IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

IN THE MATTER OF:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

- v -

TRAVIS KING

Transcript of the Ruling on Voir Dire held before The Honourable Justice K.M. Shaner, sitting in Yellowknife, in the Northwest Territories, on the 13th day of February, 2018.

APPEARANCES:

Mr. J. Potter: Counsel for the Crown

Mr. T. Pham: Agent for Peter Harte, Counsel for the Accused

(Charges under s. 5(2) of the *Controlled Drugs and Substances Act*)

THE COURT: Earlier, in January, I heard an application on behalf of Mr. Travis King to exclude evidence based on a breach of his rights under sections 8 and 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. There was evidence at the hearing that was provided by Corporal Greg Morrow and Constable John Newcombe.

On May 27th, 2016, there was an accident on the highway in the vicinity of Kakisa in the Northwest Territories. The accident occurred between a pick-up truck and a grey Chevrolet Malibu with Saskatchewan licence plates, which I will refer to as the "Malibu". The driver of the pick-up truck, Mr. Villeneuve, reported the accident by telephone to the RCMP detachment in Hay River. He was calling from Enterprise.

Corporal Morrow testified that he is the one who received the call from Mr. Villeneuve. He took the call directly. He would not have ordinarily done so, but he said that the detachment was very busy that day and there were not enough staff members there to answer the phones.

Corporal Morrow learned from Mr. Villeneuve that the accident, as I said, occurred just outside of Kakisa; that the Malibu struck the pick-up truck from behind; that there were three

people in the Malibu; and that following the collision, Mr. Villeneuve drove himself, his passenger and the three occupants of the Malibu to Enterprise from which he made the call to the RCMP. Enterprise is a community in the Northwest Territories, which is approximately 40 kilometers south of Hay River.

Corporal Morrow said that after the call concluded, he contacted Constable John Newcombe by radio and the two of them left the Hay River detachment to go to Enterprise to investigate the collision.

Corporal Morrow stated that when he took the call, he had just returned from his lunch break which he had at his home. He said his home was located at the outer south edge of Hay River. As he was driving back to the detachment, located in the downtown part of Hay River, he observed Mr. Max Hyde driving his car in the opposite direction toward Enterprise. He recognized Mr. Hyde and his car from previous dealings with him. At the time Mr. Hyde was a sole occupant in the car.

On the way to Enterprise, Corporal Morrow and Constable Newcombe observed Mr. Hyde's car driving towards them in the direction of Hay River. The radar in the police vehicle indicated

Mr. Hyde's car was travelling at 98 kilometers per hour in a zone which was marked 90 kilometers per hour. I will pause here to say that Corporal Morrow testified the zone had a speed limit of 90 kilometers per hour. Constable Newcombe was not sure if it was 80 or 90 kilometers an hour, but both conceded that Mr. Hyde was not driving at a significantly higher speed than that which was posted.

Corporal Morrow observed now that the car had passengers in it. The police decided they would pull over Mr. Hyde. Both Corporal Morrow and Constable Newcombe were asked why they stopped Mr. Hyde. From the evidence, it appears a number of factors went into their decision. First, Mr. Hyde was speeding, albeit not excessively. Second, Corporal Morrow noted Mr. Hyde now had passengers in his vehicle. said that given that there is "really nothing" south of Enterprise, he thought the passengers might be connected to the accident. Third, both Corporal Morrow and Constable Newcombe had previous dealings with Mr. Hyde related to, among other things, nuisance calls for parties and traffic infractions. Corporal Morrow also suspected Mr. Hyde was involved in the illegal drug trade in Hay River. Finally, the police

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officers had intelligence from the RCMP suggesting that a car matching the description of the Malibu involved in the accident was connected with drug activity in Hay River.

Upon exiting the police vehicle after stopping Mr. Hyde, Constable Newcombe went to the driver's side of Mr. Hyde's car and Corporal Morrow went to the passenger side. Corporal Morrow stated that he did not hear much of the conversation between Constable Newcombe and the car's occupants because he was on the other side of the car. Corporal Morrow was, meanwhile, talking to the occupants on the passenger side through an opening in the car window.

Constable Newcombe said he advised Mr. Hyde that he had been stopped for speeding. He asked him to produce his driver's licence, proof of insurance and registration. Mr. Hyde complied with this request. Constable Newcombe also asked the three passengers for their names as he did not recognize them. They too complied.

The two passengers in the back identified themselves as Alexander Norwegian and Brandon Baxandall. The passenger in the front seat was the accused, Travis King. Corporal Morrow recognized Mr. Norwegian and Mr. Hyde. He did not know Mr. King or Mr. Baxandall.

