R. v. Green, 2013 NWTSC 20 S-1-CR-2011-000086

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

IN THE MATTER OF:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

- v -

TYLER SAMUEL GREEN

Transcript of the Reasons for Sentence delivered by The Honourable Justice L. Charbonneau, in Yellowknife, in the Northwest Territories, on the 20th day of March, 2013.

APPEARANCES:

Mr. A. Godfrey: Counsel on behalf of the Crown

Ms. B. Rattan: Counsel on behalf of the Accused

Charges under s. 268 C.C. x 2

1		R. v. Samuel Green
2		March 20th, 2013
3		Reasons for Sentence
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6	THE	COURT: Today it is my difficult
7		responsibility to sentence Tyler Green on two
8		charges that he has pleaded guilty to earlier
9		this week. The offences date back to October
10		2010, almost two-and-a-half years ago. The
11		incident that led to these charges appears to
12		have been quite brief, yet it had devastating
13		consequences for all involved. These few moments
14		of unexplained and unexplainable blind rage have
15		changed the lives of the victims and their family
16		forever.
17		On the evening of this incident there had
18		been a drinking party at a house in Tuktoyaktuk.
19		Mr. Green was there, as were the two victims,
20		Doug Kristjanson and Mary Cockney. All the Court
21		knows about what happened, based on the Agreed
22		Statement of Facts, is that Mr. Green became
23		angry at Mr. Kristjanson; Mr. Green became
24		verbally abusive to him; Ms. Cockney attempted to
25		defend her husband; Mr. Green punched her in the
26		face; Mr. Kristjanson, in turn, attempted to
27		intervene to defend his wife, and this triggered

an extremely violent response from Mr. Green. He

punched Mr. Kristjanson repeatedly; and after Mr.

Kristjanson fell to the floor, Mr. Green

repeatedly kicked him in the head. Ms. Cockney

tried to stop him but was not able to do so.

Eventually, Mr. Green stopped on his own. He was

intoxicated that evening.

they found Ms. Cockney crying and Mr. Kristjanson unconscious on the floor. Those in the house at the time were almost all intoxicated, and initially the police officers did not receive any assistance in determining what had happened.

Eventually, through further investigation, they determined that Mr. Green was responsible and they arrested him later that night. They found him sleeping in another residence. DNA analysis later confirmed that some blood found on his shoes was in fact Mr. Kristjanson's blood.

Mr. Kristjanson was taken to the nursing station and later medevaced to Yellowknife, and later to Edmonton. He suffered very, very serious injuries as a result of this attack. His injuries are referred to in the victim impact statements. They are also referred to in the Agreed Statement of Facts. To the extent that they can be summarized in a few words, he

sustained a fractured jaw, a fracture to his skull and spinal fractures to several of his vertebrae. He had to be intubated to ensure that he would continue breathing. He was in intensive care for several days. He had to have a plate put in his jaw, which has since been removed. He lost several teeth that had to be pulled because they were broken. For a period of time he had to use a cane to walk. He experienced significant memory loss.

It is clear that this terrible attack has transformed his life and that of his family.

That is very clear from the victim impact statements that were filed, and I will talk about those in more detail in a moment.

At this point, almost two-and-a-half years later, Mr. Kristjanson has still not fully recovered from this attack and it is questionable whether or not he will ever fully recover. He and his wife moved to Inuvik to be closer to the hospital because of the medical attention that he requires as part of his recovery.

Before this happened, he was a fully functional, productive individual. He worked regularly. He earned an income to support himself and his family. He was apparently a very creative person who loved to build and create

things with his hands. The fact that he was
working is confirmed by some of the documents
filed as exhibits in the sentencing hearing. He
can no longer do that. He is on disability and
social assistance, and it is unknown whether he
will ever be able to work again in the way that
he used to. He has not fully recovered his
mental faculties, so certain things he used to be
very good at, such as cooking, are things that he
can, in part, do again but for which he requires
a lot of help.

In many ways, life as he knew it has been taken away from him, and, consequently, the life of his wife and some of his relatives has also been taken away from them.

And no one even remembers or knows why. Mr. Green himself does not know why he did this.

The Criminal Code allows victims of crime to prepare victim impact statements to explain how a crime has affected them. This is not because sentencing is about effecting revenge; it is simply to ensure that everyone does understand how a crime has impacted a victim, if a victim is willing and able to put words to it. It is important. Sometimes in court we hear the words spoken or read about what one person did to another. We hear about someone kicking someone

in the head and causing serious injuries to them and we think, naturally, "that is awful". We think we know how awful it is, but we never get as good a sense of the true impact of a crime until we hear about it from the person who suffered it.

In this case the victims have chosen to share their experience with the Court. Several victim impact statements were prepared and were filed. The Court thanks the victims for having done so. Ms. Cockney wanted to read her victim impact statement in court herself. She read the most recent one over the phone earlier this week. I am sure it was very difficult for her to do that. It was a very emotional thing for her, as was apparent to all of us who heard her read it, but she did so, and she did so with courage and with grace and in a very compelling way.

The victim impact statement of Kendyce

Cockney, Mr. Kristjanson's step-daughter, which

was read by the Crown prosecutor, is also very

compelling. It talks about how her life has been

affected by this; about how awful it was for her

to be with her stepfather when he was in hospital

with tubes in his mouth, not knowing if he would

survive. According to her victim impact

statement, she was there at the scene with him

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before the police even arrived and, as I have said, she spent some time with him at the hospital. She also saw her own mother physically hurt and psychologically devastated. I am sure there are no words to describe what this must have done to this young woman.

Mr. Kristjanson himself has filed a few victim impact statements as well. He talks in simple words about how this assault has affected him.

