R. v. Mehari, 2006 NWTSC 21

S-1-CR2005000098

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

IN THE MATTER OF:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

- vs. -

SEMERE MEHARI

Transcript of a Ruling by The Honourable Justice J.Z.

Vertes, at Yellowknife in the Northwest Territories, on

March 21st A.D., 2006.

APPEARANCES:

Ms. S. Smallwood: Counsel for the Crown

Ms. M. Nightingale: Counsel for the Accused

Charge under s. 354(1)(a) Criminal Code of Canada Charge under s. 5(2) Controlled Drugs and Substances Act

An order has been made temporarily prohibiting the publication in a newspaper or broadcast of the information contained herein pursuant to Section 648 of the Criminal Code

BAN ON PUBLICATION OF COMPLAINANT/WITNESS PURSUANT TO SECTION 486 OF THE CRIMINAL CODE

THE COURT: These are my reasons on the

defence application for further and better

disclosure. Because the application is resisted

in part on the basis of a lack of relevance to

the issues of this case, it is necessary to set

out what I understand to be the factual

parameters of this application.

The accused is charged with one count of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and one count of possession of proceeds of crime. The charges arose as the result of a vehicle stop. Constable Vezina, along with another officer, stopped a vehicle driven by the accused. In the vehicle was another occupant, M.P. The stop came after Constable Vezina checked the vehicle's license plate with telecoms operators.

Upon stopping the vehicle, Constable Vezina saw that M.P. was a passenger. M.P. was known to him. A search of M.P. resulted in the discovery of drug paraphernalia. M.P. then told the officer that there were drugs in the vehicle. A search of the vehicle resulted in the seizure of some crack cocaine. A search of the accused revealed further amounts of crack cocaine and cash.

The defence has filed an application to

exclude the evidence seized as the result of the searches of the vehicle and the accused on the basis that the accused's rights were violated.

It is in the context of the preparation for the voir dire that this disclosure application has been filed. The defence seeks information relating in particular to M.P.'s involvement with the police, particularly Constable Vezina, and M.P.'s involvement in other cases. Such information is said to be relevant so as to enable the defence to probe the reasonableness of Constable Vezina's actions in stopping the vehicle and then in searching the vehicle and the accused.

Crown counsel informed me that the Crown does not intend to call M.P. as a witness either on the voir dire or at trial. Defence counsel informed me that, if the seized items are admitted as evidence at trial, the primary issue in dispute will be the purpose of the possession.

I set out these factual circumstances

because, as counsel know, the disclosure

obligations of the Crown rest on the foundation

of relevance. The Crown is required to disclose

all relevant material in its possession or

control. Any information that may be of some use

to the defence must be disclosed, unless

non-disclosure is justified by some legal
privilege. Relevance, of course, is determined
by the issues in the case.

In this case the issues are, first, whether
Constable Vezina had the necessary articulable
cause to stop the vehicle and, secondly, whether
he had the requisite grounds to search the
vehicle and to search and arrest the accused.
What the officer thought subjectively, and what
the objective facts of the situation were, are
all matters that will be explored in the
examination and cross-examination of the officer.

I am grateful to both counsel for narrowing the scope of the disclosure issues during the hearing of this application.

I will review the disclosure requests as outlined in the defence Notice of Motion.

(a) Telecoms log/reports and voice recordings of police transmissions relating to license plate checks or other contacts from Constable Vezina to RCMP headquarters.

I was told by Crown counsel that she will be producing the telecoms logs and recordings to the defence. Therefore, it appears to me, that this is no longer an issue.

26 (b) A list of all dates of contact between 27 police and M.P. before the offence date,

especially contacts between Constable Vezina and M.P., and copies of all notes, statements, recordings, and summaries of those contacts.

Defence counsel, during argument, reduced this request to records respecting contacts specifically between Constable Vezina and M.P. Crown counsel agreed to disclose notes or reports, if any, regarding such contacts. I think this concession is appropriate since, in my view, such material is at least broadly relevant to the question of Constable Vezina's subjective grounds to do what he did.

(c) Copies of all drug intelligence and field operations files relating to M.P. and the accused.

As a general rule, and as a matter of public policy, having regard to the purpose of law enforcement, it is in the public interest that sensitive police intelligence information, or information about ongoing investigations, or information about investigative techniques, be protected and therefore subject to a public interest privilege from disclosure. It seems to me that, broadly speaking, drug intelligence and field operations files fall under one or all of those categories. I have heard no evidence to suggest that there is some fair trial interest or

other important factor that should cause me to deviate from this general approach. However, if there are any such files specifically relating to the accused and to this offence, then I assume they have already been disclosed. I see no such files listed on the Crown's inventory of information in its possession and ordinarily I would not expect to see such files since these charges apparently arose from a vehicle stop made on the spur of the moment (the validity of the grounds for doing so not being the issue on this application). There is nothing to suggest that the stop was the result of some ongoing investigation.

(d) The disclosure of all notes, debriefings, plea agreements, immunity agreements, Indictments, sentencing hearings, letters from Crown attorneys to police respecting charges laid against M.P. and later stayed in this investigation, including documentation regarding the charges for breach of probation.

Crown counsel has agreed to disclose any such information, if it exists, but only as it relates to these proceedings. I think that is sufficient to comply with the Crown's disclosure obligations considering the fact that M.P. will not be a Crown witness.

