R. v. Beaulieu, 2009 NWTSC 48

S-1-CR2008000070

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

IN THE MATTER OF:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

- vs. -

## GERALD BEAULIEU

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Transcript of the Reasons for Sentence by The Honourable

Justice L. A. Charbonneau, at Yellowknife in the Northwest

Territories, on June 26th A.D., 2009.

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## APPEARANCES:

Ms. T. Nguyen: Counsel for the Crown

Mr. S. Fix: Counsel for the Accused

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Charge under s. 271 Criminal Code of Canada

An order has been made banning publication of the identity of the Complainant/Witness pursuant to Section 486.4 of the Criminal Code of Canada

THE COURT: Yesterday, Mr. Beaulieu

pleaded guilty to a charge of sexual assault that

coccurred on May 2nd, 2008 and these are my

reasons for sentence on this charge. Before I

begin I want to reiterate that yesterday I issued

an order prohibiting the publication or broadcast

of any information that could identify the

complainant in this matter.

The facts that I heard yesterday are that the complainant was 69 years old when this incident happened. She lived in a house with two of her children and one adult who was a relative of the accused. She had agreed to let the accused stay in her house because there was nowhere else for him to stay at the time.

On the day this happened, the complainant, the accused, and two other people were at the house and consumed considerable amounts of alcohol. The complainant fell asleep on the bed where she ordinarily slept and sometime later the accused went to her bed, took her pants and underwear down, and touched her in her genital area. She woke up while he was touching her, screamed, told him to stop, and called for help. One of the other adults in the residence came, pulled the accused off the bed and threw him out of the house. The police were called and the

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matter was reported. The accused was charged and detained on this charge. He has been in custody since then, so he has spent some 14 months on remand.

The accused has an extensive criminal record that includes convictions for a variety of offences. The first entries are in 1977 and, sadly, continue on fairly steadily over the following 30 years. There are convictions for property offences, crimes against people, breaches of court orders. The sentences imposed include fines, probation, jail terms of varying lengths. The convictions most relevant to this matter are the last entries because they are for sexual offences. There are convictions for two counts of sexual assault in February 2007 and one conviction on May 27th, 2008 for an offence of indecent assault which was committed in 1975 when the accused was still a youth.

It is important for the purposes of the record to clarify something about the document that was filed by the Crown as Exhibit 2 on the sentencing hearing, that document having been filed as the accused's criminal record.

The document is not complete because it does not include the May 27th conviction for indecent assault. It is also somewhat misleading or, at

least confusing, about the nature of the sentence that was imposed in February 2007. On its face, it suggests that the accused received a jail term of three years on that date which of course raises questions about how he could have been at large in May of 2008. But when I inquired about this yesterday, I was advised that in fact he had been remand for some time before he was sentenced in February of 2007 so what he was sentenced to that day was 14 months in jail, having been given credit for 22 months because of his remand time. And this of course explains why he was at large in May 2008.

In deciding what a fit sentence is for this offence I must, as in all cases, consider the sentencing principles that are set out in the Criminal Code, the circumstances of the offence, and the accused's personal circumstances and background including his aboriginal background and any particular systemic problems that he faced which contributed to his coming into conflict with the law. And in this case, I must also give serious consideration to the fact that counsel have presented me with a joint submission.

They jointly submit that I should not impose any further jail term on the accused because of

1 the time that he has already spent on remand. They suggest that that time amounts to a fit sentence for this offence when the usual credit is given to him for the remand time.

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The type of crime that the accused committed in May 2008 is, sadly, a very prevalent crime in this jurisdiction. This Court has to deal with sentencings on cases of this sort at a frequency that is disturbing. These types of offences, and by this I mean taking advantage sexually of a person who is sleeping, are so prevalent in this jurisdiction that the phenomenon has been labeled by some as a veritable epidemic. Because of this, Courts emphasize the principles of general deterrence and denunciation when dealing with these cases.

In this case, it is apparent that personal deterrence is also an important factor because the accused's conduct on this occasion shows that his previous convictions and sentences for similar offences did not deter him from acting in this way again. I am told that he was released from the sentence imposed in February 2007 on December 6th, 2007. So he served ten months of that 14 month sentence and he had been at large for less than five months when he committed this sexual assault.

I must in this case, as I would in any other, take into account aggravating factors and mitigating factors that are present.

Dealing first with the aggravating factors,

I agree with the Crown that it is aggravating
that this offence occurred in the victim's home.

