R. V. Berton, 2004NWTSC67 S-1-CR20030000120

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES IN THE MATTER OF:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

- vs. -

## ARMANDO BERTON

Reasons for Judgment held before The Honourable Justice J.Z. Vertes, at Fort Smith in the Northwest Territories on the 1st Day of September A.D., 2004.

## APPEARANCES

The Accused

D.R. Lebel

A.D. Fox, Esq. Counsel for the

Represented Himself

Court Reporter

Section 127 of the Criminal Code

1 (PROCEEDINGS RESUMED 1 SEPTEMBER 2004 AT 9:30)
2 THE COURT: Good morning. I had an

opportunity to review the evidence and to

consider the arguments. You can have a seat Mr.

Berton. I am going to deliver my decision in

6 this case now.

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The accused is charged under Section 127 of the Criminal Code. That section says, in effect, that everyone who, without lawful excuse, disobeys the lawful order made by a court of justice is, unless a punishment or other mode of proceeding is expressly provided by law, guilty of an indictable offence.

Armando Berton, stands charged that on or about the 18th day of June, 2003, being bound by an order made by Chief Judge Halifax of the Territorial Court on May 15th, 1997, an order made pursuant to Section 12.2 of the Environmental Protection Act of the Northwest Territories, he did, without lawful excuse, disobey that order by storing contaminants on a property, described in these proceedings as Lot 1038 Plan 1397 in the Town of Fort Smith in circumstances under which such storage was prohibited by the terms of the order.

The order of 1997 arose out of the

prosecution of Mr. Berton on four charges 1 2 contrary to the Environmental Protection Act. Two of the charges related to discharge of contaminants on two lots, Lot 39 and Lot 1038, and the other two related to noncompliance with 5 inspectors' orders. He was convicted of those 6 7 charges and fined. In addition, as permitted by that Act, the presiding judge at that time, Chief Judge Halifax, issued an order which required Mr. Berton to comply with certain conditions including:

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- (a) to prepare and submit a clean-up plan for the two lots within a period of 30 days;
- (b) to clean up and restore the two lots within three months;
- (c) to pay, within four months, the sum of \$23,900 to the Government of the Northwest Territories to cover a portion of the cost of research and analysis related to the prosecutions;
- (d) a requirement that, if either of the two lots are to be used for storage of contaminants in the future, then that property must be properly fenced and secured with locked access, there must be proper signage as to no smoking, as to where fire stations are located, and as to what the contents are that are being stored

there. And further, that all storage barrels
must be placed on proper foundations and properly
secured either with liners or berms or both as
approved by the Government's Department of
Resources Wildlife and Economic Development.

It is this last condition that the Crown alleges has not been obeyed.

I should note that these dispositions from the 1997 prosecution were appealed by the accused to the Supreme Court and his appeal was dismissed in July of 1998.

In this case, Mr. Berton represented himself. While he may not have argued the case as smoothly or eloquently as a lawyer may have on his behalf, he managed to articulate various reasons why the charge should be dismissed. I note in this regard that Mr. Berton is no stranger to the court system. I must say that, overall, I think he put forward every argument that was available to him.

The evidence for the Crown was provided by Mr. Bernard Bergman, a compliance enforcement officer with the Department of Resources, Wildlife and Economic Development. He has been employed by the government for 27 years and has received training in respect of petroleum handling and spills control.

I want to say this first.

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There were several attacks made during the course of the trial impugning Mr. Bergman's credibility and integrity. I found nothing in the evidence to substantiate such attacks. I found Mr. Bergman's evidence to be credible and reliable and free of any bias against the accused.

Mr. Bergman testified that on June 18th, 2003, he attended at Lot 1038. He described the property as a waste dump for industrial materials of all kinds, including petroleum products. saw numerous containers and storage barrels, some leaking. He found a heating oil tank on its side with a large pool of oil underneath it at one He found a large bolted tank with waste fuel or bunker oil inside. There was seepage around it. The integrity of the tank was compromised, in his opinion. Pictures of both of these were entered as exhibits. He observed a 500 gallon oil tank with oil in it just sitting directly on the ground. There were a large number of gear oil containers and drums containing tar. None of the protective measures required by the 1997 order for the storage of contaminants had been implemented.

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the accused on numerous occasions prior to 2003 to go over the requirements of the 1997 order.

Mr. Berton had even been prosecuted in August of 1998 on four charges of failing to comply with the 1997 order (specifically of failing to comply with conditions (a), (b) and (c) outlined previously). Those convictions were appealed and the appeal was dismissed in November of 1998.

Mr. Berton, certainly, was aware of the order and its requirements.

Mr. Berton did not claim that he did not know of the requirements imposed by the 1997 order. He also did not claim that he was not storing contaminants on the property. admitted that the large bolted tank contained about ten to 12,000 gallons of bunker oil in June of 2003. He admitted that it still contains about five or 6,000 gallons. His evidence, in its essential features, came down to saying that there was not as much contaminant on the property as Mr. Bergman claimed; that he has not brought any new contaminants onto the property; that any spills or leakage have been cleaned up; that most of the contaminants that were on the lot in 1997 have been emptied or moved off; that the cost of putting in the protective measures required by the 1997 order is prohibitive; and that he saw no

purpose in putting in place most of those protective measures.

