R. v. Wilson No. 1, 2015 NWTSC 29 S-1-CR-2014-000060

### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

# IN THE MATTER OF:

## HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

- vs. -

### JAMES WILSON

Transcript of the Ruling on Applications for Testimonial Aids and Use of Video-recorded Interview by The Honourable Justice L. A. Charbonneau, at Inuvik in the Northwest Territories, on 28th May A.D., 2015.

### APPEARANCES:

Ms. A. Piché: Counsel for the Crown

Counsel for the Accused Mr. C. Davison:

Charge under s. 271, 145(1)(a) Criminal Code of Canada

Ban on publication of the Complainant/Witness Pursuant to Section 486.4 of the Criminal Code THE COURT:

I am going to now give my ruling on a number of pretrial applications that the Crown made a few weeks ago. I gave my decisions on those applications which I will term in a general way Applications for Testimonial Aids and Special Accommodations for the Evidence of the complainant. I gave counsel the bottom line decision a few weeks ago so you could prepare accordingly and said I would put my Reasons on the record later, and now these are those Reasons I am about to give.

When the pretrial motions were heard counsel agreed to call the evidence relating to all the pretrial applications as part of one large voir There was a lot of overlap in the evidence dire. that applied to the various motions. Most of the evidence was relevant to more than one of the motions. There were two broad categories of applications. The first, which I am dealing with now, were applications for testimonial aids and special accommodations that the Crown was asking be used for the testimony of the complainant. The second group were applications seeking evidentiary rulings. All of these applications stem from personal characteristics of the complainant and the impact that they might have on her ability to testify.

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First I will address my understanding of the evidence that was presented at the voir dire about the complainant's abilities.

The complainant is an adult woman in her fifties. It is undisputed and apparent on the evidence presented at the voir dire that she suffers from a serious speech impediment. be very difficult to understand her when she The voir dire evidence also establishes that there are issues with her comprehension of certain words or sentences. A.K. is the complainant's sister and grew up with her. testified that the complainant went to school for a period of time when they were young but did not finish school. She now lives with her brother and some of her daughters. She cannot read or write except for writing her own name. She is unable to count and needs help dealing with things that involve money, like going to the store. A.K. also testified that the complainant sometimes does not understand big words so that when A.K. is speaking with her, sometimes A.K. has to use smaller simpler words so that the complainant will understand. A.K. testified that when the complainant does not understand what someone is telling her she makes that known. take it from A.K.'s evidence that generally

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speaking she is able to communicate with her sister except that sometimes she may have to repeat something using simpler words so that she will understand. A.K. also testified that the complainant can look after herself in terms of feeding herself, taking care of her personal needs, getting dressed and things of that nature.

A transcript of the complainant's testimony at the preliminary hearing was filed at the voir dire. It illustrates some of the challenges in adducing evidence from her, although it also shows that she is capable of answering questions. Another exhibit filed was a note from the Court Reporter who produced the preliminary hearing transcript which confirms that making out what the complainant was saying could be difficult at The Crown also filed a video-recording times. interview of the complainant by a police officer. This interview was done as part of the investigation. The complainant's daughter R. was present during the interview and at several points during the interview assists the officer in helping him understand what her mother is saying in answer to questions. All this evidence assists in understanding more about the complainant, her ability to communicate and some of the challenges in that regard, and that

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evidence is key in assessing the various applications before the court.

The Crown applied to have the complainant testify with a support person seated next to her, with the use of a screen to block her view of the accused, and with the public excluded from the courtroom. Defence did not oppose the application for a support person but opposed the other two. Crown also sought to have the video-recorded interview of the complainant entered into evidence pursuant to Section 715.2 of the Code. That application was opposed by Defence.

Overall, the basis for the Defense's objections to what the Crown seeks is that there is an insufficient evidentiary basis to engage the provisions that permit the use of these testimonial aids and special accommodations. The Defence's submissions in relation to the interpretation of Section 715.2 overlap with its submissions regarding the request for use of other testimonial aids. The Defense's position is grounded in the submission that the special considerations recognized by the law in dealing with evidence of children are not necessarily engaged when dealing with witnesses who have a physical or mental disability.

Defence acknowledges that when it comes to children the law now recognizes and assumes a certain number of things about their vulnerabilities, their ability to recollect and recount events, and various other things that the testimonial aids and accommodations are designed to alleviate.