In an ideal world, a person should be and feel
safe wherever they are but even in our not so
ideal world, a person should be the safest when
they are within their own home. This should be
true whether a person has consumed alcohol or
not. A person sleeping in their own bed,
intoxicated or not, should not have to be
concerned about their personal and sexual
integrity being violated in this way.

I also agree with the Crown that it is aggravating that the accused had been invited to stay at the complainant's home and that this injects an element of breach of trust in this case. Like many things, there are different ranges of breaches of trust but the complainant let the accused stay at her home out of generosity. Presumably if she had not trusted him she would not have let him do so. Presumably she did not expect to have to fear him, otherwise she would not have let him stay there. And I note he was a relative of someone who was already

living in the house. The accused proved very unworthy of that trust and I do find that this is an aggravating feature this case.

I have considered the victim impact
statement that was prepared by the victim a short
time after this happened. The effect that this
offence had on her is explained in simple but
eloquent terms in that document. Her comments
are consistent with what we know to be generally
true about these types of crimes. Even sexual
assaults that do not involve the most serious of
physical violation have an impact on victims.
They rob them of their sense of security and of
their dignity.

This particular complainant, I am told, passed away from an illness in December 2008, and it is truly awful to think that, in addition to coping with her illness in those last months of her life, she and her family also had to cope with the impact that this crime had on her.

I have to take into account mitigating factors.

The accused has pleaded guilty and that is to his credit. Guilty pleas are traditionally considered mitigating because they spare witnesses, and in particular victims of crime, from having to testify in a public courtroom

about difficult matters. They are considered mitigating because they avoid the costs and time of a trial . And they are considered mitigating because they indicate remorse on the part of the offender.

The first factor does not apply here. The victim of this crime was not spared anything by this guilty plea. She had to testify at the preliminary hearing and talk about this, and was subjected to cross-examination. As I have already alluded to, she spent her last living months with the uncertainty about what might happen on this case so she was spared nothing.

The guilty plea did avoid the need for a jury trial and saved resources; and the guilty plea does demonstrate a willingness by the accused to take responsibility for what he did. And this, I agree with counsel, takes on a special connotation in this case because the complainant's passing created additional challenges for the Crown in proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Even if the application to use the preliminary hearing evidence had been successful, the trier of fact, in this case a jury, would not have had the benefit of seeing and hearing the witness recounting the events and this may well have had

an impact on the weight that they would have been prepared to give to that the evidence. So I accept that the fact that the accused has pleaded guilty, knowing of those potential challenges in the Crown's case, is something that must be acknowledged and he should be given credit for that.

I also acknowledge and recognize that by pleading guilty the accused has removed the uncertainty of outcome that is always present when a matter goes to trial and may have been more prevalent in the circumstances of this case. And although that submission was not specifically made to me, I imagine that for the complainant's surviving family it must have removed some anxiety about the outcome of this whole matter and may help to bring some closure for them.

The next issue that I must consider is the credit to be given for the time that the accused spent on remand. The accused is entitled to be given credit for the time that he has spent on remand. Counsel submit to me that that credit should be given to him on a ratio of two for one. Credit given to remand time is in the Court's discretion. Various factors have an impact on how discretion should be exercised and I want to comment here briefly on the submissions that were

made with respect to that aspect of the case.

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First, I disagree with the suggestion that the accused's consent to remaining in custody should increase or have any impact on the credit that he is to be given for the time that he has spent on remand. The jurisprudence is fairly clear that the rationale for giving credit for remand time on more than one-for-one ratio is based on a recognition that prisoners on remand do not earn remission and also to account for the fact that in some jurisdictions and in some facilities the detention conditions for remand prisoners are harsher than those experienced by serving prisoners. This includes things like overcrowding, having access to only a limited portion of the facility, and the lack of access to the programs. I simply do not see how the fact that a person has consented to their remand should weigh in the balance.

In this particular case, with the accused's record - his related convictions and recent convictions for similar matters and his numerous convictions for breaches of court orders - the fact that he did not try to get bail, in my view, simply reflect the fact that he and his counsel were realistic about the prospects of being successful in obtaining bail.

The issue of his access to programs is one where I must say I found the information provided to the Court less than satisfactory. There is a contradiction about whether, for example, he would have been able to have access to AA. Both he and his counsel presented the Court with a submission that he could not. The Crown said that the AA program is available inside the facility to serving prisoners as well as to prisoners on remand. And then there is the question of the availability of other programs to prisoners who are on remand.

