S-1-CR2012000104

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

IN THE MATTER OF:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

- vs. -

## PATRICK JOHN NADLI

Transcript of the Ruling by the Honourable Justice L. A. Charbonneau, on an Application to prevent cross-examination on the Accused's criminal record, at Hay River in the Northwest Territories, on November 27th A.D., 2013.

## APPEARANCES:

Mr. A. Godfrey:

Counsel for the Crown

Mr. T. Boyd:

Counsel for the Accused

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An order has been made banning publication of the identity of the Complainant/Witness pursuant to Section 486.4 of the Criminal Code of Canada

1	THE	COURT: Earlier in this trial,
2		before the close of the Crown's case, defence
3		applied to prevent the Crown from
4		cross-examining Mr. Nadli on his criminal
5		record. That record was filed as Exhibit A on
6		the application. It is a six page document
7		that includes entries starting in 1990 and
8		continuing on in a regular pattern up until
9		the last entries in September 2011. I gave my
10		ruling yesterday and permitted the
11		cross-examination only on an edited version of
12		the record. Specifically, I edited out the
13		convictions for crimes of violence, for
14		assault and assault causing bodily harm, a
15		conviction for uttering threats, as well as
16		convictions for being unlawfully in a dwelling
17		house, and a conviction for forcible entry.
18		In my consideration of this matter I have
19		applied the principles set out by the Supreme
20		Court of Canada in its landmark decision of
21		R. v. Corbett [1988] 1 S.C.R. 670, and I have
22		reviewed some of the cases that have applied
23		the principles that are set out in that
24		decision. There are many cases to choose from
25		because this issue comes up fairly regularly
26		in criminal trials. I have reviewed
27		specifically cases from this jurisdiction,

1 R. v. Gargan 2012 NWTSC 42 and R. v. Lepine 2 [2012] NWTJ No. 101; and cases from other 3 jurisdictions, more specifically, R. v. Tremblay [2006] J.Q. No. 433, R. v. Madrusan 5 [2005] B.C.J. No. 2658, and R. v. Charland 6 [1996] A.J. No. 819, affd [1997] 3 S.C.R. 7 1006; some of these cases were referred to during submissions. 8 9 Decisions about whether cross-examination of an accused on his or her criminal record 10 11 should be permitted are always ones that require a balancing of competing 12 13 considerations. The law, more specifically 14 the Canada Evidence Act, permits cross-examination of a witness on a criminal 15 record and recognizes that it is relevant to 16 17 the assessment of the credibility of the 18 accused as a witness. The Act applies to the 19 accused person who testifies. Until 20 Parliament changes this provision, or until a 21 Court finds that it violates the Charter 22 (something that the Supreme Court of Canada expressly refused to do in the Corbett case), 23 24 the fact that this is what this provision 25 states cannot be ignored and has to be the 26 starting point of the analysis.

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However, an important consideration is

1 also that trial fairness must be preserved and 2 steps must be taken to avoid the risks that a 3 criminal record may be used by the trier of fact not just for the assessment of 5 credibility, which is proper, but as evidence 6 of propensity to commit crimes and the 7 likelihood that the accused committed the crime charged, which is not a proper use of a 8 criminal record. This is why the Corbett 9 10 decision recognized that trial Judges have a 11 discretion to prevent completely, or limit, cross-examination on a criminal record if 12 13 allowing the cross-examination would 14 compromise trial fairness. The concern about the misuse of a record, 15

The concern about the misuse of a record, while it is present also in Judge alone trials, is more pressing when, as in this case, the trier of fact is a jury. This is because juries are composed of citizens who are not trained in the law and arguably may have more difficulty distinguishing between the permitted use of a record and the non-permitted use of a record. And that they may, even if properly instructed, engage in improper reasoning and use the criminal record for an improper purpose.

At the same time, generally speaking, we

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cannot operate on the basis that juries will not follow instructions by the trial Judge. The whole Judge and jury system is premised on the fact that on very important legal issues, such as the presumption of innocence and the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, juries will follow and understand the special rules that apply to criminal cases, and that they will follow the Judge's instructions. Arguments along the lines that the jury will not or cannot follow the instructions of the trial Judge must always, in my view, be approached with some caution.

Still, there are areas, and this is one of these areas, where trial Judges must recognize situations where the risks of compromising trial fairness are such that relying simply on instructions to the jury is not enough.

