IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

IN THE MATTER OF:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

- v -

## COLE ALLAN GRIFFIN

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Transcript of the Reasons for Sentence delivered by The Honourable Justice L.A. Charbonneau, sitting in Yellowknife, in the Northwest Territories, on the 20th day of September, A.D. 2013.

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## APPEARANCES:

Mr. B. Demone and

Ms. M. Zimmer: Counsel for the Crown

Mr. T. Boyd: Counsel for the Accused

(Charge under s. 271 of the Criminal Code of Canada)

BAN ON PUBLICATION OF THE COMPLAINANT/WITNESS PURSUANT TO SECTION 486.4 OF THE CRIMINAL CODE

BAN ON PUBLICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 648 OF THE CRIMINAL CODE

1	THE	COURT:	This afternoon, it is my
2		responsibility to	decide what sentence should be
3		imposed on Cole G	riffin for having sexual
4		assaulted C.C. sor	ne seven years ago. Mr. Griffin
5		had his trial on	this charge this past July, and,
6		after two days of	deliberations, the jury found
7		him guilty. His	sentencing hearing was adjourned
8		to this week so the	nat a pre-sentence report could
9		be prepared.	
10		In any senter	ncing, the Court has to take

In any sentencing, the Court has to take into account the principles of sentencing that are set out in the Criminal Code, the circumstances of the offence that was committed, and the circumstances of the person that has committed that offence.

As far as the circumstances of the offence, the Crown and Defence do not agree on the basis upon which Mr. Griffin should be sentenced. So that is the first question that I have to address.

This was a jury trial. For the purposes of deciding whether Mr. Griffin was guilty or not guilty, the jury was the sole trier of facts.

The jury found Mr. Griffin guilty, so it is clear that they were satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that he sexually assaulted C. But in our system of law, juries are asked to give a

verdict. They are not asked, and, in fact, they are not permitted, to give reasons for that verdict. The entire deliberation process is subject to strict rules whereas jurors are not permitted to disclose anything about it. That rule is there for a very good reason, but it means that sometimes, because of how the evidence has come out during the trial, there can be some uncertainty, possible ambiguity, about what factual findings a jury made to arrive at its verdict. Other times it is clear that there is only one way the jury could have reached its verdict, and, in those cases, that is what the sentencing judge has to use for the factual basis for the sentencing. But this is one case where I agree that there can be some uncertainty as to what the factual basis for the conviction is. Mr. Griffin faced a sexual assault charge

Mr. Griffin faced a sexual assault charge alleged to have involved events over a period of several months. C. herself described various acts of sexual assault that took place during that period of time. The jury was told, as they always are, that the jury could accept all, some, or none of the evidence of any of the witnesses called. So it is possible that they could have returned a verdict of guilty based on some of the things that C. said happened, that they may not

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have been completely sure about some of the other
things she said happened.

In addition to that, Mr. Griffin gave a statement to the police during this investigation, and, in that statement, he admitted to certain acts that would constitute a sexual assault. That statement was ruled admissible at the trial and was part of the evidence that the jury had to consider. So it is possible that they could have found him guilty on the basis of one or more of the admissions that he made in that statement, and not necessarily because they accepted C.'s evidence. So given this, I, as the trial judge, am the one who has to decide what acts of sexual assault were proven beyond a reasonable doubt and what acts should form the basis for the sentencing.

I am not going to go over all of the evidence in detail. I will simply note the main features of the aspects of the evidence that dealt specifically with the nature of the sexual touching that was said to have taken place.

First, with respect to C.'s evidence, there were really two aspects of things that she talked about when describing being sexually assaulted by Mr. Griffin. The first aspect was her description of an incident that she recalled

happened on a very specific night, a night where she slept in the same bed as Mr. Griffin. The second aspect of her evidence was the description of assaults that occurred over a period of time when he would tuck her into bed at night.

With respect to the first incident, her evidence was that she woke up to Mr. Griffin's hands under her pajamas and underwear touching her genital area. She said that his hand was moving up and down in that area, that she laid there for five or ten minutes because she did not know what to do, that she eventually got up, went to the bathroom and then went downstairs to watch television. And she said she was about seven years old when this happened. With respect to the other incidents, she explained that Mr. Griffin would tuck her into bed and that part of his bedtime ritual was that he would tickle her on her belly, blow air on her skin (this was referred to as "blowing bubbles") and give her goose bumps. This appeared to have been, at first at least, a playful thing that happened as part of the bedtime ritual, something that made her laugh and was fun. But she describes things taking on a very different turn also. She explained that sometimes he would lower her pajamas and underwear down to her hips, that he

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would "blow bubbles" and kiss and lick her belly,
that he would move lower on her body towards her
genital area and kiss her genital area. She said
he did not spend a lot of time in that area but
would do these things as he was moving his head
up and down along her body, and she explained
that this happened on a number of occasions.
Those are the actions that C.C. described.