The victim impact statements that I read just before giving my reasons now, which were filed only today, are more dated than the ones that were filed earlier this week and they show the progression of things for these people. They add some other sad information about some of the impacts that these events had on the family. For example, this offence happened shortly before

Ms. Cockney's youngest daughter's wedding, and so Ms. Cockney and her husband were unable to go to that wedding.

The earlier victim impact statement filed by Mr. Kristjanson talks about the constant pain he is in, the fact that he cannot remember things, the fact that he does not recognize people on the street, and the fact that he cannot do many of the things that he enjoyed doing before.

I have read and considered all the victim impact statements in this matter. They are part of the record of proceedings. Mr. Green had the opportunity to hear at least some of them read. They are difficult to paraphrase or summarize, but they show that the lives of Mary Cockney, Doug Kristjanson, and Kendyce Cockney have been turned upside down by these events. In particular, Ms. Cockney and Mr. Kristjanson have struggled to get their lives back for the last two-and-a-half years. Sadly, Ms. Cockney speaks of "the husband she knew", and "the husband she knows now". Her daughter speaks of her disbelief and her inability to understand why someone would hurt her stepfather, someone she says is a "kind man who is always willing to help others". "The best stepfather in the world," she writes. There is nothing that the court can do that

There is nothing that the court can do that can repair the terrible harm that was caused that day. As I said already, sentencing is not about revenge, but the impact that this crime had on the victims demonstrates, in a graphic way, how serious these offences were, particularly, of course, the attack on Mr. Kristjanson. It is truly heartbreaking to think of the waste and the loss for all involved. It is important to take stock of that loss, and it is especially

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important for Mr. Green to understand that loss.

In any sentencing the court has to take into account the circumstances of the person who committed the offence, and I have done so.

Mr. Green was born in November 1983 and he is almost 30 years old now. He was just about to turn 27 when this happened. He is of Inuvialuit descent and grew up in Tuktoyaktuk.

A presentence report has been prepared and goes over his family history in some detail.

This is very helpful information in any sentencing, particularly so in the sentencing of an Aboriginal offender, given that the sentencing courts have special duties and responsibilities when sentencing Aboriginal offenders. I will get back to this in more detail when I talk about the governing sentencing principles that I must apply in this case.

The presentence report talks about Mr.

Green's family circumstances. It indicates that

Mr. Green felt loved by his parents when he was

growing up. He spent some time engaged in

traditional activities during his youth. There

are several comments in the presentence report

suggesting that he enjoyed these activities and

has fond memories of them. I do not know of

course, but it is possible that becoming

eventually reconnected with those types of activities is part of what could help Mr. Green get off the path that he has been on for many years.

The presentence report does mention that both his parents were heavy drinkers and that he witnessed family violence in the home when he was young. There is no mention of Mr. Green himself having been the victim of any kind of physical, sexual, or mental abuse.

In this regard, it is sad to say he is more fortunate than many offenders who come before the court and whose circumstances we hear about. It is not uncommon to hear that offenders who grew up in an environment where alcohol was abused and violence occurred, not just between the parents but also directed at the children. It is not uncommon to hear that children grew up in circumstances where there was overcrowding in the home, little supervision or guidance. And without minimizing the impact that alcohol abuse and violence in the home would have had on Mr. Green, because there is no doubt it would have an impact on a child, there appears to have been some positive aspects to his upbringing as well.

report that Mr. Green is a good person when

Several people commented in the presentence

sober, but has drinking and anger issues. That
theme comes up on a number of occasions and comes
from different sources, including Kendyce

Cockney. Kendyce Cockney says that she
considered Mr. Green a good friend before this
happened. And there are other family members,
including some of Mr. Green's siblings, that talk
about the fact he is a good person when he is
sober.

Mr. Green himself acknowledges that he has a problem with anger and a problem with alcohol.

That is abundantly clear from the events that happened in October 2010, and from his criminal record.

Mr. Green started getting into trouble at a young age. His mother describes him as being "taken away". He got into trouble, apparently mixing up with the wrong crowd. Of course it is not uncommon for young people to come into conflict with the law when they are young, but it appears that Mr. Green got into big trouble early and has not, to date, been able to break that cycle. Since that early contact with the justice system when he was about 13 years old, he has essentially been in and out of jail, and recently more often in jail than out of jail.

His criminal record is appalling. It starts

with convictions in Youth Court and, notably, he received custody the very first time he was in Youth Court. Usually, with young persons, this does not happen unless the offence is quite serious or there are compelling reasons to resort to incarceration. This is certainly the case now, but it was also true when the applicable statute was the Young Offenders Act, which is the Act that would have been in force when Mr. Green was first before the courts.

"break and enter and commit", and I do not know what indictable offence was committed in conjunction with those break and enters. I note that the dispositions in the Youth Court involve significant sentences; for example, in 1999, there is a sentence of 12 months secure custody imposed on a break and enter and commit. One of the convictions entered on the same day was for handling a firearm or restricted weapon.

Whatever he was sentenced for in July 1999, it would not have been a minor matter that resulted in that type of a sentence. And then there are more convictions in the Youth Court.

Things did not improve after Mr. Green became an adult. In May 2002, there is another one of these break and enter and commit where I

do not know what the indictable offence was, but
the sentence imposed was 23 months in jail, a
sentence at the very high end of the territorial
range.