But Defence argues that when dealing with witnesses with physical or mental disabilities, there needs to be an evidentiary basis that establishes the need to use these special procedures and that establishes a link between the witness's ability to communicate evidence and the testimonial aid or special measure that the Crown is seeking to use for the evidence of that witness. Defence argues that some of the assumptions that the law makes about children cannot be simply applied to witnesses with disabilities because there is too broad a spectrum of disabilities that can exist which in turn will have a varying impact on the witness's ability to communicate evidence and on the assistance that testimonial aids can provide.

So specifically in this case, Defence's position is that the evidence of A.K. and the other evidence adduced on the voir dire about the complainant's circumstances does not lay a

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sufficient evidentiary foundation for the court to be satisfied that those circumstances place her in the category of persons that provisions like Section 715.2 and Paragraph 486.2(2) apply to.

1. Application to use a screen during the complainant's evidence.

I will deal first with the screen. application for use of a screen is governed by Section 486.2 of the Criminal Code. provision contemplates two types of situations and prescribes a different test to be applied in each. Paragraph 1 applies to a witness who is under the age of 18 or a witness who is able to communicate evidence but may have difficulty doing so by reason of a mental or physical disability. In those situations the provision states that the judge shall order that the witness testify behind a screen or other device that would allow the witness not to see the accused unless the judge is of the opinion that the order would interfere with the proper administration of justice.

Paragraph 2 applies in all other cases.

That provision states that the judge may order that the witness testify behind a screen or other device that would allow the witness not to see

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the accused if the judge is of the opinion that
the order is necessary to obtain a full and
candid account from the witness of the acts
complained of. In other words, under that
paragraph the Crown has the onus of establishing
that the use of the testimonial aid is necessary.

As I already alluded to, Defence acknowledges that even though witnesses under 18 years old and witnesses who have physical or mental disabilities are both referred to in Paragraph 486.2(1), that does not mean that the protections that Parliament intended for those two categories of witnesses necessarily operate in the same way.

My conclusion is that Section 486.2 draws a difference between two categories of witnesses:

Those captured by paragraph 1,

a witness who is under the age of eighteen years or a witness who has a mental or physical disability,

and the others who are captured by paragraph 2. In deciding whether the application for the screen is governed by paragraphs 1 or 2, therefore the only question is whether the evidence satisfies me that the complainant is able to communicate evidence but may have difficulty doing so by reason of a mental or physical disability.

I agree with Defence counsel that the evidence does not establish the exact nature and extent of Ms. K.'s cognitive issues. The evidence establishes that she is illiterate and that she cannot work with numbers. Those things, of course, are not the same as having a mental disability. The evidence also shows that she struggles at times in answering questions. But it falls short of establishing to what extent her cognitive abilities are impaired or for what reason.

But apart from any ambiguity in the evidence about the level of cognitive difficulties that the complainant may experience, the evidence does clearly establish that she has a severe speech impediment. Based on what I saw and heard on the video-recorded interview and in the transcript of her preliminary hearing evidence I am of the view that this impediment can be characterized as a physical disability, and that it does cause her difficulty in communicating her evidence.

Given this I conclude that the application for use of a screen during her evidence is governed by Paragraph 486.1(1) of the Code.

When that provision is engaged it states that the court shall grant the application for use of the screen unless it is of the opinion

that the order would interfere with the proper administration of justice.

The Defence argues that because the screen is usually positioned near the accused and in any event must be positioned in a way to block the witness's view of the accused, this can lead the jury to draw adverse inferences against the accused, suggesting, for example, that he must be a bad person or he must be guilty if the complainant has to have her view of him blocked.

If that alone was enough to prevent the use of the screen it would mean that a screen could never be used in a jury trial for any witness. cannot accept that this was Parliament's intention. In my view the potential prejudice that Defence counsel refers to and is concerned about can be cured with an adequate instruction to the jury both at the time the testimony is heard and in the final instruction to the jury. Although not determinative, and I do not have the exact statistics about this, the court is aware that there have been cases in this jurisdiction where screens have been used in jury trials that resulted in acquittals. This tends to suggest that the use of the device, if the proper instructions are given, does not have the effect of overwhelming a jury or has an overly

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prejudicial impact on the proceedings. For those reasons I granted the application for use of the screen.

2. Application to Adduce Video-Recorded Interview of the Complainant.

Turning now to the application to adduce the video-recorded interview, that application is governed by Section 715.2 of the Code which reads as follows:

In any proceeding against an accused in which a victim or other witness is able to communicate evidence but may have difficulty doing so by reason of a mental or physical disability, a video recording made within a reasonable time after the alleged offence, in which the victim or witness describes the acts complained of, is admissible in evidence if the victim or witness, while testifying, adopts the contents of the video recording, unless the presiding judge or justice is of the opinion that admission of the video recording in evidence would interfere with the proper administration of justice.

