R. v. Kaotalok, 2013 NWTSC 36

S-1-CR2011000134

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

IN THE MATTER OF:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

- vs. -

## BOBBY KAOTALOK

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Transcript of the Reasons for Sentence by The Honourable

Justice L. A. Charbonneau, at Yellowknife in the Northwest

Territories, on April 22nd A.D., 2013.

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## APPEARANCES:

Mr. K. Onsykevitch: Counsel for the Crown

Mr. T. Boyd: Counsel for the Accused

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An order has been made banning publication of the identity of the Complainant/Witness pursuant to Section 486.4 of the Criminal Code of Canada or disclosing any information which could reveal the identity of the Complainant/Witness identified in the charge under Section 271 of the Criminal Code

1 THE COURT: Before I give my reasons for
2 sentence on this matter, I just want to remind
3 everyone that there is in place an order that
4 is prohibiting the publication or broadcast of
5 any information that could identify either of
6 the complainants in this case.

Today it is my responsibility to impose a sentence on Bobby Kaotalok for two charges of aggravated sexual assault. Mr. Kaotalok entered guilty pleas to those charges back on February 4th, 2013, the date on which his trial was scheduled to commence. Sentencing was adjourned to allow time for the preparation of a pre-sentence report. sentencing hearing proceeded a few weeks ago, on March 27th. That day I heard about the facts underlying the offences, and submissions from Crown and defence as to what sentence should be imposed for these crimes. I decided to adjourn my decision to today's date in order to have sufficient time to review the exhibits and the case law that was filed at the hearing and also to consider the very thorough submissions that were presented by both counsel, as well as the comments that Mr. Kaotalok himself made to the Court when he was given the chance to speak. I have now had

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an opportunity to review all of the that, and have come to a decision.

As is often said, sentencing is a difficult task, one of the most difficult tasks for Judges, because it requires balancing a number of factors, often competing ones.

Sentences are supposed to express society's disapproval of criminal conduct and reflect the harm that that conduct causes to victims and to the community. They are supposed to discourage the offenders and other people from committing crimes. They are also supposed to attempt to foster the rehabilitation of the offender because if that can be achieved, it is probably the best way to protect the public. Not surprisingly, all of these objectives often do not point in the same direction as far as what the sentence should be and that is what makes sentencing such a difficult task.

Every time that the Court imposes a sentence, it has to take into account the circumstances of the person who is being sentenced, the circumstances of the offence that this person committed, and the principles of sentencing that are set out in the Criminal

Code. Sentencing involves the exercise of
considerable discretion but in exercising that
discretion, courts have to follow the legal
framework that is provided for in the Criminal
Code and how that framework has been
interpreted by the higher courts.

I will start by summarizing the circumstances of these offences. They are set out in detail in an agreed statement of facts that was filed as an exhibit at the sentencing hearing, and they were read into the record at that time. I am not going to read that document again today in its entirety but I will simply summarize its main points.

Mr. Kaotalok is believed to have been infected by the Human Immunodeficency Virus (HIV) when he was born. He was diagnosed when he was seven years old and he has been under medical treatment for this medical condition essentially his whole life.

The agreed statement of facts explains in some detail what HIV is, how it is treated, and what factors affect the risk of its transmission to another person. For the purposes of my decision today, I will not go over all of that technical medical information in detail. It is part of the record and it is

1	available to anyone who may want to refer to
2	it. The things that I want to underscore for
3	my purposes today are the following:
4	The HIV virus is able to establish a
5	lifelong infection in immunologic cells. Once
6	infection is established, these cells are
7	slowly destroyed ultimately making the
8	infected person's immune system weaker and
9	weaker which leaves the person more
10	susceptible to infection. In an advanced
11	stage it is called Acquired Immune Deficiency
12	Syndrome, commonly referred to as AIDS.
13	Mr. Kaotalok's medical condition with
14	respect to his HIV infection varied over the
15	years. There were periods of time where he
16	adhered to his medical treatment and others
17	where he did would not. When he did not
18	adhere to it, his medical condition (the state
19	of advancement of his infection) got worse.
20	This in turn has an impact on the risk of
21	transmission of the disease to others.
22	During the period of time where these
23	offences were committed, Mr. Kaotalok's
24	condition was such that he presented a higher
25	risk for transmission of HIV.
26	The first complainant L.F. was born in May

27 1992. She was 17 when the offence occurred.

1 She had met Mr. Kaotalok in Yellowknife in 2 2009 and they had become friends. They 3 periodically spent time together, sometimes alone and sometimes with other friends. On 5 one of those occasions, in the fall of 2009 or 6 early winter 2010, they were walking around together in Yellowknife. They were both sober. They decided to go to Mr. Kaotalok's 8 place of residence, which at the time was a room at Bailey House. Bailey House is a 10 11 transition home for men. There, they had sexual intercourse. Mr. Kaotalok used a 12 condom. L.F. did not know that he was HIV 13 positive and he did not tell her. Had she 14 known that, she would not have consented to 15 the sexual activity. 16 It is admitted that at the time that this 17 happened, there was a realistic possibility of 18 19 transmission of the HIV virus from him to her. 20 To date, however, she has not been diagnosed with HIV. 21 22 The second complainant J.E. was born in May 1991. She was 19 at the time she had 23 24 sexual contact with Mr. Kaotalok. She too had 25 met him in Yellowknife and had become friends

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with him. They periodically spent time

together as part of a larger group of friends

1 and acquaintances.

