R. v. Ovayuak, 2009 NWTSC 24 S-1-CR-2008-000058

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

IN THE MATTER OF:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

- v -

KELLY OVAYUAK

Transcript of Ruling (re Scopelliti application) delivered by The Honourable Justice J.E. Richard, in Tuktoyaktuk, in the Northwest Territories, on the 20th day of April, 2009.

## APPEARANCES:

Ms. S. Tkatch: Counsel on behalf of the Crown

Ms. M. Nassar:

Ms. C. Wawzonek: Counsel on behalf of the Accused

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Charge under s. 268 C.C.

1	THE	COURT:			I	will	now	give	the	Court's
2		ruling	on	the	Scopeli	liti	appli	icatio	on.	

In this jury trial the accused is charged with the crime of aggravated assault. There was a fight between the accused and Andrew Gruben after a drinking party. Andrew Gruben suffered a serious spinal cord injury. He is rendered a quadriplegic, is confined permanently to a long term care facility, and is not a witness at this trial.

Crown witnesses testified that the accused was the aggressor in the fight. The accused has testified that Andrew Gruben was the aggressor and that he, the accused, only acted in self-defence.

Assessing the credibility of the witnesses will be an important function for this community jury, in particular the lay Crown witnesses Jed Stefure and Warren Steen and of course the accused.

In the course of his testimony, the accused stated that he was scared of Andrew Gruben, and, when asked why, he stated that it was because Andrew Gruben had assaulted him on two previous occasions and he related particulars of those two previous assaults.

On the present application, the accused

seeks to adduce evidence of Andrew Gruben's criminal record, Exhibit A on this voir dire.

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Defence counsel relies on the Scopelliti
line of cases. These cases, which are generally
homicide cases, hold that where self-defence is
raised, evidence of the deceased person's
propensity or disposition for violence may be
admissible for the purpose of showing the
probability of the deceased person having been
the aggressor and to support the accused's
testimony that he was attacked by the deceased.

It is for the trial judge to exercise discretion in determining whether the proposed evidence has sufficient probative value for the purpose for which it is tendered, balanced against the risk of prejudice in the sense that such evidence could cause within some jurors, feelings of hostility towards the deceased and/or cause jurors to go down a path towards a "just deserts" kind of reasoning.

The Crown opposes the admissibility of
Andrew Gruben's criminal record, submitting that
that record does not have sufficient probative
value to justify its admission. In addition, the
Crown submits that if Andrew Gruben's criminal
record is admitted, then in order that the jury
not have a distorted picture of the propensity

for violence of each of the fight participants and the probability of each version of aggression, that the court will have to also admit as evidence the accused's criminal record, which is marked as Exhibit B on this voir dire.

In the present case, there is eye witness evidence of the fight between the accused and Andrew Gruben. Crown witnesses Jed Stefure and Warren Steen stated that the accused was the aggressor. The accused testified that Andrew Gruben was the aggressor. Each of these three witnesses was examined and cross-examined at length in the presence of the jury. The focus for the jury will be their assessment of the credibility of those three witnesses.

In exercising my discretion on the present application, I ask myself: Is there something in the proposed evidence Exhibit A which may reasonably assist the jury in arriving at a just determination with respect to the accused's claim of self-defence? Although Exhibit A discloses ten convictions for assaultive behaviour, there are no details for any of those, for example, whether any of those assaults were provoked, were unprovoked, were acts of aggression, were acts of excessive force in self-defence, et cetera.

I contrast this with the evidence which was

1	ruled admissible in the Scopelliti case itself.
2	The trial judge allowed the defence to adduce
3	detailed evidence of three previous incidents of
4	violence committed by the deceased, and in
5	upholding that ruling the Ontario Court of Appeal
6	stated at paragraph 48:
7	the impugned evidence discloses

serious acts of unprovoked violence and intimidation by both the deceased, acting together, on three occasions which were reasonably proximate in time to the occurrence in question, and, in my view, such evidence had significant probative value on the issue whether the deceased attacked the respondent in the manner that he alleged on the occasion in question.

I cannot say the same in the present case. We do have the accused's evidence, his version, of the fight incident of December 15th, 2007, in which he says Andrew Gruben initially assaulted him. However, it cannot be said that any one or more of the bare line entries in Exhibit A has any probative value on the issue whether Andrew Gruben assaulted the accused on December 15th, 2007, in the manner that the accused alleges in

his testimony. Any theoretical probative value
that evidence of Andrew Gruben's history of
criminal acts of violence might have, if any, for
the purpose intended here, is certainly
diminished by the absence of detail of the
circumstances of those previous acts.

I find that introduction of Andrew Gruben's criminal record will not assist this jury in assessing the accused's claim of self-defence. Indeed, it would be an improper submission, in my view, to the trier of fact that because Andrew Gruben has this criminal record he is more likely to have been the aggressor in the early morning hours of December 15th, 2007, or that the existence of Andrew Gruben's criminal record is supportive of the accused's testimony that he was acting in self-defence. However, there is a clear danger that the introduction of Andrew Gruben's criminal record will distract this jury from their important task of assessing the credibility of the witnesses who testified viva voce before the jury at this trial, eye witnesses, including the accused, who related under oath what they saw, what they heard, what they did, et cetera.

There is a general rule that evidence of the bad character of the victim of a crime is

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inadmissible and the reason is that such evidence
is not relevant to the issue of whether the
accused person committed the crime. The
Scopelliti line of cases sets out an exception to
that general rule.

For the reasons I have mentioned, I find that the Scopelliti exception is not applicable in this case. The proposed evidence has little or no probative value for the purpose intended and there is a risk of prejudice, that is, a significant risk that the jurors will make improper use of this evidence. Accordingly, I exercise my discretion to exclude the evidence of Andrew Gruben's criminal record.

Given this ruling, it is not necessary to give a decision on the Crown's alternate or reactive application to adduce the accused's criminal record, Exhibit B. I will simply note that had that happened, i.e. that both criminal records were before the jury, the jurors would then be in a very difficult position of considering opposing submissions of whether one person's ten convictions for assault versus the other person's ten convictions for assault was more supportive or persuasive regarding the competing versions of aggression in the early morning hours of December 15th, 2007. Such a

1	scenario would even more so and without doubt
2	clearly distract the jurors from their main task
3	of assessing the credibility and/or reliability
4	of the eye witness testimony presented to them at
5	this trial.
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8	Certified to be a true and
9	accurate transcript pursuant to Rule 723 and 724 of the
10	Supreme Court Rules of Court.
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12	Annette Wright, RPR, CSR(A)
13	Court Reporter
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