IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

IN THE MATTER OF:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

- V -

## STEPHEN WENINGER

Transcript of the Reasons for Sentence by The Honourable Justice L. A. Charbonneau, sitting in Fort Smith, in the Northwest Territories, on the 4th day of July, A.D., 2013.

## APPEARANCES:

Mr. A. Godfrey: Counsel for the Crown

Mr. S. Petitpas: Counsel for the Defence

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Charge under s. 267(b) Criminal Code of Canada

INITIALS USED FOR THE COMPLAINANT'S NAME TO PROTECT THE IDENTITY OF THE COMPLAINANT

1	THE	COURT: Stephen Weninger pleaded
2		guilty yesterday to a charge of having, between
3		the 1st of November, 2011, and the 18th of May,
4		2012, assaulted his common-law spouse, S. A.,
5		and having caused bodily harm to her. I must
6		now decide what his sentence should be for that
7		offence.
8		The Crown takes the position that a jail
9		term between 18 and 20 months is appropriate
10		for this offence. Even giving credit to
11		Mr. Weninger for the time he has already spent

for this offence. Even giving credit to

Mr. Weninger for the time he has already spent
on remand, this would mean imposing a further
jail term on him today in the range of 6 to 8

months. Mr. Weninger's counsel has argued that
the time that Mr. Weninger has already spent in
custody is sufficient to address the goals of

Crown and defence agree that whatever else I do I should include a term of probation as part of his sentence, to include a no-contact order to provide a sense of safety to S. A., and also to include conditions designed to assist Mr. Weninger in his own efforts towards his rehabilitation.

Mr. Weninger and S. A. became involved in a relationship in November of 2011. They started living together here in Fort Smith.

sentencing.

1	According to the facts that I heard yesterday
2	that relationship soon became volatile.
3	Mr. Weninger and S. A. got into arguments
4	and used some level of force and violence
5	against each other as conflicts between them
6	escalated. Mr. Weninger admits that there
7	were a number of times between January and
8	May, 2012, where he struck her on her arms
9	and shoulders to the point of causing bruising
LO	to her. He also admits that he slapped her
L1	and pulled her hair. The facts presented to
12	the Court do not include any details as to
13	what brought these incidents on or what the
L 4	difficulties between these two individuals were
15	about. What I did hear was that these things
16	happened when the two of them had been drinking.
L7	On May 16th they got into yet another
18	argument and a confrontation. This one
19	escalated to the point where Mr. Weninger bit
20	S. A.'s left earlobe. This caused an injury
21	to her that required ten stitches to close.
22	To this date, over a year later, there remains
23	a scar and discolouration on her injured earlobe
24	and she still experiences numbness to that area
25	of her body.
26	The facts do not include the exact time

when these offences came to the attention of

the RCMP, but sometime after the last assault 1 Mr. Weninger re-located to the community of 3 Fort Liard where his former spouse, D. B., and his children live. After the offences against S. A. were reported and charges were laid a 6 warrant was issued for his arrest, presumably because the RCMP in Fort Smith could not locate him. That warrant was executed on June 30th, 2012. Mr. Weninger was taken into custody, 9 and following a show cause hearing held in 10 11 Yellowknife he was ordered detained on July 12 10th and has been in custody since. As of today's date, July 4th, 2013, he has spent 13 a year and four days in custody. 14

The Warrant of Committal issued following the show cause hearing includes an endorsement pursuant to paragraph (9.1) of Section 515 of the Criminal Code, stating that he was detained primarily because of previous convictions. The legal effect of this is that for the time he has spent on remand I can only give him credit for one day for each day spent on remand. I do not have the discretion to give him credit on a ratio any greater than that for the time he has spent on remand.

S. A. did not provide a victim impact statement, although Crown Counsel confirmed

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that he met with her earlier this week and that 1 she was advised of her right to do so. She also 3 did not wish to attend this sentencing hearing. I am told that after meeting with Crown Counsel and the Crown witness coordinator she expressed 6 that she still feels afraid of Mr. Weninger. She does not want any contact with him. I heard this morning that she is also not even interested 9 in contact with him for the purposes of him expressing a written apology to her, and I think 10 11 that speaks volumes about the impact that these 12 offences had on her even though I do not have 13 the benefit of a victim impact statement.

This is not a case where there is any suggestion that either party would like to continue or restore the spousal relationship that existed at the time of these events.

Crown Counsel also advised me yesterday in submissions that S. A. has also expressed that she does not think that Mr. Weninger should receive any additional jail term for this offence. This also tells me something about her character. Evidently she is not interested in revenge.

Mr. Weninger's criminal record has been filed as an exhibit, and in looking at that record it is not surprising that the Justice

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of the Peace who presided over the show cause
hearing ordered his detention primarily because
of his prior convictions. I say that because
there are numerous entries on his criminal
record for crimes of violence and a large
number of entries for breaches of court orders.
Both types of convictions would have raised
significant concerns about releasing him on
bail.

