Jackson v. Jackson, 2017 NWTSC 54 S-1-DV-2016-104503

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

BETWEEN:

KAYLEE-JO JACKSON

Petitioner

- and -

DANIEL JACKSON

Respondent

Transcript of the Oral Decision delivered by The Honourable Justice S. H. Smallwood, sitting in Yellowknife, in the Northwest Territories, on the 28th day of July, 2017.

APPEARANCES:

Ms. J. Brunet: Counsel for the Petitioner

Mr. P. Parker: Counsel for the Respondent

Ms. B. McIlmoyle: Counsel for the Children

Official Court Reporters

1 THE COURT: This is an application by the Respondent, Daniel Jackson, to vary the Interim Order of February 2nd, 2017, which set out the 3 Respondent's interim access to the children of 5 the marriage. 6 The Respondent is seeking to increase his access with the children pending the trial of this matter. The Petitioner, Kaylee-Jo Jackson, 9 is opposed to the variation. The issues of child support and spousal support were also addressed 10 11 at the hearing. 12 13 Background The parties were married in 2009 and have 14 15 three children together: A.R., who is seven; 16 B.R., who is four; and C.R.J., who is three. 17 The parties lived in Edmonton, Alberta, while the Respondent was employed by the Canadian 18 19

The parties lived in Edmonton, Alberta, while the Respondent was employed by the Canadian Armed Forces. They moved to Hay River, Northwest Territories, in 2012. The Respondent left the military and began working for De Beers at the Snap Lake mine site. He has since been relocated to the Gahcho Kué mine site. He works a two-weeks-in-two-weeks-out rotation.

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The Petitioner was employed while the parties were together, working for the Hay River Health Authority. She is currently unemployed.

The parties separated around November 14th, 2016. The Respondent left the family home and has rented an apartment in Hay River. The Petitioner and the children remained in the family home.

On November 29th, 2016, the Petitioner relocated the children to Edmonton, Alberta, without the Respondent's consent. The Petitioner filed for divorce on November 29th, 2016, seeking custody of the children. The Respondent filed an Answer and Counter-Petition on November 30th, 2016, seeking joint, shared custody of the children. The Respondent also filed a Notice of Motion seeking the return of the children to Hay River.

On December 20th, 2016, Justice Shaner ordered the return of the children to Hay River no later than December 29th, 2016. The terms of the decision provided that if the Petitioner returned the children to Hay River and she returned with them, that they would be in her interim day-to-day care until further order of the Court or other agreement of the parties. If the Petitioner decided not to return to Hay River with the children, the children would then be in the day-to-day care of the Respondent. Access was also addressed in the decision. The party

who did not have day-to-day care would have reasonable in-person, Skype, FaceTime, or telephone access with the children.

The Petitioner returned to Hay River with the children on December 29th, 2016.

A further Interim Order was made on January 12th, 2017, which provided specific interim access to the Respondent. By that time, the Respondent had been charged with assaulting the Petitioner, apparently for incidents which had occurred prior to their separation. The Respondent was subject, at that time, to an undertaking which prohibited contact between the parties, except through a third party for the purposes of arranging access to the children.

In addition to specifying access, the

Interim Order also provided for a third party to

facilitate access. A further Interim Order was

made on February 2nd, 2017. This Order, which is

currently in place, dealt with access. It

provided that the Respondent would have access

with the children during the two-week periods

where he was in Hay River from Friday at 4 p.m.

to Sunday at 7 p.m., that he would have access

with B. and C. on Tuesdays and Thursdays from

12:30 to 6:30 p.m. and with A. from after school

to 6:30 p.m. on Tuesdays and Thursdays. There

has been to date no Order made regarding custody

of the children.

The criminal matters were scheduled for trial earlier this week, on July 25th, in Hay River, and I am advised that the Respondent was found not quilty.

A trial in the divorce has been scheduled for October 2nd, 2017, in Hay River. Among other things, custody of the children will be in issue at the trial, as will mobility as the Petitioner desires to move to Edmonton with the children.

Law

Section 16 of the Divorce Act deals with custody and access. It permits this Court to make an Interim Order for custody and access.

