St. John v. R., 2015 NWTSC 57

A-1-AP2015000008

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

IN THE MATTER OF:

MICHAEL ST. JOHN

Appellant/Applicant

- vs. -

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

Respondent

Transcript of the Decision on an Application for Bail pending Appeal by The Honourable Justice S. H. Smallwood, at Yellowknife in the Northwest Territories, on September 25th A.D., 2015.

APPEARANCES:

Mr. P. Harte: Counsel for the Appellant/Applicant

Ms. K. Lakusta: Counsel for the Respondent

No information shall be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way which could identify the victim or a witness in these proceedings pursuant to s. 486.4 of the Criminal Code of Canada

1	THE	COURT: The applicant, Michael
2		St. John, was convicted after a trial by a
3		jury of sexual assault and sexual interference
4		and sentenced on August 13th, 2015 to a term
5		of imprisonment of three years.
6		He has appealed his conviction and
7		sentence to the Court of Appeal and is seeking
8		his release pending determination of his
9		appeals. The applicant is seeking his release
10		on a recognizance with a \$10,000 cash deposit
11		and a number of conditions. The respondent
12		Crown is opposed to the applicant's release.
13		The issue is whether the applicant has met the
14		requirements of Section 679(3) of the Criminal
15		Code.
16		Section 679 of the Criminal Code governs
17		release pending appeal. Section 679(1)
18		permits a Judge of the Court of Appeal to
19		release an appellant from custody pending
20		determination of his or her appeal where
21		notice of the appeal has been given. The
22		applicant in this case filed his notice of
23		appeal from conviction and sentence on
24		September 9th, 2015.
25		In considering whether the applicant
26		should be released pending his appeal,
27		Section 679(3) of the Criminal Code is

1	applicable and states that a Judge of the
2	Court of Appeal may order that the appellant
3	be released pending the determination of his
4	appeal if the appellant establishes:
5	First, that the appeal or application for
6	leave to appeal is not frivolous;
7	Second, that he will surrender himself
8	into custody in accordance with the terms of
9	the order; and,
10	Thirdly, that his detention is not
11	necessary in the public interest.
12	In this case, the Crown concedes that the
13	appeal is not frivolous and that there is
14	little concern that the applicant will not
15	surrender himself into custody. However, the
16	Crown argues that the detention of the
17	applicant is necessary in the public interest
18	The grounds of appeal contained in the
19	notice of appeal relate to the use of
20	testimonial aids during the course of the
21	trial.
22	During trial the Crown applied, pursuant
23	to Section 486.2(1), for the use of a screen
24	during the testimony of a witness (the
25	complainant in this case). At issue on appear
26	is the placement of the screen during the
2.7	testimony of the complainant and whether

another alternative should have been ordered
by the Court. The appeal will involve a
consideration of Section 486.2(1) and what it
means when a witness is permitted to testify
"behind a screen or other device that would
allow the witness not to see the accused".

With respect to the first step as contemplated in Section 679(3) (that the appeal is not frivolous). In that case, the applicant need only establish that the ground of appeal would not necessarily fail in order to establish that the ground of appeal is not frivolous. It is a low threshold to meet and I am satisfied that there is a question to be answered and that the appeal would not necessarily fail. Therefore I am satisfied that the appeal is not frivolous.

With respect to the second step, (that the applicant will surrender himself into custody in accordance with the terms of his release) the applicant has no criminal record apart from the convictions from which he appeals.

He was on release on this matter and another outstanding matter since February 24th, 2014, until he was placed into custody on being sentenced on this matter. And there is no suggestion that he has ever breached a term of

1	his release or failed to attend court when	
2	required to do so on this or any other matter.	
3	Therefore I am satisfied that the applicant	
4	would surrender himself into custody in	
5	accordance with any release conditions that he	
6	might be subjected to.	
7	The third step is whether it is necessary	
8	for the applicant to be detained (whether it	
9	is necessary in the public interest).	
10	As referred to in the case of R. v. Ussa,	
11	a 2014 decision of the Manitoba Court of	
12	Appeal, at paragraph 8, the public interest	
13	referred to in the third branch of the test,	
14	under Section 679(3), is concerned with the	
15	protection and safety of the public as well as	
16	public confidence in the administration of	
17	justice.	
18	In order to maintain public	
19	confidence, a balance has to be struck between reviewing the	
20	conviction that led to the imprisonment for error and	
21	enforcing the judgment.	
22	In that case, a number of factors were	
23	listed to be considered in the assessment of	
24	reviewability versus enforceability. They are	
25	listed at paragraph 9, and they are, first,	
26	the seriousness of the offence. Secondly, the	
27	background of the applicant, particularly any	

criminal record. Thirdly, the potential delay
of the hearing of the appeal, particularly
whether the sentence will expire before the
appeal will be heard. And fourthly, the
relative strength of the ground or grounds of
appeal.

It is important to remember that at this point the decision that is being made is whether the applicant is being released pending his appeal being determined. The Court does not have a full record of the trial and any comments made do not prejudge the outcome of the appeal. Counsel have not presented their full argument or filed their facta which would be considered at the appeal itself.