Things continued on the same path in subsequent years. Mr. Green was convicted of dangerous driving, escaping lawful custody, fleeing from police officers, continually being sentenced to more jail terms. And then in 2007, he was sentenced for aggravated assault, assault with weapon, and dangerous operation of a motor vehicle. The transcript of that sentencing decision has been filed in these proceedings. The sentence was imposed following a conviction after trial. The facts are different from the ones in this case, but there are similarities: Mr. Green was at a drinking party; he became upset at someone for no discernible reason; the attack was completely unprovoked. In that case, he used a knife to attack the victim and stabbed him. Thankfully, and by pure chance, no serious injuries were inflicted. But that was not the end of it. After the victim fled, Mr. Green chased him with a snowmobile essentially trying to run him over. For those offences, Mr. Green received a global sentence of 30 months in jail. He was convicted of a further assault with weapon

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in August 2007. I do not have any information about that particular matter. I do not know if it was for an offence that was committed while he was in custody, or whether it was for something that had happened before and only got dealt with after. In any event, he was eventually released on statutory release but was recommitted to custody after breaching his conditions. I do not know when he was finally released, but considering that he was recommitted in July 2009 and what happened in this case took place in October 2010, he would have been out of custody it would seem for a year at most before these 13 offences were committed.

> The criminal record is obviously an aggravating factor in this case. People should not be sentenced over and over again for the convictions that appear on their criminal record. That would not be fair. But what the record shows is how dangerous Mr. Green has been for fellow members of his community for the last several years. He has caused a lot of harm to others in his relatively young life, and, unfortunately, the events of October 2010 suggest that he is not getting any less dangerous when he is intoxicated.

Mr. Green spoke directly to the Court

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earlier this week. He said he was sorry for what he did, and I believe him. I believe him even if it appears that he did not show that remorse earlier on in these proceedings.

There is a reference in the presentence report about comments made by RCMP officers $% \left(1\right) =\left(1\right) +\left(1\right)$ suggesting that Mr. Green showed no remorse at the time of his arrest, and even afterwards appeared to have a careless attitude about this matter when it came up for a jury trial in Tuktoyaktuk in April 2012. It may well be that it has taken him a long time to realize the magnitude of what he has done. I do hope that sitting through this sentencing hearing, hearing the victim impact statements, has gone some way to making him realize even more the seriousness of what he has done and its consequences. But whatever his attitude was back then at the time of his arrest and in the following months, he has now pleaded guilty and I accept that he is sorry for what he has done. That is one step. The next step, of course, and the more meaningful one in the long term, is for him to be committed to dealing with his issues, live a sober lifestyle, and try to make the rest of his life more productive than the last several years have been.

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I say this because Mr. Green was probably

also very sorry about what he did to the person
he stabbed and chased with a snow machine in a
fit of rage in December 2005, which led to his
2007 convictions. The problem is that him being
sorry after the fact does not help his victims,
it does not protect the community, and it does
not address the root causes of his behaviour. If
he does not find a way to address the rage that
is within him, it is quite possible that he will
eventually kill someone. Even if he does not
kill someone, I suspect that if Mr. Green commits
any further crimes of serious violence in the
future, he is going to find himself facing an
application by the Crown to have him declared a
dangerous offender and locked up permanently.

The Court sincerely hopes that this is not where things will go. The Court sincerely hopes that there will not in fact be a next victim.

But the reality is that the Court does not have the power to do anything today that will determine for sure one way or another whether there will be a next time. The Court today can impose a sentence for what has happened. What happens or does not happen in the future is up to Mr. Green.

My task today is to impose a sentence on Mr. Green for what he has done. To impose a fit

1	sentence, I have to take into account the
2	principles of sentencing that are set out in the
3	Criminal Code. The Criminal Code sets out what
4	the objectives of sentencing are and what
5	principles govern a court in deciding what a fit
6	sentence is. I will not go over the provisions
7	of the Code that deal with this issue, but I have
8	considered them. I just want to refer briefly to
9	a few principles that are most applicable to this
10	case.
11	First, I have to bear in mind that the
12	fundamental purpose of sentencing is set out in
13	the Criminal Code and is said to be:
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15	to contribute, along with crime
16	prevention initiatives, to respect
17	for the law and the maintenance of a
18	just, peaceful and safe society by
19	imposing just sanctions that have
20	one or more of the following
21	objectives:
22	(a) to denounce unlawfully conduct,
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24	in other words, express society's disapproval of
25	the conduct.
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27	(b) to deter the offender and other

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1	persons from committing offences;
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3	which essentially means try to discourage people
4	from committing crimes.
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6	(c) to separate offenders from
7	society, where necessary;
8	(d) to assist in rehabilitating
9	offenders;
10	(e) to provide reparations for harm
11	done to victims or to the community;
12	and
13	(f) to promote a sense of
14	responsibility in offenders, and
15	acknowledgement of the harm done to
16	victims and to the community.
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18	That is the fundamental purpose and objectives of
19	sentencing.
20	The most fundamental principle of sentencing
21	is proportionality. A sentence must be
22	proportionate to the gravity of the offence and
23	to the degree of responsibility of the offender,
24	and that is what all the other principles seek to
25	achieve.
26	There are a lot of other principles that are
27	quoted in the Criminal Code. The two that I want

to refer to primarily are the fact that sentences
imposed on similar offenders for similar offences
should be similar; the sentences should be
similar. It is often called the "principle of
parity".

Another very important principle that applies here is that "all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders."

Given Mr. Green's criminal record, the paramount consideration today, in my opinion, has to be the protection of the public.

Rehabilitation is always important and is ultimately the best way to protect the public.

But at this point Mr. Green, simply put, appears to be a "time bomb". He is a very dangerous person when he is intoxicated. He knows this.

He knows he has a problem with alcohol and a problem with anger. He was intoxicated when he committed the offence that he was sentenced for in 2007, and I suspect he was probably intoxicated when he committed some of the other offences on his record. He knows that he is dangerous when he drinks. The Court knows that

it is hard to deal with addiction, but the bottom

line is that Mr. Green has not addressed that issue and he has not addressed his anger issues.