Section 16(8) of the Divorce Act requires the Court to take into consideration the best interests of the children as determined by reference to their condition, means, needs, and other circumstances.

The Court is also required, pursuant to Section 16(10) of the Divorce Act, to give effect to the principle that a child should have as much contact with each parent as is consistent with the best interests of the children and, also, to take into account the willingness of each parent

to facilitate contact.

In making Interim Orders, the focus is often on preserving the status quo pending a final determination on the issues of custody and access. The status quo is not necessarily the current situation or the situation that has developed following a party's separation.

Unilateral actions by a party cannot serve to create a status quo. The courts often instead look to the historical status quo, the situation that existed during the parties' relationship and not one created by the separation.

As stated in Kalaserk v. Nelson, 2005 NWTSC 4, at paragraph 3, the test on an interim application is what temporary living arrangements are the least disruptive, most supportive, and most protective for the children.

The purpose of the Interim Order is to provide a reasonably acceptable solution to the issue of custody until trial, and stability for the children is a focal point: Hamilton v. Hessdorfer, 2012 NWTSC 45.

Where there is an interim custody order in place, courts are reluctant to vary them, preferring that matters proceed to trial.

Lafferty v. Larocque, 2013 NWTSC 10, at paragraph 24. An Interim Order can be varied provided

there has been a change in circumstances.

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I have carefully considered whether the arrangements currently in place should continue pending the trial of this matter, given that the trial is scheduled to occur in a couple of months, in October 2017, or whether there should be some adjustment made to the present arrangements. There are only a couple of months until the trial, and the Court could leave these arrangements in place until then when the issues of custody and access will be determined. However, I have, with some hesitation, decided 13 that there should be some adjustment to the current access arrangements and I have decided this for several reasons. First, in this case, 15 16 no interim custody order has been made. The decision of Justice Shaner ordered the return of the children from Alberta and provided for day-to-day care of the children once they were 19 returned to the Northwest Territories. The Court 20 made no determination regarding custody, interim or otherwise. 23 Given the recent separation of the parties

and the unilateral removal of the children from the jurisdiction by the Petitioner, it is likely that the Court's focus was on the return of the children and their short-term living arrangements rather than determining interim custody or access based on the limited information before the Court at that time.

The further Orders of this Court addressed access in the weeks following the children's return from Alberta. The issue of custody or long-term access was never specifically addressed by the Court. As this matter has continued to proceed to trial - currently scheduled, as I said, in October - what was a short-term arrangement has become one that has been in place for months now with a couple of months still to go before the trial.

Secondly, the interim arrangements and the situation between the parties has caused some disruption. This is a high-conflict situation and the parties' relationship has been volatile, with allegations of physical and emotional abuse as well as allegations regarding alcohol abuse.

The criminal charges resulted in the Respondent having to enter into an undertaking which limited contact between the parties. It is apparent that the parties have had difficulties in communicating and have different parenting styles, and the addition of the undertaking, while necessary in the circumstances, added an additional challenge to the communication between

the parties. This is something that has been acknowledged by both the Petitioner and the Respondent, that their communication has not been good and that there is room for improvement.

Both feel that there can be improvement and they believe that their communication can get better.

In addition, both parties testified about wanting to reduce the number of transitions for the children so that they are not going back and forth between the parties as frequently. They both acknowledge that this has been difficult for the children and that their communication difficulties have also posed a challenge.

The Petitioner, in her evidence, spoke of wanting to adjust the access regime to provide the Respondent with longer access on the weekend and one access day during the week in order to streamline access. The Petitioner testified about wanting things to be smoother for the children and for the children's time with the Respondent to be a little more consecutive. The children are young, seven, four, and three, and the two months until trial is a significant period of time for a child. The goal of reducing disruption to their lives and attempting to streamline access, even in the short term pending trial, is in their best interests.

1 Evidence

Daniel Jackson, Kaylee-Jo Jackson, Trudy
Hiebert, and Nicole Klause, testified at the
hearing. I do not intend to review the parties'
evidence in detail and will refer to it only
insofar as it relates to the issues on this
application.