The criminal record begins with entries in October of 1997 for dangerous operation of a motor vehicle. Then there is a fairly steady stream of convictions every year or so until the last conviction before this one, which was in December of 2012 for possession of marijuana. In between those two there are a number of different types of convictions on this record; driving offences, offences for failing to comply with court orders, property offences, many many entries for assault, a few convictions for crimes committed against police officers (one assault police officer and one resist arrest conviction), as well as one conviction for uttering threats.

What makes the record of grave concern is the number of entries on it that are convictions for crimes of violence against his spouse, and these include the following: December 19th,

1	2002, a conviction for assault for which he
2	received four months in jail followed by
3	probation for one year. June 26th, 2003, a
4	conviction for assault for which he received
5	six months in jail and probation for one year.
6	August 6th, 2004, two convictions for assault
7	for which he received concurrent terms of six
8	and four months in jail. On the same date he
9	was also convicted of breach of probation which,
10	based on the dates, would had to have been
11	related to the probation order he was on for
12	the earlier assault in 2003. October 15th, 2007
13	one conviction for assault for which he received
14	a jail term of 60 days. August 5th, 2008, two
15	convictions for assault for which he received
16	a total of seven months in jail followed by
17	probation for two years. February 8th, 2010,
18	a conviction for assault for which he received
19	a jail term of six months. Again, he was also
20	on that day convicted for breaches of probation
21	and received consecutive jail terms for that.
22	Again, this would had to have been the probation
23	order from the earlier conviction that was part
24	of his sentence for another conviction for an
25	assault on his spouse.
26	For most of these convictions the Crown
27	prosecutor was able to determine from police

records that the victim was Mr. Weninger's previous spouse, D. B. She was also the victim in the assault convictions from 2003 and 2004.

The records that the Crown was able to consult did not specifically identify those assaults as spousal in nature, but in all the circumstances I consider it an inescapable conclusion that these assaults occurred when Mr. Weninger and D. B. were in a spousal relationship.

I heard at the sentencing hearing that he was in a relationship with her for several years and that they have two daughters together; the eldest is now 11 years old. That means she was born sometime in the latter half of 2001 or the first half of 2002. Given this I have no difficulty in concluding that the assaults for which Mr. Weninger was convicted for assaulting this same person, D. B., in 2003 and 2004 were spousal in nature.

All that means is that before he began his relationship with S. A. Mr. Weninger had been convicted eight times for assault committed against his spouse. For each of those assaults he received jail terms, although none of them were particularly lengthy. This is his ninth conviction for such an offence, and it is a conviction for an offence that is more serious

than any of the previous ones because this time
he committed the crime of assault causing bodily
harm as opposed to simple assault, which is what
he was convicted of the eight other times.

These past related convictions are obviously of significant concern to the Court. It matters very little that the spouse that he assaulted this time was not the same person as the one he had assaulted so many times in the past.

Irrespective of the identity of the person assaulted what this demonstrates is a pattern by Mr. Weninger of abusing the women he shares his life with. Deterring him from engaging in this conduct again is a significant sentencing objective at this point.

Defence counsel is asking the Court to take into account the fact that violence went in both directions in Mr. Weninger's relationship with S. A., and the Crown does not dispute that this was a volatile relationship where both spouses used force against the other, particularly when they were intoxicated.

On a charge of assault causing bodily harm consent is not a defence. That is because, for policy reasons, our law does not accept the notion of a person being able to consent to another inflicting bodily harm

on them. I do accept that the circumstances of the assault may offer some mitigation on sentencing when it is shown that the offender used excessive force and inflicted bodily harm in circumstances where the altercation began as a consensual fight, because that type of scenario is admittedly different than the scenario when the use of force is entirely one-sided. At the same time, this factor can only go so far in mitigation in this case, and I say that for two reasons:

The first is that this case does not involve a single occurrence of Mr. Weninger "going too far" in responding to force used against him in the context of a volatile relationship. There were a number of incidents here, a number of times where he "went too far." He did not just cause bodily harm to her by biting her ear on May 16th, it is also admitted that the bruises visible in the photographs taken in May of 2012 were the result of some of the earlier incidents. So he would have seen the consequences of his use of force on her. There are no allegations before me that he was ever injured by her. What is clear is that she was injured by him more than once, and the type of force he used against her on May 16th, biting her earlobe to the point it

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required stitches, is very serious. Biting is quite a vicious type of assault.

The second reason why I am reluctant to attach significant weight to the fact that there was force being used both ways here is that to an extent I think that factor is overshadowed by the pattern of spousal violence revealed by Mr. Weninger's criminal record. In my view there is clearly a problem here, a problem he urgently needs to address if he does not want to find himself before the Courts again and imprisoned for very long periods of time.

