R. v. Morgan, 2007 NWTSC 30 S-1-CR-2006000084

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

IN THE MATTER OF:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

- and -

DELROY NICHOLAS MORGAN

Transcript of the Oral Reasons for Sentence delivered by the Honourable Justice L.A.M. Charbonneau, sitting at Yellowknife, in the Northwest Territories, on April 13th, A.D. 2007.

APPEARANCES:

Ms. M. McGuire: Counsel for the Crown

Ms. D. Keats:

Ms. P. Taylor: Counsel for the Accused

(Charge under s. 268 Criminal Code)

1	THE	COURT: Delroy Morgan was convicted
2		after trial on a charge that on July 21st, 2006,
3		here in Yellowknife, he committed an aggravated
4		assault on N.D. by wounding him. In
5		my Reasons for Judgment convicting Mr. Morgan I
6		referred at some length to the evidence adduced
7		at the trial. I won't refer to it in as much
8		detail for the purposes of these Reasons for
9		Sentence, but I will summarize the general
LO		circumstances of the commission of this offence.
L1		This unfortunate incident took place last
L2		summer in the early morning hours in an area
L3		outside the Ravens' Pub, which is a drinking
L 4		establishment in Yellowknife. Near closing time
L5		the lights in the pub had gone out and customers
L 6		had started being ushered out of the bar. A
L7		large number of people found themselves in the
L8		parking lot area that is between the Ravens' Pub
L 9		and the Corner Mart.
20		A verbal argument erupted between two groups
21		of people. It seems, from the evidence, that
22		this argument involved one group of Yellowknife
23		residents and one group of Edmonton residents.
24		This verbal argument eventually escalated to a

The evidence adduced at trial did not paint an entirely clear picture of all of the details

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physical fight.

of what happened during that fight. That is not surprising. Most of the witnesses who described what they saw had consumed alcohol, things happened in a short time frame and the whole situation appears to have been quite chaotic. As a result, there are some aspects of exactly what transpired that were not, in my estimation, established all that clearly.

What is clear is that Mr. D. had not yet exited the bar when the fight broke out, but when one of his friends came back inside bleeding from the face Mr. D. ran out and started fighting with people. He was described by one of the witnesses as very angry. It is clear he made the decision to become involved in the "action", for lack of a better word, that had erupted in the parking area between the Raven Pub and the Corner Mart.

Mr. D. first fought with Jeffrey

Morris, a friend of Mr. Morgan's. He punched him

and eventually threw him to the ground. Right

after this something caused him to turn around

and Mr. D. saw Mr. Morgan in front of

him. They started fighting and wrestling.

I concluded at the end of the trial that the Crown had established beyond a reasonable doubt that during the course of that fight Mr. Morgan

1	caused the two wounds to the back of Mr.
2	D.'s head. The trial evidence left me
3	with a reasonable doubt about how other wounds
4	suffered by Mr. D. were inflicted and,
5	more importantly, by whom.
6	There was also evidence adduced at the trial

from which I drew the inference that a short time before his altercation with Mr. D. Mr.

Morgan was involved in another altercation. A witness called by the defence describes seeing a person, who I found to be Mr. Morgan, being assaulted by two others. She observed this from being parked across the street near the Reddi Mart. There is no evidence about how that situation ended or how Mr. Morgan found himself facing Mr. D. closer to the back of the Corner Mart sometime after.

Over the years, this Court has dealt with a number of cases involving deaths resulting from wounds inflicted during the course of a physical fight between intoxicated people. It is a matter of pure luck that the injuries to Mr. D. were not more serious and were not fatal. The consequences for Mr. Morgan today, obviously, would have been much more significant if that had been the case. So although I am sure it may sound odd to both Mr. D. and Mr. Morgan

to hear me say that they were lucky in this

event, the fact is that they are both very

fortunate that this did not lead to much more

tragic results.

I take it from the comments Mr. Morgan made when he addressed the Court this morning that he realizes the seriousness of this event and that it could have led to far worse consequences.

