IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

BETWEEN:

JEANNINE DIANE PILON, of the City of Yellowknife, in the Northwest Territories

- and -

ROGER ERNEST PILON, of the City of Yellowknife, in the Northwest Territories

Petitioners

Transcript of the Oral Decision delivered by The Honourable Justice L. A. Charbonneau, sitting in Yellowknife, in the Northwest Territories, on the 7th day of December, 2015.

APPEARANCES:

Mr. E. Bruveris: Counsel for Ms. Pilon, Petitioner

Mr. R. Pilon: For himself, Petitioner

This transcript has been altered to protect the identity of the child pursuant to the direction of the presiding Judge

THE COURT: This case was before me in regular Family Chambers on December 3rd, 2015.

Two Notices of Motion, one filed by the mother, the other filed by the father, are before the Court concerning the care and control of one child, A., born in 2001.

It is apparent from the record that this is a high conflict and complex matter. I will refer to some of the background. My purpose this afternoon is not to summarize all the past proceedings on this case, but I think some background is necessary to put my remarks in context.

A few years after A.'s birth, the parties separated. They lived in the same house for some time and, in 2004, began living in different homes and began a shared parenting regime which was eventually incorporated in a Corollary Relief Order.

Some years later, the mother initiated proceedings to vary that Order and obtain sole custody of A. That matter went to trial in March 2011. The Court's decision was filed in August 2011 and is reported at 2011 NWTSC 41 ("the 2011 decision"). It is a lengthy decision which goes over the trial evidence, some of the contentious issues that emerged from that evidence and were

relevant to the issue of custody, and of course it includes the Court's findings.

mother sole custody in 2011. But the Court also disagreed with the father's position that the existing custody regime should remain unchanged. The Court decided that A. should spend alternating years with each parent, each year being aligned with the school year. The Court decided that this regime should begin with A. spending the first year with his mother. He would then spend a year with the father starting in September 2012, and this alternating regime would continue from year to year.

The Court also concluded that A. has special needs. The Court concluded that of the two parents, the mother was the more reasonable one when it came to dealing with his medical issues and with medical professionals. Although the Court directed that the mother consult with the father and keep him advised of changes and recommendations regarding A.'s medical situation, the Court also ordered that in the event of disagreement as to medication, treatment, or testing, the final decision would be the mother's, and that she also would have authority to consent to testing at school without the need

to obtain the father's consent. This authority,
the Court decided, would remain with her even
when A. was spending his year in the care of the
father, unless the mother agreed otherwise.

As far as the shared parenting regime, the year commencing in September 2014 was a year where A. was with his father. The school year commencing in September 2015 was when he was to return to the care of his mother.

As far as the present motions, it is undisputed that A. was returned to his mother's care in August 2015 for what was supposed to be the year in her care; but he has not remained in her care. There is significant conflict in the affidavit evidence about the reasons that led to this.

The father's wife and another child have relocated to Manitoba. The father wants to relocate to Manitoba as well. It is undisputed that the father took A. to Manitoba in September 2015, registered him in school and, for all intents and purposes, purported to relocate A. to Manitoba to live with the father's family.

Again, there is much conflict in the evidence about how this came to be and, in particular, whether this was a unilateral action on the father's part or whether it was something that

happened with the mother's agreement or
acquiescence.

The mother filed a motion on November 6th,

2015, seeking the immediate return of A. to the

Northwest Territories and to her care. That

application came before this court for the first

time on November 12th. At that point, the only

evidence before the Court was the mother's

affidavit. The father appeared by phone. He

told the Court that he intended on filing a

Notice of Motion to vary the custody regime. He

told the Court various things about his version

of what happened before A.'s move, but of course

none of it was under oath and properly in

evidence before the Court at that point.