When Mr. Weninger spoke to the Court
yesterday he apologized and he said he was
ashamed about what he did, and I believe that
this is truly how he feels today. He talked
about making a mistake, but he also described
himself as a not violent person by nature,
saying he has a tendency to retaliate even
though he knows he should not. I do not
question his sincerity in saying that, but
with all due respect to him I do have some
difficulty with how he characterizes himself
and how he characterizes his actions. I question
the accuracy of his self-perception in being "not
violent in nature." I do so when I consider the
sheer number of convictions for assault on his

record, combined with the fact he also has a conviction for uttering threats, combined with the fact he does not only have spousal assault convictions on his record but also convictions for other types of assault, including assaults and behavior resisting peace officers.

Putting all of that on account of retaliation as opposed to being violent, simply put, does not sound very realistic to me. I think Mr. Weninger does have a problem with violence and anger, not just a problem with alcohol and retaliating when he should not. I think he is going to have to come to terms with the fact that he is capable of violence period, and he needs to get help to figure out why and figure out how not to act this way when he is angry or frustrated or whatever it is that triggers these reactions.

There are a number of aggravating factors in this offence. First, the fact that there were several incidents over the course of a number of months as opposed to a single incident. Second, the type of injury inflicted on the last incident and the lasting consequences that it had. That impact continues a year later, and in my view is not at the most minor end of what constitutes bodily harm. The third aggravating

factor is the criminal record, which I have already talked about at length. The fourth is the fact that this occurred within the context of a spousal relationship which has, for many years, been treated by this Court and other Courts as an aggravating factor and is now specified as an aggravating factor in the Criminal Code.

As far as mitigating factors, the main one and really I think the only one is the guilty plea. This guilty plea was not entered at an early opportunity. The case did proceed to a preliminary hearing and S. A. had to testify at that hearing. Sometime ago this week was identified as the week where the trial would proceed in this Court. At the end of last week counsel for Mr. Weninger advised the registry that there would be a guilty plea.

I recognize that while S. A. was not spared completely from having to testify in relation to this charge, because she did have to testify at the preliminary hearing, the Crown was able to advise her that she would not have to testify at this trial and the Crown was able to de-notify other witnesses. I am certain she must have been very relieved not to have to testify at this trial.

This Court knows very well from seeing witnesses testify in criminal cases week in and week out that it often is a very difficult process for them. It would be especially difficult for someone who remains afraid of the accused. Sparing someone from that is always significant. It also provides complainants with certainty of the outcome, which is not insignificant.

So while Mr. Weninger is not entitled to as much credit for his guilty plea as he would have if he had offered it a year ago or at some earlier time in the process, he did give up his right to have a trial and have the Crown prove these allegations beyond a reasonable doubt, and for that he is entitled to some credit. I also consider that he was facing not just a charge of assault causing bodily harm when this matter was set for trial, the Crown was going to try him also on the more serious charge of aggravated assault, a charge that the Crown is now prepared not to proceed with. So the jeopardy he faced as this trial date was coming up was greater than ultimately what he has pleaded guilty to. That is another reason why I am prepared to give that plea mitigating effect even though it was entered late in the process.

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The circumstances of the offence, which is what I have mostly been talking about so far, are part of what I must consider when determining what a fit sentence is. Another important aspect I have to consider is Mr. Weninger's personal circumstances. I have already talked about his criminal record, which is part of those circumstances, but obviously there is a lot more to him and to his life than that criminal record.

I heard from counsel that Mr. Weninger
was offered up for adoption right from birth.
He was fortunate to be placed in the care and
later formally adopted by a family where he
was able to grow up in a supportive and loving
environment, free from abuse and violence.
His family re-located several times as he was
growing up because of the nature of his father's
employment, and later of his mother's employment,
but there is no suggestion that those frequent
re-locations impacted negatively on him.

It is clear from what his counsel has said and from what Mr. Weninger himself said that the conduct that he had displayed in his adult life is not in line with the values that his parents taught him or with how they behaved with each other in the family unit. I heard that for

whatever reason Mr. Weninger did experiment with alcohol when he was very young, 10 years old, and unfortunately his use of alcohol escalated when he was 15. He now acknowledges that he has an addiction to alcohol, and he has said to the Court that in the year that he has spent on remand he has had a lot of time to think about the role that alcohol has played in his life. He says he has come to the conclusion that he must absolutely stop drinking if he wants to change his lifestyle and not end up in jail again. He appears determined to make that change.