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3 friends, spent an evening drinking at a local bar. J.E. and Mr. Kaotalok both were 5 intoxicated by the time they left the bar at 6 closing time. J.E. went to a friend's apartment and continued drinking there. She 8 then went to a neighbouring apartment to see Mr. Kaotalok. There, they continued drinking 10 together. The agreed facts say that she was 11 significantly intoxicated and experienced blackouts that night. It is admitted that she 12 13 and Mr. Kaotalok had sexual intercourse at some point that night. Neither of them 14 remembers if a condom was used. 15 I pause here to note that in law, a person 16 17 who is highly intoxicated may, in some 18 instances, not have the capacity to consent to 19 sexual activity. In those circumstances any 20 so-called consent that is given is not valid. 21 We see a fair number of cases like that in our 22 courts. Given the alleged facts here, at the sentencing hearing, I sought clarification on 23 this point from the Crown and the Crown

One night she, Mr. Kaotalok, and other

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intoxicated to be capable in law to give

is not that the complainant was too

confirmed that the basis for this prosecution

consent to sexual activity. The basis for the prosecution is the same as it is on the charge involving the other complainant; that is, J.E. did not know that Mr. Kaotalok was HIV positive, that he did not tell her, and that she would not have consented to sexual activity with him had he disclosed his medical condition to her.

Mr. Kaotalok also acknowledges with respect to this count that at the time that he had intercourse with J.E. there was a realistic possibility of transmission of HIV from him to her. To date, she has not been diagnosed with HIV.

The Crown confirmed that both complainants were advised of their right to prepare a victim impact statement. No such statement has been filed by either of them.

I have to pause here again to note something about the pre-sentence report. It is a very thorough report in most respects but I am concerned about one aspect of it.

For many years it has been a standard practice in the preparation of these types of reports in this jurisdiction for the person preparing the report to contact the victims of the crime and see whether they want to make

any contributions to the report. There is

even a special heading in the pre-sentence

reports we see that is called "interview with

victims". It is an important aspect of the

pre-sentence report because it is one of the

ways whereby the victims' views about the

offence and the impact it had on them can be

conveyed to the Court. It is not the only

way, but it is one of the ways.

In this report, under that heading on page 9, the author states that because of the publication ban that prevents the publication and broadcast of the identity of the victims in this case, they were not contacted.

This shows a lack of understanding of the scope and effect of a publication ban. There are almost always things in court records that identify victims. More often than not the Indictment does. Usually the agreed statement of facts does. If photographs were filed they also do. If medical records are filed they also do. And often the pre-sentence reports do. Preparing and filing documents to be used as part of a sentencing hearing does not offend a publication ban. What is prohibited is for anyone to publish or broadcast information that could identify the victims.

1 So the existence of a publication ban is not a 2 bar to contacting victims as part of the 3 preparation of the pre-sentence report to see if they want to contribute anything to it. It 5 is not a bar to reporting the victim's views 6 of the offence in the report itself. The 7 victims have no obligation to participate and 8 should never be pressured to do so, but they should always be given an opportunity to do 10 so. Some victims choose not to prepare a 11 victim impact statement but may be prepared to speak with the person preparing a pre-sentence 12 13 report who takes the step of contacting them. Everyone is different. Sitting down and 14 writing a victim impact statement is different 15 from having a conversation with someone. So I 16 17 strongly suggest that the Crown raise this 18 issue with responsible officials to clarify if 19 there is a misunderstanding about this. If 20 there is any concern on the part of the 21 government officials on this point, then it 22 should be brought to the attention of the Court when these reports are ordered because 23 24 it would be easy enough for the Court to make 25 it clear when it orders the preparation of a 26 pre-sentence report to state that it will not 27 be a breach of the publication ban for the

victims to be contacted and for their views to
be reflected in the report.

That issue aside, the pre-sentence report that was prepared in this case is very helpful in providing information about Mr. Kaotalok's personal circumstances to which I now turn.

I also have had the benefit of the submissions of his counsel and of the comments that Mr. Kaotalok himself made at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing. As I have said, when he was given an opportunity to speak he spoke at length about his circumstances, the struggles that he has faced, and how he contemplates the future.

I have given careful consideration to everything that I have heard about

Mr. Kaotalok's personal circumstances. I will refer to and emphasize some aspects here, but I want to make it clear that I have considered all of the information that was presented whether I refer to a specific detail or not.

Mr. Kaotalok is of Inuit descent. He was born in 1985 and is now 27 years old. His family resided at an outpost camp that was located in Nunavut between Bathurst Inlet and Bay Chimo. The family had a house in Bay Chimo but led a traditional lifestyle,

spending a lot of time at the outpost camp,
sometimes years at a time.

Aspects of his childhood years at the outpost camp were happy but unfortunately also involved a number of sad and tragic things.

The first of course is the fact that he was infected with the HIV virus at birth. When he was six, his mother passed away. He explained to the author of the pre-sentence report that he believes that his mother and himself both were infected with the virus when his mother had to have a transfusion when Mr. Kaotalok was born and ultimately, that is what she died from.

For the next few years after his mother died, Mr. Kaotalok was raised by his father, still at the outpost camp. But when he was eight, his father drowned following an accident that happened when several family members, including Mr. Kaotalok, had been traveling in a canoe. Mr. Kaotalok almost drowned himself that day but he was saved by his brother. From that point on, Mr. Kaotalok was raised by his grandmother. He was fond of her and she taught him a lot. But she too passed away a few years later. Mr. Kaotalok and his brother were then placed in the care

of an aunt and that did not end up being a
good situation for them. The aunt began
abusing alcohol and was physically and
mentally abusive to both of them, both when
she was intoxicated and when she was not.

Mr. Kaotalok stayed at the outpost camp until he moved to Cambridge Bay to go to school. After a few years he moved to Hay River to live with an aunt and uncle. At that point he had nowhere to go and the alternative would have been placement in foster care so his aunt and uncle took him in. The move to Hay River meant being reunited with his siblings because his sister had been adopted by the same aunt and uncle and from time to time his brother traveled to Hay River to spend time there as well.

