IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

IN THE MATTER OF:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

- and -

ROBERT JOHN LIVINGSTONE

Transcript of the Oral Reasons for Sentence delivered by the Honourable Justice L.A. Charbonneau, sitting at Yellowknife, in the Northwest Territories, on June 29th, A.D. 2012.

APPEARANCES:

Ms. A. Paquin: Counsel for the Crown

Mr. P. Fuglsang: Counsel for the Accused

(Charges under s. 5(2) CDSA)

1	THE	COURT: Earlier this week, Mr.
2		Livingstone pleaded guilty to two charges under
3		the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act: one
4		count of possession of cocaine for the purpose of
5		trafficking and one count of possession of
6		cannabis marijuana for the purpose of
7		trafficking. I must now sentence him for those
8		two offences.
9		The facts that led to these charges are
L 0		relatively simple. Mr. Livingstone was stopped
L1		by the police about 40 kilometres outside the
L2		City of Yellowknife in the early morning hours or
L3		June 27th, 2010, just about two years ago today.
L 4		The police had started a drug related
L 5		investigation a few days before that as a result
L 6		of information that they had received from a
L7		confidential human source. He was driving the
L 8		truck and he had one passenger with him.

The vehicle was taken back to the RCMP detachment and was searched. The police found 268 grams of cocaine hidden inside the rear seat of the vehicle. They also found 2,912 grams of cannabis marijuana which was concealed inside tires that were in the back of the truck.

Sold at \$20 per gram at the street level, the value of that quantity of marijuana is close to \$60,000. It would, of course, be worth less

than that if it was sold in larger quantities, by
the ounce or by the pound.

As for the cocaine, assuming a sales price of \$120 per gram, the value of the quantity seized that day is approximately \$32,000. Again, the resale value would be less than that if the drugs were sold in larger quantities, by the ounce.

Mr. Livingstone provided a statement to the police after his arrest. He admitted that he was asked to take these drugs from British Columbia to Yellowknife. He admitted that he was the one who concealed the drugs in the manner described before he left British Columbia. The Crown advised that the passenger in the vehicle was also charged in relation to this matter but was found not guilty at trial.

Through the submissions of his counsel and, to an extent, when he spoke directly to the Court, Mr. Livingstone said that he was more or less told to do this; that he had not intended on committing these offences; that he is sorry that he did; and that he has feared and still fears retribution for having cooperated with the police after he was arrested.

There is no evidence that he stood to make any money out of this. According to his counsel,

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what he was getting out of it was a means to return to Yellowknife. His counsel advised that Mr. Livingstone had recently moved to Yellowknife from British Columbia. He had employment lined up here. He wanted to go to British Columbia to get his truck and drive it back. Once there, he realized that the truck was not ready to be driven back. He was short on funds. He was anxious to get back to Yellowknife and it was suggested to him that he could drive this particular vehicle back, bringing the drugs with him. All that information is not part of the agreed facts, but it was conveyed by Mr. Livingstone's counsel and the Crown has not attempted to dispute it.

Mr. Livingstone's counsel described the decision to agree to bring these drugs to Yellowknife as a very bad choice. To say the least, that is an understatement.

Mr. Livingstone has been in custody since his arrest. His counsel advises that he spent the entire time in administrative segregation at the jail, because the authorities were concerned for his safety. As a consequence, he has had no access to any of the programs offered at the jail. He has had very limited contact with people during his time in custody, very limited

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ability to use the facilities available to the serving prisoners in the jail.

Counsel has also advised that he spoke to Mr. Livingstone's case manager, who reported that Mr. Livingstone was cooperative as an inmate and that his behaviour was good while he was in custody. It was further reported that there was nothing about his behaviour that would have prevented him from earning remission had he been a serving prisoner instead of a remand prisoner.

Mr. Livingstone has a criminal record, but, as was fairly acknowledged by the Crown, it is unrelated. It is fairly dated, the last entry being from 1999, more than 10 years ago. The criminal record is part of Mr. Livingstone's background, but I consider that it has minimal weight for the purposes of this sentencing.