It is a fact that this is not an easy road to travel even for people who are very determined. Mr. Weninger knows this because he has been in treatment twice before, in alcohol treatment, and he I am sure realizes that he will need to renew his commitment to live an alcohol-free life regularly if he is to succeed. There is no doubt he will be exposed to temptation to return to alcohol use when he regains his freedom, and he probably will need help and support if he wants to maintain a sober lifestyle. I heard he has an education, he has talents and skills and many hobbies and interests. So I have no doubt that he is capable

of doing it, but it will require a life-long commitment on his part. It is the Court's sincere hope that for the sake of his children, for the sake of others in his life who care for him, and for his own sake, that he will in fact maintain that commitment.

Mr. Weninger is of Metis descent, and this imposes special obligations on me in the analysis I must undertake to decide what a fit sentence is for this crime, in accordance with the directions given by the Supreme Court of Canada in the cases of R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, 133 C.C.C. (3d) 385, 23 C.R. (5th) 97, and R. v. Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13. I have considered the principles set out in those cases and the obligation that I have to examine systemic and case-specific factors that have impacted Mr. Weninger as an aboriginal person. I have considered to what extent those factors should impact my ultimate decision on sentencing today.

As I have already alluded to, his family situation as he was growing up was such that it does not appear that he faced some of the systemic disadvantages that we hear about in many sentencing hearings involving aboriginal offenders in this jurisdiction. He grew up, by all accounts, in a healthy and supportive

environment, something he acknowledges. He said himself "this is not how I was raised." He was not raised in alcohol abuse, he was not raised in violence, and he was not taught growing up that it was okay to abuse a spouse, physically or psychologically.

He has succeeded in his educational pursuits. He got his general education degree in 2006, as well as a diploma from Aurora College here in Fort Smith to work in small airports as an observer/communicator. He has held that type of employment, and he has also worked as a carpenter and obviously has good employment prospects for the future. He has musical talents, hobbies, he can carve, he can build log cabins, and he assists people on hunts. Clearly he has a lot of skills.

I also heard that he believes, from speaking with relatives, that his biological mother abused alcohol when she was pregnant and that when he was born he had some features generally associated with fetal alcohol syndrome disorder that he somehow outgrew. It is difficult for me to assess the weight and effect of this information. There is no evidence of an actual diagnosis, and my understanding is that FASD is not something

that a person can simply outgrow, although a person can learn skills to help cope with the condition. Maybe in his case it was more a question of physical features that disappeared as he got older, I do not know.

I also heard that both Mr. Weninger's biological parents passed away sometime ago from illnesses. He also lost an adoptive sister who passed away when she was still fairly young, 35 years old. She suffered from diabetes. So like many aboriginal offenders who come before our Courts he has experienced a fair bit of loss in his life. He started using and abusing alcohol at a young age, which is also something we frequently hear about and is part of what leads young people to making destructive choices and run into problems with the law.

I am satisfied that despite his good fortune in being adopted by a supportive and healthy family there are things in Mr. Weninger's background that are relevant for the purposes of assessing what a fit sentence is for this offence and going to the root cause of his behavior. At the same time, the paramount considerations on sentencing have to be denunciation and general deterrence for reasons that I will get into in a moment,

and I do not think that the Gladue and Ipeelee
factors that are present here are such that
they can serve to significantly reduce his
level of blameworthiness for this offence
and result in a much more lenient sentence
than would otherwise be the case.

This takes me to the principles of sentencing that I must apply in deciding this case and an examination of the case law. Counsel have submitted various cases for my consideration, and I have also refreshed my memory with a few others that have talked about the principles that apply in domestic violence cases.

The purpose and principles of sentencing are set out in the Criminal Code, and I will not refer to all of them here. The fundamental sentencing principle is proportionality.

A sentence should be proportionate to the seriousness of the offence and the degree of blameworthiness of the offender. Sentencing in the area of domestic violence engages certain considerations that are specific to the nature of that unfortunately still very prevalent social problem.

26 In 1992 the Alberta Court of Appeal 27 had occasion to comment on this in the case

1	of R. v. Brown, (Alta. C.A.) [1992] A.J. No.
2	432. In that case the Court was dealing with
3	appeals in three cases involving wife assaults.
4	It took the opportunity to comment about what
5	the paramount sentencing considerations are when
6	dealing with this type of crime. Although that
7	case is now over 20 years old, in my view the
8	things that the Court of Appeal said in it remain
9	as relevant today as they were when the case was
10	first decided. I will refer to that case because
11	I think what was said in it is important to
12	remember.
13	The Court said many things, but started
14	its analysis by referring to comments made by
15	Justice Wilson in the Supreme Court of Canada
16	decision of R. v. Lavallee (1990) 55 C.C.C.
17	(3d) 97 (S.C.C.). That was not a sentencing
18	case, that was a case that dealt with the
19	"battered wife syndrome" defence in the context
20	of a murder charge. But Justice Wilson said in
21	that decision, at pages 112 and 113, among other
22	things, this:
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24	The gravity, indeed, the tragedy of domestic violence can hardly be
25	overstated. Greater media attention to this phenomenon in recent years
26	has revealed both its prevalence and its horrific impact on women
27	from all walks of life