Because of that, he continues to be a threat to the safety of the public.

Denunciation and deterrence are factors
here, of course, because society has to express
its disapproval of this type of conduct that has
such terrible impacts on the victims of the
crimes. Specific deterrence is a factor because
Mr. Green obviously continues to behave in ways
that are unacceptable. Whether a jail term can
achieve these purposes is not necessarily clear,
but the Court does not have a lot of tools
available to it on sentencing.

I want to spend some time now on the important sentencing principles that are engaged because Mr. Green is an Aboriginal offender.

That factor requires me to approach his sentencing in a special way, one that takes into account that factor. I will spend a bit of time now explaining what that means.

I am required to approach this sentencing in a manner that takes Mr. Green's Aboriginal descent into account. I have already referred to the principle that says that "all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances must be

considered for all offenders, with particular 1 2 attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal 3 offenders." That provision was interpreted by the Supreme Court of Canada many years ago in R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, and it was more recently interpreted in the case of R. v. 6 Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13. I do not plan on quoting at length from these decisions, but I just want 8 to refer to the main principles that they have 9 enunciated because those principles are binding 10 on sentencing courts. 11

> This sentencing principle codified in section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code is a remedial provision. It was intended to address the problem of overrepresentation of Aboriginal people in Canadian jails. The court acknowledged that this problem could not be addressed through the sentencing process alone, but found that sentencing was one of the areas where consideration for the unique circumstances of Aboriginal offenders had its place. The court found that when sentencing an Aboriginal offender, courts are required to take into account the unique, systemic or background factors that may have played a part in bringing the particular offender before the court. And, the Supreme Court also found that sentencing

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courts were required to consider the type of sentencing procedure and sanctions that may be appropriate in the circumstances because of the offender's particular Aboriginal heritage.

Judges are required to take judicial notice of broad, systemic and background factors that affect Aboriginal offenders generally, but also case-specific information that is provided by counsel or through the presentence report.

The Supreme Court made it clear in the Ipeelee decision that courts must take judicial notice of factors such as the history of colonialism, displacement, residential schools, and how these factors continue to translate into things like lower educational attainment, lower income, higher unemployment rates, higher rates of substance abuse and suicide, higher levels of incarceration for Aboriginal people. The Supreme Court also made it clear that those matters do not on their own justify a different sentence for an Aboriginal offender compared to what would be imposed on a non-Aboriginal offender, but they are things that provide context for understanding the case-specific information that is presented by counsel in any given case about the offender who is being sentenced.

I have taken judicial notice of those

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factors. They are referred to frequently in the courts in this jurisdiction where, of course,

Aboriginal people form the majority of the population in many of the communities, even though they do not form the majority of the population in the City of Yellowknife. This case arose in Tuktoyaktuk where the majority of the population is Aboriginal. It just so happens in this case that the victim of the aggravated assault charge is non-Aboriginal, but his wife, the victim of the assault charge and very much a victim also of the consequences of the assault on her husband, as well as her daughter, are Aboriginal.

The courts in this jurisdiction are familiar with the impact that residential schools had on many people. They are familiar with it, sadly, because we hear about it frequently in the course of our work.

The courts also often hear about the very difficult circumstances faced by people in their youth; about families where there is alcohol abuse, physical and sexual abuse; about low education levels; about the struggles to succeed and break free from the terrible cycle that so many people are trapped in; about the challenges of living in very isolated communities with

limited employment opportunities; limited
resources to deal with addictions and other
issues, for those who are ready and willing to
address those issues.

The case-specific information that is available to the Court in this case, through the submissions of counsel and through the presentence report, are very much in line, unfortunately, with information that is provided frequently in sentencing cases.

As I have said, in some ways the circumstances described in Mr. Green's presentence report are better than what the Court often reads and hears about, but it is clear that he also faced difficulties in the home particularly with respect to alcohol abuse and domestic violence. Those are things that do children a lot of harm.

In addition, both his parents did attend residential school, and the report is clear that this had an impact on the way that they parented their children. According to his counsel, Mr. Green, growing up, knew that his parents loved him because they said they did, but they did not show it. This is consistent with his mother's comments in the report about her experience of being at a residence school for many years, where

no love was shown, and the people running the school were, in her words, "mean". She is reported saying she raised her children the same way she was raised in that environment, so clearly the impact that the residential school had on her translated into a very real impact on her children, including Mr. Green.

There are other aspects of the report that reveal circumstances that, sadly, are also common in our northern communities. Mr. Green remembers quite a few friends committing suicide. That alone would be traumatic and it is not the standard experience for young people growing up in this country. It is not surprising that such experiences would leave some painful traces.

All these things having something to do with the unhealthy relationship Mr. Green developed with alcohol and drugs and with his anger issues, is something that I have no difficulty at all to infer.

Going back to the Tpeelee case, the Supreme

Court of Canada reminded sentencing judges that

they are required to focus their analysis on the

unique circumstances of Aboriginal offenders that

can reasonably and justifiably impact on the

sentence imposed, in other words, the systemic

factors that play a part in bringing the offender

1	before the court and the type of sanctions that
2	may be appropriate because of the offender's
3	Aboriginal heritage, are things that bear on the
4	ultimate question of what will be a fit sentence.
5	The court explained that systemic factors may
6	have a bearing on the level of blameworthiness of
7	the offender, which in turn impacts on the
8	proportionality principle, but the court also
9	made it clear that the true meaning of having a
10	different approach in sentencing Aboriginal
11	offenders did not amount to creating what they
12	called a "race-based discount on sentencing".
13	At paragraph 75 of the Ipeelee decision, the
14	court said this:
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16	Section 718.2(e) does not create a
17	race-based discount on sentencing.
18	The provision does not ask courts to
19	remedy the overrepresentation of
20	Aboriginal people in prisons by
21	artificially reducing incarceration
22	rates. Rather, sentencing judges
23	are required to pay particular
24	attention to the circumstances of
25	Aboriginal offenders in order to
26	endeavour to achieve a truly fit and
27	proper sentence in any particular

case. This has been, and continues
to be, the fundamental duty of a
sentencing judge.