The Court ordered that A. be returned to the NWT and returned to the care of his mother by

November 20th. The order also prohibited both

parties from removing the child from the

Northwest Territories and stated that the 2011

order would remain in effect. The matter was

adjourned to be spoken to on December 3rd, which

is when it came before me. By then there were

new materials before the Court. The father had

filed a Notice of Motion seeking various relief

and he had also filed a lengthy affidavit. In

addition, the mother had filed a Supplementary

1 Affidavit.

The mother continues to seek A.'s immediate return to her custody and care. She asks that the order include a clause requiring the RCMP to assist with enforcement if necessary.

In the motion that he filed on November 24th, the father seeks the appointment of counsel for A., a variation of the 2011 order granting him interim primary day-to-day care of A., child support, and an order permitting him to relocate with A. to Manitoba.

I will now refer to the evidence. It is not possible for me to refer to it in all its detail.

I do want to make a few preliminary observations about it, though.

The first is that some of the topics and events covered in the affidavits were the subject of evidence at the 2011 trial. To the extent that findings were made by the Court at that time, the evidence now presented is of little weight or use because any analysis now undertaken must have as its starting point the findings that were made by the Court in 2011.

The second observation I want to make is that while there is significant conflict in the evidence, there are certain relevant facts that are not disputed. Clearly, there have been

changes in the circumstances since the 2011 Order was made. At the time that Order was made, both parents lived in Yellowknife. It appears from the decision, in particular at paragraphs 109 and 121 of the decision from 2011, that while the possibility of the father relocating had been a live issue at one point, it no longer was by the time of trial. Things are different now. The father's wife has lost her employment and she and another child have relocated to Manitoba. The father wants to relocate there as well. That is a change of circumstances compared to what the situation was in 2011.

Another change is A.'s age. He was ten at the time the 2011 Order was made. He will turn 15 next March. There is no doubt that that is a big difference. In the 2011 decision, at paragraph 149, the Court specifically acknowledged that the custody regime may have to be revisited as A. got older.

Another point is that at the time the 2011 order was made, although there had been problems between A. and his mother, the situation was found at that point to have been improving. In fact, one of the reasons why the Court felt A. should spend the first year with his mother was to build upon these improvements. It would

appear that at present, the situation between A.

and his mother has deteriorated significantly.

At first blush, these changes in circumstances may well open the door for the custody regime to be revisited, but that of course does not answer the question as to how it should be changed. Any decision in that regard must be based on what is in A.'s best interests, and, on that front, A.'s best interests may not necessarily coincide with his present wishes.

What I mean by that is that if, for example, one change in circumstance should turn out to be the two parents no longer live in the same community, that does not answer the question of which parent A. should be residing with. That decision would have to be made on an assessment of what is in his best interests, which would include an analysis of whether one parent is, in fact, trying to cut A.'s ties from the other parent. At this point, these are things that are alleged by the mother and denied by the father.

It is one of the many conflicts in the evidence.

One area where there is conflict in particular is what has transpired since August 2015 when A. was returned to the care of his mother. That conflict in these various areas cannot be resolved on the basis of affidavits.

Unless the parties are able to come to some sort of a resolution, which most unfortunately does not seem very likely at this point, the application for variation will have to be the subject of a hearing with viva voce evidence, and this will not happen overnight. Inevitably, it will take some time before that hearing can proceed.

In the meantime, the mother seeks enforcement of the existing Orders. She wants A. returned to her care immediately in accordance with the custody regime that was decided in 2011 and which was the basis for the Order made by the Court in November.

For his part, the father asks that the custody regime be varied on an interim basis so that A. can remain in his care even though, under the existing regime, this is supposed to be the year he spends with his mother. And I understand that the father also wants A. to be in his care in Manitoba.

The factual conflict in the affidavits filed by the parties is very consistent with past history. The 2011 decision includes numerous references to conflicting evidence presented in that case. It is worth pointing out that the Court's findings as to credibility in that case

were mixed, as was the Court's assessment of each parent's decision about various things. The mother and the father were each found to be somewhat unreasonable or unrealistic about aspects of their approaches and behaviours. This was not a situation where the Court's conclusions were entirely in line with the mother's position, nor were they entirely in line with the father's position. The Court concluded, also, that aspects of each parent's positions were not always in line with A.'s best interests.