Sentencing is never an easy process, because it requires balancing a number of factors, and those factors sometimes point in different directions. The principles of sentencing are set out in the Criminal Code, in particular at section 718, 718.1 and 718.2. I am not going to refer to each and every one of these principles or quote from the sections, but I have considered all of them.

There was evidence that the argument that led to this series of fights was an argument about whether Edmonton is better than Yellowknife or whether Yellowknife is better than Edmonton.

If that was all that led to all of this, it can only leave a person shaking their head in dismay. But the Court often hears about those kinds of events, often times in circumstances where people are under the influence of alcohol or other substances, and, unfortunately, I am sure this

case will not be the last one where the Court has
to deal with events such as the ones that
happened last July.

In fact, a number of the cases filed by the Crown show other examples from this jurisdiction and from elsewhere where people have been seriously injured in fights that started over nothing or over things that are entirely silly or stupid.

I was struck by the comment of one of the witnesses during the trial who, in describing the events of that night, said something along the lines that this was, quote, "Just a typical night, a bunch of people fighting in a group," unquote. I say quote, but they may have been just words to that effect.

If this type of brawl is considered or described as typical of bar closing time, it speaks volumes about how far we still have to go as a supposedly civilized society. That kind of senseless violence must be deterred and denounced firmly by the courts. Sending the message that this conduct will not be tolerated by society and will be met with a meaningful response is an important sentencing objective. Discouraging Mr. Morgan himself, but also others, from engaging in this kind of senseless behaviour is an important

1 sentencing objective.

Rehabilitation can never be overlooked in a sentencing. If a sentence can contribute to help a person in their rehabilitation, help them become law-abiding and productive, then obviously that serves the interests of the offender, but it serves the interests of society as a whole.

Mr. Morgan is still a very young man. He is in his early 20s. So his rehabilitation is a factor that must be taken into account. But in a case with this level of seriousness, rehabilitation does take second place to other sentencing objectives that I have referred to, and the law on that is clear.

During counsels' submissions this morning, I heard two very different characterizations of the offence committed by Mr. Morgan and different submissions about his level of blameworthiness for that offence. Crown counsel has described this as an unprovoked attack on an unarmed man. By contrast, defence counsel has asked me to draw inferences that Mr. Morgan's level of blameworthiness for this offence is at the lower end of the spectrum.

Strictly speaking, the Crown is not entirely wrong. Mr. D. was not involved in any altercation with Mr. Morgan before this happened,

1	he did not provoke him and he was unarmed. But,
2	with respect, I find that the characterization
3	does not do justice to the full context of how
4	this altercation came to be.

Mr. D. chose to go outside the bar and get himself involved in this fight. No one had attacked him. He decided, as I said already, to jump into the action, as it were. He was far from an innocent bystander. He was quite willing and able to engage in physical altercations, and when he turned and found himself facing Mr.

Morgan, on my understanding of the evidence, they both engaged into this fight.

I am not convinced the evidence was all that clear that Mr. Morgan immediately wounded Mr.

D. to the back of the head. The fight moved some distance before they were both against that fence behind the Raven Pub, and my recollection of the evidence is that Mr.

D. was not that clear as to when he felt himself being stabbed in the back of the head.

He was very clear that it was during his fight with Mr. Morgan, but I did not understand his evidence to be clear that it was right at the beginning of their altercation. So I do have a

bit of a problem with how the Crown has

characterized things.

1	I also have a bit of a problem with how
2	defence characterized Mr. Morgan's level of
3	blameworthiness. Whether Mr. Morgan was
4	intervening in the fight between Mr. D.
5	and Jeffrey Morris really does not matter all
6	that much. Mr. Morgan was not an innocent
7	bystander either. He had been in another fight,
8	one where it seems at least for a time he was
9	outnumbered. But somehow, when that altercation
10	ended, rather than leaving the area or staying
11	out of any further fighting, somehow Mr. Morgan
12	got himself to the area near the back of the
13	Corner Mart and chose to essentially confront Mr
14	D
15	The evidence, as I understand it - and on
16	this there really only is Mr. D.'s
17	evidence - was that they started fighting pretty
18	much right after Mr. D. turned around.
19	Mr. D. testified that he put his hand on
20	Mr. Morgan's shoulder. He admitted that he was
21	trying to get a good swing at him. But he also
22	said this was a physical fight; they were both
23	using their strength.
24	So I do not agree that the inference can be
25	drawn that Mr. Morgan's actions were more
26	defensive than aggressive. In my view, the most
27	significant element of blameworthiness in this

case quite simply is the introduction of a weapon
in what was otherwise a fist fight.