1	Long after society abandoned
2	its formal approval of spousal abuse, tolerance of it continued
3	and continues in some circles to this day.
4	Fortunately, there has been a
5	growing awareness in recent years that no man has a right to abuse
6	any woman under any circumstances. Legislative initiatives designed to
7	educate police, judicial officers and the public, as well as more
8	aggressive investigation and charging policies all signal a
9	concerted effort by the criminal justice system to take spousal
10	abuse seriously.
11	Then, and this is on page 6 of R. v.
12	Brown, the Court of Appeal of Alberta made
13	its own comments about its experience with
14	the phenomenon. It said the following:
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16	This Court's experience is that the
17	phenomenon of repeated beatings of a wife by a husband is a serious problem in our society. It is not
18	one which may be solved solely by
19	the nature of the sentencing policy applied by the courts where there are convictions for such assaults.
20	It is a broad social problem which should be addressed by society
21	outside the courts in ways which
22	it is not within our power to create, to encourage, or to finance.
23	But when such cases do result in prosecution and conviction, then the
24	courts do have an opportunity, by their sentencing policy, to denounce
25	wife-beating in clear terms and to attempt to deter its recurrence on
26	the part of the accused man and its occurrence on the part of other men.
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Then the Court went to establish certain guidelines or principles to assist sentencing judges who are dealing with wife assaults. The first of these principles was that the starting point should be what the sentence would be if the assault had taken place between strangers. The next step that the Court suggested was to then consider that the fact that the assault happened in a domestic context is an aggravating factor because of the breach of trust that this represents. Interestingly this principle, as I have already mentioned, has since then been codified: it is specifically provided for in the Criminal Code, now, that this is an aggravating factor.

Today this may go without saying, or seem to go without saying, but it bears remembering that there was a time where this would not have even been considered an offence, or it might have been considered mitigating that the person assaulted was the person's spouse. There are reasons why the law has evolved in this way and those reasons must be borne in mind.

The next thing that the Court said in R. v. Brown is that one of the sentencing objectives in dealing with these types of matters is to foster the rehabilitation of

1	the offender and deter the specific offender
2	from repeating the conduct, but that these are
3	now the paramount considerations. The Court
4	said at page 7:
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6	The more important principles are
7	that the sentence should be such as to deter other men from similarly
8	conducting themselves toward women who are their wives or partners
9	(what is called the principle of "general deterrence"), and that
10	the sentence should express the community's wish to repudiate such conduct in a society that values
11	the dignity of the individual (the
12	"denunciation principle").
13	Finally, the Court talked about how
14	cautious sentencing judges should be in those
15	cases that commonly occur in these types of
16	situations where the very victim of the offence
17	does not want to see the offender punished
18	because they hope to continue the spousal
19	relationship, are concerned about loss of income,
20	do not want to deprive the children from their
21	father's presence, and reasons of the sort.
22	Those considerations are not applicable in this
23	case as the relationship between these parties
24	is over. But the point is, even when the parties
25	wish to pursue the relationship, the victim's
26	views are not determinative and must be assessed
27	with great caution and with the recognition

of the unique dynamics that are at play in
the context of domestic violence.

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In summary, one way of saying it is that as I approach this case I must remember that it is not just about Mr. Weninger. It is about him, of course, but it is not just about him and it is not just about what he did to S. A. The sentencing principles of general deterrence and denunciation require looking beyond the one case that the Court is dealing with. The Court has to be concerned about the message that this sentence sends to the public. It is not about making examples of people, it is not about succumbing to political or other pressures, it is not about being unduly harsh, but it is about ensuring that the sentences imposed for crimes reflect the seriousness of the crime, the importance of discouraging others from behaving in a similar way, and that those sentences reflect society's condemnation of the conduct.

R. v. Brown was quoted and approved of a few years after it was decided by our own Court of Appeal in R. v. B.A., [1996] N.W.T.J. No. 7 (NWTCA), and R. v. L.R.C., [1996] N.W.T.J. No. 8 (NWTCA), among others. It was applied several times by this Court and by the Territorial Court.

It, of course, does not answer the question 1 2 that I have to answer today, namely, what a 3 fit sentence is for this particular offence. But the principles that it stands for, which have been restated in different ways by different 6 Courts over the years, remain important to bear in mind, and that is why I have taken the time to talk about that case. As I said at the 8 outset, over 20 years later I think it is every 9 bit as relevant as it was when it was decided, 10 as are the comments made by Justice Wilson in 11 12 Lavallee, which I have also referred to. 13 I now turn to the cases that the Crown and defence have provided to me. No two cases are 14 15 ever exactly alike. It is always possible to draw some distinctions, but I found reviewing 16 17 those cases quite helpful. It is always helpful

to review decisions made in other cases and assess how similar or dissimilar they are from the ones being dealt with.