Daniel Jackson and Kaylee-Jo Jackson

testified extensively about their relationship

and their parenting of their children. The

parties' evidence differed significantly in

several aspects. It is apparent from the

evidence the parties' relationship was a

high-conflict one. There were allegations of

arguments, physical violence, emotional abuse,

alcohol abuse, and poor parenting. The parties

did not agree on the extent of their parental

role while they were still together.

Turning to the issue of violence, both parties testified about incidents involving violence. Some of these incidents form the basis of the criminal charges that Daniel Jackson was facing.

Whether the Respondent had assaulted the Petitioner and was criminally responsible has been decided by the Territorial Court in a trial and the Respondent has been found not guilty.

However, it is apparent that there were incidents of violence between the parties. The relationship between the parties was a volatile one, and now that the parties have separated, the no-contact provision in the undertaking had the benefit of prohibiting contact between the parties and hopefully put them in a situation where they had to learn to communicate and interact with each other in a more appropriate manner. In my view, limited communication between the parties should continue until the trial at least.

My focus on this application is on the interim parenting of the children and not on determining who might have been responsible for various incidents during the relationship.

It appears that the children may have witnessed acts of violence while the parties were together, and it is not healthy or appropriate for a child to witness family violence. That the parties are now separate and their contact is limited is an opportunity for each parent to focus on their relationship with the children.

Looking at the alcohol use by the

Respondent. The Respondent acknowledged that he

drank but testified that he did not abuse

alcohol, that he drank around four drinks twice a

week, and he testified that his consumption of alcohol was one of the things that he and the Petitioner regularly fought about during their relationship. His evidence was that the Petitioner felt he had a problem with alcohol, and he testified that he quit drinking as a result of this for a period of about six months prior to the parties' separation.

The Petitioner testified that the Respondent had a problem with alcohol and that when he was home from work (his two-week periods that he was out) that he would often be drunk. She described the times when he was drinking as being horrifying and that he could be physically and verbally abusive during these times. Other times things would be fine; he could be loving.

It appears, upon review of the evidence, the Respondent has minimized to an extent the amount of alcohol that he consumed during the relationship. He acknowledged in cross-examination that there had been occasions where he had drunk to excess. For example, to the point of being denied boarding on a plane.

Trudy Hiebert also testified about an occasion where she was present and the Respondent appeared intoxicated. She described him as looking drunk, that he was stumbling, loud,

argumentative, and aggressive. So there is some evidence that the Respondent has drunk to excess during the relationship between the parties.

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On this application, my concern, as I have said, my focus, is on the interim parenting of the children and not assigning blame for the various incidents which may have occurred during the parties' relationship. To that end, I am concerned about the Respondent's consumption of alcohol while the children are in his care. The provision that he not consume alcohol while he is caring for the children will remain in place, so that provision is that the Respondent shall not consume alcohol or be under the influence of alcohol when any of the children are in his care. The other provision that will also continue will be the one that is when any of the children are in the care of the Respondent, the Respondent shall not allow any of his friends or family members to have contact with the children if any of those friends or family members are under the influence of drugs or alcohol.

Turning to parenting prior to separation.

The parties testified about the role that each played in parenting prior to the separation and the parties' evidence differed in this regard.

In the years prior to the parties'

separation, they had a nanny and both parties were employed. The parties agreed that while they employed the nanny, that the nanny was primarily responsible for taking care of the children's needs on a daily basis. Each party played a role in parenting the children. The Respondent has been working on two-week-in-two-week-out rotation for several years now. The Petitioner's evidence was that while the Respondent was working, that she and the nanny were responsible for the care of the children and with the nanny doing many of the day-to-day tasks for the children. When the Respondent was home, it appears that the parties and the nanny cared for the children. The parties disagree about who did more for the children, each saying that they took on more responsibility when it came to caring for the children than the other parent. Overall, I find that both parties

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Overall, I find that both parties
participated in caring for the children when the
Respondent was home. The Petitioner's role in
their lives has been more constant and continuous
given the Respondent's work schedule. I am not
sure that it matters for the purposes of this
application the exact extent of each party's
involvement.

The parties both agree that the Respondent should have access to the children for a period of days, including overnight visits. At this point, the focus is on ensuring that the parties are able to maximize their contact with the children while maintaining stability and minimizing disruption.