As far as Mr. Livingstone's personal circumstances, I have heard that he is 48 years old and he is originally from British Columbia. He is a mechanic by trade, and his skills, I am told, are largely self-taught. He grew up in difficult circumstances, as his father was violent and physically abusive towards him. I heard of one instance where Mr. Livingstone, when he was still very young, had to be hospitalized as a result of an assault at the hands of his

father. His mother left the relationship and the children were placed in care. Fortunately, the siblings were kept together. Apparently, this was at the insistence of Mr. Livingstone, even though he would have still been quite young back then. When he was 10, the children returned to live with their mother and her new spouse.

Mr. Livingstone has a good work history. He has worked at different jobs and has worked as a mechanic. He has done some manual labour for CP Rail and he has worked at repairing heavy equipment. He has had some health issues, including a nervous disorder when he was 21 from which he has recovered. He also suffered a back injury some time ago and has used marijuana from that point on to control that pain, according to his counsel.

The sentencing principles that provide the framework for any sentencing decision are set out in the Criminal Code. The fundamental sentencing principle is proportionality. A sentence should be proportionate to the seriousness of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.

When considering the seriousness of a criminal offence, one of the things to consider is the sentence that can be imposed for it.

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Possession of less than three kilograms of cannabis marijuana for the purpose of trafficking is punishable by a maximum sentence of five years less one day in jail, but possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, irrespective of quantity, is punishable by a maximum of life imprisonment. That particular offence is among the most serious provided for in the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and subject to the most severe penalty available under our criminal law.

As for the degree of responsibility of Mr.

Livingstone, it is less than if he had been

motivated by greed and stood to make a profit

from his involvement with the illicit trade.

However, while he could be characterized as a

courier, he was also involved in the concealment

of the drugs in the vehicle.

I must say that what I heard earlier this
week leaves me with some uncertainty as to what
his actual motivation may have been. His counsel
referred to this as having been a way to
essentially get a ride back to Yellowknife. Mr.
Livingstone's comments, when he addressed me
directly on Monday, were to the effect that he
had been threatened. So I am not entirely clear
if the main reason he did this was because he
wanted to make his way back to Yellowknife so he

could report to his work, as was suggested in counsel's submissions, or if it was because he succumbed to some pressures from people, as he alluded to in his comments. But whatever the reason was, once he decided that he would do this, he did take part in concealing the drugs and there is no question that he knew exactly where they were and the quantity he was bringing into this community.

The courts in this jurisdiction and elsewhere have long held that when dealing with these types of offences, especially in relation to hard drugs, the paramount sentencing principles are deterrence, both general and specific, and denunciation. This is so because the drug trade is a very lucrative business. The consequences for those who get caught have to be harsh if they are to have any hope of making people think twice before doing this kind of thing. The consequences also have to be significant to reflect the fact that this trade causes a lot of harm and devastation in our communities. As has been stated over and over again by the courts in this jurisdiction and elsewhere, these are not victimless crimes.

In recent years, this Court has had occasion, unfortunately, to comment on the very

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1	real impact that the trafficking in hard drugs
2	has had on our communities. In Yellowknife only,
3	we have had home invasions committed by people
4	who were desperate to get money to buy cocaine.
5	We have had a number of instances of respected
6	business people spiralling down after developing
7	an addiction to this drug and running their
8	business and themselves down to the ground. We
9	have had homicides committed in circumstances
10	related to the drug trade. We have had people
11	assaulted on the streets in broad daylight by
12	people who wanted to steal from them to get quick
13	money to buy the next hit of drugs. We have had
14	parents become addicts and neglect their own
15	children to the point of those children having to
16	be apprehended by Social Services. We have had
17	all sorts of violent crimes committed by those
18	trying to get money to buy these drugs, and we
19	have had all sorts of crimes of violence
20	committed by people under the influence of these
21	drugs.
22	These consequences were referred to in
23	recent cases such as R. v. Turner [2006] NWTJ No.
24	76, R. v. Desjarlais [2007] NWTJ No. 23,
25	R. v. Gosselin [2009] NWTJ No. 25, R. v. Baker
26	[2009] NWTJ No. 81, R. v. Howie [2009] NWTJ No.
27	46, to name only a few. Unfortunately, the

