2004 NWTSC Al

CR S-1-CR20030000103

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

IN THE MATTER OF:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN



- vs. -

IAN ADAM KIRBY

Transcript of the Ruling of The Honourable Justice J.Z. Vertes on the Defence Motion for a directed verdict, at Yellowknife in the Northwest Territories, on September 28th A.D., 2004.

APPEARANCES:

Ms. L. Colton:

Counsel for the Crown.

Ms. K. Payne:

Counsel for the Accused

Charge under s. 220(b) and s. 215(2)(a)(ii) of the

Criminal Code of Canada

THE COURT: The accused is charged with two counts; Count 1 being that on September 30th, 2003 at Yellowknife he did, by criminal negligence, cause the death of Betsy Kirby contrary to Section 220(b) of the Criminal Code. And Count 2, that on the same date, being the spouse of Betsy Kirby, he did fail without lawful excuse to provide the necessaries of life to Betsy Kirby and did thereby endanger the life of Betsy Kirby contrary to Section 215(2)(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown has completed its case and the defence has brought a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on the basis of no evidence to support the charges. In other words, defence submits that there is no evidence on the basis of which the accused could reasonably be convicted.

The theory of the Crown is that the accused was present when his wife hung herself and that he did nothing to intervene to save her until it was too late and he was asked to do so by the deceased's young child. The defence argues that the evidence of the two principal witnesses is so internally contradictory that it is tantamount to being no evidence.

On a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, the test is whether there is any admissible evidence, either direct or

circumstantial, which, if believed by a properly instructed jury acting reasonably, would justify a conviction. If there is, then there is no justification in directing a verdict of acquittal. On the application of this test, it is not my function as the trial Judge to test the quality of the evidence or its reliability. It is not a question of determining whether the case is weak or strong.

Defence counsel submitted that there is still a responsibility to do some limited weighing of the evidence at this stage. I agree. But that weighing is limited simply to see if the evidence registers at all as some evidence to meet the test. In other words, to weigh the evidence to determine if it is any evidence upon which a reasonable jury properly instructed could return a verdict of guilty. It is not weighed for frailties or contradictions but solely to see if there is any evidence which, if believed, could support a conviction.

This is not a jury trial but the same principle applies. The question before me is simply whether there is some evidence that, if accepted by the trier of fact, is capable of satisfying every essential element of the crimes charged.

To convict on Count 1, the charge of criminal negligence causing death, the Crown must prove (A),

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that the accused did something or omitted to do something that was his duty to do; and (B), that he showed a wanton or reckless disregard for the life or safety of the deceased; and (C), that his conduct caused the death of the deceased.

The first element relates to Count 2 in the indictment, the charge of failing to provide the necessaries of life and thereby endangering the life of the deceased, since that is the legal duty that the Crown alleges that the accused failed to do.

Section 215(1) of the Criminal Code, being the basis for Count 2, sets out the duty of the accused: Everyone is under a legal duty to provide necessaries of life to their spouse or common-law partner.

Section 215(2) sets out the offence, and I paraphrase, everyone commits an offence who, being under a legal duty within subsection (1), fails to perform that duty if the failure to perform that duty endangers the life of the person to whom the duty is owed.

The law has held that providing medical aid or intervening to save life is a "necessary" as that term is used in Section 215.

The offence in Count 2 imposes liability on an objective basis. So the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (A) the failure to perform the

duty would endanger the life of the deceased was objectively foreseeable in the circumstances; and (B), that the conduct of the accused represented a marked departure from the standard of care required of a reasonable person in the circumstances.

There is evidence presented in this case of the following: First, the accused and the deceased were husband and wife. Therefore the legal duty imposed by Section 215(1) arises. Two, the deceased died by hanging. Assuming, as indicated by the evidence, that this was a suicidal act, the question becomes whether the failure of the accused to intervene was a marked departure from the standard of conduct required. And here, as both counsel seem to agree, the nub of the question is whether the accused was with his wife when she hung herself.

There is evidence, if believed, to support a conclusion that the accused was with the deceased when she hung herself in the washroom. I refer specifically to the evidence of Crystal Kalaserk.

During her examination-in-chief, she related what she heard being discussed between the accused and the deceased in the washroom, a discussion referring to suicide, and then she testified as to how she asked the young boy Brent to go check on them and what she heard when Brent did this.

She testified, and I quote,

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He went and knocked on the washroom door, then I heard the door open and I heard Brent say can you take that off my mom, Ian. And then I heard Ian say just wait a second and he said can you please take it off, and then Ian said I'll take it off and then Brent came back into the room with me but he never told me anything about what he saw.

I refer also to the evidence of Brent Nelson, and, in particular, to those occasions when he testified that when he went into the washroom after having to open the door using a Q tip, that he saw his mother slumped on the floor with the washroom curtain around her neck and the accused sitting on the toilet looking at his watch, and that he asked the accused to remove the shower curtain from around his mother's neck.

This evidence, if believed and accepted by the trier of fact, would show that the accused was present and his presence could lead to an inference that he had knowledge of what was happening and was aware of what his wife was doing.

There is also evidence, primarily from the expert witness, that hanging would expose someone to the risk of death. Indeed I think it may be fair to

say that that is a common sense inference, that anyone with the capacity to think would be able to draw. So, if there is a duty to intervene to preserve life or to prevent harm to one's spouse, and I think in law there is, then I think any trier of fact could conclude from the evidence, if accepted, that with the deceased's action of hanging herself with the shower curtain, it was objectively foreseeable that a failure to intervene would endanger her life. I think that a trier of fact could conclude from this evidence that the reasonable person in those circumstances would intervene to try to save the deceased's life. These are objective assessments that a trier of fact could make from the evidence if accepted by the trier of fact.

There is some evidence to support Count 2.

This then provides the basis for Count 1.

The legal duty on the accused was to provide necessaries of life. By his failure to intervene, the accused could be said to have omitted to do his duty. Thus, the first essential element is capable of being satisfied by the evidence.

On the second element, the Crown must prove a wanton or reckless disregard for the life of the deceased. It must be a marked and substantial departure from what a reasonably prudent person

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would do in the circumstances. This is an objective standard.

Again, there is evidence, if believed, that demonstrates that the accused was aware of the deceased attempting to kill herself, that he was there when she did so and that he did nothing until asked by young Brent to do so. In other words, he was aware of the risk of death.

Finally, for this omission to cause the deceased's death, it must be at least a contributing cause of the death. There is evidence that hanging quickly leads to unconsciousness, brain damage and ultimately to death. There is evidence capable of supporting the inference that prompt intervention by the accused could have saved his wife's life and his lack of intervention thereby contributed to her death.

Now, there are certainly, as pointed out by defence counsel, inconsistencies in the evidence.

But I repeat what I said earlier - this is an application to dismiss the charges on the basis of no evidence capable of supporting the charges. I am not engaged in a weighing of the evidence to determine which parts of the evidence should be believed or should be rejected, which parts of the evidence are capable of proving the charges beyond a reasonable doubt or fail to do so. That is a

1	different assessment completely. But in my opinion,
2	just because there are inconsistencies in the
3	evidence, that is not the same thing as saying there
4	is no evidence upon which a properly instructed jury
5	acting reasonably could not convict on these
6	charges. For these reasons, the application to
7	dismiss at this stage is itself dismissed.
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10	Certified to be a true and
11	accurate transcript pursuant to Rulcs 723 and 724 of the Supreme Court Rûles,
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