IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

IN THE MATTER OF:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

- v -

TERRY RICKY DON KAYOTUK

Transcript of the Reasons for Sentence delivered by The Honourable Justice A.M. Mahar, sitting in Inuvik, in the Northwest Territories, on the 30th day of August, 2016.

APPEARANCES:

Mr. A. Godfrey: Counsel for the Crown

Ms. M. Tordoff: Counsel for the Accused

(Charges under s. 255(3), 255(3.1), 249(4), 255(2.1), 255(2), 249(3), 253(1)(a), 253(1)(b), 249(1), and 220(b), of the Criminal Code of Canada)

1 THE COURT: On July the 6th, 2014, Ricky
2 Kayotuk was driving a pickup truck with five
3 passengers in the early morning hours. The truck
4 was proceeding at a high rate of speed, estimated
5 between 160 and 170 kilometers an hour in a
6 50-kilometer-an-hour posted speed zone.

Shortly before the accident scene, there are three caution signs on the roadway indicating "use extreme caution" and "uneven road" and "travel slowly". The vehicle struck a pole. Two of the passengers were ejected from the vehicle. Sasha Larocque-Firth was an occupant of the vehicle. She was one of the parties ejected. She was approximately 24 years old, and she was fatally injured. She died.

Kristen Elias was 20 years old at the time. She suffered severe injuries as a result. She had to be resuscitated at the scene. There was a fear that extensive brain damage may have occurred. This was, thankfully, not borne out. She suffered a number of fractured bones in the area of her pelvis, as well as her arm, and a ruptured bladder. She has, thankfully, recovered, although the recovery took a significant period of time.

Darci Frost was 19 years old. She suffered relatively minor injuries, although she did

require sutures on her forehead. She was kept in the hospital for tests. She suffered pain for a number of weeks, as did Lucy Jane Thrasher, who was also an occupant of the vehicle.

The other parties, including Mr. Kayotuk, do not appear to have been injured.

Mr. Kayotuk entered a guilty plea on the last occasion before the Court on a single count of impaired causing death, three counts of impaired causing bodily harm, and one count of dangerous diving.

While his guilty plea was not at the first instance, I am giving him credit for the guilty plea, because it appears that once he got himself properly aligned with current defence counsel, there was very little hesitation involved.

Mr. Kayotuk has shown remorse by entering a guilty plea to these charges.

I have been provided by both counsel with significant case law, which I will refer to at this point. There has been some discussion about the appropriate range for these sorts of offences. This Court takes the view that this range has been moving upwards, as society becomes more and more willing to display its abhorrence at the carnage caused by drinking and driving.

The range suggested by the cases provided is

somewhere between two and eight years, depending on the circumstances. It is clear that cases of this sort depend very heavily on their circumstances, on the aggravating and mitigating factors that the Court must consider in coming to a determination of a fit sentence.

Counsel has suggested that the appropriate range in this case is between two and a half and three and a half years. While this is not, technically speaking, a joint submission for a particular sentence, it is a well thought out position taken after extensive negotiation, and the Court must give it some deference. There is also a recommendation that the period of prohibition be between five and seven years.

Ricky Kayotuk is 35 years old. Prior to this event, he had a single count on his criminal record. That was for impaired driving back in 2010. The existence of a related record is a significant aggravating factor. The circumstances of the offence are also significantly aggravating. Mr. Kayotuk's blood alcohol readings were 170 and 190, taken some two hours after the incident. This is in excess of two times the legal limit and is also an aggravating factor.

Getting back to the specifics of the

driving. Mr. Kayotuk will be sentenced in a concurrent way for the dangerous charge, but I take the circumstances of the driving into account in assessing the gravity of this offence. This is not a situation of momentary loss of control due to alcohol consumption. Driving at that rate of speed, at 110 or 120 kilometres over the limit, is extremely dangerous and takes this case out of the usual situation of drunken inadvertence resulting in an accident. So I take it into account in an aggravating way.

In my view, the appropriate range in this case, not taking into account some of the mitigating factors, is between four and six years.

Mr. Kayotuk is of indigenous decent. He comes from a small community. His formative years were plagued by alcohol abuse. I take this into account, as I must, pursuant to section 718.2(b) and as directed by the Supreme Court of Canada in *Ipeelee*. There are no cases in which these circumstances should not be considered by the Court and I take that into account.

I take it as given as well, that counsel has taken these circumstances into account in coming to their recommendation with respect to range. I am willing to impose a sentence within the range,

1	somewhat reluctantly. I do not fault counsel for
2	this.
3	The sentencing regime with respect to
4	impaired driving, specifically impaired driving
5	causing death and impaired driving causing
6	injury, has, as I have indicated, been a moving
7	landscape. And this Court must and does embrace
8	that movement upwards. So while I am willing to
9	accept the range, Mr. Kayotuk's case will fall
10	into the upper end of that range, as will his
11	period of prohibition.
12	Referring now to the case of R. v. Lacasse,
13	2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089, in
14	paragraph 73, and I quote:
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16	While it is true that the objectives of deterrence and
17	denunciation apply in most cases, they are particularly relevant to
18	offences that might be committed by ordinarily law-abiding people.
19	It is such people, more than chronic offenders, who will be
20	sensitive to harsh sentences. Impaired driving offences are an
21	obvious example of this type of offence, as this Court noted in
22	Proulx.
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24	They then quote the $R.~v.~Proulx$, [2000] 1
25	S.C.R. 61 decision within their decision:
26	
27	dangerous driving and impaired driving may be offences for which

harsh sentences plausibly provide general deterrence. These crimes are often committed by otherwise law-abiding persons, with good employment records and families. Arguably, such persons are the ones most likely to be deterred by the threat of severe penalties.