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The final comment I will make about the Ipeelee decision is that it reiterated that this different approach was mandated in all cases involving the sentencing of Aboriginal offenders, including serious offences. There were some excerpts of the Gladue decision that had been used to support the proposition that perhaps when dealing with serious offences there was no requirement to take into account the Aboriginal status of the offender or, perhaps more appropriately, that it did not make a difference. In Ipeelee, the court clarified that this was not the case. In each case, a sentencing court has the ultimate discretion to impose a sentence that is fit, taking into account the circumstances of the offence, the specific circumstances of the offender including the systemic and background factors and factors specific to the offender by virtue of his or her Aboriginal heritage. The availability of sanctions other than imprisonment and the effectiveness of such sanctions to achieve the goals of sentencing must also be considered.

In this case no one is suggesting that something other than a jail term is required in order to uphold the principle of proportionality. I think it is clear that there are no sanctions other than imprisonment that could address the fundamental principle of proportionality in the circumstances of this case.

I have gone to some lengths here to make it clear that I am mindful of the duty that rests on me to take Mr. Green's Aboriginal heritage into account when examining what a fit sentence is for the serious crimes he committed in October 2010.

I have taken into account the specific circumstances brought to my attention through the presentence report and through his counsel, and I have taken judicial notice of the situation and circumstances faced by Aboriginal people in this jurisdiction and elsewhere in the broader sense as well.

The task of any sentencing judge is to apply the sentencing principles to the specific circumstances of any given case.

The crime of aggravated assault is a serious offence. It is punishable by a maximum of 14 years' imprisonment. Obviously any assault where the life of the victim is endangered would always be inherently serious, but, as with all offences,

there are a variety of ways in which this offence can be committed, so there is a range of seriousness within what constitutes an aggravated assault. It is possible to assault someone and endanger their life, but that in the end there would be no long term consequences for the victim. Fortunately, there are often situations where, even after serious assaults, people make a full recovery. Unfortunately, this is not one of those cases. There have been long-term consequences, and very serious ones.

As I have already mentioned, the criminal record is an aggravating factor. It is aggravating because it demonstrates the risk that Mr. Green currently poses for the members of the community. It reflects a pattern of conduct that is very disturbing, the seriousness of which appears to continue to be escalating.

The only mitigating factor here is the guilty plea. Offenders deserve credit when they plead guilty. It saves the time and resources required to run a trial. Importantly, it spares victims from the trauma of having to relive events by having to talk about them.

The facts alleged here are that those who were present at this house party were all intoxicated. The standard of proof on a criminal

trial is a high one, so giving up his right to
having the Crown prove the charge beyond a
reasonable doubt is something that Mr. Green
deserves credit for, and it is also an indication
that he is remorseful and is now willing to take
responsibility for his actions.

At the same time, this was not a guilty plea at an early stage of the matter. The witnesses did have to testify at the preliminary hearing. They were subpoenaed for the jury trial in Tuktoyaktuk in April 2012. After that resulted in a mistrial because it was not possible to select a jury, they were later subpoenaed again for the January 2013 scheduled trial. For all this time they were left thinking that they would have to testimony. There was stress and anxiety that I am sure came with it. It was a few weeks before the scheduled trial that they learned that they would not have to testify. So while mitigating, the guilty plea is not mitigating to the same extent that it would be had it been entered early on. But still, it is mitigating and I have taken it into account.

I have also taken into account, as I have mentioned a few times already, the circumstances of Mr. Green as an Aboriginal offender and the extent to which this has bearing on what is a fit

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reread the Ipeelee decision and I have reminded myself of the directions provided in that case.

Here the question is not whether a jail term is required; the question is whether the circumstances that Mr. Green has faced are such that his moral blameworthiness for his offences is less than it would be had he not faced those circumstances.

Another thing I must consider in this case is how much credit should be given to Mr. Green for the substantial period of time he has spent in pre-trial custody - two years and five months - and, again, I do need to spend some time dealing with that issue thoroughly.

How much credit is to be given for the time a person has spent in pre-trial custody is a matter for the court's discretion, but that discretion has certain limits. Section 719 of the Criminal Code provides a framework for dealing with that issue. The aspects of the provision that are relevant for the purposes of this case are that in determining the sentence to be imposed, the court may take into account the time that the accused has spent in pre-trial custody. The credit for that time is to be limited to one day credit for each day spent in

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1	pre-trial custody. But despite this general
2	rule, if the circumstances justify it, credit may
3	be given on an enhanced basis of up to
4	one-and-a-half days credit for each day spent in
5	pre-trial custody, but that enhanced credit
6	cannot be given if the reason for detention was
7	stated on the record as being primarily because
8	of previous convictions of the accused. To
9	properly apply these principles, the sentencing
10	court has to be advised precisely of the
11	procedural history of the matter as far as bail
12	is concerned, to determine whether the court has
13	discretion to give credit for the pre-trial
14	custody on an enhanced basis and, if the court
15	does have that discretion, to determine whether
16	the circumstances in fact justify enhanced credit
17	being granted.
18	The consequences of this analysis are
19	particularly significant in a case such as this
20	one where the period of pre-trial custody was
21	lengthy, so this is an issue that must be

I have gone through all the documents on the court file in great detail, and this is my understanding of the procedural history of Mr. Green's remand:

carefully considered.