court's response to these crimes, imposing jail
terms of some significance, has not had the
effect of stopping this activity. But the courts
must continue to send the same consistent
message. The court's response to crimes
involving drugs, especially hard drugs, must
leave no doubt in the public's mind about the
consequences for those who choose to engage in
this kind of activity.

This is especially important when dealing with people who take on a role that they may consider to be peripheral: couriers or people who agree to store the drugs for someone else, even though they themselves are not making any money out of it. These people are an essential part of the chain. It is not a complicated proposition. Those higher up in the chain of the drug trade organizations, those who stand to make the most money out of this, are not the ones who take the risk of getting caught transporting these drugs. The ability of those people to continue to traffic is entirely dependent on having others willing to take those risks, to act as couriers and move the drugs, to store the drugs and also, obviously, to sell them at a street level.

So there has to be a strong deterrent message sent to anyone who, for whatever reason,

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is inclined to agree to become a courier. One would think that people would realize that the very reason they are being asked to do this is that, in fact, there is a risk of getting caught.

The drug world is not a world of tea parties and crumpets. It is an underworld where people set other people up, rat each other out, get back at each other in a variety of distasteful and criminal ways. And the police are out looking. They have ways of finding things out. So those who decide to take the risk and contribute to this very destructive substance hitting our streets must face the consequences. Even if they themselves did not stand to make a profit from it, the harm that these drugs cause is just too great, and anyone who plays a part in that chain bears responsibility for the devastating consequences that I have already referred to.

I recognize that there are mitigating factors in this case. It is mitigating that Mr. Livingstone has pleaded guilty, although this is not an early guilty plea. Crown counsel acknowledged that the Preliminary Hearing in this case was focused on very specific points that the defence wished to explore, including possible Charter issues. That Preliminary Hearing took place over a year ago, in April, 2011, and there

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has not been any reference as to why it has taken so long since then to bring this matter to a conclusion. But still, the guilty plea has avoided the time and cost of a trial and for this Mr. Livingstone deserves credit.

He also deserves credit for having cooperated with the police after his arrest, and I recognize that by doing so he has possibly placed himself at some risk of retribution. The correctional authorities certainly seemed to think so, since they kept him in administrative segregation while he was on remand.

As far as credit for the time that he has spent on remand, counsel agree that the circumstances of this case are such that I do have the discretion to grant credit on a ratio higher than one-for-one; namely, that I am entitled to give him more than one day's credit for every day he has spent on remand under the provisions of the Criminal Code.

His counsel has provided information about his detention conditions and his behaviour while he was in custody. That information was obtained by counsel speaking with Mr. Livingstone's case manager.

26 As this Court recently recognized in
27 R. v. Mannilaq [2012] NWTSC 48, the issue of

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credit to be given for remand time should be approached on a case-by-case basis, not in a mechanical way. The type of information that was provided in this case through counsel can form the basis for affording credit on an enhanced basis.

In this case, I am satisfied that the detention conditions that Mr. Livingstone was under, even though they were for his own protection, have made his remand time more difficult than it would have been if he had not been in segregation. The fact that his behaviour was such that he would have been earning remission, had he been a serving prisoner, is something that I have also taken into account in giving him credit for the time he has spent on remand. Because of those reasons, I am satisfied that he should get enhanced credit for the time he has spent on remand.

The Crowns has asked for a number of ancillary orders, and I will deal with those first.

First of all, I have signed the forfeiture order that was prepared by Crown counsel and signed by defence counsel. The order will issue as presented and the items listed in the order will be forfeited.