Mr. Kaotalok lived in Hay River from 1997 to 2005. After moving there, he was required to attend school and there was structure in the home. He was able to secure various jobs in the community but he had behavioural issues and ultimately this led to his aunt and uncle asking him to leave.

After that, he stayed with friends and relocated to various communities. By then he had started consuming alcohol and drugs and

his use of alcohol and drugs increased
particularly after he moved to Behchokò.

In 2005, Mr. Kaotalok had a serious car accident after falling asleep while driving and in that accident he lost an arm.

While he was in Behchokò, he developed a romantic relationship with a woman and that relationship appears to have continued over the years despite the fact that Mr. Kaotalok, especially in recent years, has spent a considerable amount of time in jail. This woman is still supportive of him and he spoke about her and this relationship when he spoke to the Court. This seems to have remained a significant relationship for him.

Mr. Kaotalok relocated to Yellowknife in 2006 on the advice of his doctor who was concerned about the fact that he was not taking his medication. Since his move to Yellowknife, unfortunately he seems to have frequented people who, like him, abuse drugs and alcohol, have no employment, and lead a fairly destructive lifestyle. His consumption of alcohol escalated and he was convicted of numerous property crimes committed to acquire money to sustain his drug and alcohol habits. The author of the report, who has been

1 Mr. Kaotalok's probation officer since 2006,
2 writes that Mr. Kaotalok "has become embedded
3 in this negative lifestyle and has been since
4 his teenage years".

This unfortunate fact is reflected in Mr. Kaotalok's criminal record. As his own counsel put it, his life has been in a downward spiral since 2006. Since that time he has been in and out of jail, and more often in than out. He has accumulated a steady pattern of convictions for various offences and has received jail term after jail term. Since April 2006, the longest period of time that he has spent out of custody was just over four months. That, on its own, says a lot about the pattern that he has been stuck in.

According to the pre-sentence report,

Mr. Kaotalok has not consistently sought help
to deal with his addiction and other issues

when he has been out of custody. Anything
that he has done in this regard has been
sporadic and inconsistent. It seems that
while in custody, particularly during this
last period of two years he has spent on
remand, Mr. Kaotalok has engaged more actively
in support services available to him - he has
met with the jail psychologist at various

points in time, he has attended AA meetings,

he has completed the Healing Drum program

"Embracing our Human Nest", he has completed

two life skills modules that are done by

completing workbooks.

Mr. Kaotalok has told the author of the pre-sentence report that for a period of about a year he used crack cocaine and was addicted to it. He also said he stopped using crack on his own because he recognized how destructive it was. The Court often hears about how difficult it is to beat that addiction; if Mr. Kaotalok was addicted to crack cocaine, and if he beat that addiction on his own, it certainly says something about his ability when he sets his mind to doing something. It means that he can show inner strength and personal power.

He has expressed to the author of the report that he also recognizes that alcohol and other drugs are destructive for him and he wants to stop using them as well. It is obvious to the Court, and would be to anyone reviewing the materials filed on this case, that unless and until Mr. Kaotalok gets alcohol and other intoxicating substances out of his life, his chances for rehabilitation

are slim to none. And irrespective of the

sentence that I impose today, that step will

be up to him because one way or another he

will eventually be released and he will once

again be free to make choices in this regard,

as well as many others.

As I have already said, when Mr. Kaotalok addressed the Court at the conclusion of his sentencing hearing on March 27th he spoke at length. He was quite articulate. He comes across as a bright person capable of insight. He has at times gone to school and been able to work so it is obvious that he has capabilities and skill. He has shown resilience at some points in his life. It seems to me that there are reasons to think that Mr. Kaotalok does have the capacity and the skills to make the changes that he needs to make but there is no question he is the only one who can do this. This Court cannot make him do it; doctors cannot make him do it; no one else can make him do it.

I did note that Mr. Kaotalok told the author of the pre-sentence report that he expects to die from the HIV virus within the next few years and that he is more or less resigned to that fact. Maybe a part of

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1 Mr. Kaotalok's failure to take real steps to
2 make real changes in his life until now has
3 been in part based on that belief and that
4 feeling of being doomed no matter what. The
5 Court obviously has no medical expertise but I
6 will just say this:

From what is set out in the agreed statement of facts, it appears that when he strictly followed his medical regimen, his viral load became very low, which is another way to say that the medication did help to control the progression of this disease. It is also clear from the agreed statement of facts, that compliance, strict compliance with the medical treatment that he is under, is crucial to stabilizing his condition and improving his prognosis. So in many ways, and to that extent, his treatment is in his hands.

To the extent that the life and circumstances of a person can be summarized in a few minutes, that is my understanding of Mr. Kaotalok's personal circumstances as they were presented at the sentencing hearing and must all be taken into account in deciding what sentence should be imposed today.

I now turn to the principles of sentencing. I will deal with the principles

1	of sentencing in two parts - first, sentencing
2	principles generally; and second, sentencing
3	principles that apply to this particular of
4	offence.
5	The general principles of sentencing are
6	all set out in the Criminal Code. I am not
7	going to read them all, I have considered them
8	all, but I will simply refer to the
9	fundamental purpose of sentencing because it
10	is always a good place to start when examining
11	the question of what is a fit sentence for any
12	given crime.
13	That is set out in Section 718 of the
14	Criminal Code which says,
15	The fundamental purpose of
16	sentencing is to contribute, along
17	with crime prevention initiatives,
18	to respect for the law and a
19	maintenance of a just, peaceful
20	and safe society by imposing just
21	sanctions that have one or more of
22	the following objectives:
23	(a) to denounce unlawful conduct;
24	(b) to deter the offender and
25	other persons from committing
26	offences;
27	(c) to separate offenders from