He was arrested and charged on this matter

shortly after it happened. He had several appearances before the Territorial Court. On October 15th, 2010, a warrant of committal in Form 8 issued. That warrant states that the accused is remanded on consent, reserving his right to a show cause hearing.

Then, by operation of section 525 of the Criminal Code, the issue of Mr. Green's detention came to be reviewed in this court on a number of occasions. The first time was in January 2011, and at that time he waived his right to a bail review.

The next time it came up for review when the matter was spoken to in court it appears that, because there was the upcoming preliminary hearing in May, the review was postponed to June, to take place after the preliminary hearing.

After Mr. Green was committed to stand trial in May, he appeared in this court and on the 13th of June, 2011, he sought release. He was ordered detained on the primary and secondary grounds, according to the clerk's notes on the file. It does not appear that a new Form 8 warrant of committal was issued at that time, and there is also no transcript of those proceedings. There is nothing to indicate that the accused was detained primarily because of his criminal

1 record.

There were several subsequent bail reviews.

In October 2011, and in January 2012, both times his continued detention was ordered on the primary and secondary grounds. There are transcripts of those decisions. No mention was made that detention was being ordered primarily because of his record.

Mr. Green's jury trial had been scheduled to proceed in Tuktoyaktuk in April 2012, but because the court was not able to select a jury a mistrial was declared.

Mr. Green sought a review of his bail again in May 2012. At that time he sought release on the basis that circumstances had changed since the previous hearing largely because the trial had not proceeded and the new date for trial at that point was not known. His continued detention was nonetheless ordered again on the primary and secondary grounds. There is no transcript of that hearing, but there is nothing on the court record that indicates that detention was ordered primarily because of his record.

So based on my review of the court file, it appears that the only Form 8 warrant of committal that ever issued was the one that issued in 2010, and that warrant does not include any endorsement

or the reasons for detention, which is not

surprising given that at that point detention was

on consent.

Throughout the rest of the procedural history of this matter, there is no record of any of the subsequent decisions to detain Mr. Green having been based primarily on his criminal record. The net result is that I have discretion to give him credit for the time he spent in pre-trial basis on an enhanced basis.

The next question is whether I should. There has been some uncertainty, and a fair bit of litigation, about what types of circumstances justify granting enhanced credit. The question is what the words "if the circumstances justify it" in subsection 719(3.1) actually mean. In some cases it was argued that this enhanced credit was only available if there were exceptional circumstances. It was argued that things that apply to all remand prisoners, such as the unavailability of remission, limited access to programs, et cetera, are not among the things that Parliament intended be considered to grant enhanced credit for remand time. But there is now a strong trend in jurisprudence, including the jurisprudence from this jurisdiction, that the proper interpretation of this provision is

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1 that the circumstances that can justify enhanced 2 credit do not have to be exceptional or occur 3 only in rare situations. They do, however, have to be applicable to the specific accused who is before the court. They do have to be individual circumstances faced by the accused before the 6 court. There are a number of cases that now stand for this proposition: 8 R. v. Stonefish, 2012 MBCA 116; R. v. Vittrewkwa, 9 2011 YKTC 64; R. v. Desjarlais, 2012 NWTSC 2; R. 10 v. Mannilaq, 2012 NWTSC 48; R. v. Carvery (L.A.), 11 12 2012 NSCA 107; and just a few weeks ago a similar conclusion reached by the Ontario Court of Appeal 13

in R. v. Summers, 2013 ONCA 147.

There is nothing automatic about enhanced credit. The onus is on the person being sentenced to show on a balance of probabilities that the circumstances do justify enhanced credit being granted. This may be done by calling viva voce evidence about the conditions of detention being particularly harsh, or about the fact that the prisoner's conduct while on remand was such that had he or she been a serving prisoner, they would have received remission.

In this jurisdiction it has also been found acceptable for the information to be provided by counsel, as an officer of the court, so long as

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this information comes from reliable sources,

such as people who are involved with the offender

in the correctional centre. That was the

conclusion of both levels of court in this

jurisdiction in R. v. Desjarlais, 2012 NWTSC 2,

and R. v. Mannilaq, 2012 NWTSC 48

In this case counsel has not presented this type of specific information likely because that information was included in the presentence report. The problem I find, though, is that the information included in the presentence report seems to be somewhat contradictory. As noted by Mr. Green's counsel, the author of the report states, at page 3, that Mr. Green has been a good inmate, that there have been few concerns and few incidents during his two-and-a-half years of remand. But, on the same page, the author of the report, at the bottom of the page and also at the top of page 4, reviews Mr. Green's file and refers to a number of incidents during his time in remand. These have included incidents where there has been issues with his interactions with staff or other prisoners which have resulted in him being "locked down "or having certain privileges suspended. Other incidents involve the use of drugs, being intoxicated, making homebrew, which is particularly of concern given

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the negative impact that alcohol seems to have on him. I recognize that there can be more serious incidents in a jail setting, but I still find it a little bit difficult to reconcile this part of the report with the case manager's reported comments and assessment about Mr. Green's conduct while on remand.

The report also shows that Mr. Green was offered to participate in the Healing Drum program, and refused. His counsel clarified that although Mr. Green had initially refused the program, he later did agree to take it. This is an eight-week program that he completed and apparently has certificates for. So he has had access to programs while on remand.

As I have mentioned already, the onus to show that there should be enhanced credit for remand time rests on the accused. In this case I am not satisfied that he has discharged that onus. Although I will exercise my discretion to grant him credit for the time he spent in pre-trial custody, I am not inclined to grant that credit on an enhanced basis because I am not satisfied that he has demonstrated that the circumstances justify it.

