent with myself.

In considering the hypothetical situation

that was presented as part of the constitutional challenge, I said that in that situation a sentence below the penitentiary range coupled with probation would be appropriate, and that is my starting point in considering what sentence is appropriate for Mr. Cardinal.

The sentence that I imposed on Mr. Kakfwi earlier this week is also something that I have to consider and be consistent with. It was to my knowledge the first one imposed in this jurisdiction for an offence under Section 244.2. Mr. Kakfwi also faced charges for uttering death threats to the police officers and using a firearm in the commission of that offence. And for that third charge, he was required by law to receive the minimum consecutive sentence of one year. So the sentence on the Section 244.2 charge had to be tempered to give effect to the principle of totality.

Mr. Kakfwi received a sentence of four years on the 244.2 offence, one year concurrent on the threats and one year consecutive on the Section 85 charge, for a global sentence of five years. As I already noted, Mr. Kakfwi was suicidal when he committed his offences. There were several aspects of his circumstances including his circumstances as an indigenous person that

1 reduced his blameworthiness.

2.7

However, as I have said, there are also important differences between what he did and what Mr. Cardinal did. Most significantly perhaps, none of the shots fired by Mr. Kakfwi were intended for himself and his actions had a considerable impact on many people and that impact was completely predictable. He did not intend to harm anybody; but he did, in fact, cause immense trauma to several people in his community.

As I said, Mr. Kakfwi's sentence on the 244.2 charge had to be tempered to give effect to the principle of totality. Mr. Cardinal's case does not call for a sentence as significant as the one Mr. Kakfwi would have received on that charge if totality had not come into play.

I think Mr. Cardinal's case also clearly calls for a sentence much higher than what I had assessed should be imposed in the hypothetical situation examined in the constitutional challenge.

Going back to where I started, to the fundamental principle of proportionality,
Mr. Cardinal's sentence has to reflect that his conduct created a significant risk, in particular, the second and third shot but

especially the second. It has to reflect the gravity of misusing a firearm considering the reality and context of this jurisdiction where firearms are prevalent. It must also take into account, to some extent, his past violent behaviour. But it must also reflect that his blameworthiness is reduced by the very difficult circumstances he has faced in his life, by the fact that he has pleaded guilty and exonerated Mr. Rogers, and the very significant fact that, at its core, this offence was committed, not simply by someone who was suicidal, but by someone who was engaged in an actual suicide attempt.

Balancing all those things, in my view, the range of sentence proposed by the Crown is excessive. I am not persuaded, however, that a sentence of time served would be adequate; but I have, as I must, given effect to the principle of restraint as much as possible.

Can you stand up, please, Mr. Cardinal.

Mr. Cardinal, I have thought about this a lot and I have decided that, if you did not have any remand time, I would impose a sentence of three and a half years. I am going to give you credit for the two years and 27 days that you have spent in custody already. I am giving you

credit for three years and one month. And so that means that today I am imposing a further jail term but of five months imprisonment, not nearly as long as what the Crown was asking.

Do you understand?

6 THE ACCUSED: Yes.

2.7

7 THE COURT: All right. You can have a seat now, because there is more that I am going to say.

This jail term will be followed by a period of probation, Mr. Cardinal, and this is to try to assist you. It is not try to punish you further. It really is to try to help your efforts at rehabilitation.

I have read your record, and you have not done particularly well with probation in the past. You have not done very well at following orders, and I know that. But since you say you want to continue with counselling and you want to try to get into treatment, having a probation officer that can help you perhaps find resources and guide you through this, may actually be useful for you.

So I am not going to put many conditions in there. I do not think you should ever drink again, but I am not going to put a "no drinking" condition because I do not want to set you up for

a breach. But I think you know what happens when you drink and I think you know that that is not a good thing.

The only conditions that I am going to put in this Probation Order are, first, that within 48 hours of your release you report to Probation Services and after that you report as they direct you.

There will be only one other condition. I am going to word this carefully. I cannot force you to take treatment and I cannot force you to take counseling. So the way I have worded the condition is that you are to consider any counselling or treatment program recommended by your probation officer. I hope that you will be able, working with your probation officer, to find the kinds of programs that will help you.

You have said through your lawyer that you want to move to Whitehorse. If that happens, your probation will be transferred to the Yukon. And you are right, they do have treatment options there. And if your probation is transferred to the Yukon, you will have a probation officer in the Yukon who can assist you. But you have to stay in touch with them and make sure you let everybody know what you are doing so that that support can continue to be there.

I do not know if I have said it, but that

probation will be for a period of three years

because you have a long road ahead of you and I

think you will need all the help you can get.

There will be a firearms prohibition for a

There will be a firearms prohibition for a period of 20 years from your release.

There will be a DNA order because it is mandatory for a primary designated offence.

I do not have a choice but to impose a Victim Fine Surcharge of \$200 for this. The time to pay and the default time is provided by the law; but as far as I am aware, you can also work it off. You might even be able to work it off while you are in custody, I am not sure, but talk to your case manager about that.

Now I imagine the firearms should be forfeited. I do not imagine there can be a lawful owner to a prohibited weapon. So is that what the Crown is asking?

MR. MAJOR-HANSFORD: Yes, Your Honour, pursuant to the section 491.

22 THE COURT: All right, so there will be --

I will ask you to, you or your office, to prepare

24 a written order confirming this, but the

25 firearm --

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

26 MR. MAJOR-HANSFORD: Yes.

27 THE COURT: -- is ordered forfeited.

Ţ		Have I overloo	ked anything from the Crown's
2		perspective?	
3	MR.	MAJOR-HANSFORD:	Not from the Crown's
4		perspective, thank	you.
5	THE	COURT:	Have I overlooked anything
6		from the defence's	perspective?
7	MS.	OJA:	No, Your Honour, thank you.
8	THE	COURT:	All right. Mr. Cardinal, I
9		wish you luck and I	hope things work out for you.
LO		And I want to	thank you counsel for their
L1		work throughout thi	s case. I would appreciate if
L2		you can pass this o	n to Mr. Green. I received
L3		excellent submissio	ns at every stage of this
L 4		case, and I am extr	emely grateful for it because
L5		it was a difficult	case. Close court.
L 6	THE	COURT CLERK:	Thank you, Your Honour.
L7			
L8			
L 9			
20			
21			
22			
23			
24			
25			
26			
7			

1	CERTIFICATE OF TRANSCRIPT
2	
3	I, the undersigned, hereby certify that the
4	foregoing pages are a complete and accurate
5	transcript of the proceedings taken down by me in
6	shorthand and transcribed from my shorthand notes
7	to the best of my skill and ability.
8	Dated at the City of Edmonton, Province of
9	Alberta, this 22nd day of May, 2018.
10	
11	Certified Pursuant to Rule 723
12	of the Rules of Court
13	
14	Nanta Kuball
15	Linda Kimball
16	Court Reporter
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	
27	