On many of these topics, there is overlap between the areas that were covered at that trial and some of the things that are now covered in the affidavits, and this makes it all the more difficult to make any decision based on the parties' most recent conflicting affidavits and the assertions that they make about what has been happening over the past few months.

Serious allegations are being made in both directions.

The father alleges that A. does not want to live with his mother and wants to live in

Manitoba. He says that A. is and feels unsafe in the mother's house. The father deposes that A. has recently disclosed to him that there has been physical abuse both on the part of his mother and

on the part of her common-law spouse while A. has been in their house. The father deposes that at A.'s insistence, he brought him to the RCMP in early October 2015 to make a complaint about this abuse. The father says that the Department of Social Services has also been notified of the situation and are investigating. There is no evidence before the Court at this point of any charge being laid against anyone or of Social Services having taken any specific action in relation to these allegations. In submissions last Thursday, counsel for the mother advised that she had an upcoming appointment with Social Services in relation to these allegations.

Another allegation that the father makes is that the mother essentially agreed with him taking A. to Manitoba and that she is now going back on that agreement.

It seems undisputed that there was a serious conflict between A. and his mother at the end of a camping weekend at Reid Lake (which is outside of Yellowknife) at the end of the Labour Day weekend. The mother does describe this incident in her affidavit and it seems fairly clear that this incident happened. She deposes that they had been camping as a family at Reid Lake that weekend and were in the process of packing up

when an argument broke out between her and her son. As a result, he declared that he was going to walk back to town. She decided to let him "walk it off", thinking that within 20 minutes they would have finished packing and would catch up with him on the road. As it turned out, A. hitchhiked and got a ride into town from a man who was driving on the Ingraham Trail and saw him. A. asked to be taken to his father's home.

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The father deposes that after this incident, he encouraged A. to go back to his mother's place and to work things out with her. At that point, he was scheduled to leave to go to Manitoba for a period of two weeks. He deposes that the mother would not let A. stay with her for those two weeks. He related a lot of things that A. allegedly told him about his exchanges with his mother, including the fact that she told him he had made his choice and that, essentially, she kicked him out. The father deposes that she packed up all of A.'s belongings in 25 to 30 boxes and told the father to come pick them up. The father deposes that he believed at that point that the mother was in agreement to letting A. go to Manitoba with him and live there. This, he says, is why he arranged for A. to travel there with him, for his things to be moved, and this is

why he registered A. for school down there notwithstanding the fact that under the Court Order, A. was to be in his mother's care for the school year.

In her Supplementary Affidavit, the mother does not respond to many of the allegations in the father's lengthy affidavit, but she specifically says that her silence on those matters should not be taken as an admission. She deposes that since the Reid Lake incident, she has been unable to have A. return to her care. She does not talk about the aspect of any refusal on her part to let A. return living with her or about packing up his belongings or about agreeing in any way to have him reside with his father, notwithstanding the 2011 Order.

The mother's Supplementary Affidavit is focused on the fact that this court's November 12th Order still has not been complied with.

About that, she deposes that A. did show up at her residence on November 25th, five days after the deadline that had been set by the Court. She deposes that A. told her he did not want to stay there, did not feel safe staying there and wanted to live in Manitoba and should be able to make his own choices about where to live. She says she attempted to lock the door to force A. to

stay so that they could continue their conversation, but he roughly moved her out of the way by elbowing her in the chest. She also deposes that she looked out the window after A. left and she saw that the father's truck was parked a short distance away and she saw A. get into that truck and drive off with his father.

