IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

BETWEEN:

JEANNINE DIANE PILON

- and -

ROGER ERNEST PILON

Petitioners

Transcript of Ruling on Summary Judgment Application delivered by the Honourable Justice V.A. Schuler, sitting at Yellowknife, in the Northwest Territories, on March 16th, A.D. 2011.

APPEARANCES:

Mr. D. Large, Q.C.: Counsel for Jeannine Diane Pilon

Mr. A. Duchene: Counsel for Roger Ernest Pilon

| 1 | THE | COURT: | This proceeding is an |
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| 2 | | application by Ms. | Pilon for an order varying the |
| 3 | | 2006 Corollary Rel | ef Order that provides that |
| 4 | | she and Mr. Pilon l | nave shared custody of their |
| 5 | | son, Alexi. Alexi | currently spends alternating |
| 6 | | weeks with each par | rent. Ms. Pilon seeks sole |
| 7 | | custody of Alexi an | nd that he live with her and |
| 8 | | Mr. Pilon have spec | cified access on weekends and |
| 9 | | during holiday pers | lods. My understanding is that |
| 10 | | Mr. Pilon is conten | nt with the current regime, |
| 11 | | but, if it is not | to continue, his position is |
| 12 | | that he should have | e custody of Alexi. |
| 13 | | At this stage | in the trial I have heard from |
| 14 | | Ms. Pilon and her | witnesses. Dr. Seitz, who was |
| 15 | | appointed to do an | assessment under section 29 or |
| 16 | | the Children's Law | Act, is scheduled to testify |
| 17 | | in April. She will | l testify as a court witness |
| 18 | | and counsel for bot | th parties will be able to |
| 19 | | cross-examine her. | |
| 20 | | However, now, | before Dr. Seitz is heard and |
| 21 | | before he calls his | s own evidence, Mr. Pilon |
| 22 | | applies for summary | y judgment. He argues that |
| 2.3 | | there is no triable | e issue with regard to a |

However, now, before Dr. Seitz is heard and before he calls his own evidence, Mr. Pilon applies for summary judgment. He argues that there is no triable issue with regard to a threshold matter, that being whether there has been a change of circumstances as required by section 17(5) of the Divorce Act. That section provides that before the Court makes a variation

order in respect of a custody order, the Court shall satisfy itself that there has been a change in the condition, means, needs or other circumstances of the child of the marriage occurring since the making of the custody order.

The burden on an Applicant for variation of a custody order, including an order that was made on consent, as this Corollary Relief Order was, is to show that a material change has occurred.

Section 17(5) speaks of a change occurring since the making of the custody order. I do not read the section as requiring that the change be a continuous one or one that exists precisely at the time of trial, although those will certainly be factors in assessing the effect of any change.

Rule 16 of the Divorce Rules provides that in a contested proceeding the parties may take any steps that are available in other causes, including applying for summary judgment on any or all issues in the proceeding.

Cases from this jurisdiction, such as the Anderson Mills case and the Wallace v. Wallace case, establish that the test on an application for summary judgment is whether there is a genuine, a bona fide issue for trial. The question at this stage for purposes of the summary judgment application is not whether Ms.

Pilon has established that there has been a

change of circumstances since the Corollary

Relief Order, but it is, instead, whether Mr.

Pilon has shown that there is no genuine issue of change of circumstances.

Essentially, Mr. Pilon says that the evidence heard thus far in the trial all indicates that the parties are currently communicating well, that they have been able to do so for the last year and a half or so, that Alexi is doing well under the current custody regime, despite his special needs.

As to the evidence of Dr. Seitz, Mr. Pilon's position is that even if Dr. Seitz is of the opinion that Mr. Pilon was alienating the child from Ms. Pilon or that Mr. Pilon engaged in negative parenting behaviours, that evidence is current only as at May of 2009 when Dr. Seitz prepared her report. He says that even if the problems identified by Dr. Seitz did exist, which he does not admit, the evidence heard thus far in Ms. Pilon's case indicates that those problems are no longer operating and no longer affecting Alexi and are, therefore, not relevant.

Ms. Pilon, on the other hand, opposes the application for summary judgment. She says that alienation is a live issue, one that has arisen

since the Corollary Relief Order. She testified, for example, about a number of incidents that she says occurred in 2008 where Mr. Pilon encouraged or at least did not discourage the child in behaving badly toward Ms. Pilon or did other things that interfered in the mother and child relationship.

To briefly summarize some of the incidents she referred to, there was the incident where Mr. Pilon, she says, called Social Services and came to her home, which led her, in turn, to call the RCMP, all because Alexi was crying while she was bathing him and she would not let Mr. Pilon speak to him on the telephone.

There is also what I will describe as the Tim Hortons incident where she says Mr. Pilon would not assist her in controlling the child when he was screaming that he hated her and that Mr. Pilon told her that the child hates her.