Mr. Griffin testified at his trial. Some of his evidence dovetailed with C.'s. For example, he, too, remembered the night where they spent the night in the same bed and his evidence was consistent with hers as to how this came about, but he denied touching her sexually that night. He also agreed with a lot of what she said about the bedtime routine, but denied touching her in a sexual way when he would tuck her in. On his evidence, none of the contact that took place would constitute a sexual assault, and I gave instructions to the jury to that effect in my charge. I told the jury that if they believed him or if his evidence left them with a reasonable doubt, they would have to find him not guilty because, on that version of events, he did not commit a crime.

It is obvious from the length of the deliberations and some of the questions and

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read-backs that the jury requested that they carefully considered this and the rest of the evidence. It's equally clear from their verdict that they rejected Mr. Griffin's trial evidence.

The last evidentiary piece is Mr. Griffin's statement to the police. In his statement to Constable Foley, Mr. Griffin initially denied that he ever touched C. in a sexual manner, but as the statement progressed, he eventually made certain admissions about having touched her in a sexual way, although those admissions do not dovetail exactly with what she described in her trial testimony. He admitted to doing some things, but he admitted to less than what she described at trial. Again, the jury was instructed that it was for them to decide how much weight to attribute to Mr. Griffin's statement.

As I have already explained, the jury could have found Mr. Griffin guilty without necessarily accepting that he did all of the things that C. alleged. For example, they could have accepted what she said about waking up to his hand under her pajamas but not what she said about the things she said happened as he was tucking her in, or, in the reverse, they could have accepted what she said about what he did when he was

tucking her in but not been sure that he deliberately put his hand on her genitals that time they spent the night in the same bed, or they could have not accepted her evidence but found him guilty on the basis of his own admissions. There are many permutations and combinations possible.

The defence is asking me to sentence

Mr. Griffin on the basis of the least serious

scenario available on the evidence. To do so, I

would have to conclude that the more serious

aspects of what C. alleged - the touching of her

genitals by Mr. Griffin with his hand on one

occasion and with his mouth on a number of

occasions - have not been established beyond a

reasonable doubt at this trial. The Crown is

asking me to conclude that those serious

allegations have been proven to the requisite

degree and that it is on that basis that

Mr. Griffin should be sentenced.

I have considered this and I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting C.'s testimony about what happened to her, and this for many reasons. In my opinion, she gave clear and convincing evidence about what happened to her. She underwent very thorough and very competent cross-examination and was never shaken in any way

1 on the details that she gave about what happened 2 to her. She struggled at times during her 3 evidence, but she stood very firm on what happened to her. I observed her carefully as she testified. Demeanour is always something that must be approached with great care. But the 6 moments when she broke down during her evidence, the way she responded to suggestions that somehow 8 she might have misconstrued or been confused 9 about what happened to her, and everything else 10 about the manner in which she delivered her 11 12 evidence was, in my opinion, very compelling. I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the 13 assaults that she was subjected to by Mr. Griffin 14 were as she described them and not the somewhat 15 16 watered-down version that Mr. Griffin eventually 17 admitted to Constable Foley. To the extent that Mr. Griffin's statement to the police suggests a 18 less serious interference with C., it does not 19 raise a reasonable doubt in my mind about her 20 21 allegation. I understand why the jury rejected 22 Mr. Griffin's testimony at trial. In my view, 23 2.4 that was a sound conclusion given the nature of 25 that evidence, the many inconsistencies within it

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and between it and the various things he said in

his statement to Constable Foley. There were

1 also inconsistencies within his statement to 2 Constable Foley. And as for some of these 3 differences between the statement and his trial evidence, some of the explanations that he gave, to my mind at least, were simply unbelievable. Even though he eventually did make some admissions to Constable Foley, those admissions do not raise a doubt in my mind as to the accuracy of C.'s description of what actually 9 happened, and wherever there is a difference 10 between the two, I accept what C. said as an 12 accurate account of what happened.

> It is clear from the pre-sentence report that Mr. Griffin continues to maintain his innocence and perhaps he has convinced himself that he did not do the things that C. described. I cannot know. But I am satisfied that her account of events is credible, reliable, and accurate as far as how serious these sexual assaults were.