Fist fights are not a good thing, but the introduction of a weapon in what is otherwise a fist fight is a very, very serious thing.

Whatever was used to cause these wounds, Mr.

Morgan had to have it on him at the start of that altercation with Mr. D.. He chose to use it and he chose to use it more than once. He used it on Mr. D.'s head. That is very serious conduct, and, in my view, even when looked at in consideration of the overall context of these events, it remains very serious.

The introduction of a weapon in a fight escalates things to a considerable degree. The risk of serious and potential lethal injury rises dramatically when a weapon is introduced and so does the level of blameworthiness of the person who chooses to introduce it.

Defence counsel has asked that I take into account the nature of the wounds in examining the blameworthiness of Mr. Morgan for this offence.

Clearly, the injuries could have been more serious. I am not certain how much credit Mr.

Morgan can receive for that, though. He did wound Mr. D. in the head. As I have already mentioned, the fact the injury was not

much more serious is at least in part a matter of

pure luck. But I recognize, as I have said, that

the injuries could have been more serious and

that Mr. Morgan must be sentenced for what he

actually did and not for the various things that

might or could have happened.

In reviewing the other factors, more specifically the aggravating factors on this case, I have considered the fact that Mr. Morgan has a criminal record, which was filed as an exhibit. It does not include convictions for crimes against persons, except for a dated Youth Court conviction. So it is of limited relevance to this hearing, as Crown counsel fairly mentioned, but the existence of that record means Mr. Morgan does not get the benefit or mitigating impact of coming before the Court as a first offender. I do note that he has never before been sentenced to a jail term.

The second aggravating factor is the fact that Mr. Morgan was on a recognizance at the time of this event. A copy of the recognizance was also filed as an exhibit. It shows that Mr. Morgan was on release on charges of assault with a weapon, assault causing bodily harm and mischief.

The fact that someone is out on bail when

they commit a crime is an aggravating factor.

That principle has been recognized in many cases,

including those included in the Crown's book of

authorities on that issue; cases such as

R. v. Lau and R. v. Mircha and other cases. So

it is another aggravating factor in this case.

Turning to mitigating factors, there is very little by way of mitigation in this case.

Clearly, Mr. Morgan is entitled to be credited for the time he has spent in pre-trial custody.

He has been in custody since a few days after the incident, which works out to be just under nine months.

A sentencing Judge has discretion to decide how much credit should be given for time spent on remand. Defence counsel has asked that more credit than the usual two-for-one ratio be given in this case because Mr. Morgan did not have access to schooling while he was on remand because of the status he was under. I have considered this argument, but in my view this is not a case where Mr. Morgan should receive any more than the usual credit for his remand time.

Mr. Morgan spoke when he was given an opportunity to do so and said he apologized to Mr. D. for this event. He said he wished Mr. D. was here so he could look him in

the eye and apologize to him. He said no one

should have to go through what Mr. D.

went through. Mr. Morgan is right about that. I

accept that he is sincere in his apology and that

he realizes the seriousness of what he has done,

even though he may still have some difficulty

accepting that he, in fact, did it.

Crown counsel has filed a number of cases from this jurisdiction and others to assist the Court with arriving at a fit sentence in this case. Of course, no two cases are the same.

That is one of the challenges of sentencing.

There are many variables to each case and rarely do the circumstances of one case match perfectly the circumstances of another case. But I have reviewed the ones that were filed and I have taken into consideration the principles that were applied in those cases. I have reviewed the cases from this jurisdiction, R. v. Itsi, R. v. Green, R. v. Gruben and R. v. Gonzales, and I have also considered the other cases that were included in the Crown's book of authorities.