In these applications, there are things that have to be balanced - on the one hand, seeking not to the withhold from the jury information that is relevant and could be helpful in making their decision, not distorting the truth-seeking objectives of the criminal justice system, not misleading juries and, on the other hand, ensuring that trial fairness is not compromised. It is a delicate

1 exercise and many factors must be considered.

2 I have summarized those factors in

3 R. v. Gargan in paragraphs 10 to 12. I am not

going to quote from that decision but I adopt

5 what I said in that case about the principles

6 that apply, and I have applied them here.

Gargan was decided in the context of a Judge

alone trial whereas this case is a Judge and

jury trial. And, of course, each decision is

10 very fact specific and driven by the

11 circumstances of the case.

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Here the criminal record is lengthy and spans over many years and includes a variety of offences.

In Charland, the Court recognized that a pattern of repeated breaches of the law on a person's part is something that a jury should be aware of and could assist in assessing the credibility of that person, even if it is the accused. Even if individual convictions are not for crimes of dishonesty, the pattern of lack of respect for the law, is what the trier of fact may consider relevant to the person's credibility. And this is the type of criminal record that we have here.

There are no convictions on it for fraud, perjury, public mischief, giving contradictory

1	evidence or things of that nature, but there
2	is a steady and persistent pattern of
3	noncompliance with the rules of society, as
4	well as numerous convictions for not complying
5	with orders of the court. The lack of respect
6	for the rules of society and the lack of
7	respect for court orders is something which I
8	think is relevant to Mr. Nadli's credibility
9	as a witness, and for that reason I did not
10	think that preventing the cross-examination
11	completely would achieve the balance that a
12	Court must strive for in these matters.
13	However, I concluded that allowing
14	cross-examination on the whole of the record
15	would not achieve that balance either.
16	Given the number of convictions for crimes
17	of violence, I think there would be a real
18	risk that the record could overwhelm this jury
19	and could lead them to propensity reasoning.
20	There are no convictions for sexual offences
21	on this record so the risk or propensity
22	reasoning did not relate to that. But the
23	allegations here are a sexual assault
24	accompanied by a violent beating resulting in
25	bodily harm. In that sense, the convictions
26	for crimes of violence, even nonsexual
27	violence, creates, in my view, a real risk of

improper propensity reasoning on the jury's part. By my count, there is a total of 13 convictions for assault, including two for assault causing bodily harm. There is also a conviction for uttering threats, a conviction for forcible entry, and a conviction for being unlawfully in a dwelling house. Together those convictions account for about a third of Mr. Nadli's criminal record.

The Crown's position was to concede that the convictions for the assault causing bodily harm, forcible entry, and unlawfully in a dwelling house could be edited out. But Crown argued that the assault convictions should not be edited out for fear that doing so may create an artificial gap in the criminal record. I disagree: there are sufficient other types of convictions to not create such an artificial gap.

The probative value of the convictions for violent crimes, in my view, is outweighed by their potential prejudicial effect. Leaving the balance of the convictions available for cross-examination would ensure that the jury would have this relevant information for the purpose of assessing Mr. Nadli's credibility as a witness but without bringing in the risk

of propensity reasoning.

I would add that although one of the counts here in this trial is for break and enter, the substance of that offence really is not the property offence. The core of the offence is the sexual assault causing bodily harm that he is alleged to have committed once inside the complainant's residence. For that reason I do not think that the potential prejudicial effect of the property-related crimes warrants editing them out of the criminal record.

Those are the reasons why I permitted the cross-examination of Mr. Nadli on his criminal record to the extent that I did, and why I edited the convictions that I enumerated in my ruling from yesterday.

In addition, to ensure that the jury is aware of the limited use that they could make of this evidence, I gave them a mid-trial instruction at the point in the evidence where Mr. Nadli's record was put to him, and I reiterated those instructions this morning in my final charge; hopefully, this will have conveyed to them in clear and no uncertain terms how they can and cannot use this evidence in their deliberations.

Τ	so those are my reasons on the Corbett
2	application and, as I said, a transcript will
3	be prepared of this ruling and Exhibit A will
4	be appended to it to provide context.
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6	RULING CONCLUDED
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10	Certified to be a true and
11	accurate transcript pursuant to Rules 723 and 724 of the
12	Supreme Court Rules,
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17	Lois Hewitt,
18	Court Reporter
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