The first two cases filed by defence, R. v. Condo, 1995 CarswellOnt 4560, and R. v. English, 2012 CarswellNfld 345, have some elements of similarity with this one in the sense that they involve offenders who bit another person's ear. The injuries inflicted in these cases were actually more significant

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than the one here. On the other hand, these cases did not occur in a domestic violence situation, and that is a significant distinction.

They are helpful cases to some extent because, as I have said previously, the starting point in determining a fit sentence in a domestic violence situation is to think about what the sentence would be if the same assault had been perpetrated on a stranger, but that is in my view the extent to which those cases can be of assistance because the existence of a spousal relationship is a significant aggravating factor and is at the root of the sentencing principles that are paramount when dealing with such cases.

The third case referred to me by defence,

R. v. Olson, 2010 CarswellBC 2270, is a case

from British Columbia that does involve a

domestic violence situation. The offender

in that case was sentenced for fairly serious

assaults against two different partners, as

well as other charges, breaches of release

documents and an attempt to obstruct justice.

While that decision includes several statements about the seriousness of spousal violence that I completely agree with, with the greatest of respect I find the case

wholly unpersuasive as far as its result.

In my view it is completely out of line with

the law in this jurisdiction, and I want to

spend a few moments talking more specifically

about that case to make it clear why I am of

that view.

Mr. Olson was being sentenced for numerous charges involving crimes committed against two different women he had been in relationships with. As I said, these included assaults, threats, breaches of bail conditions, and a charge for attempting to obstruct justice.

In relation to the first complainant the offender had become controlling and abusive after she moved in with him. She moved out at one point, but returned shortly thereafter to live with him. After she returned he became mad at her over money issues, and in the course of the argument that followed he told her that she needed to be taught a lesson. He pounced on her, and it appears from the decision that he was somehow mimicking the behavior of a dog. He licked her on her body and he bit her in various places of her body, including her breast area. He let her go briefly, but then resumed his assault, banging her head against the wall and pressing his thumbs on her temples. He later

apologized, but told her that she needed to be taught a lesson. He added that if she ever tried to leave him again he would have her fired from her job and have a friend beat her up.

There was another incident that happened about a week later, but she was able to escape. She notified the police, and that is when he was charged. While he was out on bail he struck up a relationship with another woman a few months later, and he became controlling and abusive of her as well. There was various incidents, ultimately one where he bit her. He was charged, arrested, released on bail again. Despite this he returned to her residence and threatened to kill her and her family and refused to leave. There was a further incident where he assaulted her, striking her on the head and threatened to kill her. They were in a bathroom apparently and he would not let her leave the room. He held a knife and threatened to stab her a hundred times, cut her head and put it in the toilet, and before doing this he had apparently disconnected the phone.

A few days later, after this last assault, the police contacted her to follow up on the earlier matter for which Mr. Olson was already facing a charge. Because of the threats he had

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made to her she tried to convince the police not to proceed with that charge. In the end, when she disclosed all of this, he was charged with attempting to obstruct justice.

That accused had spent the equivalent of ten months in pre-trial custody. On sentencing the Court was presented with a joint sentence of a three-month jail term to be served in the community as a conditional sentence.

The sentencing judge found the joint submission unreasonable and he did not go along with it.

Instead, he imposed a further jail term of eight months, but he did make it a conditional sentence.

I certainly understand why the sentencing judge did not follow the joint submission.

In this jurisdiction, and I suspect in most, it would be considered clearly outside the range for such a serious series of offences.

As far as the sentence that was actually imposed in Olson, to the extent I can make an assessment based on the reported case, I do not think it is in line at all with the range of sentences that would be imposed in the Northwest Territories for similar facts.

A person in the Northwest Territories who would assault partners in this way, repeatedly

breach release conditions, re-assault the same victim while on bail, especially in a spousal context, who utters threats and who tries to obstruct justice by convincing his spouse not to testify or scaring her, in this jurisdiction would ordinarily receive a significant jail term and would not be permitted to serve that jail term in the community.

For those reasons, while I think R. v.

Olson does include several comments that

I agree with about the considerations and

principles that are relevant when dealing

with the case of domestic violence, in its

result I do not find it persuasive.

I now turn to the cases filed by the Crown.

They are from this Court. As defence counsel correctly noted, they each have certain features that distinguish them somewhat from this case.