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Turning to communication. The parties agree that the Respondent was on an undertaking which prohibited his contact with the Petitioner except through a third party for purposes of facilitating access. He was on this undertaking for several months. And both parties testified regarding their communication since the separation. It is apparent that there has been communication between the parties that is otherwise than contemplated under the undertaking. The Respondent has communicated through the third party to the Petitioner about issues other than access, such as things having to do with the house. Similarly, the Petitioner has frequently directly contacted the Respondent about the children or other issues, and she has done that through electronic means. But the Respondent has not replied.

Communicating about the issues which arise in a divorce can be challenging, particularly

when one party is prohibited from contacting the other. At this point, given the issues which exist between the parties, I think that they should continue to communicate through a third party even though the undertaking is not in effect. This issue can be revisited at trial and it can be determined then whether direct communication should occur, whether it is through email or text or in person or by telephone. That is an issue that can be determined at trial seeing how the communication between the parties occurs over the next two months.

Parenting since separation. The parents have been parenting pursuant to the Orders made in December and February for several months now. There have been some issues, some involving communication. There have been challenges in trying to coordinate exchanges, ensuring that the children have the proper clothing, that clothing is returned. There is a concern that the Respondent has taken the children to school late. Overall, I do not find that these incidents are significant. They do not raise concerns with respect to parenting. These issues often occur when parties split and there are challenges in parenting in two separate households. Parenting styles differ and no parent is perfect.

Within this, I have seen some signs of progress. The parties have been able to agree on some things, like additional access without the Court's involvement, and it is hoped that this will continue.

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The Petitioner described an injury which occurred to B. while in the Respondent's care. The Respondent denied that anything like that had occurred. No additional evidence was presented regarding this injury. I cannot say what occurred with respect to B., but if he was injured, that is a serious concern, and I want to make it clear that the children must be properly supervised and not left unattended while they are in the Respondent's care. B. and C. are four and three years old and need to have proper supervision and are to be monitored at all times. Injuries that may occur while in a parent's care should be explained to the other parent. This is to ensure that the other parent is aware of what occurred and so that they can monitor the injury in case follow-up is required. Failing to communicate this type of information will only increase the tension and discord between the parties.

So turning to the decision. The parties agree that there should be joint custody, so

there will be an Interim Order for joint custody.

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The children will be in the day-to-day care of Mrs. Jackson subject to the following access. In the two-week period when Mr. Jackson is in 5 Hay River, he will have the children as follows and, in saying this, I have tried to take into account the concerns that have been expressed regarding the disruption to the children, minimizing transitions. So the access will be as 10 follows:

> Mr. Jackson will have the children each Friday at 8 a.m. until Tuesday at 8 a.m. When school begins, Mr. Jackson will have access to A. when school lets out on Friday and he will be responsible for dropping her off for school on Tuesday morning, and he will also be responsible for providing lunch and whatever else is necessary for her to attend school on that day.

The parties will continue to communicate through the third party for all purposes. Whether that party is Christine Ferguson, which has been suggested, and it sounds from the evidence that person is agreeable, so whether it is Christine Ferguson or another mutually agreed-upon third party, all communication will occur through that third party. This will be in place pending the trial date, and that, as I

said, can be revisited at the trial.

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With respect to alcohol use, the Respondent shall not consume alcohol or be under the influence of alcohol when any of the children are in his care, and when any of the children are in the care of the Respondent, the Respondent shall not allow any of his friends or family members to have contact with the children if any of those friends or family members are under the influence of drugs or alcohol.

Turning to the other issues: spousal support and child support. The Petitioner is seeking interim spousal support. She was employed during the relationship but left her job when she moved to Edmonton with the children. She had secured a job in Edmonton, one that is apparently being held for her. Since her return to Hay River, she attempted to get her job back with the Hay River Health Authority, but she was not successful in doing so. The Petitioner testified that she had applied for another job but was not successful. It does not appear that she has made other attempts to obtain employment. During her testimony, the Petitioner questioned whether any employment she obtained would outweigh the child care costs she would also occur and also testified regarding the difficulty in obtaining child care in Hay River.

The Respondent has been paying most of the household bills since the parties separated, paying the mortgage on the family home as well as for other debts accumulated by the parties.