The complainant was not called at the voir dire. Essentially the Crown sought what I would call a ruling in principle to the effect that if she did adopt the video-recording interview at trial, then it would make this admissible. In a sense the Crown sought a ruling that all the other prerequisites of the provision were met and that if the adoption did take place then the recording would be admissible.

Section 715.1 is worded in a very similar

way as Section 715.2 but applies to witnesses under the age of 18. There is much more jurisprudence dealing with Section 715.1 than there is dealing with Section 715.2. The Crown argues that these are companion provisions and that the jurisprudence dealing with 715.1 should inform the interpretation of 715.2. That was the conclusion reached by the Ontario Court of Justice in R. v. Osborne, 2011 ONSC 4289 in particular at paragraph 39.

As I said already, the Defence's position as to the interpretation of Section 715.2 overlaps in some respects with its position about the use of other testimonial aids. Defence argues that despite the similarity in wording, the manner in which Section 715.1 has been interpreted does not necessarily inform what the interpretation of Section 715.2 should be because not all the considerations that apply to young witnesses necessarily apply to a witness who suffers from one form of disability or another. Defence notes that no expert evidence was adduced at the voir There is no evidence about what level of cognitive difficulties the complainant may have, how those difficulties impact on her ability to recount events or about how having to testify in the usual way about those events could be

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traumatic or detrimental to her. 1 2 As I said, the wording of Section 715.1 and Section 715.2 is very similar. The only 3 difference is in the description of the type of 5 witness each provision applies to. 715.1 applies 6 to, 7 a victim or other witness who is under the age of eighteen at the time the offence is 8 alleged to have been committed, 9 whereas 715.2 applies to, a victim or other witness who is able to 10 communicate evidence but may have difficulty 11 doing so by reason of a mental or physical disability. 12 13 I agree with the reasoning in Osborne that the similarity of language is indicative of that 14 Parliament intended these two categories of 15 witnesses to be treated similarly for the 16 purposes of using the video-recorded statement to 17 assist in introducing that witness's testimony. 18 Parliament decided to adopt measures to 19 20 facilitate adducing evidence from certain 21 categories of witnesses by allowing the use of a recorded interview, provided that certain 22 23 conditions are met. This is a statutory 24 exception to the usual prohibition for adducing out-of-court statements at a trial. Its effect 25 26 is to avoid the witness having to tell their 27 story in court as long as they adopt what they

have said in the earlier interview. It serves as a substitute in whole or in part for their testimony in chief. The thinking behind this has to be that this will assist the witness. In a sense there is a legislated assumption that it will assist the witness to proceed in this way.

What the provision requires on its face, and here I am speaking of Section 715.2, is a link between the disability, whether it is mental or physical, and the ability of the witness to communicate evidence. The provision applies,

when a witness is able to communicate evidence but may have difficulty doing so by reason of a mental or physical disability.

To suggest that there is a requirement to establish a further link between the nature of the disability and the salutary effect that the use of testimonial aids would have in alleviating the difficulties in communicating evidence would, in my view, add to the provision a requirement that is not there. It could well empty this provision of meaning for a large number of those it was intended to assist. It may be extremely difficult and in some cases impossible for the Crown to adduce the type of evidence that Defence counsel evoked in his submissions, by this I mean evidence that could clarify the type of disability a person has and how that disability

ties into that person's ability to testify in the ordinary way.

So as far as how Section 715.2 operates and how it should be interpreted I am in agreement with the Crown's position that the jurisprudence that relates to Section 715.1 is useful and that there is, in this case, a sufficient evidentiary basis to engage the provision. The evidence shows that the complainant is able to communicate evidence but may have difficulty doing so by reason of a physical or mental disability. Again, the impact of her speech impediment on her ability to communicate evidence is clearly established. There is also evidence that suggests that while she is capable of communicating, her difficulties in understanding certain words or questions, whatever her specific condition or diagnosis might be, may also give her difficulties in communicating her version of events.

The fact that the provision is available to the Crown does not end matters though. The question then becomes whether this particular interview should be admitted pursuant to Section 715.2. I do recognize that the basic prerequisites for this provision to apply are met. Despite the lack of cogent evidence about

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the extent and nature of any mental disability
that the complainant may suffer from there is
clear evidence that she may have difficulty
communicating her evidence by reason of her
speech difficulties, which I consider to be a
physical disability. I am also satisfied that
the recording was made at a reasonable time after
the alleged events, and I am satisfied that in
some portions of the video she describes the acts
complained of.