With respect to the seriousness of the offence, in the case of Gingras, a BC Court of Appeal from 2012 which is referred to in the notes of Martin's Criminal Code, held that the greater the seriousness of the offence, the stronger the grounds are required to shift the balance from enforceability to reviewability.

In this case, the applicant was convicted following a jury trial of sexual assault and sexual interference and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of three years. While I do not

have the full details of the offences for

which the applicant was convicted, I

understand that they involve multiple sexual

assaults over a lengthy period of time on a

child for which the applicant was in a

position of trust.

I am satisfied that the offence is a serious one. It involved the sexual abuse of a child by a person who was in a position of trust and the applicant has received a significant term of imprisonment.

With respect to the background of the applicant, the applicant, as previously stated, has no prior criminal record before being convicted of these offences. He does have another outstanding charge which is scheduled for trial in November of this year. However, that charge arose around the same time as the matters which are before me today. And there is nothing otherwise in the background of the applicant which raises any specific concerns with respect to that factor.

With respect to the potential delay in the hearing of the appeal, the applicant's appeal is not yet ready to be heard. And as I stated, the appeal books have not been filed and the factums have not been filed by either

party. The Court of Appeal sits four times a year in Yellowknife. They sit next in October and, following that, sit again in January, April, and June of 2016.

It is apparent that this matter cannot be heard in October. The next available date would be January of 2016. Counsel for the applicant advises the Court that he is not available in January so unless the applicant were to retain new counsel, the earliest his appeal could be heard would be April of 2016.

Balanced against this is a sentence that
was imposed for these offences, which was a
significant one, one of three years
imprisonment. It appears to me that the
appeal could easily be heard before the
sentence imposed would expire so that there is
little risk that the sentence would expire
before the appeal could be heard.

With respect to the relative strength of the appeal, the appeal itself relates to Section 486.2(1) of the Criminal Code which states that the Judge shall, on application of the prosecutor, the witness, who is under the age of 18 years, order that the witness testify outside the courtroom or behind a screen or other device that would allow the

witness not to see the accused unless the

Judge or Justice is of the opinion that the

order would interfere with the proper

administration of justice.

The issue in this case is the placement of the screen which was placed in front of the accused during the trial.

There have been excerpts of transcripts filed which demonstrate the discussion that was had between counsel and the trial Judge regarding the application itself and then subsequently the placement of the screen.

The initial discussion relating to the placement of the screen was that it would ensure that the witness did not have to see the accused during her testimony but also ensuring that the view of the witness with respect to counsel or the jury was not obscured. Ultimately when the screen was placed, it was placed in front of the accused - something that was different than earlier contemplated as there is a reference to the screen being wheeled in on a trolley. Ultimately it was placed on a table in front of the accused.

26 Counsel for the applicant raised concerns 27 at trial with respect to this placement. It

was clear from the discussions that the trial Judge's concerns were the placement of the screen so that it obscured the witness's view of the applicant while at the same time ensuring that counsel and the jury could see and also hear the witness while testifying.

Subsequent discussions relating to the placement of the screen also seem to reflect this concern. Counsel for the applicant raised the placement of the screen again (once the screen had been placed in front of the applicant) and at that time the discussion related around the drawing -- that the screen would draw attention to the applicant in the courtroom and also that communication with his client was also of concern. The trial Judge confirmed with counsel that he was able to communicate with the applicant although it was less convenient than if the screen was not present.

Also during trial, the trial Judge advised the jury when the witness testified, and later again during the jury charge, about the screen and advised the jury that it was a testimonial aid used to help facilitate the evidence of child witnesses and was something that was allowed by the Criminal Code.

She also clearly advised the jury that the use of the screen had no bearing on the guilt or innocence of the applicant and also clearly that it had no bearing on the credibility of the witness. So the issue on appeal will involve a consideration of Section 486.2(1) and the use of testimonial aids in the courtroom, as well as the placement of those testimonial aids.

The importance of ensuring that witnesses are able to provide their testimony in a courtroom has been the subject of amendments to the Criminal Code, and as recently as 2014. It is considered in the public interest to take steps to ensure that matters reach the courtroom and decisions regarding criminal charges are made in the courtroom - that accused persons receive a fair trial on the merits while at the same time ensuring that witnesses are able to provide their evidence before the trier of fact.

Obviously my role is not to determine the outcome of the appeal, simply to consider the relative strength of the appeal based on the arguments that have been presented to me by counsel. By the time of the appeal, counsel will have the benefit of the full transcript

1	of the trial and present full arguments on the $% \left(1\right) =\left(1\right) \left(1\right)$
2	issue. But in my view, the relative strength
3	of the appeal is not as strong given some of
4	the factors that I have referred to and the
5	arguments that have been presented by counsel
6	in argument the other day.
7	In the circumstances, given the
8	seriousness of the offence, the sentence of
9	imprisonment that was imposed, the
10	availability of a hearing date (albeit not the
11	soonest date) all tend toward the public
12	interest being in the enforceability of the
13	sentence that was imposed after trial rather
14	than reviewability of the decision.
15	Therefore, I am dismissing the applicant's
16	application.
17	If there is nothing else, counsel, we will
18	adjourn.
19	(ADJOURNED)
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2	Certified to be a true and	
3	accurate transcript pursuant to Rules 723 and 724 of the Supreme Court Rules,	
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