So, in my opinion, the Crown has satisfied the essential requirements for a conviction under Section 127 of the <u>Criminal Code</u>. It is indisputable that the accused knew about the requirements of the order and he consciously did not obey it. He admits storing contaminants on that property and he admits not putting in place any of the protective measures required by the order.

And this is the point that was emphasized by Crown counsel. The question is not whether others in the community have to meet the same requirements. The question is not whether Mr. Berton can or cannot store contaminants on this property. The question is whether he was storing contaminants on Lot 1038 on June 18th, 2003. If the answer is "yes", then the next question is were the requirements of the 1997 order met. Clearly, the answer to that is "no".

So, does Mr. Berton have a lawful excuse for not obeying the order?

He said that the order was not lawfully made because he was not given an opportunity to address it back at the sentencing hearing in 1997. But, he appealed the sentence and the

appeal was dismissed. He had an opportunity to argue back then that the order was unlawful but the appeal court upheld it.

Also, it is well established in law that a charge of disobeying a court order is not answered by the assertion that the order was erroneously made or even that it is void. The proper course is to move directly to have the order quashed or to appeal it. The validity of the order cannot be collaterally attacked on a charge of disobeying it. It was a valid order that had to be obeyed unless it was set aside in a proceeding dealing directly with the question of its validity.

Mr. Berton also argued that he has been prosecuted for this crime before and the Crown should be precluded from prosecuting him again. It is true that he was convicted in 1998 of failing to obey this order. The particulars of that prosecution did not relate to the specific condition not obeyed in this current prosecution. And it is not a matter of whether he can be prosecuted today or any other day. The issue is, as reflected in the charge, whether on June 18th, 2003, he was guilty of disobeying the 1997 order or any aspect of it.

The fact that the accused has been

previously prosecuted and convicted of not obeying this order is no impediment to this prosecution or any future prosecution should it again develop that the accused is not obeying the terms or any specific term of this order.

As I said before, the order is in place, it is continuing in force. It has not been set aside and until it is set aside on an application brought directly for that purpose, it must be obeyed.

The previous prosecution also answered the question of whether there is any other mode of proceeding expressly provided for by law (a stipulation contained within Section 127 of the Code). My colleague, Justice Schuler, on the appeal heard by her in November of 1998, found that there was no other mode of proceeding, and thus, Section 127 of the Criminal Code is the appropriate avenue for prosecutions relating to noncompliance with such orders as this made under the Environmental Protection Act. That conclusion was not appealed further; it stands uncontradicted; and, I respectfully follow it in this case.

Mr. Berton also argued that he should not be held liable because he is not the owner of the property. The evidence shows that his wife is

the registered owner.

The fact that the accused is not the registered owner of Lot 1038 is, in my opinion, immaterial. The order is directed to him. The order requires him to take certain measures.

There was ample evidence of his use and control of the property. The obligation to comply with the order is his and his alone.

Mr. Berton also submitted that he could not afford to do what the order requires him to do. That may be true (although he presented no specific evidence as to his financial circumstances). But, even assuming this to be true, the proper recourse is not to ignore the order. Mr. Berton could have, and should have, made an application to modify the terms of the order. Also, there was no evidence of his attempting to do what he could do to comply with the order. All the evidence points to the undeniable conclusion that the accused did practically nothing to comply with the order between 1997 and 2003.

Finally, I want to address what has been an underlying theme of the defence position. That theme, to put it generally, is one of persecution by the authorities, whether they be the Government of the Northwest Territories or the

Town of Fort Smith.

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I have no doubt that Mr. Berton has been or can be a productive businessman. He obviously knows a lot about petroleum products. He may even be doing a service by collecting and attempting to recycle waste petroleum products.

I also have no doubt that he has had long-running battles with the authorities in Fort Smith. I have heard his witness, Mr. Burk, talk about that to a great extent. I don't, by any means, want to denigrate or criticize what Mr. Burk said on the accused's behalf. I accept what Mr. Burk said. There has been, obviously, a long history of problems. But a criminal court, and I, as a judge, sitting in this case, is not in a position to arbitrate or mediate these disputes or even to determine who is right or wrong in these long-running disputes. All I can do is determine, as the law requires me to do in any criminal case, whether the Crown has proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt. I am called on to determine whether the Crown has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the specific charge before me today, that is, did Armando Berton, on June 18, 2003, disobey the order made by Chief Judge Halifax in 1997 and did he do so without lawful excuse. My conclusion is that the Crown

	1	has so proven.
)	2	Therefore, for these reasons, the accused
	3	stands convicted as charged.
	4	Now, Mr. Fox, Mr. Berton. The next step is
	5	to move towards the sentencing hearing.
	6	MR. BERTON: Yes.
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	8	REASONS FOR JUDGMENT CONCLUDED
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	10	I, Douglas R. Lebel, Court Reporter, hereby
	11	certify that I attended the aforementioned trial
	12	and took faithful and accurate transcript of my
	13	shorthand notes to the best of my skill and
	14	ability.
	15	Dated at the City of Calgary, Province of
	16	Alberta, this 24th day of September A.D., 2004.
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