In R. v. Nitsiza, 2010 NWTSC 22, the accused was sentenced for an assault with a weapon. He had beaten his spouse with his fist, but also used a belt and a plastic coat hanger while he was assaulting her. He had a criminal record and was on probation at the time of the offence, but his record was not nearly as extensive as Mr. Weninger's. The victim suffered extensive bruising to her entire body. The decision does

not specify what type of treatment she had to receive, but she was treated first at a local nursing station and then sent out for followup treatment. She wanted the relationship to continue and did not want the offender to receive a jail term. A guilty plea was entered at the 11th hour, on the day scheduled for the start of his trial. The sentence imposed in that case was 18 months in jail.

In R. v. Tsetta, 2006 NWTSC 14, the assault was more serious than it is in this case. It involved choking the victim to the point of unconsciousness and punching her to the face to the point of breaking her jaw. The accused pleaded guilty shortly before his trial was set to commence. He was also being sentenced for a breach of probation. That probation was as a result of a conviction for an assault on the same person; that would have been an aggravating factor. He also had a significant criminal record, although there is no indication that he had as many prior convictions for spousal assault as Mr. Weninger does.

In that case the Crown was asking for a term of imprisonment in the penitentiary, and the defence was asking the Court simply to impose a shorter sentence than that. The

sentence imposed was 20 months, 16 of which were for the assault causing bodily harm. Reviewing the decision, one must be cautious about the individual sentences imposed on each count in that case because the Court had to consider totality. As mentioned at paragraph 18 of the decision, the Court had to consider totality not just as between the two charges it was sentencing the accused for, but also in the context of a sentence that Mr. Tsetta was already serving when he was sentenced for these offences.

The last case referred to by the Crown was R. v. Mercredi, 2010 NWTSC 5. Again, the injuries inflicted in that case were serious and required surgery. The offender pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily harm. It appears that he did so because he did not want his 12-year-old daughter, who had witnessed the events, to have to testify. He had a record which included some convictions for assault, including some spousal assaults, but again, it does not appear that his record for domestic violence was as significant as Mr. Weninger's. He had three prior such convictions, not eight. But the most recent one had been an assault with a weapon, and for that he had received a year in jail. This is

another case where his spouse had sent a letter
to the Court pleading for leniency and expressing
her wish to continue the relationship with him
and expressing the hope that he would change his
lifestyle. On that case the sentence imposed was
14 months imprisonment.

I have considered all of these cases. The one feature that this case has and those cases do not is the fact that this is the ninth conviction that Mr. Weninger has for an assault on a spouse. A Court must always be careful not to overemphasize a criminal record. People should not be punished over and over again for things that they have already been sentenced for. But the persistence of this offender's pattern in being violent towards his spouse cannot be ignored. That pattern re-emerged remarkably quickly after his relationship with S. A. began. It is a very frightening pattern, one that raises serious concerns for the safety of whoever Mr. Weninger's next partner will be.

The sentence I impose today must address this. It is very clear that the relatively short jail terms that were imposed on him, even after he was repeating the same conduct over and over again, have not achieved this. The sentence

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I impose today has to send a clear message to him about the seriousness and consequences of this type of conduct, and it must also send a message about how seriously this Court treats domestic violence.

Mr. Weninger has said that he knows he is a better person than what it would appear on paper, and I am certain that this is true. The things that I have heard about him, as I have referred to already, suggest that he has many skills, abilities and talents, and he has obviously made some efforts during the time he has spent on remand to better himself. He has participated in AA meetings. He has taken the Embracing Our Human Nest program. He has taken educational upgrading. He was involved in the inmates committee and was its president for a number of months. And he has expressed remorse. All of those things are in his favour, and the fact that he has skills and abilities suggests that if he sets his mind to it he can be productive and not behave in this manner.

He has said, and I think he is correct on that as well, he realizes that he must eliminate alcohol from his life if he is going to achieve his objective of changing his path.

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He has taken treatment programs before and may need to take them again, I do not know, but I am certain that he will need support and assistance.

I have listened carefully to what he has said, to his comments about being 40 and wanting to change, wanting to abide by counselling and treatment conditions and wanting to beat his addiction to alcohol. That is really the only reason I am inclined to include probation as part of his sentence. I say that because the reality in the past has been that probation has not been successful with him in the past. He was convicted several times for breaching probation orders, and it appears they had no effect in preventing him from re-offending. But perhaps this time probation can and will be more effective and productive than it has been in the past.

Maybe Mr. Weninger really is at a crossroads today. Either he will take a different path, and to do so he will need help, or he will continue on the same path he has been on for over a decade. If this happens there will just be more victims and more suffering. So for that reason I certainly think it is worthwhile to include probation as part of his sentence.

That aspect of my sentence essentially is aimed at supporting his efforts at rehabilitation, it is intended to support his efforts in making the changes that he has told the Court about, and it is also intended to provide S. A. some measure of comfort by knowing he will not be permitted to have any contact with her.