> So to be clear, for the purposes of sentencing today, the facts that I am basing my decision on are the following: Mr. Griffin became involved in a relationship with C.'s mother when C. was very young. He took on a parental role in the family and was a father figure to C. She liked him a lot and they got

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along very well and did a lot of things together.

Mr. Griffin often looked after her and her

siblings from time to time as their mother was

involved in shift work and her schedule varied.

One night, C. and Mr. Griffin spent the night in

the same bed. This was at the suggestion of C.'s

mother who thought it would give them and

opportunity to bond.

Here, I have to pause, given some of the submissions that were made at trial and at the sentencing hearing about this aspect of the facts, this question of how C. and Mr. Griffin came to spend a night in the same bed. Many may view the idea of having Mr. Griffin and C. sleep in the same bed as not a good idea, something not appropriate. But that is not what this case is about and it has, in my view, very little relevance to sentencing. This case is not about C.'s mother, the choices that she made, her parenting skills, or other decisions she made during the course of that time frame. This case is about Mr. Griffin's actions.

I recognize that everything must be looked at in context and sometimes with the necessary nuances, but no amount of context or nuance can shift the responsibility away from Mr. Griffin himself for his actions in having sexually

assaulted this little girl. The reasons he ended up sleeping in the same bed as her do not reduce his blameworthiness for having taken advantage of the situation. I think that aspect of the evidence is relevant only to one extent: Because this was not his idea, it cannot be argued that he planned this all along. If he had, obviously it would make it all the more serious. Here, there is nothing to suggest that these sleeping arrangements were his idea or his suggestion, but beyond that, I do not find that fact particularly relevant.

Soing back to the facts that the sentence should be based on, on that occasion, when Mr. Griffin was sleeping in the same bed as C., I find that he did put his hand under her pajamas and underwear and touched her on her genital area. He moved his hand up and down and at one point she woke up. She waited because, understandably, she did not know what to do.

Eventually, she got up and went to the bathroom and went downstairs to watch TV. She said she thought she was seven when this happened. She may have the exact year wrong depending on how one looks at the evidence and given the time frame on the Indictment, but it really does not matter. The fact is she was still quite young.

1 The other sexual assaults took place when 2 Mr. Griffin was tucking her into bed. He would 3 tickle her on her stomach and move down towards her pelvis and her genital area, blow on her stomach and try to give her goose bumps. He did lick her stomach and he did eventually move 6 closer to her pelvic and genital region and he did have his mouth on her genital area. He said 8 this, too, would go on for three or five minutes, 9 that he did not spend a lot of time on her 10 genital area but would basically move his face up 11 12 and down in that general area of her body. She did not say how many times this happened or over 13 exactly what period of time, but I infer, and I 14 think it is clear from her evidence, that it 15 16 happened several times until eventually she got 17 older and decided she did not want to get tucked 18 in anymore. Those are my factual findings as to the 19 circumstances of the offences committed by 20 21 Mr. Griffin. 22 Turning to his personal circumstances, he is

now 27 years old. He was in his early 20s when these offences were committed, and he was only 19 when he began his relationship with C.'s mother, who is much older than him.

I have reviewed the pre-sentence report

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carefully. It sets out some of the challenges
and struggles that Mr. Griffin faced when he was
growing up. His was not an easy upbringing and I
recognize that.

There are a few areas in the report where Mr. Griffin's accounts or perceptions do not appear to be entirely in line with the perception of others. For example, he says he was the subject of physical abuse at the hands of his father. He made reference to that in the statement to the police also, I think. The father denies that in the pre-sentence report and I have no way of knowing where the truth is on that front. There is also some mention in the report about a misunderstanding of sorts within the family about an incident that happened between Mr. Griffin and his sister and circumstances that led to him being sent away to Bosco Homes. The reason why he was sent to Bosco Homes seems to not be understood exactly the same way by him and by his parents, at least according to what is in the report. I cannot draw any conclusions from all this, but I just note that it may be an indication of other examples where Mr. Griffin's way of perceiving events may not necessarily accord with the perception of others.

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What is positive for him is that despite

some of the problems that occurred over the years, he still has the support of his father and stepmother, and hopefully this will be of assistance to him in reintegrating society when the time comes.

I also heard from his counsel and also in the report that he had, at the time of the trial, reached a point where he was more clear and consistent about what he wanted to pursue as far as work opportunities and more generally give a direction to his life.