There is the incident where Ms. Pilon says that Mr. Pilon told the child that she, Ms. Pilon, would give him medication that made him sick and then told the child that he was a good boy when the child told Ms. Pilon that he did not have to listen to her.

There was also evidence from Ms. Pilon suggesting that -- and the evidence, I do not

know that it went this far, but my understanding is that she is asking the Court to draw the inference that Mr. Pilon removed her as the primary contact for the hospital for Alexi and, instead, replaced her with himself and his second wife.

Now, I want to make it clear that I am not making any findings at this stage as to whether these incidents occurred at all or as described by Ms. Pilon. I am not determining credibility at this stage. I am not making any findings of fact, because I have not heard evidence from Mr. Pilon or from any of his witnesses at this stage of the case, but I have to determine the summary judgment application on the basis of the evidence as it now stands.

Mr. Pilon points out that the incidents that were testified to by Ms. Pilon predate Dr. Seitz' report. That, too, however, may give rise to credibility issues, and, again, I cannot determine those at this stage. The fact that the alleged alienating behaviour stopped once the Court appointed Dr. Seitz and she identified the behaviour in her report shortly before this matter was to go to trial the first time in 2009 arguably raises the question whether any change in behaviour is genuine and likely to last.

There is some evidence from Ms. Pilon that, arguably, is relevant to the issue of alienation; for example, that Mr. Pilon's wife attends the child's medical appointments and that it is she who speaks at those appointments and not Mr. Pilon. It is also clear from the evidence that Mr. Pilon's wife's involvement is still a source of conflict, at least as far as Ms. Pilon is concerned.

There are also issues around medications and Mr. Pilon's alleged lack of cooperation with medications that have been recommended by some of Alexi's doctors and with arrangements for medical travel, such as the evidence given by Ms. Pilon that he refused to permit an MRI and an EEG to proceed because of issues about who would accompany Alexi under the medical travel allowance.

Although the evidence that I have heard thus far indicates that the parties have been able to deal with these issues more cooperatively in the recent past, it also indicates that Alexi's situation is not settled, that it may change. No one knows if his medications or the dosage will need to be reviewed again and changed. So, again, it is arguable that the disagreements or Mr. Pilon's refusal to cooperate in arrangements

- and, again, I emphasize that I am not making any finding of fact in that regard - are a change since the Corollary Relief Order.

It is since the order that a diagnosis was arrived at and a medication regime was imposed. It is also arguable that these issues affect Alexi's best interests, because they concern his medical situation or his medication situation. The fact that there has been some improvement in the parties' ability to deal with each other or some improvement in Alexi's situation does not mean that there will no longer be any conflicts.

In my view, it is enough to refer to those issues to dispose of the application, but I do note that other issues certainly arise on the evidence thus far. It is clear that Alexi, who is now almost ten years old, is a child with special needs. He is a difficult and unique child. He is a child with problems of aggression. All of these issues have developed and changed over the years and can reasonably be expected to develop and change as he gets older. The evidence thus far indicates that he has difficulties with change, that he needs to be constantly supervised at school, that he, in fact, leaves school early because of incidents of aggression or conflict with other children.

1 The difficulties that he has with change clearly raise an arguable issue whether a week to week change of households is in his best interests, notwithstanding whether it may have been appropriate at the time of the Corollary Relief Order when he was four or five years old and the situation having changed in that Ms. Pilon is no longer involved in work that requires 9 her to travel.

> In connection with these issues, of course, there have been some issues raised about whether his disciplinary issues at school are more frequent during the weeks he stays with Mr. Pilon, whether some of the activities that Mr. Pilon lets him engage in are exacerbating his aggression.

Again, I want to emphasize that these are arguable issues. I am not making any findings of fact at this stage of the proceedings. It will only be after hearing all the evidence that a decision can be made as to whether, first of all, there has been a change in circumstances that affects Alexi's best interests and whether the current shared custody regime or any aspect of it should be changed. I say any aspect of it, because, of course, as in any case involving child custody, the Court has a variety of options

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| 1 | when it comes to making an order that addresses |
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| 2 | the best interests of the child. |
| 3 | But ultimately I am satisfied that there is |
| 4 | a genuine and triable issue as to whether there |
| 5 | has been a change of circumstances affecting |
| 6 | Alexi's best interests since the Corollary Relief |
| 7 | Order as required by section 17(5) of the Divorce |
| 8 | Act. So, accordingly, the application for |
| 9 | summary judgment is dismissed. |
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| 12 | |
| 13 | Certified to be a true and accurate transcript pursuant |
| 14 | to Rules 723 and 724 of the Supreme Court Rules. |
| 15 | Supreme Court Raies. |
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| 17 | Jill MacDonald, RMR |
| 18 | Court Reporter |
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