We heard from a number of members of the public who have been tragically affected by this incident. Cases involving a death are always heartbreaking for the Court, especially when that death was entirely pointless and unnecessary. It is very difficult not to be blinded by anger in circumstances like this. I did not even know the deceased, and I found myself struggling with this yesterday. A lovely young woman has been taken from her friends and family by a criminal act, so I struggled with how to proceed in this case last night and this morning.

We have, collectively, an extreme reaction to these sorts of incidents. There is a need for a strong deterrent message to be sent by the Courts, especially when people are severely injured or killed.

I agree, as I must, with the Supreme Court of Canada and with appellate decisions with respect to the need for extremely deterrent and denunciatory sentences in cases like this.

I do, however, take some issue with a bit of

the logic. We all know someone who has gotten heavily intoxicated and driven. There is nothing unusual about people who take this kind of outrageous risk, and yet the Court is limited in terms of the steps that it can take to try to address that risk.

It is easy to forget that Ricky Kayotuk did not intend to hurt anyone that night. People who commit this sort of offence never do. And when they do, it is not an impaired causing death; it is a different offence, and it is dealt with differently. It is hard to keep that in mind. It is hard to keep that in mind when I see the picture of the deceased.

about stopping the carnage on the roads other steps will have to be taken as well. I agree that a strong deterrent message has to be sent in cases where a death or bodily harm has ensued as a result of drinking and driving. But by definition people who drink and drive are not exercising good judgement when they get behind the wheel. The number of times that grossly reckless behaviour takes place and it does not result in a serious injury or death are legion. I am simply guessing, but what if it is one in a hundred times that somebody who takes the kind of

risk Mr. Kayotuk took actually ends up either
hurting or killing somebody? If we are serious
about stopping drinking and driving, then we have
to address the problem at the point of decision
and apply meaningful consequences to somebody who
decides to turn their vehicle into a weapon.

I was struck by the comments of Justice Fuerst in the $R.\ v.\ Muzzo,\ 2016\ ONSC\ 2068$ decision. She was echoing earlier comments as well:

Everybody who decides to drink and drive is essentially taking the risk of killing somebody.

The guilty mind involved in this case is no different than anybody else who gets highly intoxicated and gets behind the wheel. Be that as it may, we are dealing with this case today.

With respect to the charge of impaired causing death, the sentence of the Court is three and a half years at a rate of 365 days per year. I give Mr. Kayotuk credit for 285 days, essentially, that he has served, giving him credit on 1.5 credit for 1 basis for the 190 days that he served, which leaves 992.5 days remaining.

With respect to the other charges, time will

be served concurrently. It will be two years on each charge concurrent to the charge on which he is more substantially sentenced.

There will be a driving prohibition for seven years commencing the day of the completion of his sentence.

DNA order is mandatory. It is made, as is a firearms prohibition, under section 109, for ten years. There will be a section 113 exemption allowing him to apply for a limited permit for the purposes of hunting for sustenance or employment.

To the family and friends of Sasha

Larocque-Firth, I extend my deepest sympathies.

There is nothing that this Court can do to undue what was done. Circumstances like this, it is, at best, a clumsy tool; we simply wield it the best we can.

Counsel, is there anything that I have neglected?

21 MS. TORDOFF: That would be the victim fine 22 surcharge, sir.

23 THE COURT: Victim fine surcharge of \$200
24 on each charge, as I have been mandated to do,
25 totalling a thousand dollars. There will be five
26 years to pay.

27 Mr. Godfrey, anything?

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	1	MR. GODFREY: Yes. The remaining charges,
	2	Your Honour, I believe the Crown can indicate
	3	they will be stayed, and I will file a written
	4	stay once I get back to Yellowknife.
	5	THE COURT: Anything else?
	6	MR. GODFREY: I don't believe so, Your
	7	Honour.
	8	MS. TORDOFF: No, sir.
	9	THE COURT: Thank you, both.
	10	
	11	CERTIFICATE OF TRANSCRIPT
	12	I, the undersigned, hereby certify that the
	13	foregoing pages are a complete and accurate
	14	transcript of the proceedings taken down by me in
	15	shorthand and transcribed from my shorthand notes
	16	to the best of my skill and ability.
	17	Dated at the City of Edmonton, Province of
	18	Alberta, this 30th day of September, 2016.
	19	Certified Pursuant to Rule 723
	20	of the Rules of Court.
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	22	Jenne Maurit
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	25	Jenna Mearns
	26	Court Reporter
	27	Court Keporter
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