The difficulty with admitting this video into evidence is not that the prerequisites are not met; the problem lies, in my view, with the content of the statement itself because of how the interview unfolded. The Crown fairly acknowledged that there were several problems with the video. The complainant's daughter R. was present during it, the interviewing officer essentially using her as a translator to help him understand what the complainant was saying. There are several segments of the interview where the complainant speaks and it is not possible to discern what she is saying. The officer then asks R. to tell him what her mother is saying. On the basis of what R. answers the officer continues with his questions.

There are portions of this statement that

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really are R.'s statement as to her
interpretation of what her mother is saying.

This is highly problematic in itself. The
problem is compounded because R.'s interpretation
of what her mother says then becomes the basis
for follow-up questions by the officer including
many leading questions.

There are parts of the interview where R. volunteers some information on her own. This clearly falls outside the ambit of what Section 715.2 is meant to contemplate; and finally, no doubt, because this was a difficult interview to conduct, the officer uses a lot of leading questions, even apart from those stemming from R.'s "translations" of what her mother says. Many of those incorporate reference to things that the complainant has told the officer in an earlier conversation that is not part of the recorded interview.

Acknowledging those problems the Crown suggested that the problematic aspects of the interview could be cured by showing the whole recording to the jury but editing out the sound for the inadmissible portions. I accept that in certain cases editing can be an adequate solution where inadmissible things find their way in an otherwise admissible interview. This is

sometimes done with accused person's statements, and it is not inconceivable that it could be done with a witness' statement. But here in my view there are simply too many portions of the statement that would have to be edited out. There comes a point where an edited statement can no longer be considered to be the statement of a witness especially if it is edited for the kind of reasons for which it would have to be edited in this case. If the various portions of the interview were edited as outlined during the submissions we would be left, in my view, with something that could no longer truly be considered to be the complainant's statement. The portion that the Crown itself agrees should be edited out really add up to a substantial portion of the interview.

In summary, the requirement to edit large portions of the interview, the use of leading questions in other portions, and the numerous other portions of the interview where what the complainant says is unintelligible, all lead me to the conclusion that admitting this video recording in evidence would interfere with the administration of justice. For that reason, although I agree that the provision is engaged and the statutory prerequisites for admission are

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1	met, I conclude that the video-recorded interview
2	cannot be used during the complainant's
3	testimony.
4	3. Application to Exclude the Public.
5	I am now going to turn to the application to
6	exclude the public. That is governed by
7	Section 486 of the Criminal Code:
8	Any proceedings against an accused shall be held in open court, but the presiding judge
9	or justice may order the exclusion of all or any members of the public from the courtroom
10	for all or part of the proceedings if the judge or justice is of the opinion that such
11	an order is in the interest of public morals, the maintenance of order or the
12	proper administration of justice or is necessary to prevent injury to international
13	relations or national defence or national security.
14	Security.
15	The part of the provision that is engaged here is
16	the one referring to the proper administration of
17	justice.
18	The constitutional validity of this
19	provision was upheld in the case of <u>C.B.C. v.</u>
20	A.G. New Brunswick et alia 1996 CarswellNB 462.
21	The Supreme Court also reviewed the decision of
22	the sentencing judge in that case to exclude the
23	public in that specific case. I would summarize
24	the principles that emerge from that case as
25	following:
26	First, the guidelines outlined in
27	Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation

1	(1994) 3 S.C.R. 835, which dealt with the
2	exercise of the common law powers to order
3	publication bans, apply when dealing with
4	applications to exclude the public. Second, the
5	burden of displacing the general rule of openness
6	of court proceedings lies with the party making
7	the application, in this case the Crown. Third,
8	when these applications are made there must be a
9	sufficient evidentiary basis from which the judge
10	can assess the applicable factors. And fourth,
11	the factors that are to be considered, and this
12	is at paragraph 69 of <u>C.B.C. v. A.G. New</u>
13	Brunswick, include, first, the availability of
14	other options and whether there are other
15	reasonable and effective alternatives to the
16	exclusion of the public; second, whether the
17	order sought is as limited as possible; third,
18	the importance of the objectives of the order
19	sought and its probable effect must be weighed
20	against the importance of openness and the limits
21	the order would place on the rights in order to
22	ensure that the positive and negative effects of
23	the order are proportional. In essence, it is a
24	proportionality test which, put in simpler terms
25	perhaps, boils down to whether the order would do
26	more harm than good when considering the
27	importance of the competing interests at stake.

