Miller Sales & Engineering Inc. et al. v. Metso Minerals Industries Inc. et al., 2016 NWTSC 23

S-1-CV20110000110

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

BETWEEN:

MILLER SALES & ENGINEERING INC. dba MILLER ENGINEERING assignee of DIAVIK DIAMOND MINES (2012) INC.

Plaintiff

- and -

METSO MINERALS INDUSTRIES INC. and METSO MINERALS dba SVEDALA INDUSTRIES INC.

Defendants

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Transcript of the Decision by The Honourable Justice

A. M. Mahar, at Yellowknife in the Northwest Territories,
on February 19th, A.D., 2016.

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## APPEARANCES:

Ms. S. Webber: Counsel for the Plaintiff (by Teleconference)

Ms. C. Hanert: Counsel for the Defendants (by Teleconference)

- THE CLERK: Ms. Hanert, you are on the
- line?
- MS. HANERT: Hello. 3
- THE CLERK: So I have both Ms. Hanert
- and Ms. Webber on the phone.
- MS. WEBBER: I am here, it is Sandra 6
- 7 Webber, yes.
- THE CLERK: Court is in session, the
- Honourable Mr. Justice Mahar presiding.
- 10
- 11 Teleconference connected
- 12
- THE COURT: Good morning, Ms. Hanert, 13
- 14 Ms. Webber.
- MS. WEBBER: 15 Good morning.
- MS. HANERT: 16 Good morning.
- THE COURT: 17 This is the case of Miller
- 18 Sales and Engineering Incorporated, Miller
- 19 Engineering assignee of Diavik Diamond Mines
- 20 (2012) Incorporated as plaintiff; Metso
- 21 Minerals Industries Incorporated, Metso
- Minerals, Svedala Industries Incorporated, 22
- 23 defendants. This is an application by the
- 24 defendant.
- 25 Application and position of the parties:
- 26 This is an application by the defendants
- 27 Metso Minerals Industries Incorporated and

Metso Minerals Svedala Industries Incorporated seeking to have the action brought by Miller Sales and Engineering Incorporated, Miller Engineering, assignee of Diavik Mines (2012) Incorporated referred to arbitration and either stayed or dismissed.

The claim is that Miller and Metso are bound by the terms of a distributor agreement which contained an arbitration clause. Miller takes the position that what is at issue here is not a claim between Miller and Metso, but an assigned claim between Diavik (2012) and Metso. Since Diavik (2012) was not a party to any agreement with an arbitration clause, then they are not bound by any such agreement and neither is their assignee in good faith.

## Background:

on April 12, 2002, Miller and Metso entered into a distributor agreement under which Metso agreed to supply various products which Miller would then distribute. These products included the pumps which form the basis of this action. They agreed, in article 16.1 of this agreement, that any disputes arising between them would be settled through recourse to arbitration. This clause bears repeating in full, as it is notably broad and

1	all-encompassing:
2	16.1 Any and all disputes of whatever nature arising between
3	the parties to this agreement or
4	the underlying business relationship, including
5	termination thereof, and which are not resolved between the parties
6	themselves, shall be submitted for final settlement by arbitration conducted in accordance with the
7	then current JAMS/Endispute Comprehensive Arbitration Rules
8	and Procedures, except as listed within this section, by a sole and
9	independent arbitrator who shall
10	base his or her decision solely on presentations by the parties and
11	not by independent review, in Milwaukee, Wisconsin or at such other location as may be mutually
12	acceptable. Any and all disputes shall be submitted to arbitration
13	hereunder within one year from the
14	date they first arose or shall be forever barred. Arbitration hereunder shall be in lieu of all
15	other remedies and procedures
16	available to the parties.
17	The distributor agreement remained in
18	force until March 25th, 2012.
19	In the fall of 2006, Metso agreed to
20	provide Miller with 12 pumps which Miller had
21	agreed to provide to Diavik Diamond Mines
22	Limited for the purpose of dewatering their
23	mine property. The pumps were provided and
24	installed in 2007.
25	In January of 2009, Diavik expressed
26	concerns to Miller about the pumping system
27	Miller had provided and Metso had

1	manufactured. During the course of 2010,
2	Diavik and Miller corresponded about the
3	alleged deficiencies and Miller also
4	corresponded with Metso.
5	On November 12, 2010, Metso notified
6	Miller that it would not acknowledge full
7	liability for the alleged deficiencies.
8	On December 17, 2010, Miller responded and
9	claimed that any deficiencies resulted from
10	defective manufacture and advised Metso that
11	Miller would seek indemnification for any
12	ensuing loss suffered by Miller as the result
13	of payments to Diavik.
14	On August 5, 2011, Diavik issued a
15	Statement of Claim against Miller for damages
16	resulting from negligence and breach of
17	contract in the evaluation, engineering and
18	design of the pumps. Metso was not named as a
19	defendant.
20	On September 28, 2011, Miller filed a
21	Statement of Defence.
22	On March 23, 2012, two days before the
23	agreed upon termination of the mutual
24	obligations contained in the distributor
25	agreement, Miller issued a third party claim
26	against Metso, alleging that any damages
27	suffered by Diavik were the result of breach