1	society, where necessary;
2	(d) to assist in rehabilitating
3	offenders;
4	(e) to provide reparations for
5	harm done to victims or to the
6	community, and
7	(f) to promote a sense of
8	responsibility in offenders, and
9	acknowledgment of the harm done to
10	victims and to the community.
11	So to achieve these objectives, the Code
12	sets out several sentencing principles.
13	The fundamental sentencing principle is
14	proportionality. A sentence should be
15	proportionate to the seriousness of the
16	offence and to the level of responsibility or
17	blameworthiness of the offender.
18	The Criminal Code lists a number of other
19	principles, the most significant ones to this
20	case, the most relevant ones, are, first of
21	all, parity, which means that similar offences
22	committed by similar offenders should result
23	in similar sentences being imposed. That is a
24	matter of simple fairness.
25	Another important principle that is
26	engaged here is totality. Where the Court
27	sentences a person for more than one offence

and imposes consecutive sentences, the Court

has to make sure that the global effect of all

of the sentences is not unduly harsh. And

that is important.

Restraint is a very important sentencing

Restraint is a very important sentencing principle. It means that when jail can be avoided, it should be. And when jail has to be imposed, it should never be a longer jail term than is necessary to achieve the goals of sentencing. Sentencing is not and should never be about exacting a price for conduct or effecting revenge.

The principle of restraint takes on particular significance when dealing with aboriginal offenders because paragraph 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code says
All available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the

circumstances of aboriginal offenders.

There has been much debate about what this provision meant when it first came into force, and I must now take a moment to explain what the Supreme Court of Canada has said it means,

which is, of course, binding on me as a sentencing Judge.

Two decisions from the Supreme Court,

R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 and

R. v. Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13, have explained the special considerations that are engaged when a sentencing Court is determining the sentence to be imposed on an aboriginal offender. I am not going to quote from those cases but I will refer to the main points that emerge from

those decisions.

First, this provision is a remedial provision that was designed to address the overrepresentation of aboriginal people in Canadian jails. That means that when sentencing an aboriginal offender, Courts are required to take into account the unique systemic and background factors that may have played a part in bringing the offender before the Court; and also, to consider what sentencing procedures and sanctions may be appropriate to the offender in light of his or her aboriginal heritage. Sentencing Courts are directed to take judicial notice of broad systemic factors, background factors, that affect aboriginal people generally.

For example, Courts are required to take

judicial notice of the history of colonialism, displacement, residential schools, and how these have often translated in lower educational attainment, lower income, higher unemployment rates, high rates of substance abuse and suicide, and high levels of incarceration for aboriginal people. I have taken judicial notice of these factors which are also things that we commonly hear about in this jurisdiction in the day-to-day work of the Courts.

I am also required to take into account, and I have, case-specific information about Mr. Kaotalok as it has been conveyed in the pre-sentence report, the submissions of his counsel, and the comments that he made to the Court himself.

It is clear that he was raised initially in a very traditional lifestyle. He lost his parents at a young age. Because he lived for many years at the outpost camp, it is not difficult to imagine it would have been quite a change to relocate to Cambridge Bay to attend school, particularly without family supports in place. He was fortunate to be taken in by his aunt and uncle in Hay River but there is little doubt that the behavioral

1 issues that he displayed there and the 2 unhealthy relationships that he developed with 3 alcohol and drugs was partly related to the numerous losses that he experienced early in 5 life, the abuse that he suffered when he was 6 under of the care of his other aunt, having to 7 relocate to go to school and live in a place where he had no connections, not to mention 8 having to live basically from the start of his 10 life with the knowledge that he had this very 11 serious disease. Not all of these things are necessarily connected to the fact that he is 12 13 an aboriginal man but some of them certainly 14 are. What the Supreme Court of Canada 15 jurisprudence says, among other things, is 16 that Courts have to consider to what extent 17 18 these types of factors have an impact or 19 should have an impact on the sentence to be 20 imposed. One way of understanding it is to 21 say that the question is whether those factors 22 have an impact on the offender's blameworthiness which, in turn, has an impact 23 24 on the application of the proportionality 25 principle. 26 I have gone to some lengths here to make

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it clear, I hope, that in considering my

1 decision in this case I have been mindful of 2 the duty that rests on me to take 3 Mr. Kaotalok's aboriginal heritage into account, both the matters that I am required 5 to take judicial notice of and the case-specific information that has been 6 presented at the sentencing hearing. The 8 question in this case is not whether jail is required, (Mr. Kaotalok's counsel acknowledges 10 that it is), the issue really is how long that 11 jail term should be. In arriving at that decision, I have considered the impact that 12 Mr. Kaotalok's unique circumstances and the 13 circumstances have had on his level of 14 15 blameworthiness. I turn now to the sentencing principles 16 that apply more specifically to this type of 17 18 case. 19 Aggravated sexual assault is an 20 objectively very serious criminal offence. 21 That is reflected in the fact that it is 22 punishable by life imprisonment. But it is also an offence that covers a wide wide range 23 24 of possibilities as far as the behaviour that 25 qualifies under that section. 26 The particular type of aggravated sexual

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assault charge that I am dealing with here

- 1 today, I think it is fair to say, is really in 2 a category of its own. It does not involve a 3 person forcing himself on his victims, overpowering them, overtly causing physical 5 injuries during the commission of the act as a 6 result of violence used during the course of 7 the act. That is the type of scenario that we more naturally think of when we hear about 8 aggravated sexual assaults. This, however, is 10 a very different type of aggravated sexual 11 assault. It involves deceitfully obtaining the consent of another person in being 12 13 involved in a very personal and intimate activity, one of the most personal and 14 intimate activities that a person can engage 15 16 in. Mr. Kaotalok knowingly exposed L.F. and 17 J.E. to potentially lethal consequences and 18 19 took away their right to choose whether they 20 would engage in sexual contact with him, despite that risk, and he did this for his own 21 22 sexual gratification. I agree with the submission that was made by Crown counsel at 23 24 the sentencing hearing. He showed callous 25 indifference and ruthless disregard for their
- To my knowledge, this is the first time

well-being.

that a Court in this jurisdiction has had to deal with this type of offence. This does not mean that the Court should make an example of Mr. Kaotalok and impose a sentence on him that would be unduly harsh. But it does mean that the Court has to ensure that the decision that it makes addresses the goals of sentencing and makes it clear to everyone in this jurisdiction what the consequences are for this type of conduct.