Mr. Griffin has no criminal record. This will be his first conviction. It is to his credit that despite some of the difficulties he had growing up and despite having spent a few years living on the streets in Yellowknife as a young man, not even an adult, he managed to stay out of trouble with the law. It is also to his credit that he had, at least recently, come to some decisions and a clearer sense of direction about what he wanted to do with his life and the employment opportunities and training he wanted to pursue. When he was given an opportunity to speak earlier this week, he said he wanted to move in a more positive and healthy direction with his life. He is still quite young, and no matter what I do today, the fact is he will still

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be a young man when he will regain his freedom.

And there are things in the pre-sentence report,

including the support that he has, that give some
cause for optimism.

Of course, from the Court's perspective, one area of concern is his refusal to acknowledge the wrong that he did. Maybe his relationship with C.'s mother was unhealthy and dysfunctional, maybe in some respects he tried to do his best when he became part of that family unit. It seems clear that in some respects he did do his best to contribute and maybe he was in way over his head; but one day he will have to come to terms with the fact that none of that changes or explains his conduct towards a girl C.'s age and how he abused the trust that she had placed in him.

The Court is concerned for him and for the future in that regard, and the Court hopes that during his sentence and after his release, he will benefit from assistance in gaining more insight into his actions and the root causes of those actions. This for the protection of other young people he may come into contact with, of course, but also for his own wellbeing, because suffice it to say that if Mr. Griffin ever finds himself convicted for a crime of this nature

again, his prospects will be very grim and he would likely face a sentence of imprisonment far, far more significant than anything he can be facing today, coming before the Court as a first offender.

The pre-sentence report makes mention of the fact that Mr. Griffin is of Metis descent. I did not hear any specific submissions on that and the implications it has, given the provisions of the Criminal Code that mandate a different approach when dealing with aboriginal offenders. I have given that issue some consideration. I have already noted that Mr. Griffin faced difficult situations as he was growing up. But, on the whole, this is not a case where those are factors that can make a significant difference on the ultimate sentence that I impose given the seriousness of this crime and the overall circumstances.

So, in general, and I say it again, in arriving at my decision, I have taken into account everything that I have heard about Mr. Griffin's personal circumstances.

Now I must turn to the law. I have considered the principles of sentencing that are set out in the Criminal Code. I will not be referring to all of them in detail except to say

that the fundamental sentencing principle is that 1 2 a sentence must be proportionate to the 3 seriousness of the offence and the level of blameworthiness of the offender. This is a serious offence and Mr. Griffin's degree of blameworthiness for it is very high. It has long been established that the paramount sentencing principles when dealing with sexual abuse of children are denunciation and deterrence. Courts have to impose sentences that make it clear that 10 in our society the abuse of children is 12 intolerable. Courts have to ensure that their sentences discourage those who might be inclined 13 to take advantage of children in this way. 14

In the area of sexual abuse of children by persons who are in a parental position, such as is the case here, the case law has developed more specific principles. The cases filed by the Crown and the case filed by defence refer to some of those principles and to the sentencing ranges and approaches that have been developed as a result.

The law is clearly established in this jurisdiction that the starting point for a single act of major sexual assault against a child by a person who is in a position of trust or authority is four years. But I think it is important to go

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back to some of the things that were said in the case that articulated that starting point in the first place some 20 years ago. Because beyond recognizing the existence of these ranges of sentences and starting points, it is important to remember the reasons why higher courts came to develop them.

The starting point of four years imprisonment is significant, but it is not harshness for the sake of harshness or revenge. It is important for everyone to understand why courts have for so many years approached these cases in this manner, and, for that reason, I am going to quote, at length, actually, from the decision of R. v. W.B.S.; R. v. Powderface, [1992] A.J. No. 601, which is the case referred to in many of the authorities that have been filed in this case. It was the case where the idea of this four-year starting point was articulated. I want to refrain from quoting more than I should, but because of the circumstances of this case, I think some of these things bear repeating.

The Court started its analysis by talking about the general question of the psychological trauma that is suffered by sexual assault victims generally and then went on to say various things.

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1	The Court said:
2	When the victim of a major sexual assault is a child, it is also no
3	doubt true that such an assault frequently results in
4	psychological harm to the victims.
5	This is on page 4. And later on page 4, the
6	Court says:
7	One consequence of being abused sexually may be that the child
8	will never be able, as an adult, to form a loving, caring
9	relationship with another adult of the opposite sex, being always
10	fearful, even unconsciously, that such a partner will use sexual
11	acts to hurt him or her rather than as an intimate expression of
12	caring and affection. There is no empirical way of proving that a
13	particular child victim's emotional trauma will or will not
14	<pre>make it more difficult or impossible for him or her to love</pre>
15	another, without fear of abuse. We have only the recorded
16	experience of men and women who attribute their difficulties as
17	adults in forming mature and fulfilling relationships to their
18	having been abused sexually when they were children.
19	Another consequence of being
20	abused sexually may be that the child, when he or she becomes an
21	adult, will treat a child or children as he or she has been
22	treated as a child - that is, he or she may abuse a child sexually.
23	There is no empirical way of proving that a particular child
24	victim, when he or she becomes an adult, will do to some child what
25	had been done to him or her. We do know that sentencing judges are
26	commonly told by defence counsel that the accused claims to have
27	been sexually abused by a man (or by a woman, or both) who had stood