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1	Next, there will be a firearms prohibition
2	order pursuant to section 109 of the Criminal
3	Code. It will commence today and expire 10 years
4	from Mr. Livingstone's release from imprisonment.
5	Third, the Crown has asked that I issue a
6	DNA order. These are secondary designated
7	offences. That means that the order is
8	discretionary. The test that I must apply in
9	order to decide whether to make this order is set
10	out in the Criminal Code. It is in section
11	487.051(3), and I will just read an excerpt from
12	that. It says that:
13	The court may, on application by the
14	prosecutor and if it is satisfied
15	that it is in the best interests of
16	the administration of justice, make
17	a DNA order.
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19	In deciding whether to make the
20	order, the court shall consider the
21	person's criminal record, whether
22	they were previously found not
23	criminally responsible on account of
24	mental disorder for a designated
25	offence, the nature of the offence,
26	the circumstances surrounding its
27	commission and the impact such an

1	order would have on the person's
2	privacy and security of the person.
3	In R. v. Gosselin, a similar application was
4	made in the context of a matter involving
5	possession of cocaine for the purpose of
6	trafficking. The quantity seized in that case
7	was 146.5 grams of cocaine. In that case, I
8	ultimately denied the Crown's application for a
9	DNA order. Mr. Gosselin was a young man. He had
LO	no prior record. He had allowed his address to
11	be used for the delivery of a package that
12	contained the cocaine. The Crown's basis for
L3	seeking the order was simply the inherent
L 4	seriousness of the offence. R. v. Gosselin,
L5	paragraphs 60-64.
16	There are some differences between the
L7	Gosselin case and this one. Mr. Livingstone was
18	found with two different types of drugs. The
L9	quantity of cocaine found in his possession was
20	almost twice what it was in Mr. Gosselin's case.
21	Unlike Mr. Gosselin, he handled the drugs, in the
22	sense that he was the one who concealed them. He
23	also transported them some distance; whereas Mr.
24	Gosselin simply allowed his address to be used
25	and was going to give the package to a friend
26	when he was intercepted by police.

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On balance, I am satisfied that there are

sufficient distinctions between the two
situations to justify a different outcome, given
the test provided in the Criminal Code which I
have just referred to.

The process for taking samples for DNA testing is not particularly intrusive, and I am satisfied, given the nature of the offence, the circumstances of its commission and Mr.

Livingstone's criminal record, that it is in the best interests of the administration of justice to have a DNA order issue in this case.

That leaves the question of the jail term to be imposed. The Crown's position is that a sentence of two and a half years is an appropriate sentence for this crime and that from this I should give Mr. Livingstone credit for the time he spent on remand.

I have given that position careful thought. There is never just one and only one appropriate sentence for a given crime committed by a given offender. There is always a range that is appropriate. The sentence proposed by the Crown is within that range, but I consider it is at the very low end of that range, considering the quantities of drugs seized. The cases that were filed by the Crown are useful to get a sense of what the range is for these types of offences.

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In Gosselin, the amount of drugs, as I have said, was about half as much cocaine as in this case and no other type of drug was seized. The matter did go to trial, but, as the reasons for sentence show, there were numerous admissions.

The admissibility of Mr. Gosselin's statement, which was essentially a confession, was not challenged. The trial was basically focused on the question of Mr. Gosselin's knowledge and wilful blindness as to what was in that package. He was young and had no criminal record. He was sentenced to two years less a day, but the Court made it clear in that decision that this was primarily because of his very young age and that the sentence could have been much higher.

In R. v. Howie, the quantity of drugs seized was larger - it was over 1,000 grams, if I recall - and the involvement of the offender was more significant, as he was actually selling some of the drugs, but he also had extenuating personal circumstances. The sentence imposed was two and a half years on a guilty plea, and in that decision the Court described that sentence as the "absolute minimum", even considering the guilty plea.