Constable Newcombe said he asked all four occupants if they were involved in the accident. He said they all denied involvement. He was unable to recall their exact words and he did not write them down in his report.

Constable Newcombe took the documents from Mr. Hyde and returned to the police vehicle.

Corporal Morrow stayed on the passenger side of the car. He spoke to Mr. King through the passenger window and asked him his name and for his identification. He also asked Mr. King if he had been involved in the accident by Kakisa.

Corporal Morrow did not recall precisely what Mr. King said in response, but he interpreted Mr. King's response as a denial.

Meanwhile, Constable Newcombe called another officer, Constable Hutchinson, on the radio in the police vehicle. He knew that Constable Hutchinson had recently stopped a vehicle that matched the Malibu's description. From that conversation, Constable Newcombe learned that when Constable Hutchinson stopped the Malibu, Mr. Norwegian was the driver and Mr. Baxandall was a passenger.

Upon returning to Mr. Hyde's vehicle,

Constable Newcombe asked the occupants why they

had lied about the accident. He testified that

they maintained their denials. He asked Mr. Hyde where they had been and Mr. Hyde responded, "the falls". Constable Newcombe took this to mean Alexandra Falls, which are south of Enterprise and in the opposite direction from Kakisa.

Constable Newcombe arrested Mr. Norwegian for obstruction of justice contrary to section 129 of the *Criminal Code*. He conducted a search of Mr. Norwegian and the search resulted in the discovery of the registration for a grey Chevrolet Malibu with Saskatchewan licence plates. He then placed Mr. Norwegian in the police vehicle where Mr. Norwegian admitted that he was driving the Malibu at the time of the accident and that Mr. Baxandall and Mr. King were passengers.

It is convenient to note at this point that no issues have been raised about whether any of Mr. King, Mr. Norwegian or Mr. Baxandall were properly advised of their rights upon arrest.

That was not in issue.

Constable Newcombe left the police vehicle and told Corporal Morrow what he had learned.

Corporal Morrow testified that he then asked Mr.

King again if he had been involved in the accident. He was unable to recall the exact words Mr. King uttered in response, but under

1 cross-examination, he suggested Mr. King may have 2 said words to the effect of, "No, I was not in 3 that vehicle", or "I wasn't involved in this. You've got the wrong person". In any event, Corporal Morrow interpreted the response as a denial and he arrested Mr. King and Mr. Baxandall 6 7 for obstruction. They were handcuffed and placed 8 in the police vehicle.

> Mr. Hyde was arrested as well. He was handcuffed and told to wait in the ditch on the side of the road. According to the witnesses, this was because there was no room for him in the police vehicle. The officers then searched his vehicle and they found nothing relating to the accident. Mr. Hyde was subsequently released and he was given a ticket for speeding.

Meanwhile, a third RCMP officer, Corporal Scaplen, arrived on the scene, and at Constable Newcombe's request, he went to Enterprise to continue the accident investigation.

Mr. King, Mr. Baxandall and Mr. Norwegian were taken to Hay River to the detachment in the police vehicle.

While in the vehicle, Corporal Morrow and Constable Newcombe both noticed a strong odour of what they recognized to be "green marijuana", that is, marijuana that has not been smoked.

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Both testified that the odour was not present prior to placing the three detainees into the vehicle. Constable Newcombe described the odour as overwhelming. They were unable to determine the source of the odour immediately.

The three detainees were processed when they arrived at the detachment. Corporal Morrow and Constable Newcombe were particularly concerned at that point with finding the source of the green marijuana odour.

Mr. King was the first to be processed. As part of that, he was asked to remove his clothing to the first layer. This left him wearing his shirt, pants and underwear. The police found nothing at this stage, and still needing to pinpoint the source of the odour, they moved to a strip search of Mr. King.

Now I will pause to note as well that before the strip searches began of all three of these individuals, they were all asked to go down to the first layer, meaning that they were wearing a shirt, pants, and the strip search had not begun. So it was after all three of them had been searched that they moved to the strip search of Mr. King.

A visual recording of the strip search was tendered into evidence during this hearing. The

search occurred in one of the cells at the detachment. Corporal Morrow and Constable

Newcombe were both present. The door from the cell to the hallway was open, although no one other than the two police officers and Mr. King was present. Mr. King removed his pants and then his underwear. His shirt remained on at all times. A clear plastic bag containing what was later determined to be crack cocaine was found in his underwear. His pants and underwear were returned to him almost immediately and he put them back on. Mr. King was then charged with possession for the purpose of trafficking. The strip search lasted less than two minutes.

