S-1-CR2012000138

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

IN THE MATTER OF:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

- vs. -

JASON FRANK PAULETTE

Transcript of the Ruling on the admissibility of utterances as res gestae by The Honourable Justice S. H. Smallwood, at Fort Smith in the Northwest Territories, on January 17th A.D., 2014.

APPEARANCES:

Mr. A. Godfrey: Counsel for the Crown

Ms. K. Lakusta:

Mr. M. Hansen: Counsel for the Accused

An order has been made banning publication of the identity of the Complainant/Witness pursuant to Section 486.4 of the Criminal Code of Canada

1	THE	COURT: Earlier in this trial, a
2		voir dire was to held to determine the
3		admissibility of evidence of an utterance
4		allegedly made by the complainant R. P. to
5		Ashleigh Stokes. I ruled that the evidence
6		was admissible and said that I would provide
7		reasons later in the trial so as not to delay
8		the continuation of the proceedings before the
9		jury at that time. These are those reasons.
10		The charge that the accused is facing is
11		sexual assault causing bodily harm. The
12		complainant and Ashleigh Stokes testified on
13		the voir dire and three exhibits were filed:
14		Two were agreed statements of facts. One
15		related to the injuries and condition of the
16		complainant as observed by members of the RCMP
17		and medical personnel and another which
18		related to DNA evidence which was discovered
19		as a result of a sexual assault examination
20		which was performed on the complainant during
21		the course of the investigation. The DNA
22		evidence located the accused's DNA in the
23		vaginal pool of the complainant. The third
24		exhibit was photographs which were taken of
25		the complainant which showed the injuries that
26		she had when the photographs were taken
27		following the alleged incident.

In the voir dire, the complainant testified that she went to the accused's residence. The accused is her cousin and she went over because she knew his common-law spouse was away for medical treatment and she thought that she would help him out with his children. She spent the evening at his residence and they smoked marijuana and drank alcohol.

The complainant testified that she went to the accused's residence before 5 p.m., they smoked a joint, had supper and did the dishes, then smoked another joint. She was asked to go to the liquor store to get a 15 pack of beer which she did. When she returned, she and the accused smoked another joint. After this the accused had a tattoo gun and offered to touch up a tattoo that she had on her ankle. She agreed and the accused proceeded to work on her tattoo and they also began to drink the beer. The complainant estimated that she had seven beer and the accused had about the same amount of the 15.

While the accused was working on the complainant's tattoo, the complainant was texting a friend. She testified that she texted this friend throughout the evening.

After the accused finished touching up her tattoo, they smoked another joint. At some point the complainant testified that there was a discussion about going to the bootlegger to get a 26-ounce bottle of vodka but she does not remember if they did so.

Following this, the accused got mad at the complainant for being constantly on the phone. She testified that she thought it was a joke at first but she realized he was serious when he slapped the back of her head. She was scared and put her phone away.

The complainant then went to the bathroom upstairs. When she was in the bathroom, she blacked out. When she came to again, the accused was choking her. She faked being unconscious so he would get off of her. He went downstairs and she pulled up her pants and went downstairs. She stated she was "freaking out" and asking how he could do this to her. The accused then punched her in the face cutting her chin. Blood went all over her clothes and floor. The complainant started yelling at the accused again and he grabbed her by the neck and pushed her to the floor and used her hair to mop up the blood.

The accused told her to "shut the fuck up you

1 stupid bitch".

The complainant testified that she blacked

out again and the next thing that she

remembered was putting on her shoes and

running out the door, leaving behind her cell

phone, jacket, Ipod, and a bag of clothes.

She testified that when she left the residence

she wasn't thinking about her stuff; she just

wanted to get out of there. When she left the

residence she did not know where the accused

was.

The complainant testified that she ran over to her friend Ashleigh Stokes' residence, which was a street over, approximately three minutes away. When she left the accused's residence, it was cold out and the complainant testified that it was minus 40.

At Ashleigh Stokes' residence, the complainant knocked on the door. When there was no immediate answer, she began banging on the door yelling and crying. Ashleigh Stokes answered the door. The complainant testified that Ashleigh Stokes asked her what happened and she tried her best to explain. She testified that she was still kind of drunk. The complainant was unable to recall the words that she said when she was talking to Ashleigh

Stokes. She went into the residence and went into the washroom and tried to wash the blood off her hair. She testified that Ashleigh Stokes told her to stop and then they went to the hospital.

The complainant testified that when she

The complainant testified that when she blacked out during the evening, she did so because she had been consuming alcohol and marijuana.

The complainant also testified that there were portions of the night that she did not remember as a result of blacking out due to alcohol and marijuana consumption.