In R. v. Baker, the facts upon which the offender was sentenced were that he had agreed to

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let Mr. Howie store the drugs in the ceiling above his restaurant in exchange for \$5,000. So, again, the quantity of drugs was larger, but on the facts alleged by the Crown the involvement was less significant. In that case, counsel presented a joint submission for two and a half years in jail for that case. I applied the law that joint submissions must be followed unless they are clearly unreasonable, and I accepted the joint submission. But in that case, as well, I said that the sentence could easily have been much more significant and that it was at the low end of the available range.

Having reviewed those cases, reviewing the comments that were made in them about the seriousness of the drug trade problem in our jurisdiction and the harm it continues to cause, I conclude that this Court ought not to impose a sentence that is at the low end of the available range when dealing with this offence of possession for the purpose in trafficking in a hard drug such as cocaine. Perhaps the Court's response needs to be more stern than it has been to make the point that needs to be made in this area.

In saying this, I am not being critical of the Crown, as I do not think that the range

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proposed by the Crown is inadequate. It does fall within the range that emerges from some of the cases decided in this jurisdiction. But considering that there were two types of drugs and the quantities involved, considering that it appears the drug trade continues to be alive and well in this community and considering the terrible ravages that it causes, on balance I have decided that the sentence must be higher than what the Crown seeks. But I am going to exercise some restraint still, as this, too, is an important sentencing principle.

I am taking the principle of totality into account and also the fact that these offences were essentially committed simultaneously, and, of course, I have taken into consideration the guilty plea. What I want to make clearest of all is I consider that the sentence that I have determined is fit for this crime is certainly not at the high end of the range, even on a guilty plea, and that that is the reality that people involved in these types of crimes need to be aware of for future cases that might come before this Court.

Please stand, Mr. Livingstone. For these two offences, Mr. Livingstone, I have concluded, for the reasons I have just mentioned, that a fit

sentence would be three years' imprisonment. 1 2 Because I have decided to give you the maximum credit that the law entitles me to give you for 3 the two years you spent in jail, the net result 5 is that I am not going to impose a further jail term today. But, as I have said, this is not the 6 7 high end of the range. This is maybe not even 8 the middle. 9 THE ACCUSED: I understand. 10 THE COURT: The sentence imposed for 11 today's purposes will be time served, essentially. You can sit down now. 12 13 THE ACCUSED: Okay. Thank you. 14 THE COURT: For the purposes of the 15 warrant of committal, Madam Clerk - because we are required to be very specific on these things 16 17 - the sentence on count 1 is three years. sentence on count 2 is two years concurrent. The 18 19 credit for the remand time is three years. So the sentence imposed is time served. 20 21 Mr. Livingstone has the ability to work, and 22 although it may take him some time to get himself 23 organized and start working again, I have decided there should be an order for payment of a victim 24 of crime surcharge in this case. The Criminal 25

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Code sets out the amount of that surcharge. It

is not a large sum of money, but these surcharges

Τ		go to a fund that is used to assist victims of
2		crime.
3		As I said already, there are many, many
4		victims to drug crimes, and no one should ever
5		lose sight of that, and that is the reason why I
6		am imposing the surcharge. Section 737 of the
7		Criminal Code says that the surcharge is \$100,
8		and I am going to give Mr. Livingstone until
9		October 31st, 2012 to pay it. If you are not
10		able to do so, you can apply for extensions. But
11		in relative terms it is not a large sum of money,
12		and I think it is important that the surcharge
13		orders be made when possible.
14		Is there anything that I have overlooked,
15		Ms. Paquin?
16	MS.	PAQUIN: No. Thank you, Your Honour.
17	THE	COURT: Anything I have overlooked
18		from your perspective?
19	MR.	FUGLSANG: No, ma'am.
20	THE	COURT: All right. I want to thank
21		counsel for their work in resolving this case and
22		for your submissions earlier this week.
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1	Certified to be a true and accurate transcript pursuant
2	to Rules 723 and 724 of the Supreme Court Rules.
3	Supreme Court Nutes.
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5	Jill MacDonald, RMR-RPR
6	Court Reporter
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