Reviewing the financial statements of both parties, it is apparent that their financial circumstances are strained. There is very little discretionary money available to them, they have a significant amount of debt, and maintaining separate households since the separation has increased the financial strain.

In the circumstances, I am not prepared to order spousal support on an interim basis. That issue can be fully explored at trial.

With respect to child support. There has been no child support ordered to date. Child support is the right of the children and should be paid. It should be the priority in this situation to provide for the support of the children. And as I have said, I am aware that the parties' financial situation is a tight one. They have significant debt and the Respondent has, to his credit, being paying most of the expenses related to the matrimonial home since the separation. He has paid the mortgage, he has paid the vehicle payment, as well as other

expenses, including paying on debt that the

parties accumulated during the marriage.

However, in my view, there should also be a child support order.

Based upon the Respondent's 2015 Notice of Assessment, his income was \$115,698.

Mr. Jackson's evidence regarding his 2016 income was that it was \$121,433. Using the 2016 income, child support for three children, according to the tables for the Northwest Territories, is \$2,096 per month.

Looking at the Respondent's financial circumstances, I am aware that imposing this amount of child support will be a financial burden and it may be that he could establish a case for undue hardship in these circumstances.

I am also mindful that the trial is only a couple of months away and I expect that the financial issues will be dealt with during the trial, including the division of matrimonial assets and debt. Therefore, I am making an Interim Order that the Respondent pay child support for the months of August, September, and October, on the 1st of each month, in the amount of \$1200. It may be at trial that the trial judge will make a retroactive order for child support and adjust this amount, but, in the

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interim, there should be some support for the

children that is paid pending the trial.

Thank you, counsel. Is there anything else

to address?
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MR. PARKER: 5 Thank you, Your Honour. The 6 only question I have is regarding contact between the parties. Recently, the undertaking was revised to allow the parties to have contact in 9 the case of mediation or any other kind of ADR and that was done with myself, Ms. Brunet, and 10 the prosecutor. I was wondering if we could have 11 a similar provision. I just want to understand 12 13 the third-party contact. Are you saying they should not have any contact except for through 14 the third party? 15

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THE COURT: Well, that is one of the issues, that is what I have said in the decision, but I was also, in coming to this decision, concerned about what had happened to the undertaking. And listening to both parties testify, they both seemed to be interested in moving towards having communication. But I guess my concern was whether -- what sort of incremental steps should be taken. So at this point what I have said is that it should be through a third party for all purposes, but I am open to hearing from counsel, you know, what you

- 1 think is reasonable, because I do not want to
- 2 push -- open it up, wide open and have issues
- 3 arise. So I would like, if it is agreeable, to
- 4 have something that is incremental that will
- 5 improve their communication.
- 6 MR. PARKER: My suggestion would be that --
- 7 I think the Court suggested Christine Jackson as
- 8 a third party.
- 9 THE COURT: Is it Christine Jackson or
- 10 Ferguson?
- 11 MR. PARKER: I'm not --
- 12 THE COURT: Because I notice in the
- 13 transcript she had been referred to in both ways.
- 14 So I am not --
- 15 MR. PARKER: Maybe we can confirm with one
- of the parties.
- 17 THE COURT: Okay. Can someone confirm
- 18 whether it is Christine Ferguson or Christine
- 19 Jackson.
- 20 MS. BRUNET: It's Christine Ferguson.
- 21 THE COURT: Okay.
- 22 MR. PARKER: Thank you. So my suggestion
- 23 would be that that Order be -- the third party be
- 24 Christine Jackson or another --
- 25 THE COURT: Christine Ferguson.
- 26 MR. PARKER: Ferguson. Pardon me. Or
- 27 another third party mutually agreeable by the