I am disturbed by this and comment on it because, as I said yesterday, I have recently heard in another case, the case of R. v. Avadluk which proceeded in Hay River about five or six weeks ago, very detailed submissions about the access to programming for remand prisoners at the Yellowknife correctional facility. What I was told in that case was that, with the exception of programs that are offered outside the facility, remand prisoners have access to all of the same programs as serving prisoners although serving prisoners are sometimes given priority which may mean that a remand prisoner may apply for something and not be accepted into the program. So some of the things that I heard in that case

seem inconsistent with some of the submissions I heard in this case.

I make mention of this because the issue of what programs are or are not accessible is an important one and needs to be presented to the Court, especially in a case where a person has spent a significant period of time on remand. This Court gets told on a regular basis that in this jurisdiction, at least at the North Slave Correctional Centre, there is very very little difference in the detention conditions that remand prisoners face versus the detention conditions that serving prisoners face. So if there are disagreements about the facts surrounding things like accessibility to programs and things that the parties are not agreed on, then the Court is left in the dark. It must be remembered that two-for-one credit for remand time is not in law automatic, at least not in this jurisdiction. There are several examples of cases where credit is given on a different ratio for a variety of reasons. So it is crucial for the Court to have the necessary information about this, so it can exercise its discretion on this point in a principled and consistent way. In future cases the Court might be inclined to have evidence presented on its own motion to resolve

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the types of inconsistencies and contradictions
that emerged in this type of hearing because
surely there is someone who knows the answer to
that question, someone from the correctional
facility who can say authoritatively what the
situation is in that facility.

All that being said, it's clear that the accused is entitled to credit for the time that he has spent on remand. It is also clear that it is often the case that credit is granted on a two-for-one ratio and I suppose in an instance where the information is not conclusive one way or another, the accused is entitled to the interpretation that is more favourable to him. So notwithstanding what I have said, and despite the fact that I really would have preferred to have more information to base this decision on, I am prepared to accept that he should be given credit on a two-for-one ratio for the 14 months that he has spent on remand.

As I said at the outset, I must also take into account the accused's personal circumstances. His counsel explained that the accused was removed from contact with his family at a young age, first by being placed in receiving homes and later being sent to residential schools. Counsel seemed to suggest

that I might infer from this and from the accused's conduct that he was abused in those facilities. I do not think that it is appropriate for me to speculate or infer that he was the victim of abuse. But I certainly do accept that being cut off from his family had an negative impact on him and contributed to his subsequent problems.

His record demonstrates that he has struggled his whole life and constantly has been in and out of court and in and out of jail. It is difficult to assess what, if anything, this Court could do as part of a sentencing to assist the accused with his own rehabilitation. He is already on probation arising from his last conviction and he will be on probation for some time. So even though there is no resident probation officer in the community of Jean Marie River, where the accused proposes to go back when he is released, one can only hope that Probation Services will be able to, despite these challenges, to meaningfully supervise him and assist him in accessing the programs and support systems that he needs to remain out of trouble.

The Court has serious concerns about the protection of the public in this case. It should be, and should have been for some time, very

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1	clear to the accused that the consumption of
2	alcohol is something that gets him into trouble.
3	I am not convinced that it can be said that his
4	problem is an alcohol problem because, as I
5	commented on yesterday, a lot of people get
6	intoxicated and do not commit crimes and do not
7	commit sexual crimes. But it is clear that the
8	consumption of liquor is one ingredient that
9	leads this one particular individual into
10	trouble. And despite this, only a few months
11	after being released from his last sentence he
12	made the choice to consume alcohol and committed
13	this further sexual assault. Even though there
14	was no penetration in this case, in my view it
15	was still a serious assault perpetrated on a
16	somewhat elderly woman in her own home and
17	someone who was in a particularly vulnerable
18	position. So, although I have no doubt that the
19	accused's intentions to try to grapple with his
20	issues are sincerely held, I have significant
21	concerns about whether he will hold true to those
22	intentions. But I also bear in mind that it is
23	inappropriate and unfair to overemphasize a
24	criminal record at a sentencing hearing. A
25	person should not be punished over and over again
26	for the same crimes by the record being
27	overemphasized. I am also mindful that I have to

give due weight to the principle of

proportionality and to the principles of parity,

that sentences imposed for similar crimes

committed by similar offenders should be similar.

And I must also, as I have already said, take

into account that I have been presented in this

case with a joint submission.