1 I am now going to address, out of sequence, 2 item (g) from the Notice of Motion. All records of M.P. including PIRS, and CPIC. There are also 3 references to two other acronyms which have no bearing on this case, I am told. I was informed 5 that PIRS is what are referred to as the "subject list report" and "occurrence screens" in the Crown's inventory of documents. Crown counsel 9 has undertaken to disclose such parts of PIRS as 10 refer to contact respecting this offence. 11 However, on this point, I agree with defence counsel that all of the PIRS record should be 12 13 disclosed. This is because of what I was told about Constable Vezina revising his testimony 14 from the preliminary inquiry after he reviewed 15 the PIRS report. Since the officer's testimony 16 17 will be critical on the voir dire, the basis for 18 that testimony, even just in part, may be examined. Therefore I order disclosure of these 19 reports in their entirety. 20 21 I will now address items (e), (f), (h), and (i) from the Notice of Motion. These, taken 22 23 together, request general information about 24 M.P.'s involvement with any and all law 25 enforcement agencies, his involvement in court 26 proceedings, and the use of M.P. as a police 27 informant. The Crown objects to produce any of

this material, if indeed such material exists, on
the grounds that it is irrelevant and violates,

potentially, the police informer privilege. This
is said, of course, without any admission that

M.P. is or ever was a police informant. On this
point I agree with Crown counsel.

There is no suggestion in this case that M.P. was working as a police agent or informer in reference to the stopping of the accused's vehicle. M.P. will not be a witness. Indeed it is hard to think of what M.P. would or could add to this case. The issues revolve around the police officer's subjective belief, and the objective reasonableness of that belief, as far as his grounds to stop the vehicle are concerned and then to search it and the accused. Anything that M.P. may have done on other or previous occasions is irrelevant to those issues.

It is accurate to say that ordinarily police reports and records relating to extrinsic misconduct by persons who are or may be summonsed as witnesses by the Crown in unrelated criminal prosecutions are disclosed to the defence. But the key is that the person who is the subject of those reports may be a witness against the accused. That is not the case here. Therefore I refuse to order disclosure of this material. In

any event, Crown counsel has already undertaken to disclose notes and records, if any, of all contacts between Constable Vezina and M.P.

This leaves for consideration three e-mail messages that Crown counsel identified in her inventory. These are messages between a Crown counsel and Constable Vezina after the laying of these charges. The Crown resists disclosure on the ground of solicitor-client privilege.

There is no question that solicitor-client privilege can apply to communications between Crown counsel and the police. But the privilege does not automatically apply to any and all communications as between Crown counsel and the police. The working relationship between the two inevitably leads to all types of communications, some fairly mundane and others very serious. The police is not a "client" of the Crown's office for all purposes and at all times. I know of no case that says that just because a communication is between a Crown counsel and a police officer that there is automatically some relationship of solicitor-client created so as to trigger the privilege. For the privilege to apply, it must be made in circumstances where legal advice of some kind is sought from, and given by, a professional legal advisor acting in such a

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1 capacity.

| 2 | It seems clear that the relationship between |
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| 3 | Crown counsel and the police is very much like |
| 4 | that of a government lawyer who gives advice to a |
| 5 | client department. Where the advice is on some |
| 6 | legal issue, then the privilege applies. But the |
| 7 | privilege does not apply to all communications. |
| 8 | Each claim of privilege must be assessed on a |
| 9 | case-by-case basis to determine if the |
| 10 | circumstances are such that they give rise to the |
| 11 | privilege. As noted in the Supreme Court of |
| 12 | Canada case of R. v. Shirose (1999) 133 C.C.C. |
| 13 | (3d) 257, at para 50, whether or not |
| 14 | solicitor-client privilege attaches depends on |
| 15 | the nature of the relationship, the |
| 16 | subject-matter of the advice, and the |
| 17 | circumstances in which it is sought and rendered. |
| 18 | Having reviewed the e-mail messages in |
| 19 | question, I must say that I fail to see how they |
| 20 | come within the category of solicitor-client |
| 21 | privilege. They do not discuss any legal issues; |
| 22 | they do no seek nor give advice or opinions; they |
| 23 | merely relate information as to steps to be taken |
| 24 | in the prosecution of these charges. They are |
| 25 | merely information items. Not being in the |
| 26 | nature of solicitor-client communications, the |
| 27 | privilege does not apply. |

| 1 | | Since these messages are related to these |
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| 2 | | proceedings, they are to be disclosed. The only |
| 3 | | exception to this direction are some handwritten |
| 4 | | notes at the bottom of what I gather is the last |
| 5 | | message. Those notes appear to me to be in the |
| 6 | | nature of a memo to file or, to put it in more |
| 7 | | technical terms, a lawyer's work product. Thus |
| 8 | | those handwritten notations are not disclosable |
| 9 | | and should be edited out of the document when it |
| 10 | | is disclosed. I therefore direct the Clerk of |
| 11 | | the Court to return to Crown counsel the e-mail |
| 12 | | messages that were provided to me under seal so |
| 13 | | that this order may be complied with in due |
| 14 | | course. |
| 15 | THE | CLERK: Yes, Your Honour. |
| 16 | THE | COURT: Those are my directions, |
| 17 | | counsel, and my rulings with respect to the |
| 18 | | disclosure application. |
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| 20 | | Certified correct to the best |
| 21 | | of my skill and ability, |
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| 25 | | Lois Hewitt, CSR(A), RPR, CRR |
| 26 | | Court Reporter |