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At this point, the mother is persuaded that A. is being influenced and controlled by his father and that this fits with a long-standing pattern of parental alienation on his part. She wants A. back in her care immediately so she can arrange for counselling to "de-program" him and restore their relationship. Her position and her fear is that any additional time that A. spends with his father will be further detrimental to her ability to renew her bond with A. Her position is that if need be, the Order that A. be returned to her should be enforced by the RCMP. In essence, she says A. should be forced back into her care today irrespective of his present wishes. The father's position is that A. should not be forced to live with his mother against his will. He denied attempting to alienate A. from his mother, and he says that given the complainants that have recently been made, there are safety concerns about returning A. to that

1 household.

Under both the Order that was made in 2011 after the trial and the one that was made in November 2015, A. should now be in the care of his mother. The starting point should be that those Orders are complied with. The question then becomes whether, on the evidence now before the Court, this is what should happen, and that is because there is evidence before the Court now that was not before the Court in November.

It appears uncontradicted that at this point A. does not want to return to live with his mother. This does not just come from the father relaying what A. tells him but from the mother's own evidence about how things went when A. came to her house on November 25th.

A.'s wishes are a factor to consider if they can reasonably be ascertained. Children's Law Act, Section 17(2)(b).

The older a child is, the more his views may be ascertainable. But a child's views are not determinative. There are many very good reasons why children should not be burdened with decisions that ought to be made by adults. Giving a child ultimate say on these matters puts incredible pressure on the child even if no one is consciously trying to put that pressure on.

But it also makes the child vulnerable to pressure if a parent is inclined to try to manipulate the situation. And, of course, if parental alienation is actually established, it is especially important not to give effect to a child's wishes because, if that is done, the parent who has behaved improperly by causing alienation is, in effect, rewarded for that bad behaviour, and more importantly, the child is negatively impacted because the result of the alienation is to cut off that child's bond with the alienated parent. To give effect to a child's wish in those cases is to compound the effect of the alienating behaviour and jeopardizes any chance of restoring the bond between the child and the alienated parent.

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The mother argues that the decision on these applications should take into account that there has already been a finding in this case of parental alienation. In that regard, in submissions, counsel for the mother referred to a report that was filed in the context of the 2011 trial. The father also referred to that report in his submissions.

The report in question was authored by a Dr. Seitz who testified at the 2011 trial. She had prepared a report in 2009 and had come to

certain conclusions on this issue. But it is important for everyone to understand that what is relevant at this point is not what the 2009 report said, not even what the doctor testified to in 2011. What is relevant are the findings that were made by the Court in the 2011 decision.

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The issue of parental alienation was addressed by the Court at paragraphs 110 to 124 of the 2011 decision. Among other things, the Court noted that the 2009 report had not been updated by the time of trial and this had an impact on the weight that could be attached to the doctor's conclusion.

The Court's interpretation of the doctor's report was not that the doctor concluded this was a situation of parental alienation in the matter that is usually understood. That is apparent when one reads paragraph 113 of the decision:

The contentious part of Dr. Seitz's evidence is her finding that A.'s behaviour and that of his parents and K. as she observed it in early 2009 suggests that there are ongoing alienating processes at play, by which [the mother] is more and more the alienated parent. Dr. Seitz made it clear that this is not a case of what is usually referred to as "Parental Alienation Syndrome", which she explained as a syndrome in which the child is the victim of behaviour by one parent which is aimed at alienating that child from the other parent. What she found in this case was "parental alienation" which she described as a family