The Crown seeks the exclusion of the public for the complainant's testimony on the basis that she is a witness who has special needs. Her ability to communicate is affected by her speech impediment, and even though there is no expert evidence or a diagnosis about her cognitive abilities the evidence presented at the voir dire demonstrates that she is not an ordinary witness. She presents with certain challenges as far as staying focused on the questions asked and at times as far as understanding certain words or That in my view is certain questions. demonstrated by the video-recorded interview that was filed as an exhibit and by the transcript of her preliminary hearing evidence, and it is to an extent confirmed by the evidence of A.K.

The Crown argues that given these challenges, having the public excluded from the courtroom for her evidence will enhance her chances of being able to communicate her evidence as effectively as she is capable of. The Crown is asking the court to infer that the presence of more people in the courtroom could make the entire process more intimidating, and that for a witness who has special needs the court should exercise its discretion to allow her to testify in the least intimidating or distracting of

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1 conditions possible.

On the basis of the evidence and going back to the applicable factors, I do not think that there are any alternatives available that would avoid interfering with the open court principle while also addressing the Crown's concerns.

There really is no middle ground here as far as this witness's testimony is concerned. Either the public will be excluded for it or it will not. This is not a case where there is a suggestion that the public be excluded but with certain specific exceptions. The idea is to allow the complainant to testify with as few people as possible in the courtroom.

As for the second factor, which is whether the order sought is as limited as possible, in my view it is. The Crown is not seeking an exclusion of the public for the whole trial.

Rather, it is asking for the exclusion of the public only for the complainant's evidence.

Members of the public and representatives of the media would be free to be there for every aspect of the trial except her evidence. They could hear the evidence of other witnesses, submissions of counsel where her evidence will be referred to, and my instructions where again her evidence will be referred to. They would have access, if

they wish, to a transcript of her testimony and could see for themselves what questions were asked and what answers she gave. The order sought will not render the complainant's evidence a secret and shield it from public knowledge. It will not shield these proceedings from any scrutiny from the public.

The third factor is the proportionality analysis that I have already talked about, the analysis of good versus harm. Obviously the open court principle is a fundamental one in our system of law and it is very important, but it is not the only principle that is at stake or relevant here. There is considerable public interest in ensuring that cases are decided on their merits, and that witnesses who may have certain vulnerabilities or special needs be able to tell their stories to courts. The importance of this objective is illustrated by the many amendments that have been made to the Criminal Code over the years to assist certain categories of witnesses who may need special accommodations. I have referred to this in dealing with some of the other pretrial motions.

Parliament has identified certain categories of witnesses who are thought to need special accommodations, in provisions like Section 715.1

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and 715.2 and 486.1 and 486.2, for example. Many of these provisions have been challenged and have been found to not breach the Charter. The jurisprudence on those provisions and on those issues is instructive in that it underscores that one of the many important objectives of the criminal justice system is its truth-seeking function, and that the notion of preserving trial fairness includes the rights of the accused but also other interests such as the interests of witnesses and complainants.

I recognize that the mere fact that proceedings relate to alleged sexual assaults, the sensitive subject matter of the evidence in such cases, and the embarrassment that it may cause a witness to have to testify in public about such matter is not, without more, a sufficient basis to grant an order excluding the public. But in my view in this case there is more. The evidence demonstrates that the complainant faces challenges in giving her evidence that are over and above the challenges that any other sexual assault complainant or witness in general would face. There is no direct evidence that allowing her to testify with fewer people present will necessarily assist her in communicating her evidence, but in my view the

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evidence in support of a motion like this one does not need to be to that specific effect. I am satisfied that she faces serious challenges, and I am satisfied that there is at least a possibility that having the public excluded for her testimony may partially alleviate those challenges or, put another way, I do not think it is speculative or unreasonable to think that those challenges and difficulties might be enhanced should she have to give her evidence in front of a packed courtroom.

The order sought will result in a breach of the open court principle and an encroachment of the rights protection by Section 2(b) of the Charter but will do so in a limited way and only to the extent necessary to maximize the chance of having the evidence heard, assessed by the jury and for the case to be decided on its merits.

Those are the reasons why I granted the Crown's application to have the public excluded for the testimony of the complainant. I have directed that a transcript of her evidence be filed. It means that it will be readily accessible to anyone interested in these proceedings and who may want to know what the details of her testimony were.

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2	CERTIFICATE OF TRANSCRIPT
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6	I, the undersigned, hereby certify that the
7	foregoing pages are a complete and accurate transcript
8	of the proceedings taken down by me in shorthand and
9	transcribed from my shorthand notes to the best of my
10	skill and ability.
11	Dated at the City of Edmonton, Province of
12	Alberta, this 21st, July, 2015.
13	
14	Certified Pursuant to Rule 723
15	of the Rules of Court
16	Danan
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18	Darlene Sirman, CSR(A)
19	Court Reporter
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