Sentencing is ultimately the responsibility of the sentencing Judge but a joint submission is deserving of serious consideration by the Court and unless it is unreasonable, it should be followed.

The Crown has said that a sentence of two years less a day would be appropriate in the circumstances and this is why, with the credit given to the remand time, they are in agreement with defence that no further jail term is imposed. In my view that is a position that is quite generous to the accused in all circumstances, particularly the very recent related conviction and the very short amount of time that the accused was at large before he got himself intoxicated and committed this further offence. On the other hand, I recognize that the complainant's passing puts the accused's guilty plea in a unique context as I have already said. So upon careful reflection, although I find that

1 the joint submission is very much on the lenient 2 side, I cannot say that it is out of range or completely unreasonable so I will accept it. I 4 am not going to put the accused on probation 5 because he is already on probation. But more importantly, at this point in his life what 6 happens from now on is really up to him. I am confident that Probation Services will do 8 9 everything that they can to assist him in his 10 struggles and dealing with his issues and on the 11 path that he wants to be on from this point on. 12 I am sure Probation Services will do their best 13 to help him and I hope that the accused makes as 14 much use of their help, supervision, and support as he can. But I am also certain that 15 16 Mr. Beaulieu has heard many lectures from many 17 Judges and many probation officers, many case management officers in jails, and he doesn't need 18 19 another lecture from me. What happens in his life from this point on is really really up to 20 21 him.

So Mr. Beaulieu, please stand.

Mr. Beaulieu, you have heard what I have said. I have given this matter a lot of thought and I have decided to agree with what the lawyers have suggested. I am sure they have put a lot of thought into their position. I am sure they have

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- 1 considered everything and have really considered 2 all sorts of things that maybe I do not know. So for that reason, although, you have heard me, I 4 think you are getting a sentence that is at the 5 very very low end of what could have happened in this case, I am not going to impose any further 6 jail on you today. I am going to sentence you to one day in jail but that will be considered 8 9 served by your attendance here today. So after we are done here today, you will be free to go 10 11 and I really hope that you will be able to come 12 to terms with the things that you need to come to 13 terms with and that I or any other Judge will not see you again. 14 All right, you can sit down. 15 16 THE ACCUSED: Yes. 17 THE COURT: I am also going to make an order that any exhibits that are still in the 18 19 possession of the RCMP will, if appropriate, be returned to their lawful owners otherwise they 20 21 are to be destroyed at the expiration of the
- 23 And finally there is a number of other
  24 orders, Mr. Beaulieu, that I am going to make.
  25 So, first, is an order, a DNA order pursuant
  26 to Section 487.051(2) of the Criminal Code.

appeal period.

27 Sexual assault is a primary designated offence

1 that is included at paragraph a.1 of 2 Section 487.04 but I have not heard any submissions suggesting that that order should not 4 be made so I am making that order. Madam Clerk will explain to you these things when we are done 6 here. Also, because of the type of charge this is, it is mandatory that I make an order prohibiting 8 9 you from possessing firearms and other items. 10 Because an order like that was already made, the 11 Criminal Code says that on a subsequent conviction that order would be for life except, 12 Ms. Nguyen, I was looking at it this morning and 13 as is the case for, by analogy drinking and 14 driving offences, there is no notice of intention 15 16 to seek greater punishment in this case. 17 MS. NGUYEN: Yes, the accused hasn't been served with that so the firearms order should be 18 19 treated as if this were a first order. 20 THE COURT: So it will be for ten years 21 after today. Normally it is ten years after a person is released but you will be released today 22 so that will be ten years. 23 24 There will also be an order that you have to 25 register, you have already been subjected to an

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order like this but there will be another one, to

the Sexual Offender Information Registration Act,

which essentially means that you have to provide certain information to the registry and keep them aware of your address and things of that sort.

And the order, I am sure your lawyer can help you in understanding what your obligations are.

Because you are already subject to an order like this, it is automatic that this order be applicable for life so that will be an order pursuant to 490.013(4) of the Criminal Code.

And finally, pursuant to Section 737 of the Criminal Code, on an indictable matter the Court is to impose on you payment of what is called a Victim of Crime surcharge. It is \$100. That money goes into a fund that is designed to assist victims with various things. I have heard your counsel explain that when you have not been in jail you have been able to work, that you are going back to Jean Marie River and that you expect to have employment, and for that reason I don't see any reason why I should not make the order that you pay the surcharge. But I am going to give you two months to pay it to give you a chance to go home and start working and get yourself organized again.

