R. v. Eeyeevadluk, 2017 NWTSC 38 S-1-CR-2016-000007

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

IN THE MATTER OF:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

- V -

KARMA EEYEEVADLUK

Transcript of the Decision on the Mistrial Application by The Honourable Justice S. H. Smallwood, sitting in Yellowknife, in the Northwest Territories, on the 26th

day of May, 2017.

APPEARANCES:

Mr. A. Godfrey:

Counsel for the Crown

Mr. S. Fix:

Counsel for the Defence

Charge under s. 344(1)(b) Criminal Code of Canada

Official Court Reporters

1	THE	COURT: Karma Eeyeevadluk is charged
2		with robbery contrary to Section 344(1)(b) of
3		the Criminal Code. She was tried before a jury
4		from February 6th to 9th, 2017. During the trial
5		the Crown called five witnesses and the defence
6		presented no evidence. The jury deliberated
7		for several hours before finding Ms. Eeyeevadluk
8		guilty of robbery.
9		Following the announcement of the verdict a
10		conviction was entered, the jury was discharged,
11		and the matter was adjourned to February 27th,
12		2017, to speak to the date for sentencing.
13		On February 27th Ms. Eeyeevadluk appeared
14		with new counsel, Mr. Fix, who advised that
15		Ms. Eeyeevadluk would be applying for a mistrial
16		The defence subsequently filed the application
17		and supporting materials, and I heard submissions
18		on May 12th, 2017.
19		The defence seeks a mistrial on the basis of
20		the evidence which was filed, which consists of
21		an affidavit of Karma Eeyeevadluk and that of he
22		counsel at trial, Tu' Pham. Ms. Eeyeevadluk's
23		affidavit refers to what she would say about
24		the charge before the Court and attaches a
25		statement she gave to the police. In essence
26		she denies having committed the robbery. Mr.

27

Pham's affidavit says that he canvassed with

1	Ms. Eeyeevadluk at the close of the Crown's
2	case whether she wished to testify on her
3	own behalf. Ms. Eeyeevadluk was unsure,
4	but ultimately advised Mr. Pham that she
5	did not wish to testify.
6	Following the closing of the evidence,
7	and prior to the end of the pre-jury charge
8	conference, Ms. Eeyeevadluk advised Mr. Pham
9	that she now wished to testify. Mr. Pham
10	advised her that it was too late to testify
11	as the defence had already closed its case.
12	He was unaware that an application could be
13	made to reopen her defence. No application
14	was made to reopen the defence and the matter
15	proceeded. The jury was charged and deliberated,
16	returning its verdict of guilt.
17	The first issue is whether I am functus
18	officio; that is, whether I have any jurisdiction
19	to declare a mistrial following the recording of
20	the jury's verdict and the discharge of the jury.
21	The decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada in
22	Head, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 684, and Burke, 2002 SCC
23	55, dealt with this issue. The Supreme Court
24	of Canada stated in Burke at paragraph 68:
25	
26	The general rule has been that

27 after the jury in a criminal

1	trial has been discharged, the
2	trial judge is functus officio
3	and lacks jurisdiction to reconvene
4	the jury and inquire into the
5	alleged error in the verdict.
6	
7	The Supreme Court went on to determine
8	that there is an exception to the general
9	rule and stated at paragraph 69:
10	
11	where the error is one that
12	does not require the jury to
13	reconsider the verdict or continue
14	its deliberations with a view to
15	handing down additional verdicts;
16	there the trial judge retains the
17	limited jurisdiction to recall the
18	jury and conduct a narrow inquiry
19	into the alleged error.
20	
21	The Supreme Court of Canada also set out
22	a framework in Burke for Courts to follow in
23	this situation, and at paragraph 70:
24	
25	The first question that must
26	be asked is whether the error
27	is one that requires reconsideration