Courts in other jurisdictions have dealt with this kind of case before and I take much guidance from the principles that have been developed by those Courts. The cases from the other jurisdictions are not binding on me of course, but they are helpful for many reasons. They assist in identifying which sentencing principles have been found to be paramount in these types of cases. They assist in identifying the range of sentences that have been found to be appropriate. And they assist in fleshing out the factors that have been considered to make a matter more serious or less serious bearing in mind that to start with it is serious conduct.

I am now going to spend a few minutes talking about the broad principles that I

- 1 think emerge from the various cases that have
- been filed with the Court. I have considered
- 3 R. v. Cuerrier, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 371;
- 4 R. v. Thomas, 2012 ONSC 1201; R. v. A.T.R.,
- 5 2011 BCPC 283; R. v. Tippeneskum, 2011 ONCJ
- 6 219; R. v. Felix, 2010 ONCJ 654;
- 7 R. v. Nduwayo, 2010 BCSC 1467;
- 8 R. v. McGregor, 2008 ONCA 831; R. v. J.M.L.,
- 9 2007 BCPC 341; R. v. Smith, [2007] S.J. No.
- 10 150; R. v. Walkem, [2007] O.J. No. 186;
- 11 R. v. Williams, 2006 ONCJ 484; R. v.
- 12 Lamirande, 2006 MCBCA 71; R. v. Smith, 2004
- 13 BCCA 657; and R. v. Miron, [2000] M.J. No. 500.
- 14 A useful starting point comes from
- 15 R. v. Cuerrier, a Supreme Court of Canada
- decision dealing with this type of offence.
- 17 It is a reminder of the role the criminal
- 18 courts have in addressing this issue. I say
- 19 this because there is an obvious public health
- 20 dimension to issues surrounding HIV and AIDS
- 21 but that does not mean that the courts do not
- 22 have an important role when they are called
- 23 upon to impose sentences in the context that I
- 24 am facing today.
- Cuerrier dates back 1998, but some of the
- 26 things that the Supreme Court said that in
- 27 case, I think remain very relevant:

1	The criminal law does have a role
2	to play both in deterring those infected with HIV from putting the lives of others at risk and in
3	protecting the public from irresponsible individuals who
4	refuse to comply with public health orders to abstain from
5	high-risk activities. Where
6	public health endeavours fail to provide adequate protection to
7	individuals like the complainants, the criminal law can be effective.
8	It provides a needed measure of protection in the form of
9	deterrence and reflects society's abhorrence of the self-centered
10	recklessness and the callous insensitivity of the actions of
11	the respondent and those who have acted in a similar manner. The risk of infection and death of
12	partners of HIV-positive
13	individuals is a cruel and ever present reality. Indeed the
14	potentially fatal consequences are far more invidious and graver than
15	many other actions prohibited by the Criminal Code. The risks of
16	infection are so devastating that there is a real and urgent need to
17	provide a measure of protection for those in the position of the
18	complainants. If ever there was a place for the deterrence provided
19	by criminal sanctions it is present in these circumstances.
20	It may well have the desired effect of ensuring that there is
21	disclosure of the risk and appropriate precautions are taken.
22	R. v. Cuerrier, at paras 141 - 142
23	The dominant sentencing objectives in
24	cases like this, not just because of this
25	quote but as it emerges from the various cases
26	that I have reviewed, are the denunciation of
27	the conduct, and general and personal

1	deterrence. These cases have almost without
2	exception resulted in the imposition of jail
3	terms. The range is very broad. It basically
4	goes from one year to 18 years in just the
5	cases that I have reviewed. This is because
6	there is a wide range of potential factual
7	scenarios that can underlie a charge like this
8	one.
9	I want to refer to R. v. Williams, where
10	the Court talked about the potential for
11	far-reaching and widespread consequences of
12	actions like the actions of Mr. Kaotalok in
13	this case. The Court said:
14	There can be no doubt that the aggravated assault offences are
15	extremely serious. The potential individual consequences - both
16	medical and social - are
17	monumental. They are multiplied by two in the instant case. They
18	are multiplied further by the public health jeopardy arising from the risk of inadvertent
19	transmission by the complainants and any partners with whom they
20	might have sexual relations.  R. v. Williams, para 22
21	R. V. WIIIIams, para 22
22	In a simple way, I think that underscores
23	why this is so serious. I agree with those
24	comments and I adopt them for the purposes of
25	this case.
26	As I have said, the range of sentences
27	imposed for aggravated sexual assault charges,

1 involving offenders who do not disclose their 2 HIV status to a sexual partner, goes from jail 3 terms in the range of one year, 18 months, all the way up to close to 20 years imprisonment. 5 In R. v. Smith, a Saskatchewan provincial 6 court Judge, after having reviewed many cases, stated that he felt that the appropriate range for a single incident involving sexual 8 activity in these kinds of circumstances is 10 between three and four years. I tend to agree 11 with that conclusion. This is a range that addresses, to me, the fundamental principle of 12 13 proportionality because it addresses the seriousness of the offence and the 14 blameworthiness of the person who acts in this 15 way. I am not saying that is a minimum 16 sentence because, always, the Courts have to 17 18 take into account aggravating and mitigating 19 factors. But I agree with the conclusion in 20 Smith that that is a useful yardstick. 21 The factors that have been considered to 22 make matters more serious and have led to the imposition of longer sentences include things 23 24 like high risk behaviour; for example, not 25 using any protection during sexual activity:

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that factor is not present here. The

repetition of conduct with several different

1	victims: that factor is present here. Another
2	factor is the fact that a victim was actually
3	infected with the HIV virus: that fact is not
4	present here.
5	In Williams, the Court noted this and
6	said:
7	I cannot ignore the fact that neither woman was infected through
8	her sexual involvement with Mr. Williams. This may be a product
9	of good fortune alone, but it materially distinguishes this case
10	from a number of those in which near-draconian sentences have been
11	pronounced.
12	R. v. Williams, at para 22
13	So obviously, and this runs through the
14	cases in general, when the complainants are
15	infected that is considered a very significant
16	aggravating factor.
17	Another factor that is aggravating is
18	where the offender is in a position of trust
19	vis-à-vis the victim. And finally, as is
20	always the case, the offender's criminal
21	record can be an aggravating factor.
22	So what does all of this mean for this
23	case? The question, really the ultimate
24	question, is where Mr. Kaotalok's case fits in
25	all of this.
26	He has a substantial criminal record and,
27	as the Crown pointed out, that record includes

many convictions for crimes of dishonesty and deceit. These are property crimes that would normally be considered marginally relevant on a sexual assault sentencing. But, as Crown counsel noted during the submissions, it is not completely irrelevant because there is a deceitful aspect to his conduct in this case, albeit in a much more serious context, and with much more serious potential consequences.

There are two victims in this case, one who was still a minor at the time that the offence was committed. I find there is an element of breach of trust in this case although not as significant as it would be with a spouse. But these young women had befriended Mr. Kaotalok. Presumably they trusted him more than they would have trusted a complete stranger and he violated that trust by not disclosing his medical status to them. The assault on the victim J.E., as defence counsel acknowledged, is more of a high risk situation given the level of intoxication of both parties.

As I have already said, on the other hand some factors that have been found to be aggravating in other cases are not present here.

1 Thankfully neither victim, as of today, 2 have been diagnosed as having been infected 3 with HIV. However, as some of the excerpts I have quoted from the case law suggest, they 5 still have to live with the possibility, the 6 anguish, the medical tests, and those 7 consequences are not to be dismissed as insignificant. If a person is actually 8 infected that makes the matter even more serious. But I think it must be remembered 10 11 and acknowledged that even if they did not actually get sick, there are and will continue 12 13 to be repercussions for these victims. Mr. Kaotalok has pleaded guilty which is 14 very mitigating. It was not a guilty plea at 15 the first opportunity; in fact, it occurred 16 17 long after the charges were laid but this too must be placed in context. As defence counsel 18 19 pointed out, there was an important case 20 pending before the Supreme Court of Canada for 21 some time and that case was expected to, and 22 did, clarify what defences are and are not available in a case like this. 23

R. v. Morbior, 2012 S.C.C. 47 was released on October 5th, 2012. It clarified this area of the law and the issues that were before the Supreme Court of Canada had a direct bearing

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on whether Mr. Kaotalok could or could not advance certain defences in this case. It was not unreasonable at all for him to want to know the outcome of that case before giving his final instructions to his counsel. He had the right to choose his course of action and get advice from his counsel in light of what that decision was going to be as far as the law. The other thing about the guilty plea, and 

I say this in every case where there is one, is that it has spared both complainants from having to come to the Court and testify about very personal intimate things. The Court knows from seeing witnesses testify in court proceedings that it is a process that is often difficult and sometimes very painful for them. Sparing someone from that is always very significant. Mr. Kaotalok is entitled to considerable credit for having pleaded guilty.

In addition to what it spared the complainants, it is obvious from the agreed statement of facts that it also saved considerable resources considering the type of medical evidence that would have to have been called by the prosecution had this matter proceeded to trial.

1 The other aspect of guilty pleas is they 2 are usually considered to be an indication of 3 remorse. There are comments in the pre-sentence report that call into question 5 whether Mr. Kaotalok is truly remorseful. He 6 appears to have expressed conflicting things 7 to the author of the pre-sentence report with respect to his views of the victim and taking 8 responsibility for this. But he has pleaded 10 quilty. He has expressed his remorse to the 11 Court when he was given an opportunity to speak. And while it is clear that his 12 13 expressions of remorse may not have been the 14 most unequivocal during the process leading up to the sentencing, I am satisfied, based on 15 what he said to the Court, that he does take 16 17 responsibility for his actions at this point. Whether he is truly fully deeply remorseful 18 19 and sorry in an absolute sense is something 20 that only he knows and only he will ever know 21 in his heart. I can only hope that he is and that he realizes the ramifications of what he 22 has done. 23 24 Crown counsel made submissions about 25 Mr. Kaotalok's recklessness, tying it in with 26 the inconsistent attitude in complying with 27 his medical regimen. I do not disagree: It

1	is obvious that Mr. Kaotalok has not been
2	diligent in complying with his medical
3	regimen, but I also take the point that
4	defence counsel made. The reality is
5	Mr. Kaotalok, for large periods of time while
6	he was in Yellowknife, has been residing at
7	the Salvation Army without a fixed address or
8	any place to really call home. That lack of
9	stability can only have an impact on a
10	person's overall stability, including
11	compliance with medical treatment. It is not
12	an excuse, and obviously it is crucial that
13	Mr. Kaotalok take his medical treatment
14	seriously, but I accept that the lack of
15	stability in his life was an impediment to him
16	adhering strictly with his treatment plan.
17	And this seems to be confirmed that his
18	compliance was better when his living
19	situation was more stable.
20	Another matter that has an important
21	bearing on the sentence to be imposed today is
22	how much credit Mr. Kaotalok is going to
23	receive for the time that he has spent on
24	remand which, in this case, is a substantial
25	period of time. He has been on remand since
26	March 1st, 2011, which is two years and three
27	weeks. The first question is whether I have

discretion to give credit on anything more
than a one for one ratio. Or, in other words,
whether I have discretion to grant him
enhanced credit for his remand time.