Mr. Norwegian was processed next in the same manner, and this led to the discovery of a bag of marijuana. A strip search was also conducted on Mr. Baxandall and nothing was recovered. All three were subsequently taken before a Justice of the Peace and then released. The obstruction charge against Mr. King was ultimately stayed.

The legal framework in an application to exclude evidence under section 24 of the *Charter* is well established. An applicant must first establish that there has been a *Charter* violation. If this threshold is not met, that is the end of the matter. If it is met, then it

falls to the applicant to demonstrate that the evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed or denied his or her *Charter* rights and that admitting the evidence would, in all of the circumstances, bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

Strip searches represent an extreme invasion of personal dignity and privacy. A strip search following arrest and in the context of lodging an accused must be based on reasonable and probable grounds. Strip searches may not be carried out as a matter of routine or blanket policy and the necessity of conducting such a search, given its invasiveness, must be assessed by the police on a case by case basis. They must be conducted in a reasonable manner, and the onus is on the Crown to demonstrate compliance with these standards.

The authority for this is found, of course, in the case of the R v Golden, 2001 SCC 83, and as well in R v Coulter, 20 OJ 3452 and 2000 CarswellOnt 2972.

At the hearing defence counsel, Mr. Harte, conceded that the initial traffic stop was authorized under the terms of the Northwest Territories *Motor Vehicles Act*, RSNWT 1988 c. M-16. His argument was that there were not reasonable and probable grounds to arrest

Mr. King for obstruction in the first place and therefore the ensuing search violated his right to freedom from unreasonable search and seizure under section 8 of the *Charter*.

That narrows the issues to these: First, were there reasonable and probable grounds to arrest Mr. King for obstruction?; second, did the strip search to which Mr. King was subjected comply with the constitutional requirements?; and third, if the answer to either or both of these is no and Mr. King's Charter rights were violated, should the cocaine be excluded from evidence?

Turning to the first issue, the defence arguments on this question focussed on the elements of the offence of obstruction under section 129 of the *Criminal Code* and whether they were present when the arrest occurred.

Mr. Harte submitted that lying to the police does not, by itself, equate to obstruction. It is also necessary that the police are misled, that is, obstructed, by the lie. He reasoned that because the police were confident that Mr. King and the two other passengers were involved in the accident that they were investigating, Mr. King's denial did not mislead the police. Moreover, the extra work involved as

a result of Mr. King's denial, that is Constable
Newcombe's radio conversation with Constable
Hutchinson and the fact that a third officer
wound up going to Enterprise to continue the
investigation into the accident, was of
insignificant consequence. He also emphasized
that the obstruction charge against Mr. King was
ultimately stayed.

The case of *R v Khan*, 2014 ONSC 6541, which is a summary conviction appeal, was cited in support of the defence position. The issue there was whether an action that had a trivial effect on the execution of a police officer's duty was sufficient to find an accused guilty of obstruction and, in particular, the applicability of what is termed the *de minimis* principle in that determination.

Justice Dawson embarked on a thorough discussion of, among other things, the elements of obstruction, the *de minimis* principle and its application in various contexts. He also canvassed case law from a number of jurisdictions throughout Canada where the meaning of obstruction has been considered. Among his conclusions was this: (at paragraph 71)

I agree with these comments and with

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the comments of Robertson J. in

1	Walcott at paragraph 35, that the
2	words of Spence J. in Moore cannot be
3	taken as requiring the Crown to prove
4	"a major inconvenience" to the police
5	in order to establish an obstruction
6	pursuant to s. 129(a) of the Criminal
7	Code. However, I remain of the view
8	that it does not follow that the de
9	minimis principle has no application
10	where the effect of the obstructive
11	conduct on the execution of the
12	police officer's duty was so minor or
13	trivial that it falls within the de
14	minimis range. It goes too far, in
15	my view, to say that any effect on
16	the execution of the police officer's
17	duty, no matter how trivial or
18	insignificant, is sufficient to
19	establish the second essential
20	element of the offence.
21	While I accept all this, respectfully, I find
22	that the argument advanced on behalf of Mr. King
23	cannot succeed. That is because it conflates
24	what is required to sustain a conviction with
25	what is required to establish reasonable and
26	probable grounds for an arrest.
27	Securing a conviction requires that a court

of competent jurisdiction, after hearing and considering all of the evidence, be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of each element of the offence. This is the context in which the analytical framework in *Khan* and other cases respecting whether there was actual obstruction would be relevant.