The sentence I impose today, as I have referred to already, must attempt to foster Mr. Weninger's rehabilitation, but it also has to address, and in a paramount way, deterrence and denunciation for all of the reasons I have been talking about. I am unable to conclude that those objectives will be met by imposing a sentence of time served, which would be the equivalent of a one-year sentence. In my view, such a sentence will offend the principle of parity when one looks at cases from this jurisdiction involving serious spousal violence. It would not adequately reflect the seriousness of this offence or the fact that Mr. Weninger is a repeat offender for this type of crime.

record, the repetition of the assaults on S. A. and the seriousness of his conduct on the most recent of the incidents, Mr. Weninger would have

Honestly, in my view, with his criminal

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been facing a sentence in the penitentiary range
had he not pleaded guilty to this offence and had
been convicted after trial. And while his guilty
plea is mitigating it cannot have the effect
of bringing the sentence down to a one-year
sentence in all the circumstances.

I would have been inclined initially to impose a sentence of two years less a day for this offence, the very maximum range available to me short of a sentence in the penitentiary range. But having thought about it and reflected on it and taken into account the Crown's position, all the things that were said on Mr. Weninger's behalf, and especially having reminded myself of the importance of the principle of restraint, I will refrain from doing so. Stand up please, Mr. Weninger.

Mr. Weninger, for the assault causing bodily harm you committed on your spouse I sentence you to a term of imprisonment of 20 months.

For the time you spent in remand I will give you credit for one year. So there will be a further jail term of eight months in jail.

You can sit down.

This will be followed by a probation order for two years, and the terms will be that you keep the peace and be of good behavior.

You know what that means. Within 24 hours of
your release you are to report to Probation

Services and then as directed by them. You

are to take counselling and treatment programs

recommended by your probation officer including,

but not limited to, the areas of alcohol

addiction and anger management. You are

to have absolutely no contact directly or

indirectly with S. A.

Given what I have heard from Crown

Counsel this morning I am not going to create
an exception to this no-contact condition.

There may be a time where it will be okay for
you to express your apology directly to her,
but she is not prepared to hear that at this
point, and the Court has to respect that and
you have to respect that. I am sure the Crown,
in his discussions with her, has passed on what
you have said, and as I say, over time her
views may change on that. But for the period
of your probation you are not to have any
contact with her even if it would be for
that purpose.

In addition, there will be a DNA order as it is mandatory for this offence. There will be a Section 109 firearms prohibition order; it too is mandatory. There will be an order

for the return of any exhibits seized during
this investigation if that is appropriate.

By this I mean returned to the rightful
owners, otherwise they will be destroyed
at the expiration of the appeal period.

Given the jail term that I am imposing today and the amount of time that Mr. Weninger has spent on remand I am not going to make an order for the payment of the victim of crime surcharge. I am satisfied that it would result in hardship.

The Warrant of Committal will be endorsed with the recommendation that if adequate programming is available to Mr. Weninger in the correctional facility here in Fort Smith the correctional authorities consider placing him there so as to allow him easier access to family members, and in particular given the illness of one of his uncles.

Defence counsel has asked that I make a further recommendation that Mr. Weninger be considered for an early work release program.

I am not going to make that recommendation.

I think that Mr. Weninger has done some work trying to deal with his issues, and he has obviously done a lot of thinking, but I also think there are things he needs to continue

- to work on. It is possible that some of the programs available to him while in custody will assist him in that.
- The reality is that he will be looking at the prospect of very significant jail terms if 6 he does not address the underlying issues that lead to this conduct, especially if he ever commits another crime of violence against a 8 9 spouse. So it would be in his best interest to have access to more programming and more 10 assistance in understanding the root causes 11 12 of his behavior before he is released and free to make all of his own choices again. That 13 whole question of his participation in whatever 14 15 release programs may exist, I think, is better left with the correctional authorities, based 16 on their assessment of his progress and their 17 assessment of how the risk he presents can be 18 19 managed.
- Is there anything that I have overlooked?
- 21 MR. GODFREY: Your Honour, I didn't hear
- the length of the firearms prohibition order.
- 23 THE COURT: I am sorry. It will commence
- today and expire ten years after his release.
- MR. GODFREY: Thank you.
- 26 THE COURT: Anything from defence?
- 27 MR. PETITPAS: No, Your Honour.

1	THE	COURT:	Mr. Weninger, I do hope you
2		are able to achi	eve what you have said you want
3		to do, and I do	hope that you will not ever be
4		having to appear	in a criminal courtroom again.
5		We will close co	urt.
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7			
8			Certified to be a true and
9			accurate transcript, pursuant to Rules 723 and 724 of the
10			Supreme Court Rules.
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12			Joel Bowker
13			Court Reporter
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