1	in a parental relationship to him or her when he or she was a child.
2	of her when he of she was a chira.
3	Then the Court referred to an article called
4	"Impact of Child Sexual Abuse: A Review of the
5	Research", by Angela Browne and David Finkelhor,
6	of the Family Violence Research Program and the
7	Family Research Laboratory of the University of
8	New Hampshire. Those references are on page 5 of
9	the decision. Again, I want to refer to what was
10	said. The reasons I'm referring to this detail
11	will become apparent in a moment. The Court
12	noted some things that the article in question
13	made clear:
14	The initial effects of sexual abuse of a child may include
15	reactions of fear, anxiety, depression, anger, hostility, and
16	inappropriate sexual behaviour.  The long-term affects are
17	summarized as follows:
18	Adult women victimized as children are more likely to manifest
19	depression, self-destructive behaviour, anxiety, feelings of
20	isolation and stigma, poor self-esteem, a tendency toward
21	revictimization and substance abuse. Difficulty in trusting
22	others and sexual maladjustment
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24	A little bit later the Court says:
25	In addition, the authors indicate that incest victims "seem
26	especially likely to experience difficulty in close
27	relationships", including "conflict with or fear of their

1	husbands or sex partners" and
2	failure to marry.
3	And one of the other things that the Court
4	concludes on page 6 is that:
5	when the accused stands in a
6	parental or other family relationship with the child such
7	that he had assumed the duty to protect the child from harm and is
8	the repository of trust placed in him by the child, the sexual
9	assault committed by him upon the child constitutes a grave breach
10	of that duty and an outrageous breach of that trust.
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12	These are only some of the things that the
13	Alberta Court of Appeal said in the W.B.S. case
14	in explaining why that court felt that the
15	sentences imposed in these kinds of cases should
16	be as significant as they are. Reading these
17	kinds of things, they may sound very theoretical,
18	but they are not. And this case provides a very
19	vivid illustration of this.
20	Two Victim Impact Statements were filed in
21	this case and I am going to read them into the
22	record in their entirety. I am going to read
23	them into the record in their entirety for two
24	reasons. First, because one is from the
25	grandmother and she has specifically requested on
26	the form that the document be read into court by

27 the judge. But I also want to read these into

1	the record because these Victim Impact Statements
2	bring home what these types of crimes do to the
3	victim. The parallels between what they say and
4	some of the quotes that I have just read from the
5	W.B.S. decision are striking.
6	The first Victim Impact Statement was
7	completed in July by C.'s grandmother. This is
8	what it says:
9	The way this has affected C. so far is that she has changed from
10	an easy-going, free-spirited child to someone who is very angry and
11	withdrawn. She has no trust in anyone and can't express herself
12	as she was once able to do. She is afraid and insecure. She needs
13	to keep her bedroom door and windows locked at night and has to
14	have a bat under her bed. She says that she doesn't understand
15	how to love and is therefore unable to form any long-term
16	relationships. She holds back emotionally even with close family
17	members (i.e. unable to show love to grandpa or be alone with
18	grandpa). This has turned her into a lonely person. She once
19	had several friends but now only has a few casual friends that she
20	sees only once in a while. C. does not like to interact with
21	anyone and is afraid to make close relationships. She does not hang
22	out with friends except for maybe once a week. C. wishes to have no
23	contact with the accused. When she sees him again, it brings back
24	the memories and makes her feel afraid again.
25	This was completed on the 10th of July, 2013.
26	The second Victim Impact Statement is

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written by C. herself and it was written very