The Crown argued that I do have discretion for the portion of his remand time up until April 2012 when he had a bail review. But that after that, my discretion is limited because he was detained at that bail review primarily because of his record. The defence says that I have discretion to grant him enhanced credit for the full period of his remand.

Whether I have discretion or not depends on the reason why bail was denied.

Paragraph 515(9.1) of the Criminal Code imposes a requirement for the Justice who detains an accused primarily because of his record to indicate so clearly on the record. The provision says "the Justice shall state that reason in writing on the record", that reason being that it was primarily because of the criminal record.

Mr. Kaotalok had a show cause hearing on March 1st, 2011 and was ordered detained. The warrant of committal issued on that date does not include any note that he was detained

primarily because of his record. Then he had his preliminary hearing and he was committed to stand trial in August 2011. He did not apply for release at the conclusion of the preliminary hearing. He had a number of bail reviews scheduled in this court by operation of the law, which requires there to be a review of detention every 90 days. He waived those reviews in November 2011 and February 2012. He did seek release at a bail review on April 30th, 2012 and on September 24th, 2012, and was ordered detained both times.

The Crown argues that the transcript of the reasons given by the Judge who ordered his continued detention on April 30th makes it clear that the primary reason for that decision was his criminal record. The Crown says that the transcript can serve as the written entry into the record referred to in paragraph 9.1 of Section 515. I disagree with that submission.

The requirement for a written entry into the record as to the primary ground for detention is designed to ensure there is no ambiguity in this area. A transcript of reasons given orally does not constitute a written statement as to the primary reasons

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1 for detention. In my view, Parliament's 2 requirement to have the reasons for detention 3 entered in writing is precisely to ensure that there is not going to be a debate based on a 5 transcript or on clerk's notes about what the 6 reason for detention was. Clarity in this 7 area is very important given the potential implications. In this case the difference is 8 a full year of credit that is either possible 10 to give or not possible to give depending on 11 the answer. So I am not satisfied that the transcript 12 13 of the April 30th decision is something that can be used or meets the requirements of the 14 Criminal Code. The net result is that I have 15 discretion to give Mr. Kaotalok enhanced 16 credit for the full period of time that he has 17 18 spent on remand. The fact that I have that discretion does 19 20

The fact that I have that discretion does not mean that I should ever use it. Granting enhanced credit for remand time is not automatic - far from it.

The relevant portions of Section 719

provide that the starting point is that the credit for the remand time is to be given on a ratio of one for one but that if the circumstances justify it, enhanced credit can

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- be granted up to a ratio of one to one and a
  half.
- 3 In a relatively recent case, R. v. Green,
- 4 2013 NWTSC 20, I discussed some of the issues
- 5 that have arisen about the interpretation to
- 6 be given to the words in the provision and the
- 7 case law that has interpreted it. The
- 8 principles that emerge from the case law,
- 9 including appellate jurisprudence, is that
- 10 while the circumstances that may justify
- 11 enhanced credit need not be rare or
- 12 exceptional, they do have to be
- individualised; that is, they have to relate
- 14 to the person being sentenced. This
- 15 case-specific information can be provided
- through evidence from case managers or, as has
- 17 been frequently accepted in this jurisdiction,
- 18 from information provided by counsel as
- officers of the Court as long as counsel is
- able to indicate that he or she has obtained
- 21 that information from a reliable source such
- 22 as the offender's case manager. This
- 23 approach has been adopted fairly consistently
- in various cases such as R. v. Stonefish, 2012
- 25 MBCA 116; R. v. Carvery (L.A.) 2012 NSCA 107;
- 26 R. v. Summers, 2013 ONCA 147; R. v. Mannilaq,
- 27 2012 NWTSC 48; R. v. Desjarlais, 2012 NWTSC 2;

and R. v. Vittrewkwa, 2011 YKTC 64.

2 In this case the information before me is 3 that Mr. Kaotalok's behaviour while on remand was, for the most part, without problems. He 5 had a few incidents with other inmates, apparently arising from him getting taunted by 6 them, but the information that was conveyed to this Court by his counsel is that his case 8 manager advised that if he had been a serving 10 prisoner during this period of time, he would 11 have earned most of his remission for the time that he spent on remand. 12

I also have information that Mr. Kaotalok benefitted from some programs while he was on remand. The lack of availability of programs for remand prisoners and harsh detention conditions are among the factors that historically have been taken into account in the decision to give enhanced credit for remand time. Those factors do not apply here.

All in all, I am satisfied that

Mr. Kaotalok should be granted credit for his

remand time on an enhanced basis but not quite

to the maximum ratio of one to one and a half.