1	dynamic, not focused on actions by one parent.
2	one parent.
3	Ultimately, the Court concluded that the
4	opinion of the doctor was not significant to the
5	decision that had to be made.
6	At paragraph 124, the Court said:
7	The significant thing in my view is
8	that Dr. Seitz described all this as a dynamic, not an intentional course
9	of action by [the father]. Although it is clear that Dr. Seitz tended to
10	accept what she was told by [the mother] and was more skeptical about
11	what she was told by [the father] and K., her conclusion was that all
12	are reasonably good parents to A. And although Dr. Seitz testified
13	that she would not now change her opinion, her opinion is still
14	affected by the fact that her observations were made and her
	information gathered more than two
15	years ago. The testimony of [the
16	<pre>mother] indicates that her relationship with A. has improved</pre>
10	since then. [The father] no longer
17	has concerns about her mistreating A. From this I conclude that even
18	if Dr. Seitz is correct and the family dynamic was causing some
19	alienation of [the mother], that has significantly decreased or changed,
20	possibly because [the father] and his spouse have consciously changed
21	any behaviour on their part that may
22	have contributed to the dynamic. For those reasons, I do not view
23	Dr. Seitz's opinion as to alienation of [the mother] as determinative of
24	or very significant for the decision I have to make. I am not saying
25	there is no validity to her concerns, but they are concerns that
26	appear to have been addressed.

In light of these excerpts of the decision,

I do not think it is accurate to say that there was a finding in 2011 that deliberate parental alienation had been established. The Court's findings were much more nuanced than that.

Whether parental alienation can now be established at this point on the basis of what has transpired since 2011 of course is another issue entirely, and one that may well have to be addressed when the variation hearing proceeds.

A. certainly seems to now be completely aligned with his father, including on the question of relocating to Manitoba. He is apparently making serious allegations against his mother and her current spouse. Part of the evidence adduced by the father is an email sent to him by the mother in 2013 where she reports that A. made a very serious threat against her; more specifically, to slit her throat. All of these things raise flags and concerns, but it is obviously beyond the Court's ability, without more evidence, to draw any firm conclusion on that issue at this point. But there are elements in the evidence here that do raise concerns.

Another area of concern that arises on the evidence, of course, are the allegations of A. being physically abused in the mother's household. Allegations of abuse are not new in

this matter as it is clear from the 2011 decision that these types of accusations were, at trial, made by both parents against the other. At this point, there is no admissible evidence that such abuse has taken place; everything that is before the Court is hearsay. But A. has told his mother, not just his father, that he feels unsafe in her home. That does not establish that he is actually unsafe or actually even feels that way, as opposed to him saying that because it is a way to remain in the care of his father, but it does confirm that these are things that A. is, in fact, saying, because, again, it is not coming just from the father, it is also coming from the mother herself.

Another concern is the volatile nature of the relationship between A. and his mother at this point, irrespective of what has caused it.

The incident at her house on November 25th, as well as the Reid Lake incident earlier on, suggests that at this point she is not able to get through to him, and this is a reality that cannot be ignored.

The net result of their argument at Reid

Lake was that he started walking to town from a

very remote area, essentially in the middle of

the bush. She may have thought it best to let

him walk it off, and maybe there was very little a parent could do in her situation, but the situation was not without some risk for A. He could have been picked up by someone with less noble intentions than the man who did pick him up. He could have encountered a bear. All sorts of things could have happened.

As for the interaction at the house on November 25th, the mother was evidently not able to convince him to stay with her or reason with him at all at that point. She attempted to lock the door to stop him from leaving and continue the conversation, but it appears that this escalated matters further to the point that he was rough and physical with her. That type of interaction between A. and his mother is not conducive to restoring their relationship; it is more conducive to escalating things further between them and ultimately causing more harm.

The father's actions in this matter raise some concerns as well. It is always a great concern when a parent takes a course of action that goes against a Court Order without first taking steps to get that Order varied. Here, the father claims that he thought he had the mother's agreement not only to have A. stay with him, but also to relocate him to Manitoba. I must say I

find that claim suspect. It would be one thing for the father to think, after a volatile incident between A. and his mother, that the mother was agreeable to have A. stay with him for some time. But a relocation outside the jurisdiction, and her giving up her whole year with A., is a whole other matter. Given the highly conflictual history of this matter, I have some difficulty with the suggestion that the father could have truly believed the mother was agreeing not only to have A. in his care but that she was agreeing to this for the whole school year and agreeing to a relocation to Manitoba. A firm finding cannot be made on this on the basis of affidavits, but I am just flagging it as a concern that emerges from the evidence.