1 of contract and negligence by Metso and seeking indemnification should Miller be found liable to Diavik. 3 On October 10, 2012, Diavik Diamond Mines 5 (2012) Inc. was substituted as plaintiff in lieu of the earlier incarnation of Diavik and the Statement of Claim was amended accordingly. Metso was not named at this point or at any point previous as a defendant 9 by Diavik or Diavik (2012). 10 11 Two weeks later, on October 24, 2012, 12 pursuant to a settlement and assignment agreement with Miller, Diavik assigned the 13 14 rights to carry on this litigation to Miller. Two specific portions of this settlement 15 16 agreement were bought to my attention by the 17 applicant and warrant repeating for the 18 record. The settlement agreement states, in 19 part, that "Miller has not resolved its 20 dispute with, or its claims against Metso and, in fact, wants to continue to pursue Metso" 21 22 and "it is the intention of Miller to bring 23 finality to the involvement of (Diavik) except 2.4 to the extent that Miller wants to continue to 25 pursue Metso for contribution towards the amount paid by Miller by (Diavik)". 26

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On March 6, 2015, Metso was substituted in

1 place of Miller as defendant, and Miller was substituted in place of Diavik (2012) as plaintiff. On April 28, 2015 a further 3 Amended Statement of Claim was filed 5 reflecting these changes. At no point in any of these proceedings, 6 with the exception of this application, did 7 Metso take any position. It never attorned to these proceedings. 9 Analysis: 10 11 The question of whether or not this 12 dispute is captured by the International Commercial Arbitration Act RSNWT 1988, c. I-6, 13 14 depends on the answer to a more fundamental question - is this a dispute between Miller 15 16 and Metso, or, as the respondent claims, a 17 dispute between Diavik (2012) and Metso to 18 which Miller is simply an assignee? 19 Section 7(1) of the Act provides that 20 "Subject to this Act, the International 21 Arbitration Law applies in the Territories"; 22 and in subsection (2), "the International 23 Arbitration law applies to international 24 commercial arbitration agreements and awards, 25 whether made before, on, or after August 10, 1986." 26 27 There is no question that Diavik (2012),

in its own right, is not limited in any way
from pursuing a claim in damages against

Metso.

It also appears clear to the Court that Miller, under the terms of the distributor agreement between Miller and Metso, would be precluded from making any sort of claim against Metso directly by virtue of the unequivocal arbitration clause contained in that agreement.

The third party claim filed by Miller against Metso, two days before the expiry of the binding terms of the distributor agreement, is interesting in this context.

The respondent has taken the position that Miller was never required to refer this dispute to arbitration because there was no actual dispute unless and until damages had been ascertained. It makes limited sense that Miller can claim that it was in a position to file a third party action against Metso and at the same time claim that there was no dispute such that arbitration could have been commenced.

At any of many points in time over the long history of this litigation, Miller could have asked that this dispute go to

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arbitration. None of the parties to this proceedings are unsophisticated, nor do they lack the advice of obviously highly capable counsel. Clearly, a decision was made early on to avoid the arbitration process in the hope that another avenue to compensation could be found.

Miller and Metso entered into an agreement which was intended to limit the risk of both parties in the event of a dispute. Miller, for whatever reason, chose not to enter into a similar agreement with Diavik. The arbitration clause states, in no uncertain terms, that "any and all disputes shall be submitted for arbitration" and that "arbitration...shall be in lieu of all other remedies and procedures available to the parties".

The convoluted and imaginative restructuring of this litigation certainly gave me pause, as did the able and compelling presentation by counsel for the respondent, but underneath it all this is simply an attempt by Miller to escape the bonds of an agreement it voluntarily entered into with Metso. This is Diavik (2012)'s claim in name only. As was stated by counsel for the

applicant during this hearing, the question is whether the Court looks to the form or the substance of things. This Court takes the view that where there is a choice to be made between the two, substance should always triumph over form.

This litigation flows directly from a dispute between Miller and Metso. The machinations discussed above fall under the rubric of "other remedies and procedures" in the distributor agreement arbitration clause and the parties are therefore referred to arbitration.

It is not necessary for me to rule on whether or not the one year limitation period in the arbitration clause has passed. It is difficult to conceive of an interpretation of events in such a way in which the one year limitation period has not been exceeded, however I make no such finding.

Pursuant to section 11 of the

International Commercial Arbitration Act, the
parties, having been referred to arbitration,
this action is stayed insofar as the assignee
litigant Miller's action against Metso is
concerned. This should not be seen as
extinguishing the rights of Diavik (2012) as

Ţ	against Metso.
2	Costs to go to the applicant on a
3	party-party basis.
4	I want to thank you both again for your
5	very thorough and fulsome presentation. Close
6	court.
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11	Certified correct to the best of my skill and
12	ability,
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17	Lois Hewitt,
18	Court Reporter
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