She testified that she did not recall any sexual relations with the accused that night and she did not consent to any sexual relations with the accused that night.

That is essentially the complainant's evidence regarding the evening on the voir dire.

The Crown also called Ashleigh Stokes to testify. She testified that she was sleeping at her residence that morning. At around 4:30 in the morning, she heard knocking on her door. Initially she was not going to answer the door. She then heard yelling and screaming and realized that it was the

complainant. She got up and answered the 1 door. She testified that when she opened the door she saw the complainant who was crying, 3 her hair was messy. There was blood on her face and she was shivering. She was wearing a sweater and jeans and her clothing was not 6 appropriate for the cold weather. She testified that the complainant said to 9 her "my cousin raped me" over and over again. 10 She asked the complainant "your cousin who?" to which the complainant responded "my cousin 11 Jason raped me". 12 13

Ashleigh Stokes described the complainant as being in a frantic state. She testified the complainant went and laid down on her couch. When the complainant came inside,

Ashleigh Stokes noticed the cut on her chin.

While inside Stokes' residence, they had a further conversation about what happened.

With respect to the complainant's intoxication, Ashleigh Stokes said she noticed the smell of alcohol on the complainant but did not observe any other signs of intoxication. There was no slurring of speech, her walking was fine, but she was shivering and frantic. Ashleigh Stokes herself had not been drinking or consuming

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drugs that evening.

2 Ashleigh Stokes denied the complainant 3 used the washroom while at her residence.

The Crown is seeking to adduce the utterances made to Ashleigh Stokes "my cousin raped me", "my cousin raped me", "my cousin Jason raped me" for the truth of its contents as an exception to the hearsay rule. The Crown argues that the evidence is admissible because it falls under one of the traditional exceptions to hearsay evidence being inadmissible. That is the res gestae exception which refers to what is also called spontaneous utterances.

The Crown has also argued that the utterances meet the principled exception to hearsay which has developed, which is that the utterances are necessary and reliable and thus admissible on that basis as well. The position of the defence is that the utterances were not admissible and that they did not satisfy either res gestae or the principled exception and the arguments focused on the reliability of the evidence.

The utterances are hearsay. There is no dispute regarding that. As hearsay, they are presumptively inadmissible. There have been

1	traditional exceptions to the hearsay rule for
2	many years, res gestae being one of them.
3	More recently the Supreme Court of Canada has
4	developed what has been called the principled
5	exception to hearsay which focuses on the
6	necessity and reliability of the evidence.
7	The case of R. v. Mapara, [2005] 1 S.C.R.
8	358, a decision of the Supreme Court of
9	Canada, discussed how the principled exception
10	and the traditional exceptions are to be
11	considered. At page 42, which is quoted in
12	R. v. Courouble 2012 NWTSC 8, they say:
13	(a) Hearsay evidence is presumptively inadmissible unless
14	it falls under an exception to the hearsay rule. The traditional
15	exceptions to the hearsay rule remain presumptively in place.
16	(b) A hearsay exception can be
17	challenged to determine whether it is supported by indicia of
18	necessity and reliability required by the principled approach. The
19	exception can be modified as necessary to bring it into
20	compliance.
21	<pre>(c) In "rare cases", evidence falling within an existing</pre>
22	exception may be excluded because the indicia of necessity and
23	reliability are lacking in the particular circumstances of the
24	case.
25	(d) If hearsay evidence does not fall under a hearsay exception, it
26	may still be admitted if indicia of reliability and necessity are
27	established on a voir dire.

1	So as I understand it, the traditional
2	exceptions to hearsay such as res gestae
3	remain presumptively in place. In this case
4	the defence has not challenged the exception
5	but focused on the reliability of the evidence
6	to argue that the issues with reliability are
7	such that neither res gestae nor the
8	principled exception have been met.
9	In the case of R. v. Oliver, a decision
10	from 1996 of this Court sitting as a summary
11	conviction appeal Court, the requirements of
12	res gestae were considered. At paragraph 12,
13	quoting from the Ontario Court of Appeal
14	decision in Khan, res gestae is defined as
15	A spontaneous statement made under
16	the stress or pressure of a dramatic or startling act or event
17	and relating to such an occasion may be admissible as an exception
18	to the hearsay rule. The stress or pressure of the act or event
19	<pre>must be such that the possibility of concoction or deception can be</pre>
20	safely discounted. The statement need not be made strictly
21	contemporaneous to the occurrence so long as the stress or pressure
22	created by it is ongoing and the statement is made before there has
23	been time to contrive and misrepresent. The admissibility
24	of such statements is dependent on the possibility of concoction or
25	fabrication. Where the spontaneity of the statement is
	clear and the danger of
26	fabrication is remote, the evidence should be received.
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1 It was noted in Courouble at paragraph 11 that the issue of reliability, unless there 2 were special features of concern, was better 3 left to the trier of fact to determine. In this case, the utterance is alleged to have occurred shortly after the incident in 6 question. It is not clear how long as the complainant has no memory of the event but she 9 does remember fleeing the accused's house. If 10 a violent sexual assault had occurred which left her bleeding and scared, then it is 11 reasonable to assume that she left the house 12 shortly after the event so that the utterance 13 14 could be considered contemporaneous. 15 Contemporaneousness is not required. There have been cases where utterances have 16 17 been admitted where they were made not just 18 minutes but in some cases hours after the event. So the focus is really on the 19 circumstances, including the spontaneity of 20 the statement, the possibility of concoction, 21 22 and whether the individual is still under the 23 stress or pressure of the event. In my view, the statement meets the 24 25 requirements of res gestae. 26 The complainant fled Jason Paulette's