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In all the circumstances, the unilateral actions of the father do raise concerns, in particular, on the relocation issue, and, for that reason, I do not think that A. should be taken outside the jurisdiction, further away from his mother, under the present circumstances because then he would be completely removed from her and that would make the restoration of communication and relation with her very difficult, if not impossible.

 $\ensuremath{\text{I}}$ am certainly satisfied that there is an

urgent need for intervention in this matter and for A. to receive counselling and assistance in dealing with the conflict that has been occurring over the past few months and in beginning to restore communication lines and the connection to his mother. Both parents should cooperate fully on this.

I bear in mind that the mother was granted final decision-making in 2011 for medical and treatment issues related to A., and this was because the Court had concluded at that time she was the more reasonable of the two parents when it came to such issues, and this was to be so even when A. was with his father. There is at this point no basis to interfere with that finding. She will have leave to arrange for whatever counselling she sees fit for A.

I am also satisfied that A. needs legal representation in these proceedings. Having counsel will assist in giving him a voice and hopefully also in understanding that the outcome of these proceedings, including where he is going to live, will not be left up to him.

Counsel for A. may be able to obtain independent evidence to assist the Court in deciding what is in A.'s best interest in the face of this very complicated situation. So I am

going to make that appointment today. I know that counsel is here for the Office of the Children's Lawyer and I urge that office to arrange for counsel to speak to A. as soon as practicable on this matter because I think it is much needed in this case.

I am going to adjourn this matter to

December 17th, which is the last Family Chambers
sittings before the courts close, and this is so
that updates can be provided to the Court about
various things, including the status of the RCMP
and Social Services' investigation into the
allegations of abuse. It may be overly
optimistic, but hopefully one or more counselling
sessions may be arranged between now and then and
this may provide additional useful information
and assist everyone involved; and, finally,
possibly by then counsel for the child may be in
a position to assist the Court as to what the
next step should be.

The last issue of course is whether A.

should be ordered returned to his mother's care
immediately. The mother does seek that. She
seeks strict enforcement of the existing court
Orders even though she recognizes that her son
currently seems to want nothing to do with her.
Her position as conveyed to the Court through her

counsel last week is that she is convinced that if she has him back living with her, she will be able to turn the situation around with the assistance of a counsellor. She is so convinced of this that she is asking the Court to go as far as to get the police involved, if need be, to forcibly bring A. back into her home.

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As I have already said, there is evidence before the Court now that was not before the Court at the November appearance.

Even apart from the allegations included in the father's affidavit, many of which I realize the mother disputes, there is her own evidence about what A. told her when he was at her house on November 25th and her own evidence about the physical escalation and him being rough with her when she tried to prevent him to leave. While I empathize with the mother's concerns and her wish to get things back on track with A. as soon as possible, with the greatest of respect, I am not persuaded that it is necessarily realistic to think that she can have the police force him back into her home and then succeed in getting things back on track with him and their communication. There is huge potential for such an action to cause further escalation of the situation and do more harm than good. The chance of turning

things around would be much greater, in my view,

once there has been some sort of intervention

with counsellors and may also be assisted by A.

having independent counsel to provide an outside

perspective on things and some advice to him.

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So after much thought, and although the Court is always concerned when its Orders are not being complied with, I have concluded that any decision to order A. back into his mother's home should be made only with the benefit of submissions from his appointed counsel and in light of any additional evidence that may be brought forward as a result of counselling process. Forcing A. to go back to that home before then, before there has been an opportunity for some counselling and some professional intervention, and especially ordering police involvement to enforce this, does not seem to me to be in his best interests. And although I do understand the mother does not take that view, I think doing this at this point could also be very detrimental to her relation with him as well.