1	recently. It is dated the 15th of September and
2	was filed with the Court a few days later. This
3	is what she writes:
4	The crime that was committed
5	<pre>impacted on my life in a huge way. It emotionally destroyed me. I feel angry and withdraw. It</pre>
6	ruined my relationship with my
7	<pre>mom. I don't feel comfortable with any older man. It makes me</pre>
8	<pre>sad and discouraged because I wish it wasn't that was (sic). It made</pre>
9	<pre>me depressed and have nightmares that Cole will hurt me. I don't feel emotions that much anymore.</pre>
10	I can't love or trust anyone. I
11	only feel safe if I'm at my grandparents or if I'm alone in my
12	<pre>room with my door and windows locked. I feel boxed in and that I can't express myself.</pre>
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14	It financially affected my family. My mom is to (sic) depressed to work. That affects me in many
15	ways. It makes me feel worthless. I feel if I didn't speak up and
16	tell my mom she would still be working.
17	-
18	Physically it drove my mom to the point where I don't even have a mom. It makes me depressed, and
19	wish I had someone else's life.
20	These Victim Impact Statements are
21	heartbreaking, and they go a long way to explain
22	why these types of offences are considered to be
23	so serious. What the Court does today cannot
24	repair the harm done to C. I do hope that in
25	time she can heal from this, that she will get
26	some help, the help that she needs to get back
27	some of what she lost. And I hope it brings her

some level of comfort to know that she is not responsible for what happened to her and that the Court believed her.

I have talked at length about the principles of law and the four-year starting point that applies to major sexual assaults of children committed by persons in authority. Here, defence disputes that Mr. Griffin's conduct falls within the range of conduct that triggers this four-year starting point. With the greatest of respect, I disagree with that submission. Mr. Griffin's actions, which included the kissing of this younger girl's genitals and the touching of her genitals with his hand under her clothing while she was sleeping, was a very serious intrusion and a very serious violation of her sexual and personal integrity. In my view, the starting point does apply to this case. That being said, a starting point is not a minimum sentence and it is not an automatic sentence. The starting point is a guideline that assists sentencing courts, but the individual circumstances of each case must still be considered from there to determine what the sentence should be.

As noted by defence counsel, some of the cases that were filed are cases where the starting point did apply and yet the sentence

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imposed was significantly lower than that
starting point, and I am certainly mindful of
that.

The other thing about the starting point in this specific area is that it already factors in many of the things that would otherwise be aggravating factors and would result in an increased sentence from the starting point. For example, the fact that the victim was a child, the fact that the offender breached the child's trust, the fact that the case involved a serious sexual assault. These are all things that are already factored into the starting point that the courts have identified.

Here, there are a few other aggravating features to consider. First, the repetition of the conduct: This was not a single act. The second is something that the Crown has referred to as the element of grooming that emerges from the evidence. I understand the Crown's submission on that, but I do think it has to be balanced against other things about Mr. Griffin which have been noted by his counsel: His lack of maturity, the fact he found himself propelled in a fatherly role at a time when he was himself still young and mostly probably completely ill-equipped to take on that role. None of that

1	excuses the things that he ultimately did, but it
2	does raise some question in my mind as to whether
3	he was, from the start, truly grooming C. in the
4	way we generally understand that term to mean.
5	For example, when compared to the conduct of
6	hardened pedophiles who can be very deliberate,
7	calculating, and manipulative in setting
8	themselves up to be in a position to abuse
9	children. On this point, I am not prepared to
10	conclude that Mr. Griffin, from the very start of
11	his involvement with C., planned on things
12	evolving in the direction that they did. But
13	what is beyond doubt is that at one point things
14	did take a terrible turn and that from that point
15	on, as the conduct repeated itself, it
16	necessarily had to involve some level of
17	deliberation and planning, in particular around
18	this so-called bedtime ritual. I am not able to
19	treat this as strictly a crime of opportunity or
20	a crime involving a temporary lapse on his part.
21	Because the conduct was repeated, it necessarily
22	became increasingly deliberate.
23	I also agree with the Crown that the fact
24	that C. was on one occasion assaulted while she
25	was asleep and therefore even more vulnerable is
26	aggravating as well. I say this bearing in mind

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that it is plain on the evidence in this case she

was very vulnerable, in any event: because during the other incidents she was awake and yet she was as helpless as she was on the incident where she was sleeping. And of course the fact that she was as young as she was would make her exceedingly vulnerable, in any event.

I do want to address certain aspects of the defence's submission disputing the Crown's characterizations of the seriousness of this conduct. Of course it is always possible to imagine cases involving conduct that is worse than what happened here, conduct that is even more serious. But some of the things that were referred to by defence counsel, to my mind at least, really constitute the absence of what would otherwise be an aggravating factor, rather than being truly mitigating. For example, the absence of overt violence or threat is not mitigating; it simply would be highly aggravating if those elements were there. The reality is that young children are vulnerable and that often adults do not have to threaten them or use any force or violence against them to do what they want.