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house. She did not stop to put her jacket on,

- left her cell phone behind and went to 1 Ashleigh Stokes' residence which is a short 2 3 distance from the accused's home. She arrived hysterical, visibly upset, bleeding, and spontaneously told Ashleigh Stokes that her cousin had raped her, repeating it twice. In 6 response to one question "my cousin who?", she said her cousin Jason raped her. In the 9 circumstances, the utterances were made close 10 in time to the event when R. P. appears to still be under the stress or pressure of the 11 12 event and her utterances were spontaneous. In my view, the risk of fabrication or concoction 13 14 are minimal in the circumstances. 15 The concerns raised by defence regarding the reliability of R. P.'s evidence, (there 16 17 did not appear to be much issue taken with Ashleigh Stokes' evidence and the accuracy of 18 what she heard) relate to whether what R. P. 19 said to Ashleigh Stokes is reliable. The 20 21 defence says that R. P.'s mind appears to be 22 one that has been overwhelmed by a startling 23 event as opposed to a focused mind. He
- 25 control of her mind and focus but was
- overwhelmed by events.
- In my view, this is one of the main

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submitted that R. P. did not have time to get

1 features of res gestae - that the declarant is overwhelmed, preoccupied with the event, and 2 is not focused. They do not have time for reflection and it is that preoccupation, that stress or pressure of a recent dramatic or 6 startling event which minimizes the risk of concoction or fabrication. The defence also suggests that she is 9 mistaken about what occurred and because of 10 her level of intoxication that her memory is not reliable. He points to the 11 inconsistencies in her statement and the 12 testimony on the voir dire, her reference to 13 dreams, and that she now thinks that she must 14

have been sexually assaulted.

Today, over two years later, the

complainant is convinced that she was sexually

assaulted. It appears from her testimony on

the voir dire that this is as a result of her

knowledge of the DNA evidence, her belief that

she would not have consented, and her

knowledge of the accused's criminal history.

That is her belief today. What is relevant is

her perception at the time of the events.

The accused's criminal history is not

clear. While the complainant knew about his

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history at the time, she said that she had

heard the accused had been convicted of sexual assault in the past. Her evidence was that prior to going to the accused's residence on that night, she didn't know what to believe about the accused's criminal history. She said that she didn't acknowledge his criminal history. She viewed the accused as her cousin and did not believe he would do that to her.

While there may be inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence on the voir dire and the statements she gave to the police and the testimony she gave at the preliminary inquiry, none of them relate to the alleged sexual assault. The complainant testified that she has no knowledge of the sexual contact between her and the accused and this has been consistent throughout. That has not changed. Her only statement on this point is that made to Ashleigh Stokes and she acknowledged that she did not remember what she said to Ashleigh Stokes.

It is clear that the complainant was intoxicated at the time of the utterance. She acknowledged that her memory had blanks that evening due to the consumption of alcohol and marijuana.

27 Ashleigh Stokes testified that she smelled

- alcohol on R. P.'s breath but made no other 1 observations of intoxication. She indicated that R. P. handled her liquor well and she had not seen her get so drunk that she would be falling down. While intoxication is a factor on 6 reliability, in the circumstances I do not view R. P.'s intoxication that it was such 9 that the utterances should not go before the 10 trier of fact. 11 For these reasons, looking at all of the 12
 - For these reasons, looking at all of the factors, I conclude that this evidence is admissible as res gestae and that any concerns about the reliability of the evidence are matters that are better determined by the triers of fact.
 - I have gone on to consider the principled exception in the event that I am incorrect about res gestae still being a valid exception to the hearsay rule or that my analysis regarding res gestae is incorrect.
 - Necessity and reliability are the requirements of the principled exception to the hearsay rule. Necessity in this case is established because although the complainant is available to testify, she has no recollection of the sexual contact between her