I have given some consideration to the

MacLeod case that was filed by defence counsel

where a six-month sentence was imposed in a

stabbing case. I must say I find the

circumstances of that case very distinguishable

from the situation here. The incident in that case happened after the victim and another person went, uninvited, inside the house where the accused and the home owner were sleeping. The stabbing occurred while the victim was in the process of assaulting the owner of the home. The fact that the eventual victim had basically broken and entered a dwelling-house at night surely must have played a significant part in the ultimate sentence imposed in that case.

The Crown's position is that an appropriate sentence for this offence is between four and five years and that I should deduct from this the credit to be given for the remand time. That would result in a further sentence between two and a half years and three and a half years.

Defence counsel has asked me to consider a much lower range of 18 months to two years less a day minus credit to be given for the remand time. This would translate, at the low end, to a sentence of time served or, at the high end, to a sentence of a further six months' imprisonment. In my respectful view, that range falls far short of what is required to reflect the seriousness of this offence and address the other sentencing principles I must address.

In my view, and bearing in mind that each

case must always be examined on its own specific facts, the general range that emerges from the case law for crimes of this nature is between 30 months and five years.

In arriving at a fit sentence in this case, the challenge is to impose a sentence that will send the appropriate denunciatory message about this kind of conduct, while not crushing an offender who is still a young man and who, I accept from the e-mail from his father and brother which has been filed, continues to have the support of his family.

After much consideration, I am not satisfied that the imposition of a sentence as high as what the Crown seeks is necessary to achieve the purposes of sentencing. However, even exercising some leniency, even taking into account Mr.

Morgan's youth, the fact that this will be the first time he is sentenced to jail and the fact that a Court should never sentence a person to more time than is needed to address sentencing principles, it is my duty to impose a sentence of some significance to him today.

Mr. Morgan, please stand. Mr. Morgan, I have concluded that a fit sentence for the crime that you have committed, if you had not spent any time in pre-trial custody, would have been a

sentence of three and a half years. So because

of the time you have spent on remand, which I

give you credit for, I am sentencing you today to

a further term of imprisonment of two years. You

may sit.

I am required by law, as this is a primary designated offence and no submissions have been made otherwise, to issue a DNA order, and I will issue such an order.

I am also going to make a firearms prohibition order pursuant to section 109 of the Criminal Code, which is to expire 10 years after Mr. Morgan's release. Any firearms that Mr. Morgan owns will have to be surrendered, I am going to say, within 14 days. The situation is that he is here and whatever he owns would be somewhere else, if there is anything, so he will have some time to make arrangements.

Given the fact that I am imposing today a jail term of some significance, I will not make an order for payment of the victims of crime surcharge, as, in my estimation, that would create a hardship.

Finally, I will make an order for the return of the exhibits. Ms. McGuire, I am inclined to say to the RCMP at the expiration of the appeal period, unless you have another suggestion

1	MS.	McGUIRE:	No, that's fine. Thank you.
2	THE	COURT:	Okay. So at the expiration of
3		the appeal period.	
4		Have I overlo	oked anything from the
5		perspective of the	Crown?
6	MS.	McGUIRE:	No. Thank you.
7	THE	COURT:	Have I overlooked anything
8		from the perspecti	ve of the defence?
9	MS.	TAYLOR:	Nothing, Your Honour.
10	THE	COURT:	All right. I want to thank
11		both counsel for t	heir submissions.
12		Mr. Morgan, I	hope that after you have
13		finished serving y	our sentence you will be able
14		to follow through	on what you said this morning
15		and that we and ot	her courts will not see you
16		again.	
17		We will close	court.
18			
19			
20			
21			Certified to be a true and accurate transcript pursuant
22			to Rules 723 and 724 of the Supreme Court Rules.
23			•
24			
25			Jill MacDonald, CSR(A), RPR
26			Court Reporter
27			

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