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parties. And then an additional sub-condition
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            there that the parties may have contact for the
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            purposes of mediation or any kind of -- or any
            other type of alternative dispute resolution.
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            There's been some discussion recently, Your
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            Honour, since the hearing in June, that the
            parties may want to have those discussions prior
            to trial, if not just to narrow some of the
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            issues and maybe to streamline some of the
            communication issues that Your Honour has been
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           talking about in today's decision. So that would
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           be just kind of a sub-clause just so they
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           wouldn't have to come back to Court to amend this
           Order for the parties to have contact for the
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            purposes of mediation.
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        THE COURT:
                               Okay. Thank you. Ms. Brunet.
       MS. BRUNET:
                               Your Honour, I had trouble
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            hearing everything that Mr. Parker said. I
           understand that he's suggesting that the third
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           party remain in place for the pick up and drop
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           off, which is consistent with your direction, and
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            also -- but that they have face-to-face contact
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            for the purposes of alternate dispute resolution.
        THE COURT:
                               Yes. What I understand
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            Mr. Parker to be saying is -- so the Order that I
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            have made that the parties are only to
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communicate with Christine Ferguson or another

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1 third party for things like the children or if
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- 2 there are issues with the house, essentially
- 3 day-to-day things, but that they can have contact
- 4 for the purposes of pursuing mediation or
- 5 alternate dispute resolution.
- 6 MS. BRUNET: Yes, Your Honour. In
- 7 addition, I had suggested to Mr. Parker, and we
- 8 haven't fully explored this, but the possibility
- 9 of putting in place the Family Wizard Program.
- 10 I'm not sure if you're familiar with it, but it's
- 11 a program actually designed for divorcing
- 12 families so that those sort of day-to-day
- 13 logistical items that need to be discussed can be
- 14 done through more of a neutral platform, and that
- would help, perhaps, to alleviate the burden of a
- third party having to continually pass messages
- back and forth or to always have it through
- 18 counsel.
- 19 THE COURT: Okay. Is that an electronic
- 20 -- like an app or a program?
- 21 MS. BRUNET: Yes. Essentially, it's like a
- 22 -- yeah, program that is set up and actually can
- 23 involve counsel having access to the
- 24 communications as well.
- 25 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
- Mr. Parker, do you have any comments?
- 27 MR. PARKER: My only comment -- yes. I'm

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going to speak a little louder. Ms. Brunet has
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            suggested this platform, and I've taken a look at
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            it, my client is aware of it. There are some
            issues with his ongoing, consistent access to his
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            device while he's at the mine site, so it may not
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            work perfectly or be able to be ruled out, but
            there could be a general order simply saying if
            the parties agree, they can have further access
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            for the purposes of, of -- maybe it's not even
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            (indiscernible). Further access through an
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            electronic platform that they agree to. Just
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           something general that permits them to use that
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            kind of tool. Like I said, there may be some
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            difficulties. We're looking into how it could be
            implemented from Mr. Jackson's end. But a term
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            in the Order that permits the parties to do that
           without being in contempt of any court order
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            would be useful, I think.
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        THE COURT:
                               Thank you. Ms. McIlmoyle, do
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            you have anything to add?
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       MS. MCILMOYLE:
                               Thank you, Your Honour. I
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            have had clients work with the Family Wizard in
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            the past and there have been some concerns that
            if one of the parties doesn't respond right away,
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            then the other one will be upset that their
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            communication isn't being considered. So there
            are glitches in the program, but I do think that
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1 it's a good program as long as they both stay on
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- 2 top of things and respond and let each other know
- 3 what's going on every day.
- 4 THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you.
- 5 So, the communication through the third
- 6 party. So the parties will communicate through a
- 7 third party, whether it is Christine Ferguson or
- 8 some other mutually agreed-upon third party.
- 9 There will be an exception that they may have
- 10 contact with each other for the purposes of
- 11 pursuing mediation or alternate dispute
- 12 resolution, and, if the parties agree, they can
- have further contact through a mutually
- 14 agreed-upon electronic platform.
- Does that address, then, the communication?
- 16 MR. PARKER: Yes. Thank you.
- 17 THE COURT: Ms. Brunet? Hello.
- 18 Ms. Brunet?
- 19 MS. BRUNET: Yes, Your Honour, that sounds
- 20 -- that sounds good. I did have one other
- 21 question with respect to finances. The order for
- child support, is that in addition to
- 23 (indiscernible).
- 24 THE COURT: Sorry. I can't --
- 25 MS. BRUNET: (Indiscernible).
- 26 THE COURT: Something's happened to the
- volume, Ms. Brunet. So you kind of faded out