All that being said, the bottom line question is what is a fit sentence in this case?

Crown and defence agree that a significant jail term is required. They have jointly suggested that the appropriate range is between three-and-a-half and four-and-a-half years' imprisonment. The Crown is asking the Court to impose a sentence at the higher end of that range; defence, relying primarily on the principles articulated in Ipeelee and Gladue, asks that I impose a sentence at the lower end of that range.

I have applied the analysis required by the Gladue and Ipeelee cases. I have taken into account all of Mr. Green's circumstances and the factors that I have taken judicial notice of that may have impacted on him and on his moral blameworthiness for the offences that he has committed.

Taking that into account, along with the many other factors I am required to consider, I consider that the high end of the presented range is actually at the very low end of what is fit in this case. I say this because of the seriousness of the offence itself; the recent conviction for another serious crime of violence; the pattern of conduct shown in the criminal record; and the need to protect the members of the community of Tuktoyaktuk or whatever other community Mr. Green

may live in from this type of behaviour. But for
the factors related to Mr. Green's Aboriginal
heritage, in my view a fit sentence for this
crime would be even longer, even taking into
account a guilty plea. As I said, in my
estimation Mr. Green is literally at the doorstep
of a dangerous offender application if he
persists in this type of conduct.

I was the sentencing judge in 2007. I then expressed the wish that that case would be a turning point in Mr. Green's life. Evidently it was not. I can only express the same hope again, that this time it will. I hope he will remember, and think about, what we heard from Mary Cockney, from Mr. Kristjanson, and from Kendyce Cockney earlier this week. I hope that beyond anything I have said today, that remembering the words of those whose lives he harmed so much will provide him a powerful motivation to take real steps to change his ways. No one has any control over the past; the only impact we can have is on the future. I really hope that Mr. Green will take steps to have his future be different from his past.

Starting from the upper end of the range suggested and giving Mr. Green credit for his time in pre-trial custody on a one-for-one basis,

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would mean imposing a sentence in the

penitentiary range but just over the two year

mark. By this, I mean that if I take four years

and six months and I subtract two years and five

months, the sentence would be two years and one

month and would be in the penitentiary range. I

have been not heard anything that convinces me

that it is essential to impose a sentence in the

penitentiary range for this offence, and the

Crown has actually suggested that I keep it under

two years.

Crown has also asked that I impose a probation order. The conditions sought are counselling conditions and no contact conditions to protect the victims, who have indicated that they do not want to have any contact with Mr.

Green. Of course in an ideal world there would eventually be a reparation of harm, restoration, and potentially some of the damage caused could be repaired, but that is not something that can be imposed on victims. And to the extent that they have indicated they do not want contact with Mr. Green, I think that wish has to be respected.

I am not entirely convinced that probation will be helpful in this case because Mr. Green has so many convictions on his record for breaching court orders. But, as I have said, a

period of probation allows me to do something
that I cannot otherwise do, which is prohibit
contact with the victims, something that they
have asked for and that may give them some level
of comfort. So for that reason alone, I think it
is worthwhile doing.

The other thing of course is if Mr. Green does wish to turn his life around, having the support and the help from the probation officer, having that added "push", if I can call it that, to take counselling, to take treatment, may be helpful to him and there is, I suppose, no harm in trying.

The other thing the Crown has asked me to consider is to make a compensation order in favour of Mr. Kristjanson to compensate him, in part, for the loss of income he has suffered as a result of the injuries that he sustained. The Crown has filed documents showing what his income was in the years before these sad events and information about what it has been since.

Compensation orders can be made pursuant to section 738 of the Criminal Code to compensate victims for losses suffered as a result of crimes. They are not intended to be substitutes for civil proceedings but they can, in appropriate cases, help achieve one of the

objectives of sentencing, which is the reparation
of harm done to victims.

The Crown has filed a number of cases dealing with this issue. Some talk about the applicable principles; a number of them are cases where compensation orders were made but there is no explanation of the reasoning that is behind the order. All these cases involved sentences that were far less significant jail terms than the one that will be imposed here today.

I have also considered the case of R. v.

Devgan [1999] O.J. No. 1825, a decision that I

found quite useful because it sets out the

factors to consider when deciding whether or not

a compensation order should be made. In that

case the court said that orders for compensation,

while they have a place in the sentencing

process, must be made with restraint and caution.

The means of the offender must be taken into

account, and this should not be used as a

"substitute for civil proceedings."

The evidence filed by the Crown shows that Mr. Kristjanson worked before this incident. His income tax returns for the years 2009 and 2010 show that he earned \$28,000, more or less, and \$22,000 respectively for those years. By contrast, his income for the 2011 taxation year

dropped to just under \$9,000 and consisted primarily of disability benefits.

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There is no question that section 738 specifically contemplates compensation orders being granted for loss of income, and there is no question that this offence resulted in the loss of income for the victim. But that loss is not easily quantifiable because it will have continued in 2012 and could continue for some years to come. As I have said, I must take into account Mr. Green's ability to make restitution.

The other factor I have considered is that the case law is clear that compensation orders are a component of sentencing. I have already concluded that a significant jail term must be imposed for this offence so this, too, is relevant in deciding whether the sentence should also include a compensation order. This is a difficult decision. I wish the sentence that I impose today could somehow repair, at least in part, the harm that has been done to these victims, but I cannot ignore the fact that Mr. Green has been in jail for a long time and will be in jail for some time yet. He is not someone who has been particularly employable in the last several years. He has a long road ahead of him if he is to turn his life around. Having a hefty compensation order the equivalent of a civil judgment against him hanging over his head could potentially just turn into a reason for him not to make the necessary efforts to actually upgrade and try to get work, and in that sense it could become counter-productive. The victims would still not be able to enforce their compensation order, and Mr. Green may be less inclined to pursue his efforts towards rehabilitation.