Defence counsel also noted the absence of evidence of sexual gratification. I recognize again there was no evidences of ejaculation or

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things of that sort, but this contact had to somehow be sexually motivated. This is what a sexual assault is. The absence of evidence of sexual gratification does not detract from the seriousness of the conduct, nor from its obvious sexual nature.

Defence noted the fact that there was no evidence of protest. Again, that is not unusual in cases involving child sexual assault. This would have been exceedingly confusing for C.

That is part of what makes this case so serious and so sad.

Defence noted also the fact that the relationship continued for some time after these events occurred, but, again, that is not unusual. Delayed disclosure is something that frequently happens in sexual assault matters generally, but especially in the sexual assault of children. Part of my instructions to the jury in this case, in fact, was to this effect. There is no rule in law or life as to how people who are abused or subjected to trauma will react and there are lots of reasons for that. So I simply do not see how the fact that the family unit continued to function for a period of time after these events started taking place changes anything to the seriousness of what happened.

1 I do not disagree with defence counsel that 2 this family situation was perhaps atypical. 3 There was a considerable age difference between Mr. Griffin and C.'s mother. He was closer in age to some of her children than to her. He found himself taking on a role he may well not 6 have been mature enough to take on. But none of that has anything to do with the fact that he 8 sexually abused C. On the evidence, I cannot 9 accept the theory of the case that would suggest 10 that these were misguided actions by a confused 11 12 young man who did not know exactly where the parenting boundaries were. C. was very young. 13 No adult man, even a young adult man, could 14 possibly be confused about whether things like 15 16 touching her genitals with his hand or touching 17 her genitals with his mouth would be 18 inappropriate and criminal. 19 There are things that are in Mr. Griffin's favour here in the sense that they are reasons to 20 21

There are things that are in Mr. Griffin's favour here in the sense that they are reasons to exercise some restraint in sentencing him. The first is his young age at the time that these offences were committed and the fact that even today he is still a young man. The second is that he does come before the Court as a first offender. As noted by counsel and by our Court of Appeal in the case of A.J.P.J., 2011 NWTCA 2,

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the absence of a criminal record, though, is the absence of an aggravating factor. That should not be confused with something that is mitigating. But the young age and the lack of record are factors to consider in sentencing someone and they are a reason to exercise restraint.

The Crown asks that I impose a jail term between three and three and a half years. Defence has argued that the range of sentence should be lower, from 18 months to two and a half years. Various cases have been filed and I have reviewed them. As I said during submissions, every case is different and there are always several distinguishing features from one to the next. The most relevant sentencing decisions, of course, are the ones dealing with sexual assault on children because those cases engage very unique considerations for the reasons I have already mentioned. It also makes a considerable difference on sentencing when the mitigating factors involve the presence of a guilty plea. People should not be punished for having exercised their right to have a trial of course, but the fact is that people who are sentenced, having pleaded guilty and having expressed remorse, are given considerable credit for that.

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- In the case of Mannilaq, 2012 NWTSC 48, in

  paragraphs 44 and 45, the Court talks about some

  of the reasons why this is the case. Here, that

  significant mitigating factor is not present.

  There is no evidence of remorse and there is, in

  fact, very little by way of mitigation.
  - Without going into all of the cases filed in great detail, there are a few things I want to note about them since submissions were made about them.
- R. v. C.O., 2006 NWTSC 3, was a serious 11 12 sexual assault committed by a father on his seven-year-old son. The sentence imposed by the 13 Court of Appeal was two years. But at paragraph 14 12, the Court noted that there were several 15 16 mitigating factors, and there are none here. 17 addition, in C.O., the sentence imposed at trial was non-custodial. When appellate courts 18 incarcerate someone on appeal who had not been 19 20 sent to jail at the original sentencing, 21 oftentimes the Court exercises considerable restraint and imposes the least lengthy sentence 22 23 possible.
  - R. v. B.K.K. [1995] N.W.T.J. No. 122, involved serious sexual assaults of a young person by her older brother with several aggravating factors that are not present here.

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Not surprisingly, the sentence imposed in that case was much, much higher than what the Crown is seeking here.

In R. v. P.S.T., 2012 NWTSC 86, the sentence imposed was three years. The facts involved several acts of sexual touching by a father on his daughter, but I note that all those acts occurred on the same night. Serious as those facts were, they did not involve a pattern of repetitive behaviour over a long period of time, and there was a guilty plea, which is a significant distinction.

In R. v. C.S., 2003 ABCA 325, the victim was young, the assaults were serious and repeated over a period of time, and it was also a case where the accused was convicted after trial.