So the Order I am issuing today will be as follows:

- The matter is adjourned to be spoken to on December 17th, 2015, at 10 a.m.;
- 27 The Order of this court, dated August 16,

1	2013	1, will remain in effect with the
2	exce	eption that on an interim interim basis:
3	1.	A. may remain in the care of his father
4		until December 17th, 2015;
5	2.	The issue of access over the holiday
6		season will be spoken to on December 17,
7		2015;
8	3.	There will be a clause that neither
9		parent shall take A. outside the
10		Northwest Territories until further
11		Order of the Court or without leave of
12		the Court;
13	4.	The mother shall be permitted to arrange
14		for counselling for A., and the father
15		shall cooperate and assist in ensuring
16		that A. attends any counselling sessions
17		that are arranged for him by the mother;
18	5.	The Office of the Children's Lawyer is
19		appointed to represent A. in these
20		proceedings. The terms of that
21		appointment will be in accordance with
22		the ones that are usually adopted by
23		this court.
24	And I wil	ll ask Mr. Kinnear that a separate Order
25	be taken	out in the usual form. But just so that
26	all the p	parties are clear, what will be included
27	in this	order in addition to the appointment of

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counsel is that:
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                 The Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) is
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                 authorized, without further consent of the
                 mother or the father, to make a full and
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                 independent inquiry of all the circumstances
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                 relating to the best interest of A.;
                 The OCL may contact and communicate with any
                 and all third parties involved with A.,
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                 including but not limited to childcare
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                 providers, teachers and school authorities,
                 family and child counsellors and assessors,
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                 medical service providers, psychologists,
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                 social workers, and any other individuals
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                 having contact with or information about A.;
                 Counsel for the child will be entitled to
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                 receive copies of all notes, records, or
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                 reports relating to A. from any source
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                 whatsoever;
                 Counsel for the child will have the
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                 authority to talk to and meet with A. alone
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                 and confidentially, or with others, at
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                 any location counsel deems appropriate,
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                 including but not limited to the children's
                 childcare, if that is applicable, school, or
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                 the parents' home;
                 Counsel for the child will have leave to
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communicate directly with A.'s parents

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1	without the presence of counsel for the
2	parents even if the parents have legal
3	counsel;
4 –	All third parties involved with A.,
5	including but not limited to the ones that I
6	have already mentioned, are authorized to
7	release any and all information about him,
8	including documentary information, to
9	counsel for the child, who shall receive and
10	use that information for the purpose of
11	attempting to resolve or have adjudicated
12	the issues of custody and access;
13 -	Counsel for the child will be entitled to
14	provide an oral summary to this court of the
15	information acquired in the course of
16	representing A., and, by doing so, shall not
17	be deemed to be a witness in these
18	proceedings; and
19 –	Counsel for the child is authorized to
20	participate in these proceedings as though
21	A. was a party and, without limiting the
22	generality of this, will be entitled to
23	production and discovery, toappear and
24	participate in the proceedings, have the
25	ability to examine and cross-examine
26	witnesses, to call evidence, and to make
27	submissions to the Court, including the

2	These are the standard terms of Orders by
3	this court appointing counsel to a child in
4	Family proceedings and they are designed to
5	ensure that counsel for the child get the maximum
6	information that might be needed in order to
7	present submissions.
8	The final term of the Order I issue today,
9	Mr. Bruveris, is that costs, which you have
10	raised as an issue in earlier appearances, will
11	be adjourned to December 17th to be spoken to,
12	and depending on how things go and what decisions
13	are made then, it may be that that issue is
14	adjourned again.
15	So that is my ruling. The matter is
16	adjourned to December 17.
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20	Certified Pursuant to Rule 723 of the Rules of Court
21	of the Rules of Court
22	
23	Jane Romanowich, CSR(A)
24	Court Reporter
25	
26	
27	

position advanced on behalf of A.

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