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there. So I didn't catch what you said. You had
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- 2 a question about the finances and the \$1200?
- 3 MS. BRUNET: Sorry, Your Honour. Excuse
- 4 me. Can you hear me now?
- 5 THE COURT: Yes.
- 6 MS. BRUNET: Okay. My question was with
- 7 respect to the child support order. Is that in
- 8 addition to (indiscernible)?
- 9 THE COURT: Again, it has kind of died
- 10 out. I think you are asking if it is in addition
- 11 to Mr. Jackson continuing to pay what he had been
- 12 paying previously.
- MS. BRUNET: Yes. Yes, that's --
- 14 THE COURT: Yes, it is. It is.
- 15 MS. BRUNET: Okay. Thank you.
- MR. PARKER: Just to be clear, Ma'am, we're
- 17 talking about the carrying cost of the home and
- 18 mortgage and --
- 19 THE COURT: Yes.
- 20 MR. PARKER: -- anything else that he's
- 21 been paying. I think that -- if I remember
- 22 correctly from the evidence, Mrs. Jackson is
- 23 paying things like fuel for the home --
- 24 THE COURT: Yes.
- 25 MR. PARKER: -- electricity. So we're
- 26 talking essentially about the mortgage payments
- 27 and the property taxes --

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       THE COURT: Yes. The payments that each
           party had been making previously, what they
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           testified to at the hearing, will continue and
           the $1200 is in addition. And as I said, I
 5
           expect, given that the trial is fairly close,
           that the financial issues will be sorted out
 6
 7
           then. This is, as I said, an Interim Order to
           address the next couple of months.
 8
 9
       MR. PARKER:
                              Just so my notes are complete,
           it was -- the months were August, September --
10
11
       THE COURT:
                             And October.
12
       MR. PARKER:
                              Thank you.
13
       THE COURT:
                              Is there anything else,
14
           counsel?
15
       MS. BRUNET:
                              There was one other item.
16
           When you made the -- sorry. The summertime
17
           access starting at -- is it 8 a.m. on Friday?
       THE COURT:
18
                              Yes.
       MS. BRUNET:
                              Till 8 a.m. or 8 p.m. on
19
           Tuesday?
20
                             Eight a.m. on Tuesday.
       THE COURT:
21
22
       MS. BRUNET:
                              Okay.
23
       THE COURT:
                              And I do not know what time --
           when school starts, whether it starts at eight or
24
           later, but essentially the Order is contemplated
25
           that once school begins, that Mr. Jackson will be
26
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dropping her off. So even though school starts

27

- 1 at 8:30, whatever it is, and his access ends at
- 2 8, it is expected he will be dropping her off
- 3 rather than returning her to Mrs. Jackson only to
- 4 have her take her to school, because that just
- 5 seems that is --
- 6 MR. PARKER: So, pardon me --
- 7 MS. BRUNET: Thank you.
- 8 MR. PARKER: -- taking the child to school
- 9 on Tuesday mornings?
- 10 THE COURT: When school starts, yes.
- 11 Whether school starts at 8 or 8:30 or later.
- 12 Okay?
- 13 MR. PARKER: I only have one more query and
- 14 that is would you like counsel to draft the
- 15 Order?
- 16 THE COURT: Yes, please.
- 17 MR. PARKER: Would you like the Order dated
- 18 today's date or the date of the hearing?
- 19 THE COURT: Today's date.
- 20 MR. PARKER: Thank you.
- 21 THE COURT: All right.
- 22 COURT CLERK: And would you like to review
- this Order?
- 24 THE COURT: Yes. Thank you.
- 25 COURT CLERK: Thank you, Your Honour.
- 26 THE COURT: Is there anything else,
- 27 counsel.

1	MR. PARKER:	No thank you.	
2	THE COURT:	Ms. McIlmoyle?	
3	MS. MCILMOYLE:	No.	
4	THE COURT:	Ms. Brunet?	
5	MS. BRUNET:	That's everything. Thank you	
6	THE COURT:	Thank you, counsel.	
7			
8			
9			
10		Certified Pursuant to Rule 723 of the Rules of Court	
11			
13		Jane Romanowich, CSR(A)	
14		Court Reporter	
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