This was another instance where despite the very high standard of review that applies on sentence appeals, our Court of Appeal felt compelled to interfere with the sentence imposed by the sentencing judge, which was two years less a day, and increased the sentence to three years.

These cases are all helpful illustrations of how courts have balanced various mitigating and aggravating factors to arrive at a fit sentence in cases involving the sexual abuse of children.

But they, of course, do not answer the ultimate

1 question as to what the sentence should be in this case.

Mr. Griffin has been in custody since he was convicted; a period of 69 days. He has taken some programs while in custody. He has helped other inmates. I accept his counsel's submissions that as a serving prisoner, it is quite likely he would have earned full remission during this time and that he did what he could to make his time on remand productive. I really hope that he will do the same for the whole duration of his sentence, that he will take programs to help him gain insight into his past and to what occurred here with this particular victim.

I am satisfied that he should receive enhanced credit for the time that he has spent on remand since his conviction, and so, for that time, I will give him credit for three months.

The Crown has sought ancillary orders, none of which are opposed by defence. I agree that those orders should be made. Most of them, in fact, are mandatory. There will be a DNA order. It is mandatory because this is a primary designated offence under the Criminal Code.

There will a firearms prohibition order pursuant to Section 109 of the Criminal Code. Firearms

are to be surrendered forthwith and the order will commence today and expire ten years from Mr. Griffin's release from custody. There will also be an order that Mr. Griffin comply with the requirements of the Sexual Offender Information Registration Act for a period of 20 years.

I considered the Crown's application for an order to be made pursuant to Section 161 of the Criminal Code. Mr. Griffin's lack of insight into his conduct makes me concerned that it is preferable to limit his ability to be in contact with young people, and so I think it is an appropriate case to use the power that the Code gives me under Section 161 and effect some control over his movements to that extent. So there will be an order under Section 161 of the Criminal Code, and it will prohibit Mr. Griffin from attending a public park or public swimming area where persons under the age of 16 years are present or can reasonably be expected to be present or a day care centre, school ground playground or community centre. He will also be prohibited from seeking, obtaining, or continuing any appointment (whether or not the employment is remunerated) or becoming or being a volunteer in the capacity that involves being in a position of trust or authority towards persons under the age

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of 16 years. And he will be prohibited from using the computer system within the meaning of sub-section 342.1(2) of the Criminal Code for the purposes of communicating with a person under the age of 16 years. The Crown has asked that this order be in effect for a period of ten years and I agree that that is appropriate. Under the terms of paragraph (2) of Section 161, the prohibition will begin on the day that Mr. Griffin is released from imprisonment and will be in force from ten years from that date.

I am not going to make an order for a victim of crime surcharge in this case given the length of the term of imprisonment I am about to impose.

At the expiration of the appeal period, there will be an order for the return of any exhibits that were seized during this investigation so that they be returned to their lawful owners, if that is appropriate. If it is not appropriate to return them, any exhibits that are left can be destroyed. As I have said, of course this has to be at the expiration of the appeal period.

Even giving full effect to the principle of restraint, even taking into account Mr. Griffin's age and his lack of record, the fact remains, as I hope is abundantly clear from everything I have

been saying, that the offence for which he has been convicted was very serious. In proposing the range that it has, in my view, the Crown has shown restraint considering the young age of the victim and the repetition of the conduct over a period of time.

Stand up, please, Mr. Griffin. Mr. Griffin, for the sexual assault you have committed on C.C., I sentence you to a term of imprisonment of three and a half years, which will be three years and three months considering the credit I am giving you for the time you have spent on remand. You can have a seat.

I know you have some supports in
Yellowknife, but I will leave it up to the
Correctional authorities to decide where it is
best to have you serve your sentence. I think
the most important thing is that you get some
help and assistance to deal with whatever has
happened in your past and to help you move
forward in a positive way. I am not an expert in
that, but I cannot help but think that your
ability to reach your goal of having a healthy,
productive life moving forward and your ability
to be rehabilitated and never be in this kind of
situation again really depends on whether you are
able to get insight into what has happened, and I

1		really hope you wil	l be able to do that.
2		Is there anyth	ing I have overlooked,
3		Counsel?	
4	MR.	DEMONE:	No, Your Honour. Thank you.
5	THE	COURT:	Mr. Boyd?
6	MR.	BOYD:	Nothing from defence. Thank
7		you.	
8	THE	COURT:	I thank all counsel for their
9		work on this case.	Close court, Madam Clerk.
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13			fied Pursuant to Rule 723 he Rules of Court
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16		Jane	Romanowich, CSR(A)
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