- 25 THE ACCUSED: Okay.
- 26 THE COURT: Have I overlooked anything?
- 27 MS. NGUYEN: Nothing, Your Honour.

- 1 THE COURT: Mr. Fix, have I overlooked
- 2 anything?
- 3 MR. FIX: No, My Lady -- I apologize,
- 4 Your Honour. Just two things, firstly, I
- 5 apologize for not having better information with
- 6 respect to the programs available to him. I
- 7 didn't know it was in a state of flux. Secondly,
- 8 the Court made a comment yesterday with respect
- 9 to my having an agent here for his appearance and
- 10 I just wish to address that just briefly because
- I had made arrangements for that appearance
- 12 yesterday through court administration and I was
- 13 advised --
- 14 THE COURT: -- yesterday you mean?
- 15 MR. FIX: Yesterday's appearance I had
- made previously.
- 17 THE COURT: I was talking about Tuesday.
- 18 MR. FIX: Yes, and I wish to address
- 19 that, because Tuesday I was first of all told
- 20 that -- given information that the appearance was
- 21 to be for Monday but Monday was a holiday so it
- 22 was directed for Tuesday. When I contacted court
- 23 administration to say that, you know, we might as
- 24 well only do this once, I can be here, like when
- 25 can I be here to do this. So it was arranged for
- Thursday afternoon. I was told at the time, and
- 27 I am not particularly used to removal orders, but

- 1 that the removal order for Tuesday had been
- 2 directed by the Court. I was asked, or I asked
- 3 if the Court would direct then a removal order
- for Thursday. I was told that would not happen,
- 5 that the removal order for Tuesday would be
- 6 cancelled and that he would not appear and I was
- 7 to generate a removal order for Thursday. So on
- 8 that information I didn't retain an agent, I was
- 9 on the understanding that he wouldn't appear on
- 10 Tuesday. So it is not a case of me neglecting to
- 11 hire an agent, I was operating under obviously
- misinformation but information that he would not
- 13 attend. It is not my practice to have my clients
- 14 appear in court alone.
- 15 THE COURT: The Court was told on Tuesday
- 16 that they were expecting you to have an agent
- 17 which fed into, that's what I was told on
- 18 Tuesday.
- 19 MR. FIX: My apologies.
- 20 THE COURT: That's not the main item, it's
- 21 really a side issue I think. The matter got
- dealt with and that's what matters but thank you
- for clarifying that.
- 24 MR. FIX: My apologies, because there
- 25 was -- I understood that I needed an agent for
- the other matter.
- THE COURT: The other matter?

1 MR. FIX: The matter that's in Territorial Court this morning, to get it directed there, so I apologize for any miscommunication and certainly for not having an agent here for my client. THE COURT: Thank you for clarifying. 6 Anything further? MR. FIX: No, thank you. MS. NGUYEN: There is one other thing, Your 10 Honour. Mr. Beaulieu is on probation. The 11 probation officer has indicated she would want him to report to her immediately. So if he could 12 13 be directed to do that. There is currently no direction under the probation order for a 14 particular date for him to report under that. 15 16 THE COURT: Well the problem of course is 17 that probation order is on another file in another court, the Youth Court even, and I am not 18 19 placing him on probation so I am not able to do that. But let's put it this way, Mr. Beaulieu. 20 21 Technically, I have sentenced you to one day which is served so technically I don't really 22 have jurisdiction to order you to do anything. 23 24 But there is a probation officer here, it's in 25 your interests to be in touch with them so they 26 can try to assist you. So although I am not

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going to order you to report to her, and you may

1	want to talk to Mr. Fix about this, but
2	especially if you are planning on leaving, I
3	would strongly suggest that you touch base with
4	her before you go if only to sort out how this is
5	all going to work for your meetings, your
6	appointments, the programs that you might want to
7	try to take. It is not an order. You have heard
8	the Crown, the probation officer is sitting right
9	there, and the overall objective of all of these
10	people is to try to help you. So in the spirit
11	of you helping yourself, I leave it with you to
12	make your choice there. The first choice that
13	you have to make after the end of these
14	proceedings is whether you will or not.
15	So on that note, counsel, thank you, I have
16	kept you further than 9:30 but you can tell
17	whoever who is presiding over in Territorial
18	Court that it is my fault.
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21	Certified correct to the best
22	of my skill and ability,
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26	Lois Hewitt, CSR(A), RPR, CRR
27	Court Reporter