1	of the verdict. If it requires
2	redeliberation of the verdict,
3	there are no circumstances under
4	which the judge will retain or
5	otherwise possess jurisdiction
6	to reconvene the jury and conduct
7	an inquiry into the alleged error.
8	The trial has concluded and the
9	jury's function is finished. The
10	jury is not then permitted to change
11	its mind. If the error does not
12	require the jury to reconsider
13	its verdict, then the trial judge
14	possesses jurisdiction to conduct an
15	inquiry, the nature of the inquiry
16	being whether the facts of the case
17	disclose a reasonable apprehension
18	of bias. In determining whether
19	this apprehension is raised, the
20	trial judge must consider all of
21	the relevant circumstances of the
22	case, an important circumstance
23	usually being the dispersal of the
24	jury and its probable effect on the
25	minds of reasonable members of the
26	public. If the facts disclose a
27	reasonable apprehension of bias, the

1	trial judge's remedial jurisdiction
2	is necessarily limited, such that
3	the trial judge cannot alter the
4	originally recorded verdict.
5	
6	The case of R. v. Henderson, 2004 CanLII
7	33343 (ON CA), considered the ability of a
8	trial judge to declare a mistrial following a
9	jury verdict. The Court referred to the test
10	in Burke, where the jury does not render the
11	verdict it intended, that exception. It also
12	referred to a second exception where the accused
13	wants to raise the defence of entrapment.
14	In R. v. Halcrow, 2008 ABCA 319, the
15	Alberta Court of Appeal considered whether
16	a trial court retained a residual discretion
17	to declare a mistrial several months after
18	
	the jury was discharged. The Court held that
19	the jury was discharged. The Court held that a trial court retained a residual discretion
19 20	
	a trial court retained a residual discretion
20	a trial court retained a residual discretion in narrow and limited circumstances in which
20	a trial court retained a residual discretion in narrow and limited circumstances in which the proper recording of the verdict was in
20 21 22	a trial court retained a residual discretion in narrow and limited circumstances in which the proper recording of the verdict was in
20 21 22 23	a trial court retained a residual discretion in narrow and limited circumstances in which the proper recording of the verdict was in doubt, but that:

27

new trial ought to be ordered, after

1	taking account of such matters as
2	position adopted by his counsel
3	during the trial.
4	
5	That is at paragraph 33.
6	I have read the cases provided by counsel
7	and also looked at other cases. In particular,
8	I have read the Supreme Court of Canada's
9	decision in Burke with a view to the defence's
10	argument that Burke has been wrongly interpreted
11	by appellate courts, that they have wrongly
12	reviewed the decision as relating to the nature
13	of the error when the focus should be on the
14	sanctity of the verdict.
15	With respect to my view the decision in
16	Burke is fairly clear, and the questions to
17	be asked are set out in the decision. The
18	first question I must ask myself is whether
19	the error is one that requires reconsideration
20	of the verdict. If it does, there are no
21	circumstances where I will retain or otherwise
22	possess jurisdiction to reconvene the jury
23	and conduct an inquiry into the alleged error.
24	The alleged error in this case relates to the
25	conduct of the defence.
26	It is not a question of whether there

27 was an error in recording the verdict or

1	that the jury did not return the verdict
2	that it intended. Whether it is characterized
3	as an issue of the competence of counsel or
4	some other ground, one of the questions is
5	whether the defence case could have been
6	reopened had an application been brought
7	prior to the case going to the jury.
8	My understanding is that in exceptional
9	circumstances the defence can be reopened.
10	Whether this case was that exceptional case,
11	whether there was an issue of the competence
12	of counsel are issues that were not argued
13	before me, and are questions that are preferable
14	that they be answered by an appellate court.
15	My reasons should not be construed as positing
16	an opinion on either of these issues.
17	In my view, as this is a question of
18	reopening the defence and calling additional
19	evidence, which would necessarily involve
20	reconsideration of the verdict, I do not
21	retain any jurisdiction to reconvene the
22	jury or declare a mistrial, the jury having
23	rendered its verdict and having been discharged.
24	Therefore, I am dismissing the application
25	for a mistrial. It is in Ms. Eeyeevadluk's
26	best interests to have this matter proceed to
27	sentencing and concluded quickly so that she

1	can consider her	next course of action, whether
2	she wishes to app	peal or take some other course
3	of action.	
4		
5		
6		Certified to be a true and
7		accurate transcript, pursuant to Rules 723 and 724 of the Supreme Court Rules.
8		supreme court kuies.
9		
10		Joel Bowker
11		Court Reporter
12		
13		
14		
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		
26		
27		