After careful consideration, and while it is clear that Mr. Kristjanson has suffered loss of income as a result of this crime, I have decided that this case is not one where it would be appropriate for me to include a compensation order as part of sentencing. This of course in no way prevents the victims from pursuing civil remedies. I do realize that those types of proceedings are time consuming and can be costly, and perhaps they will choose not to do it. But if they do decide to do it, it is quite likely they could claim significantly more than I would ever be able to grant as part of this sentencing hearing.

The Crown has sought certain ancillary orders and I will deal with those first.

There will be a firearms prohibition order pursuant to section 109 of the Criminal Code.

1	Such an order was made in 2007, but since the
2	Crown has not filed a notice of intention to seek
3	greater punishment, the minimum time for the
4	order is that it expire ten years from Mr.
5	Green's release. I will keep the order to that
6	duration in the hope that at some point in the
7	future he may be in a position to become
8	reconnected with activities on the land that have
9	been positive for him as he was growing up and
10	that that can be part of how he places his life
11	in a different direction.
12	There will also be a DNA order because this
13	is a primary designated offence.
14	There will not be a victims of crime
15	surcharge because, having regard to the time Mr.
16	Green has spent on remand and the sentence that I
17	am about to impose, I am satisfied that imposing
18	a surcharge would result in hardship.
19	There will also be an order for the return
20	of the exhibits that were seized. They should be

There will also be an order for the return of the exhibits that were seized. They should be returned to their rightful owner, if that is appropriate. If not, they should be destroyed, but this is only, of course, at the expiration of the appeal period.

Mr. Green, please stand up.

Mr. Green, for all these long reasons I have given, I consider to be a fit sentence for these

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offences globally a sentence of four-and-a-half years. I say, again, I come to this sentence of four-and-a-half years really exercising as much restraint, holding back as much as possible because really it could have been a lot longer given your record and given the consequences of your conduct that day.

For the two years and five months you have spent on remand, I am going to give you credit for two years six months and a day because I want to keep the sentence in the territorial range, so there will be a further jail term of two years less one day. That ensures that you will not be sent to Southern Canada because at this point I do not know that there would be any advantage to that, and this may make it easier for your family members to visit you as opposed to if you were further away.

I am also going to put you on probation. I have read your record. You know what court orders are and you do not have a great track record for following them, but I will make a probation order and it will be for three years after your release. There are automatic conditions that the clerk will explain to you. They are pretty simple. The most important one is stay out of trouble. I will put two more

1	conditions on. One is that you have no contact
2	directly or indirectly with Doug Kristjanson,
3	Mary Cockney or Kendyce Cockney. That means if
4	you come across them on the street, in a store,
5	anywhere, it is your responsibility to leave.
6	Maybe down the road there will be a time where
7	there can be healing there, but right now they do
8	not want that and that has to be respected.
9	The second condition is that you take
10	counselling or treatment as directed. You have
11	been around long enough, you know that no one can
12	make you take counselling. You probably also
13	know that counselling that you take because you

are ordered does not actually work.

I am not sure if this will be helpful to you. I hope it will be. I hope that by the time you are released you have had maybe access to other programs while in jail and that you will really be ready to stay away from alcohol and drugs and to make the rest of your life different than what it has been.

I probably said very similar things to you in 2007. I hope this time it will prove true.

You can sit down. 24

Is there anything, counsel, that I have 25

overlooked? 26

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27 MR. GODFREY: Not from the Crown's

- 1 perspective.
- 2 Just for clarification. The firearms order,
- 3 would that run from time of release, does that
- 4 run consecutive to the other firearms order or
- 5 would that run over?
- 6 THE COURT: It is part of the sentence so
- 7 I think that I can make that part of it
- 8 consecutive. That order will commence today and
- 9 expire ten years after the expiration of the
- 10 existing one.
- 11 MR. GODFREY: Thank you.
- 12 THE COURT: Anything from you, Ms. Rattan?
- 13 MS. RATTAN: Your Honour, might that
- include a provision from the Court that there be
- an exemption in the event that he wishes to apply
- to go out on the land?
- 17 THE COURT: I think he can apply for that
- 18 to the competent authority. Because we are
- 19 talking a long way down the road, I would rather
- leave that to the authorities at the time.
- 21 MS. RATTAN: That's fine.
- 22 THE COURT: Mr. Green, as I have said, I
- 23 hope you are able to take advantage of whatever
- is available to you in jail. Maybe some day you
- 25 will be able to understand where that anger comes
- from. I just want to say again, my last words to
- 27 you, that you have no control over what happened

1	in the past, whether it is the far past when you
2	were young or ten years ago or five years ago or
3	October 2010. It is too late, you cannot change
4	the past, but you can make decisions about the
5	future. I really, really hope that this time
6	this will be a turning point for you. I know
7	that it is not my sentence that is going to
8	achieve that or anything I say today; it really
9	is something that has to come from inside of you.
10	But I hope you remember for a long time what
11	Ms. Cockney said when she was reading that victim
12	impact statement and what I am sure you heard Mr.
13	Godfrey read and everything else that you now
14	know your actions caused. I am sure that you
15	would feel a lot better about yourself if you did
16	not do those kinds of things.
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19	Certified to be a true and
20	accurate transcript pursuant to Rule 723 and 724 of the
21	Supreme Court Rules of Court.
22	
23	Annette Wright, RPR, CSR(A)
24	Court Reporter
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