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1	and the accused. In addition, she recalls
2	speaking to Ashleigh Stokes but she does not
3	recall what she said.
4	So reliability is the other requirement
5	and at this stage we are concerned with
6	threshold reliability.
7	In R. v. Khelawon at paragraph 3, the
8	Supreme Court of Canada said,
9	The distinction between threshold
10	and ultimate reliability reflects the important difference between
11	admission and reliance. Admissibility is determined by the
12	trial Judge based on the governing rules of evidence. Whether the
13	evidence is relied upon to decide the issues in the case is a matter
14	reserved for the ultimate trier of fact to decide in the context of
15	the entirety of the evidence.
16	Later in the paragraph, the Court
17	continues,
18	The trial Judge's function is to
19	guard against the admission of hearsay evidence which is
20	unnecessary in the context of the issue to be decided, or the
21	reliability of which is neither readily apparent from the
22	trustworthiness of its contents, nor capable of being meaningfully
23	tested by the ultimate trier of fact.
24	The Court emphasized that ultimate
25	reliability is left to the trier of fact and
26	that trial Judges need to be cautious about
27	encroaching on that area.

So threshold reliability is not concerned
with the truthfulness of the statement; that
is for the trier of fact to determine.

Threshold reliability is concerned with
whether there are circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness surrounding the making of the
statement and consideration can be given to
the presence or absence of supporting
evidence.

In this case, many of the factors with respect to reliability pursuant to res gestae are applicable to the analysis pursuant to the principled exception. As noted in Courouble, the res gestae exception is still a valid one and all of its components mirror very much the concerns that are addressed in the principled approach.

In considering other evidence which might corroborate the complainant's utterance, I have considered the DNA evidence which establishes that the accused's spermatozoa was found in the complainant's vaginal pool. With respect to a sexual assault, this evidence is equivocal as it does not establish that there was nonconsensual sex. However, it does establish that there was sexual contact between the complainant and the accused.

1	At the time that the utterance was made to
2	Ashleigh Stokes, there was no apparent
3	evidence of a sexual assault or sexual
4	contact. To Ashleigh Stokes, the
5	complainant's appearance demonstrates injuries
6	consistent with an assault. The complainant
7	obviously had no knowledge of whether there
8	would be any DNA evidence and only she would
9	have had knowledge of the sexual contact
LO	between her and the accused. And the point
11	that I am trying to make is that when the
L2	statement was made, at that point, why would
13	R. P. say that she was sexually assaulted if
L 4	that was not true. She had no reason at that
L5	point to concoct a story about being sexually
L 6	assaulted by the accused.
L7	Obviously the issue of the truth of the
L8	statement, the ultimate reliability of that
L 9	statement is for the trier of fact to
20	consider, along with all of the other
21	evidence. But I am satisfied, for the reasons
22	given, that threshold reliability and
23	necessity have been established.
24	I have made this decision acknowledging
25	that there were some concerns.
26	The complainant's lack of memory of the
27	sexual assault and lack of memory of what she

told Ashleigh Stokes means that she can only
be cross-examined in a limited way. She can
still though be challenged, cross-examined in
a way that challenges her reliability as a
result of lack of memory due to intoxication
and potentially having suffered a head injury.

Ashleigh Stokes is also available to be cross-examined and her evidence has been consistent throughout about what was said to her by R. P. So I am satisfied that the circumstances in which the statements were made and the evidence of Ashleigh Stokes and R. P. are sufficiently reliable so that this evidence should go to the jury.

I have also considered that I have a discretion to exclude the evidence if the prejudicial effect outweighs the probative value.

The utterance is obviously prejudicial.

The Crown would probably not seek to adduce it if it were not. It is evidence of the nonconsensual nature of the sexual contact between the complainant and the accused. It is also highly probative for the same reason.

I am satisfied that the probative value does outweigh the prejudicial effect. The word spoken by R. P. shortly after the events

1	in question are very probative in determining
2	what occurred between her and the accused. So
3	in my view this is not a case where the
4	prejudicial effect outweighs the probative
5	value to the point that the otherwise
6	admissible evidence should be excluded.
7	So for these reasons, I conclude that the
8	evidence is sufficiently reliable to be
9	weighed by the jury.
10	All right, counsel, so we will adjourn to
11	await the jury.
12	(ADJOURNMENT)
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16	Certified to be a true and
17	accurate transcript pursuant to Rules 723 and 724 of the
18	Supreme Court Rules,
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23	Lois Hewitt,
24	Court Reporter
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