I do not think that the maximum ratio is

appropriate given the overall circumstances of

his pre-trial detention, including the fact

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- 1 that he has had access to some programs.
- 2 Although it is said that he would have earned
- 3 most of his remission, this is not a case
- 4 where his behaviour was without problems.
- 5 The Crown's position is that I should
- 6 impose a global sentence of four years in jail
- 7 for these two charges broken down to two years
- 8 on each count consecutive. The Crown says
- 9 that this position takes into account
- 10 concerns about totality. The Crown says that
- 11 from this sentence of four years, Mr. Kaotalok
- should be given credit for the time that he
- 13 spent on remand.
- 14 Defence counsel has argued that the
- sentence could be of a shorter duration, given
- 16 the guilty plea and the absence of some of the
- 17 aggravating features found in cases from other
- 18 jurisdictions.
- 19 Considering the range is between one year
- 20 and 18 years in the cases that I have
- 21 reviewed, I think it is fairly clear that
- Mr. Kaotalok's case does not belong at the
- 23 higher end of that spectrum. But I also do
- 24 not consider that his case falls at the very
- low end of the spectrum.
- 26 It is tragic that Mr. Kaotalok was
- 27 infected with the HIV virus at birth. He was

1 an innocent victim of very unfortunate circumstances in this regard. But what he has done as an adult through his behaviour is he has passed on that victimization to two other people by exposing them to the risk of infection. He has created a risk for these people to suffer the same fate that he did in a way - to be infected with this virus without having any control or any ability to protect themselves from that risk. 10

> I have said it many times already, and I will say it again, it is very fortunate that to date these victims have not been diagnosed with being infected with HIV but they will live with the spectre of that possibility for a long time and with that sense, I am sure, that their trust has been abused by their friend in a terrible way.

I certainly agree with the submissions of defence counsel that some of the cases filed involve situations where the offenders showed much more recklessness and even more callous behaviour than what is in question here, but the fact that there are worst cases out there does not make this one any less serious. But for his guilty plea, Mr. Kaotalok would be facing a much more significant sentence today.

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Having taken his circumstances into account and the principles of the law that are binding on me, I do conclude that a jail term of some significance is required in this case to address the goals of sentencing, to denounce his conduct, to hopefully deter other people from behaving in this selfish reckless way. There is no doubt in my mind that the global sentence sought by the Crown is within the range of what would be fit for these sentences. I do not even think that it is at the higher end of what could be imposed. 

Even so, having given this matter a lot of anxious thought, I have decided to exercise as much restraint as I can, taking into account Mr. Kaotalok's overall circumstances, including his circumstances as an aboriginal offender. And so although I think that the position of the Crown was quite reasonable, I will impose a sentence that is slightly shorter than what the Crown has sought, but only slightly. It is not because there is any joy in imposing a jail term to someone, especially knowing some of their difficult circumstances, but it is because in my view I would be shirking from my responsibility if I did not impose a sentence of some significance here.

- The Crown has applied for certain

  ancillary orders and I will deal with those

  first. The defence is not opposed to any of

  these requests.

  There will be a firearms prohibition order
- There will be a firearms prohibition order
  that will commence today and expire ten years
  from Mr. Kaotalok's release.
- There will be an order that he comply with
  the requirement of the Sexual Offender
  Information Registration Act. By operation of
  the Criminal Code, that order is for life
  under Section 490.03(ii)(c). It is a lifelong
  order because of the maximum sentence
  available for aggravated sexual assault.
- There will be no victim of crime

  surcharge. There would be an obvious hardship

  in imposing one considering the time that

  Mr. Kaotalok has spent on remand, his lack of

  means, and the fact that he will spend more

  time in custody.
- 21 Mr. Kaotalok, please stand.
- 22 For these two counts of aggravated sexual
  23 assault, Mr. Kaotalok, I have reduced the
  24 sentence as much as I feel that I can. I have
  25 taken into consideration the global effect of
  26 the sentences. I have concluded that a fit
  27 sentence for each of these counts is 21 months

- in jail, so that means a total of 42 months.
- 2 For the two years and three weeks that you
- 3 have spent on remand, I give you credit for 30
- 4 months, which is more than one for one but not
- 5 quite one and a half.
- 6 What that means is on Count 1, there will
- 7 be a further jail term of six months. And on
- 8 Count 3, there will be a further jail term of
- 9 six months consecutive.
- 10 You can sit down.
- 11 Mr. Clerk, I can assist you with the
- 12 warrant of committal if you need me to but it
- should show 21 months on Count 1, 15 months
- 14 credit for remand time. And 21 months on
- 15 Count 2, 15 months credit for remand time on
- 16 that one as well.
- I will not make any order with respect to
- 18 exhibits because there remains the matter of
- 19 Count 2 which is going to be going to trial.
- I would ask that counsel ensure that when that
- 21 matter is concluded, the Court's attention's
- is drawn to the issue of the exhibits.
- On the matter, Counts 1 and 3 which were
- 24 set for sentencing today, I extend again my
- 25 thanks to the counsel for their submissions.
- Mr. Kaotalok, I hope that you are able to
- do some of the things that you talked about

- 1 when you spoke to me a few weeks ago and that
- 2 you will be able to get your life in the
- direction that you want it to be. It sounds 3
- like you have the ability to do that if you
- 5 choose to. It will really be up to you.
- 6 THE ACCUSED: Thank you.
- 7 THE COURT: As far as Count number 2,
- Mr. Boyd, first of all, have I omitted or 8
- forgotten anything on the sentencing matter?
- MR. ONYSKEVITCH: 10 Your Honour, I apologize as
- 11 I was not here for the submissions that were
- made but as I understood it, the Crown also 12
- sought an order for the DNA of Mr. Kaotalok 13
- pursuant to Section 487. 14
- THE COURT: 15 You're correct, and I'm
- sorry, I meant to say that. Thank you for 16
- reminding me of this. 17
- This is a primary designated offence and 18
- 19 being the order is mandatory, so there will
- 20 will be one of those as well. Thank you.
- 21 Anything else that I may have missed?
- MR. ONYSKEVITCH: Nothing further from the 22
- Crown with respect to Counts 1 and 3, Your 23
- 24 Honour.
- 25 MR. BOYD: Nothing from defence, Your
- 26 Honour.
- 27 [DISCUSSION WITH COUNSEL REGARDING COUNT 2]

1	THE	COURT:	Thank you, counsel. Close
2		court.	
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5			Certified correct to the best of my skill and
6			ability,
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11			Lois Hewitt, Court Reporter
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