By contrast, an arresting officer is not required to have evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction, nor evidence that establishes a prima facie case, and the authority for that is found in R v Storrey 1990 1 SCR 241, in paragraphs 15 to 17. A lawful arrest without warrant requires first, that the arresting officer believes subjectively that the person to be arrested has committed or is about to commit an indictable offence; and second, that the grounds for the arrest are objectively justifiable in that a reasonable person in the shoes of the police officer, taking into consideration the officer's training and experience, would conclude that there were reasonable grounds for the arrest.

I am satisfied from his evidence that

Corporal Morrow subjectively believed Mr. King's

action in denying involvement in the accident

amounted to obstruction. In cross-examination he

was asked how Mr. King's denial obstructed the

accident investigation. His response was that he believed Mr. King deliberately provided false information designed to deflect suspicion from himself. Corporal Morrow was unshaken in this under cross-examination.

Turning to the more complex question of whether the arrest was objectively justifiable, the circumstances which presented themselves to Corporal Morrow with respect to Mr. King were these: first, Mr. King was asked if he was involved in the accident. He denied that he was and then Mr. Norwegian was arrested. Norwegian admitted to being the driver of the car involved in the accident and he told Constable Newcombe that Mr. King was, indeed, one of the passengers. As well, Constable Newcombe, upon searching Mr. Norwegian at the scene, found the registration for a grey Chevrolet Malibu with Saskatchewan licence plates which matched the description of the car provided by Mr. Villeneuve. Constable Newcombe imparted all of this information to Corporal Morrow who asked Mr. King, again, if he was involved in the accident and Mr. King, again, denied it.

A reasonable person in the position of a police officer with training in investigation and law enforcement would, in my view, upon being

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presented with these circumstances conclude that Mr. King was, indeed, trying to steer the investigation away from himself, thus obstructing the accident investigation. The arrest was objectively justifiable.

Before leaving this, it is important to also discuss the fact that the charge of obstruction was ultimately stayed. In my view that is a red herring. The Crown can stay charges for a variety of reasons and that is generally not reviewable by the Court. So, for the foregoing reasons, I find that Corporal Morrow had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest Mr. King and, accordingly, that arrest was lawful.

That brings us to the issue of whether the strip search to which Mr. King was subjected complied with the Constitutional requirements, and I find that it did. The police had reasonable and probable grounds to conduct the strip search following the arrest. It was not carried out to punish or humiliate Mr. King or the others. It was carried out for a specific and legitimate purpose prompted by the odour of green marijuana and it was conducted in a reasonable manner. It was not a fishing expedition, nor was the strip search conducted as

1 part of a blanket police policy.

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Both of the police officers testified, again, that there was a strong odour of green marijuana in the police vehicle following the arrests. That odour had not been present before they placed the three accused in the vehicle and this led them each to believe that one or more of the three of Mr. Baxandall, Mr. Norwegian or Mr. King was in possession of marijuana.

The police conducted the first layer search which did not reveal the source of the odour from any of the three. Thus, they believed that they needed to proceed to the strip search to determine the source.

A strong odour of marijuana emanating from an individual or individuals who are about to be lodged in cells would give rise to legitimate concern. Faced with that, it would have been entirely unreasonable for the police to ignore it and do nothing. Finally, the strip search was conducted in a manner consistent with the guidelines set out in Golden at paragraph 101. Among other things, it was carried out in a private setting. Mr. King was permitted to remove his own clothing and he was not touched in any manner by either officer during the search. It was not prolonged, lasting less than two

1	minutes. It proceeded in a way that Mr. King was
2	never fully undressed and it was conducted with
3	only the two arresting officers present.
4	Accordingly, the strip search conducted on
5	Mr. King was reasonable and the discovery of
6	cocaine incidental to this.
7	In conclusion, I find that there was no
8	violation of Mr. King's rights under section 8 of
9	the Charter and, accordingly, the application to
10	exclude the evidence is dismissed.
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12	CERTIFICATE OF TRANSCRIPT
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14	I, the undersigned, hereby certify that the
15	foregoing pages are a complete and accurate
16	transcript of the proceedings taken down by me in
17	shorthand and transcribed from my shorthand notes
18	to the best of my skill and ability.
19	Dated at the City of Edmonton, Province of
20	Alberta, this 1st day of July, 2018.
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23	C. Rea
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25	Colleen Rea
26	Court Reporter
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